"Infantry Tactics WWII Desert" Topic

I play a lot of Desert wargames and my rules are based on a squad being represented by a single stand. So tactics are at the platoon level (Hope I'm stating that correctly). Many of the infantry tactics I've read are within the squad itself, so those cannot be applied when squads are firing, moving as a single unit.

I've never been in the military. I'm wondering if there are tactics for infantry in the desert that can be applied in miniature gaming….Seems like a lot of infantry tactics are based on terrain typically found in European type landscaps (woods, bushes, Fields, hills, houses, gully's etc.)

In North Africa, while there was variation in the landscaper certainly, the deserts above the escapment along the coast, consisted of a lot of very open, and often flat terrain.

I'm thinking of a situation where one side is on offense attacking a defensive position with a 2 to 1 advantage. The only thing I can think of is to use one half the troops shoot and suppress the enemy while the other troops advance and perhaps get into a flanking position. Of course if Artillery is available that can be used as well to supress the enemy, or drop smoke.

I know a lot of gamers out there served or are serving in ground units. Thought maybe you might share some of your wisdom.

In the Western desert infantry were vulnerable to being overrun by tanks.

thanks, I think

Dan,
Your thoughts on two covering, two maneuvering are pretty spot on. Ill share some thoughts from my experience.

When speaking of infantry tactics in the desert, particularly when the squad is the base of maneuver, a couple of things to think about:
-although most WW2 squads in all Western armies were broken into "fire teams" of some sort, usually a gun team (for the Brits, the Bren), a maneuver team (the remainder of the riflemen), and sometimes a "scout" team of two men, in actual practice squads tend to maneuver as a whole within the platoon. This is true to this day; unless you are engaging in MOUT, the whole squad does the same thing, with other squads maneuvering under the cover of each other. Its actually quite rare to see a squad execute an attack all by itself (again, unless you are engaging in MOUT where fire teams suddenly become far more useful, particularly when storming houses/fortifications). Usually the fire teams are just covering each other, at most.
-You should view your platoons (as you do every other element) with the broader view of doing three or four things: one unit is providing suppressive fires, one is maneuvering to attack (the main effort), one is providing flank security, and if you have a fourth, that is the reserve to the main effort. This statement is effectively the bedrock of Western military tactics.

-Although I've never been to North Africa, the deserts I've been to are not as flat as you think they are: small depressions and slight changes in elevation over just a few hundred yards can easily block line of sight to infantryman (hence why grenade launchers and mortars exist to cover those dead spaces) so the basics I've outlined above still exist: farther out from the target, entire platoons engage in the process outlined above, but as you close on the target, platoon leaders take over and begin the process again at the lower level.

So, in sum, the biggest change in tactics for the desert is that the "movement to contact" and the breakdown of units covering, securing and maneuvering starts at significantly longer distances due to less (but not "no") cover and concealment and dispersion of units tends to be greater, but otherwise the broad tactics themselves are the same.

Hope this makes sense to you; I not only was an infantryman, but I played one on TV, too (and I'm not kidding-I actually made it to a Army TV news article :^))

Hopefully I'm not just repeating things you probably already know, but this is a typical example of what I'm talking about:

Generally a platoon is going to move to contact in a column, with each squad one behind the other, and the PL somewhere between the first and second squads. Each squad may travel in a large wedge or arrowhead, or be broken down into its fire teams and each one of those are in a wedge or staggered line. In the desert, it is possible the entire lead squad may be deployed into a staggered "skirmish" line at the get go.

At the point of contact, everyone goes prone, the lead team returns fire, and its squad leader moves to evaluate. Assuming this is not ambush range, and the target is not an isolated outpost, the SL most likely will bring his entire squad on line to begin suppressing the target.
The PL now decides on the best covered and concealed route of attack. If he has a weapons squad, he likely throws them with the lead squad to suppress the target and now chooses the second squad in line to begin an assault (usually by flank). In US doctrine, he will lead the assault.
The third squad now moves forward and provides rear and flank security behind the firing line. They are also the reserve if there is no fourth rifle squad.
The PL manuevers to flank, puts his squad on line, then the teams begin to bound forward to assault the target. The PL will signal the base of fire to lift and shift at some point to avoid friendly fire. If the nut is too tough to crack the third squad may be called forward to assist.
If the target is defeated by normal methods, the base squad moves forward and joins the mauever squad in a perimeter, forming and L shape, and the final squad(s) move forward to complete an inverted U shape (unless the flanks are already secure).

This above all assumes the target is a squad or less. Had it been bigger, the entire contact platoon may have been put on line for suppression while the trail platoons execute flank attacks..it all just builds on that basic set of suppress, maneuver, secure, reinforce…

This is what happens when I can't sleep….

Maggot +1. It is fire and movement – fire to cover the movement of the manouvre element. In open terrain, probably lots and lots of fire…

2:1 is going to be tough in the desert though as the observation ranges are so much longer than in more dense terrain. The attackers are going to run into defensive area fire (MGs, mortars, artillery) 1000 yards out. There is a reason so many night attacks took place in the desert (and the Falklands, which is equally devoid of visibility blocking cover apart form mountains and scrubby heather).

