"Russian Tank Fleet Modernization and Buildup Plans" Topic

In the spring and summer of 2025, as part of our own operation, our team obtained exclusive documents that provide new insight into Russia's tank-production plans and confirm the existence of a little-known variant of the latest Russian tank. The records indicate that by 2028, output of the T-90M and its new variant, the T-90M2, is expected to increase nearly 80% compared with 2024 levels.

The T-90M2, also known as "Ryvok-1", is scheduled to begin modestly, with just 10 units planned for 2026. However, Russia's long-term production plan points to far more ambitious goals: between 2026 and 2036, Moscow intends to build at least 1783 T-90M and T-90M2 tanks, with 1118 of them slated for completion in the three-year period from 2027 to 2029.

link

Are they getting ready for the Suwalki Gap?

Wolfhag

Well unless they learn how to effectively fight modern combine arms maneuver warfare. Their new toys will end up just like 1/2 or more of their armor did in Ukraine. Destroyed and in some cases captured. And used against their former owners.

No matter what happens in Ukraine. No matter how it ends. The Russians will continue to be a threat to NATO including the USA. Not just with rebuilding their severely attrited forces. But they still will have Nukes …

They won't be the threat the Chicoms are. But Russia and Iran will still be threats. Which makes it even more important to ensure the islamist fanatics in control of Iran do not get nukes…

They know as well as our other enemies … we still have B-2s and a lot of GBU-57s. Plus much, much more …

Russia has 22 125 kilometers of land borders. Do you think that's a lot of tanks?

Considering that the USA is estimated to have about 4560 tanks and China 6800, a couple of thousand T90's is not excessive. It is interesting though that more T90's are being added instead of T14's. What is more important though is that according to some reports Russia's serviceable tank reserves are estimated to be less than 100. link

williamb +1

Once again, a weapons system is only as good as its crew and leadership …

williamb, what amazes me is how Western propagandists manage to present the same information as both positive and negative)))

link

I see that ISW is confirming that Russia is facing a serious fuel shortage and is having trouble recruiting troops. link

So Europe is not in danger of invasion? ;-)

I have been reading with some fascination the leaked production projections for Russia's armored forces — the T-90M and its newly christened sibling, the T-90M2 Ryvok-1. By 2028, we're told, output will rise nearly 80 percent over 2024 levels, with Moscow aiming for some 1,700-plus machines over the coming decade — a figure evocative of Soviet-era mobilization rhythms.

The natural question is why now and for whom? Is this merely industrial necromancy — a Potemkin revival meant to reassure domestic audiences that Mother Russia still forges steel? Or are we witnessing the deliberate reconstruction of a western-front armored fist, perhaps with the Suwałki Gap serving as the most dangerous of rehearsal spaces?

If this buildup is genuine, it implies a logistical apparatus capable of moving not just tanks but fuel, bridging units, and electronic warfare suites westward through Belarus — a feat Russia has not demonstrated convincingly since the Cold War. Yet if it is theater, it may nonetheless achieve what theater so often does: influence the audience. NATO's planners must now re-examine the assumption that Russia will remain pinned by Ukraine's mud and attrition.

My curiosity is twofold:

Capability – Does anyone have credible insight into whether UralVagonZavod or its satellite plants truly possess the industrial depth to sustain these numbers without raiding the museum basements of the T-62 and T-55?

Intent – Given the constraints of sanctions and manpower, should we interpret this as preparation for a show of capacity to deter, rather than a capacity for war to act?

To paraphrase an old maxim of deterrence: one must appear dangerous enough to avoid war, yet sane enough not to start it. I'm not certain which half Moscow currently embodies.

So Europe is not in danger of invasion?

With Putin types never say never. Can't be trusted … If Russia with its allies i.e. North Korea and Cuba, on the ground in Russia/Ukraine invaded any NATO nations. It would probably albeit IMO unlikely, former WP on their border. Which would of course trigger NATO Art. 5.

Putin knows the Russians can't take on NATO. Unless he uses nukes. Which is unlikely.

NATO preparing for war in Europe with the primary threat being Russia. As with all that has happened with Putin's invasion of Ukraine. It is only prudent, smart, etc. to build NATO up to be a capable force to go to war.

Preparedness, e.g. Peace thru strength clearly seems to be an effective deterrent.

Russia has not demonstrated convincingly since the Cold War.

With its recent invasion of Ukraine. They clearly demonstrated their forces were poorly trained and led. Along with having little understanding of effectively executing modern combined arms maneuver warfare.

Their Log support also demonstrated they are not very good at providing what is needed to supply, maintain, recover, repair, sustain, etc. a modern military force. That is tech heavy.

As we see their losses are severe. With little gains and very heavy destruction of assets. Both on ground and in the sea.

With those heavy losses they have reverted to a WWI, meatgrinder type of warfare. Gaining little along with a lot of death and destruction.

NATO's planners must now re-examine the assumption that Russia will remain pinned by Ukraine's mud and attrition.

Some may have seen that. Especially with WWII lessons learned. Terrain and situation effects everything on the battlefield. That being said, many NATO including some in the US etc. though it would only be a over in less than a week. With Russia overrunning Ukraine. Similarly, as they did in 2014.

Does anyone have credible insight into whether UralVagonZavod or its satellite plants truly possess the industrial depth to sustain these numbers without raiding the museum basements of the T-62 and T-55?

