Tango01  | 25 Sep 2025 4:50 p.m. PST |
"When General Bernard Montgomery went ashore in Normandy on 7 June, D+1, he was convinced that the war in Europe would be over by the end of the year. The central military event of 1944 in the west, the invasion of northern Europe on the previous day, had been a success. A rapid advance now looked likely, with a gradual crumbling of Nazi forces retreating across Europe, while the Red Army was relentlessly advancing from the east. But things did not work out as he expected…"
link
Armand |
| TimePortal | 25 Sep 2025 7:38 p.m. PST |
Parton said yes. If he was given gas and other resources , he could be in Nerlin by Christmas. |
| mkenny | 25 Sep 2025 10:07 p.m. PST |
Parton said yes. If he was given gas and other resources , he could be in Nerlin by Christmas.
His performance at Metz shows he could not live up to his boasts. |
| mkenny | 25 Sep 2025 10:17 p.m. PST |
The article is just another 'blame it all on Monty' whine. For example no US supplies were diverted to Monty. He had his own working supply chain whilst Bradley did not Antwerp was needed to supply Bradley and not Montgomery. Contrast the way Monty is slighted with this gem of an understatement: An inexperienced US unit, the 106th Division, suffered badly. |
| Fitzovich | 26 Sep 2025 1:36 a.m. PST |
Could have…Yes. But the war could have also been averted if the western allies would have done something in the 1930s. These "could have" articles I find always to be rather useless. Anything "could have" come to pass…. |
 Dal Gavan | 26 Sep 2025 4:13 a.m. PST |
+1 Fitz and mkenny. There's a lot of things that could have happened to change the course of the war in both Europe/Mediterranean and the Pacific. But they didn't. |
| Major Mike | 26 Sep 2025 7:20 a.m. PST |
You need to read the Brown books on the Offical Military History of the war that are focused on Logistics. They will illustrate why it could not happen. |
| mkenny | 26 Sep 2025 9:28 a.m. PST |
The failure to secure a fully working Atlantic Port and to head east instead disrupted the US resupply and reinforcement plan so badly that it was never a realistic goal if the Germans turned and fought. They did turn. |
| Erzherzog Johann | 26 Sep 2025 2:48 p.m. PST |
As Fitzovich said above:
"But the war could have also been averted if the western allies would have done something in the 1930s." I've been reading (haven't finished it; it's pretty dry and I'm a slow reader) "Stalin's Gamble. The search for allies against Hitler 1930 – 1936", by Michael Carley. It certainly suggests there were plenty of passed over chances to form a bloc to contain Nazi Germany. Cheers,
John |
| Dal Gavan | 26 Sep 2025 3:54 p.m. PST |
It certainly suggests there were plenty of passed over chances to form a bloc to contain Nazi Germany. All it would have taken is for the Entente powers to enforce the Treaty of Versailles: close down the German "heavy vehicle", "civilian" aircraft and "for export only" heavy weapons manufacturers, ban the gliding clubs and outlaw the SA and SS as paramilitary organisations. It was too late to do anything by 1936 and the occupation of the Rhineland, Germany had been allowed to grow strong enough to resist an attempt at expulsion. As for a deal with the USSR, there was too much distrust on both sides, going back to 1917. For a modern example just look at NATO's rejection of Russia's request to have talks about Russia becoming a member. That level of long-term, mutual distrust is hard to overcome. |
| Tgerritsen | 26 Sep 2025 3:54 p.m. PST |
I think the real answer is ‘Yes, but at what cost?' If the Allies poured everything they had in, casualties be damned, they could have ended it in 1944. The Soviets were already doing that, and feeling the resultant pain, but the western allies had no stomach for that type of warfare and the people at home would have been appalled. I think the war may have been ended sooner, but at am the price of a larger butcher's bill than what they ended up with in May 1945. |
 John the OFM | 26 Sep 2025 4:00 p.m. PST |
We gave "all of the supplies" to Monty, rather than to Patton. He failed to win the war by Christmas.