They only can sustain a war level effort if they have the natural resources to affect such a move. Along with $ from oil, gas, etc. sales. Plus what support they can get from allies. E.g. China, North Korea, and Iran, etc.

They pretty much have raid what Cold War equipment they could. Much of what was still in open storage, etc. With little to no maintenance to keep these older vehicles etc. in a condition to be rapidly refurbished to be ready for combat.

I watched the footage in the media. Many of the Cold War era equipment was still seen in use. E.g. the MTLB APC, etc. Some older MBTs were up graded with improved capabilities as well.

However with Ukraine having the home field advantage/it is their backyard. Plus they were very determined to hold what they have and not let the Russians gobble up any more of their terrain. As again that happened in 2014. Where Russia pretty much took total control of Crimea. With little Ukrainian effective resistance.

And as importantly Russia's marginal at best ability to fight modern combined arms warfare. Gave Ukraine's forces an edge.

With the bottom line almost always being a weapon system is only as good as its crew, leadership + log support.

If this was an evaluated training exercise/FTX. The Russians will have gotten almost all "NO GOs". Resulting in failure and not passing the test requirements of training exercise.

Given the constraints of sanctions and manpower, should we interpret this as preparation for a show of capacity to deter, rather than a capacity for war to act?

Based on NATO intel, etc. it would take Russia a decade + to really be able to go to war. With any modicum of a success result.

deterrence: one must appear dangerous enough to avoid war, yet sane enough not to start it. I'm not certain which half Moscow currently embodies.

Agreed … Again, Peace Thru Strength. However, in Putin's/Russian's case they don't have the right stuff.

Their only Ace in the hole/trump case/X-Factor is their nukes. As we see Putin has saber rattled those often in this war. But we all know even with tac nukes the fallout will go wherever the wind blows. Some of it will end up in NATO territory. As well as possibly back in Russia.

Incavart77, NATO's membership and overall capabilities have been growing continuously over the past thirty years. What should Russia's response be in such a situation? The answer is obvious…
Furthermore, the Asian region, which Russia also shares a vast border with, is far from peaceful – the number of wars and conflicts there is constantly increasing.

The era of dιtente is over, new powers have emerged, claiming global leadership – and they need markets and resources. It's a story as old as time itself. The time has come for a new redivision of the world into spheres of influence. An era of large-scale wars lies ahead.

As for tank production at UralVagonZavod, it's a perfectly logical decision to first modernize the tanks currently in storage. Why produce new hulls when identical ones are already in stock and simply require some modifications? As for older tanks, they are used at the front as self-propelled artillery guns (as are new tanks, which is no longer rational). Again, this is a logical solution, given that there are plenty of them in storage, huge reserves of spare parts and ammunition, they are easy to operate, and there are a huge number of tankers called up from the reserves who have long since mastered this technology during their conscription service.

One can interpret all these events however one wishes, but when diplomacy is ruled out as a possible solution, the only thing left is war, or at least the threat of war. Currently, I don't see any political solutions acceptable to both sides, and any ceasefire would merely serve as a delay before the next round of battle. Therefore, this war will most likely continue until one side capitulates, and the consequences of such a capitulation would be catastrophic for the losing side.
Alas…

Legion 4,

Much appreciated — your reply reads like a staff debrief that's been through the crucible of experience, and that's precisely what makes it valuable.

I take your point about the Russian army's training and leadership deficit. It's one thing to turn out hulls and turrets; it's another to coordinate maneuver, sustainment, and morale in the field. Moscow may yet discover that quantity is a poor substitute for doctrine.

Where we may differ slightly is in interpretation of intent. A decade-long rearmament program, even one hampered by corruption and sanctions, still creates a latent capability that politics can activate far faster than industry can create. The Russians don't need to out-fight NATO to unsettle it — they only need to look capable enough to force NATO to divert attention and budgets eastward. That, too, is a form of warfare.

I share your faith in "peace through strength," though I'd append that strength requires clarity of purpose as much as hardware. The West's problem isn't a shortage of tanks, but of consensus about what deterring Russia truly means: punishment, containment, or simply endurance.

In any case, thank you for grounding the conversation in reality. It's refreshing to see analysis drawn from the field rather than a faculty lounge. If nothing else, your point reminds me that the best deterrent still wears boots — not just armor plate.

Cuprum2,

Your analysis reads with the stoic realism of a general staff memorandum — and I don't doubt that from Moscow's vantage, NATO's steady expansion looks less like a treaty organization and more like a slowly tightening tourniquet. The question, though, is whether Russia's proper answer to that tension lies in competition or collision.

It's true the world has entered a post-dιtente era — markets, resources, and prestige once again drive alignments as they did a century ago. Yet history also teaches that states which mistake inevitability for strategy tend to get both wrong. The coming struggle will be decided less by who commands more square kilometers of influence than by who manages complexity without collapsing under it.

On UralVagonZavod, your point is well-taken: refurbishing stored hulls before forging new ones is sensible economics under sanction and strain. What interests me is whether such pragmatism reflects strategic patience or industrial desperation. The distinction tells us whether Russia seeks endurance or escalation.

For my part, I still believe deterrence — intelligently calibrated, not triumphalist — remains the better course. The world doesn't need another "redivision," it needs a sustainable balance in which no side feels it must gamble everything to feel secure. That, at least, is the lesson of Europe's last century.