Had we given "all of the supplies" to Patton, rather than to Monty… He would have failed too. Come on. Admit it. You know I'm right. 😄 |
| Tango01 | 26 Sep 2025 5:25 p.m. PST |
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| mkenny | 26 Sep 2025 11:07 p.m. PST |
Bradley and Montgomery had two independent supply chains. Monty's worked whilst Bradley's did not. Monty was NEVER supplied by the US in France 1944-45. The shortages were a direct result of Bradley abandoning the pre-day plan to supply his Armies directly from the USA to the French Atlantic Ports. Monty was chosen (by the Generals who failed) to carry the can for their mistakes. |
 piper909 | 27 Sep 2025 9:59 p.m. PST |
Well, if Hitler had been blown to smithereens in July 1944 in Rastenburg, sure, the war would almost certainly have ended in 1944. Beyond that, my take is that the Allies were lucky to have won as soon as they did. A lot went wrong for Germany in 1944 for the Anglo-Allies and the Soviets to roll over as much territory as they did in such a short time. The war in Europe could have easily slipped into 1946 if Germany had fought a more methodical and cautious defense. But then, Berlin would have been atom bombed in summer 1945, so no matter. |
| Tango01 | 27 Sep 2025 10:05 p.m. PST |
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| Bill N | 29 Sep 2025 5:32 a.m. PST |
Yes, but the chances of it happening are very low. If the Western Allies were going to win it in the fall of 1944, Market Garden IN THEORY was their best shot. With two panzer divisions sitting at Arnhem the chances of Market Garden succeeding enough to allow a breakout into the central Netherlands IN REALITY were minimal. Yet they are probably better odds than the Patton alternative. There is no guarantee that if supplies had not been pulled from Patton in August that he would have been able to get through the Metz and West Wall defenses quickly. Even if he had, and had been able to get across the Rhine, Third Army was probably too far south to make a race for Berlin. The best move for the Western Allies IMO would have been for U.S. First Army to have had the troops and supplies needed to punch through the West Wall when they first encountered it, while part of British Second Army cleared the approaches to Antwerp. The window to accomplish both of these was open for a brief period. I doubt this would put Western Allied troops in Berlin by Christmas, but would have put them in a better position. to reach Berlin before the Soviets. Now what could work in the Western Allies favor is having the plot to kill Hitler go off in late August 1944. |
| piper909 | 29 Sep 2025 10:17 a.m. PST |
The Anglo-American armies were fortunate that the Soviets reached Berlin first (or were permitted to) -- that battle was a bloodbath and the Western forces can thank their luck to have stayed out of it. |
| piper909 | 29 Sep 2025 10:21 a.m. PST |
Curious -- if an American army group really had been sent ahead on a bold dash to get across the Rhine and drive on Berlin as a narrow spearhead assault, wouldn't it have been subject to a cut-off and "cauldron" destruction by those unsuspected German reserves that were instead thrown away in the Ardennes offensive? That could have been ten times worse than Arnhem. |
| mkenny | 29 Sep 2025 12:26 p.m. PST |
There is no guarantee that if supplies had not been pulled from Patton in August that he would have been able to get through the Metz and West Wall defenses quickly. No supplies were 'pulled' from Patton. The US supply chain just was not able to keep up with demand and thus all US Armies had to divide what was available between them. This meant they ALL were working with less than they needed. Patton was not singled out and he was in the same position as all the other US Armies. If Bradley had wanted to give Patton priority then he could have diverted supplies from other US Armies to Patton. If Eisenhower had wanted then supplies could have been requested from Monty's Army. When the post-war battle of the memoirs started Monty was falsely accused of 'stealing Patton's gas'. Montgomery had his own supply-lines via captured Chanel Ports and he was not short of anything. He was never at any time dependent on US supplies in NWE. |
| Bill N | 29 Sep 2025 6:16 p.m. PST |
Half right and half WRONG M. Supplies were in fact pulled from Patton and Patton was singled out, at least for a brief period. It just didn't happen as the movie suggests. What actually happened was for a period supplies were pulled from Patton with most diverted for the advance of the left wing of Hodges First Army. Hodges left flank was advancing to cover the right of British Second. Whether British Second could have achieved what it did at the beginning of September without the actions of the left wing of Hodges army is debatable. Hodges left wing dealt with some German formations in Belgium, plus on their own crossed the Meuse, liberated Maastricht and had patrols pushing into the West Wall by early September. Given what was accomplished I'd say the diversion was worth it. Still it meant stopping Patton. The idea that Montgomery was drawing extensive supplies from Channel Ports east of the Seine estuary or that he wasn't short of anything in early September period is laughable. It took time for those Channel Ports to come online. Until then Montgomery was pretty much drawing supplies from the same place Bradley was. Plus Montgomery was dealing with the same problem as Bradley was, which IMO was the bigger one, of getting supplies landed in France up to the front. Montgomery was stripping combat units of their motor contingents just like Bradley was in order to transport supplies to the front. Montgomery was having to prioritize who got supplies just like Bradley was. 21st AG had certain situational advantages over 12th AG. 12th AG forces started crossing the Seine on August 20 while 21st AG didn't start crossing until a week later. 12th AG's spearheads by the end of August were farther away from where supplies were landing than 21st AGs. Plus at the end of the first week of September 12th AG was operating in Brittany, on the border of Lorraine and then up to Liege, a far broader front than 21st AG. The advantage of bringing Antwerp online, like bringing the eastern Channel ports online wasn't simply the increased quantity of supplies that could be landed in France. It was getting them in closer to the front, so less resources were needed to get them to the front. |
| mkenny | 29 Sep 2025 8:11 p.m. PST |
The idea that Montgomery was drawing extensive supplies from Channel Ports east of the Seine estuary or that he wasn't short of anything in early September period is laughable
21st AG graph
[URL=https://imageshack.com/i/pn0B9vPEj]
[/URL] This shows that by September the Channel posts were providing just a little less than the beaches did in June-August. Also it is important to distinguish between not having enough transport to move all your supplies forward (Monty) and not having the supplies in the first place (Bradley). Another fiction used to disparage 21 AG is Chester Wilmot's book: The Struggle for Europe page 472 In Second Army's advance through Northern France, XII Corps had been able to follow XXX only because VIII Corps and nearly all Montgomery's heavy, medium and anti-aircraft artillery had been grounded west of the Seine. By the start of September all the transport reserves of 21st Army Group were on the road. Imports were cut from 16,000 tons a day to 7,000 so that transport companies could be diverted from unloading ships to forward supply. This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) had faulty pistons which rendered them useless. (footnote 1) These trucks could have delivered to the Belgian border another 800 tons a day, sufficient to maintain two divisions. By reducing the daily tonnage of First Canadian Army, by bringing in fresh transport companies from England, and by such expedients as welding strips of airfield track on the sides of tank-transporters to convert them for supply carrying, 21st Army Group was able to provide enough supplies to carry Dempsey's two forward corps into Belgium as far as Brussels and Antwerp, but with its own resources it could not go much farther. This claim 1,400 trucks were off-road is fiction. |
| Bill N | 30 Sep 2025 10:31 a.m. PST |
Look at your chart. U.S. Third ran out of fuel starting at the end of August. British Second liberated Antwerp September 4. U.S. First crossed the German border September 11 and liberated Maastricht on September 14. If there was going to be an early end of the war then September was when things had to happen. Your chart shows Ostend and Boulogne start receiving supplies in quantity in October. Once Antwerp came online it became the dominant port. Capacity does not tell the whole story. Antwerp was closer to 21st AG's operations area. It was also 300 miles closer to Liege than Cherbourg and 200 miles closer to Nancy. At the beginning of September U.S. logistics had determined it made little sense to try and bring the Brittany ports online because it took too much resources to transfer those supplies to the front. Using Rouen and Le Havre resulted in considerable savings, but again those ports didn't come online until October. Too late for an early end of the war scenario. |
| mkenny | 30 Sep 2025 12:08 p.m. PST |
Your chart shows Ostend and Boulogne start receiving supplies in quantity in October. The chart shows that in Sept. Monty was getting as much through the Channel ports as he was from Sword & Gold June-August. This is in addition to the supplies from the beaches and not 'instead of'. Antwerp never lived up to expectations in 1944 because though supplies were being landed they were not getting to the front. The US supply system could not cope and Monty had to lend Bradley several of his own Trucking Companies to help him out. No matter how you try and spin it Monty did what Monty does best. He made sure everything was in place by his meticulous planning. Monty never, at any time 1944-45 had the same shortages that dogged the US well into 1945.
See here :
PDF link By contrasting the operational methods used by the United States (U.S.) and United
Kingdom (U.K). and by looking at how Torch and Overlord unfolded, this study reaches three
conclusions. First, COMZ was woefully unprepared to execute its combat mission in August
1944, and its failures lengthened the war considerably. Second, this failure was directly linked to the U.S. Army's inability to integrate lessons learned at European Theater of Operations, U.S.
Army (ETOUSA). Third, the work demonstrates how critical the integration of maneuver and
sustainment is at the operational level of war and how U.S. doctrine and practice predating the
war made this difficult to recognize. Finally, successful command at the theater and operational
level relies upon consensus and cooperation, unlike the more directive nature of tactical control…………….. By the time SHAEF realized COMZ did not know how to do its job, it was too late to save the fall campaign. Just how bad things had gotten by October and November was masked by poor
recordkeeping during the pursuit, confusion over what was really happening within the subordinate commands, and a narrative advanced by Eisenhower in January 1945 designed to
paint a more flattering picture of recent events. Eisenhower manipulated facts in a report submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order to justify his decisions in France, dismiss any reported "mistakes" made during the fall, and ensure he retained personal control over the three army groups rather than reappointing a subordinate overall ground commander. In the process, Eisenhower initiated the cover-up that would make it so difficult to establish why the pursuit broke down. |
| Dal Gavan | 30 Sep 2025 2:56 p.m. PST |
Billy N and mkenny, thanks for a very informative discussion. The myth that Monty bodged up Patton's and Bradley's plans, by getting preferential logistics support, is a strong one in US histories. Similarly, the British ones, Neilland in particular, see Ike's failure to recognise Monty's awesomeness, and therefore not keep him as the ground commander for the Allied forces, as a major mistake on Ike's part. I think there's elements of truth in both views, but the reasons, effects and consequences have been exaggerated (as is practically SOP in Official Histories, and patriotism is a book seller in commercial military histories). If you get a chance it's interesting to read Neilland's The Battle For The Rhine 1944 (Market-Garden Section), Ryan's A Bridge Too Far and Kershaw's It Never Snows In September at the same time. Three different national views, written for two different audiences (UK and US), which could be discussing three different campaigns at times. |
| mkenny | 30 Sep 2025 4:58 p.m. PST |
The myth that Monty bodged up Patton's and Bradley's plans, by getting preferential logistics support, is a strong one in US histories. Similarly, the British ones, Neilland in particular, see Ike's failure to recognise Monty's awesomeness, and therefore not keep him as the ground commander for the Allied forces, as a major mistake on Ike's part. I have been (seriously) interested in this area for over 25 years and I can confidently say in that time I have never seen a thread started that had as its premise that Monty was 'awesome'/'the greatest/'the best thing since sliced bread'. The majority of threads on Monty are negative range from the 'drive-by' insulting ones (like the mention by Ted Danson in 'Saving Private Ryan) to deranged Anglophobic rants that claim Monty was deliberately sabotaging and preventing the US army from achieving early victory in NWE 1944. Those views feature large in most US accounts. It started with Ralph Ingersoll's 'Top Secret' in 1946, through Deste's relentless criticism in 'Decision In Nomandy'1983 up to William Weidner's insane conspiracy theories in 'Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap' in 2010.
Do not confuse those who post in such threads to correct the lies about Monty with 'those who laud Monty as awesome'. Its the normal retort of the critics to claim anyone who challenges their fictions is Monty fan-boy. They are no such thing. |
| Dal Gavan | 30 Sep 2025 8:16 p.m. PST |
I wasn't saying that you said/typed it, mate, I was talking about the extremes of view you can get in print. Have you read any of Neillands' books, mkenny? He spends a lot of time explaining why Monty deserved to hold the ground commander role, and does so convincingly (at least for the non-Monty hating audience). But Neillands also concedes that it was impossible because of the balance of forces in theatre. It's a pity Monty couldn't see that and may have eased the frictions between he and Ike if, occasionally, he'd kept his trap shut. I am not a Monty "fan", but neither am I anti-Monty. I don't like how he is the whipping boy for many "mistakes" supposedly made, from Tunisia to the Elbe River. But nor do I see him as blameless or as the Alexander of WWII. PS Fanboys? I don't see as may of them in the the UK (football fans excepted) as I do in some other countries. Being a cynical old illegitimate, I'm nobody's fanboy. |
| mkenny | 30 Sep 2025 10:35 p.m. PST |
Monty did see that he was not going to be kept as Ground Commander so made it clear Bradley should be made ground commander. Monty wanted a single Commander and not the Eisenhower method of pleasing the last Army Commander he had spoken to. It was Bradley who threatened to resign if Hodges Army was given over Monty during The Bulge. Got 4 Neillands titles that touch on Normandy but find him a bit 'light' on the tactical detail. Clearly he has taken up cudgels on behalf of Monty rather than fall in line behind the likes of Hastings. Keegan etc who publish in the same area but who tend to lean towards the US view of Monty. I am hoping someone can write a book on COBRA that includes details of Bradley's original plans and the dates/times of when/why he kept delaying his start date. This would help explain why he did not start COBRA on the date(s) agreed with Monty and thus left Monty on his own for the duration of GOODWOOD. |
| Dal Gavan | 01 Oct 2025 5:22 a.m. PST |
made it clear Bradley should be made ground commander. You have to admit that he only did so after it was made completely clear that only an American would be politically acceptable as the SHAEF ground commander. He may have brought up the possibility again later, possibly during the "Dakota Incident" (I hate "He said. No, he said" conflicting sources). Or it may be that assumptions- not necessarily completely inaccurate- were made about why he harped on about Ike's dual role. find him a bit 'light' on the tactical detail I agree, but then his books focus on the higher operational and strategic decisions, and those who made them. I think he also accentuates his role as a "myth-buster", but does the myth debunking reasonably well. Hastings. Keegan etc ……. who tend to lean towards the US view of Monty Which nation has the larger possible market for military history books, mk? (Did I mention I'm cynical?) As for Cobra, at least one delay was caused by the US not yet having captured their start line and St Lo (from memory), and would need to reorg, resup and replace losses once they had. That was understandable- St Lo was a hard fight with a tough enemy and defender-friendly terrain. I don't know enough about Cobra to guess about other delays, though. I doubt they'd be totally avoidable, or purely indecision on Bradley's part. The situation in Normandy was "extremely fluid"- staff speak for "Utterly Confusing". |
| mkenny | 01 Oct 2025 6:01 a.m. PST |
As for Cobra, at least one delay was caused by the US not yet having captured their start line and St Lo (from memory), and would need to reorg, resup and replace losses once they had. That was understandable- St Lo was a hard fight with a tough enemy and defender-friendly terrain. I don't know enough about Cobra to guess about other delays, though. I doubt they'd be totally avoidable, or purely indecision on Bradley's part. The situation in Normandy was "extremely fluid"- staff speak for "Utterly Confusing".
Could ' As for Cobra, at least one delay was caused by the US not yet having captured their start line and St Lo' be re-written as 'Bradley was too slow and too cautious'?
And if so why is it never written as such?
Bradley planned COBRA and gave Monty his start date.
Monty decides to plan and launch his own attack (GOODWOOD) to make it a double-blow for the Germans.
The intention was for Monty to start first and Bradley to start the next day as they had to stagger it because heavy bombing could be carried out for both attacks on the same day.
Bradley can not capture St Lo which is his start line for COBRA. Monty accepts this delay but goes ahead on the understanding Bradly will be in action by July 20th.
Bradley then further delays his start date.
Bradley fails to start his attack before the rain starts on 20th and this rain is then given as the excuse why he did not start his attack on the original agreed date. This is a fiction. He had already postponed the planned July 19-20-21 start BEFORE the rain started.
When Bradley finally gets his arse in gear and launches COBRA Monty launched an attack of his own (SPRING) to support Bradley. Monty never at any time made an issue of Bradley's failure to support GOODWOOD. Indeed I would say the majority of US posters have never heard of this failure by Bradley. |
| Dal Gavan | 01 Oct 2025 2:41 p.m. PST |
Could ' As for Cobra, at least one delay was caused by the US not yet having captured their start line and St Lo' be re-written as 'Bradley was too slow and too cautious'? I don't know enough to make that judgement, mate. I played the old (SPI?) game on St Lo a long time ago (not a game I liked- the movement system was the problem, I think) and I've read about it in wider Normandy histories, but that's about the extent of my knowledge. However, by themselves the terrain and opposition (about half the German force were fallschirmjäger, from memory) indicate that even the best troops were going to have to grind their way forward. Didn't Bradley sack a division commander for not making ground quickly enough around this time? As for the rest, I'll state up front that I'm ambivalent about Bradley. He was too ready to blame others for anything that went wrong, and the bit of his memoirs I read resembled the "Cover My Arse and Blame Others" missives you'll find in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. On the plus side Wiki says he cared about casualties more than Patton did (yes, I consulted Wiki because I know that little about Bradley and St Lo-Cobra). Were his delays due to concern for casualties, a favourite reason used to explain Monty's (supposed) caution? Was it logistics issues? Subordinates failing to be ready? Dame Fortune just having fun at Bradley's expense? I doubt it was a deliberate attempt to hang Monty out to dry. Up until the fiasco in the Ardennes Bradley had seemed to have respected Monty. If Monty had suspected Bradley's motives he'd certainly have made sure everyone from Venus to the asteroid belt heard about it, too. |
| Tango01 | 02 Oct 2025 4:43 p.m. PST |
Quite interesting… thanks! Armand |
ScottWashburn  | 09 Oct 2025 11:22 a.m. PST |
The official US Army History (the "Green Books") of the campaign, specifically the volumes "Breakout and Pursuit" and "The Lorraine Campaign" make it quite clear that at the end of August/start of September EVERYONE was running out of fuel and supplies. It was not a case of someone not getting supplies so that someone else could have them. Everyone ran out of gas and there was a five or six day pause along pretty much the entire front while new supplies were brought up. And that was all the Germans needed to pull themselves together and form a new defensive line. When the Allies tried to get moving again it was a whole lot harder than the pursuit had been. |
| mkenny | 09 Oct 2025 7:37 p.m. PST |
Not being able to move enough men and supplies forward because you lack the transport is not the same as not having the supplies needed to support a move forward. By the time of The Bulge the US was short of (among other things) tanks and ammunition and Monty transferred 350+ M4s to Bradley from British stocks. He also gave Bradley stocks of 25 pdr guns because he had ammunition to spare whilst Bradley had to ration his artillery Units. [URL=https://imageshack.com/i/pnjzz1rMj]
[/URL] |
| ScottWashburn | 16 Oct 2025 1:43 p.m. PST |
Yes, there was a considerable shortage of artillery ammunition in the American army in late 1944. Much of that was caused because idiots back in America, were so convinced during the Pursuit Across France that the war would be over by Christmas that they shut down the factories that made the ammunition! |
| mkenny | 16 Oct 2025 7:00 p.m. PST |
Yes, there was a considerable shortage of artillery ammunition in the American army in late 1944. Much of that was caused because idiots back in America, were so convinced during the Pursuit Across France that the war would be over by Christmas that they shut down the factories that made the ammunition! Invasion in June and pursuit in August 1944 leaves no time at all for a 'shut-down' to have any impact until well into 1945 |
| donlowry | 17 Oct 2025 10:00 a.m. PST |
Closing the gap at Falaise would have helped. |
| mkenny | 18 Oct 2025 5:38 a.m. PST |
Closing the gap at Falaise would have helped. There can be criticism of the decision to go for the 'long envelopment' rather than closing the pocket nearer Falaise. That clearly resulted in falling between two stools. |