The ideal is to manouvre onto the flank of a defensive position as even if in theory they are sited for all round defence, in practice the bulk of the defences will be sited frontally. Annoyingly real defensive positons (unlike those in manuals) often cover the flanks with wire, mines and pre planned SFMG fire lanes and mortar stonks.

Tanks and artillery support are extremely helpful in such open terrain, as noted in a response above, infantry are hideously vulnerable to armoured counterattacks in the desert until they had a chance to dig in and position mines and AT guns. Even then, tanks often simply drove right through infantry positions in desert warfare, something they were very loath to do in dense terrain in Europe, Russia or the Far East.

So the infantry tactics at platoon and company level aren't really any different to other theatres in the desert, but they are much harder as there is so little obstructing terrain to conduct an approach march behind. The attack is very likely to just get pinned down hundreds of yards out by defensive area fire before anyone is even in effective rifle range. The infantry need shooting onto the objective with artillery, tanks and heavy weapons to stand a chance, or to be highly skilled in the small unit fire and movement and bold enough to keep going (like the Australians at Derna). A 1000 gun barrage (such as at El Alamein) is extremely helpful in this regard.

Great stuff Maggot and Martin. I knew there were would be experts in the ranks to shed light on this for us armchair grognards.

Great insights

A key issue in the desert as noted was mobility – witness how the smaller but well motorized British Western Desert Force wiped the floor with the mostly foot slogging Italians in 1940 – plus as note the desert is not that flat

Armour is a big deal – notably if you don't have any – that being said, tanks are not as invulnerable as one might think – although as Martin notes desert tankers – especially the Brits – did kind of act like cavalry with treads

"The Sands of Valour" is a novel which while written by an English prof very nicely captures desert tactics

Brazen Chariots, still a big favorite of mine.

What Maggot wrote is pretty a pretty good summary, Dan. One thing I'll add, though, is that when advancing to contact in open ground, or assaulting a position, an Australian/Kiwi/British rifle platoon typically moves with two sections forward and one back, PLHQ in the middle. That was true back to '43, if not earlier. The platoons in the rifle company would also be two up one back, with two rifle companies up and two back at battalion level.

The formations the sections moved in vary according to the terrain and the frontage the company had to cover. They range from single file in very close country, to extended line (turn a single file 90 degrees and put the section commander and scouts in the middle) for an assault or clearing ground with expected contact. "T" formation, one that was removed from "the book" in the 60's but still used at times in the open country here, suited open country well. In the old 10 man section (which very rarely was 10 men) the two scouts are out (No. 2 scout behind and to the right or left, depending on the ground, of the No. 1) and the rest of the section is in extended line with the gun group on the outside flank- if that makes sense?

If a platoon was assaulting a position then another platoon from its company would provide covering fire, while the third platoon was in reserve. If the platoon was by itself (eg fighting patrol) then one section would be providing fire while the other assaulted, with the third section in reserve- ready to exploit if necessary- or covering a flank/rear. The sections will start fire and movement when they start taking effective fire (ie you can hear the secondaries or see close ground strikes- hopefully before you start taking casualties). They'll always do F & M, whether they have another section or platoon giving supporting fire or not.

There's a lot of other things we did as well, that the US infantry we worked with doesn't seem to do- contact drills, ambush drills, immediate ambush drills, buddy pairing for MOUT, etc. But I don't know how different they are to what was done in the desert.

Firing without maneuver is a waste of ammo.
Maneuver without firing is a waste of personnel.

Dal, when these tactics were employed, can I assume that these situations dictated that they outnumber the enemy by a certain ratio? If the platoons operated 2 forward and one back, if they were facing a force of similar size, would that still work? (maybe a dumb question)

Same question only different…if one platoon was providing cover fire while another advances, would that work if facing an enemy of two platoons? Can one platoon adequatly supress two platoons?

Martin said "2:1 is going to be tough in the desert though as the observation ranges are so much longer than in more dense terrain. The attackers are going to run into defensive area fire (MGs, mortars, artillery) 1000 yards out. "

So the question begs and I'm trying to apply this logic to devising and carrying out wargame scenarios…a direct assault like this…using cover fire to allow another unit to advance: what are the force requirements to make this tactic likely to succede vs likely to fail?

I'm putting together my first infantry scenario (1941 North Africa) and trying to create a table situation that involves an assault on a defensive position. Trying to create a sitiuation on the table where the offensive player has to engage in infantry tactics to be successful, using combined arms (infantry, mortar, MG – a bit of armor) as opposed justing lining up and everyone opening fire at once.

And ideally it's a scenario that gives each side a chance at prevailing (in the interest of a good game)

Maggot pointed out " the deserts I've been to are not as flat as you think they are". Yes agree completely. I've tried to devise a method whereby at 6mm scale I can replicate deserts that are undulating and not completely flat. I'm using cigar box battlefields and I put various materials under it to simulate changes in elevation that are more subtle. Not quite happy which what I've done so far. Hard to replicate this across a large 5x6 board. But still working on it.

There is a piece of terrain I use a lot for these kind of open terrains. I call it a "crestline." It is just a literal piece of string laid down on the table. It represents a small rise in elevation. It blocks LOS across it but has no other effect. Simple and effective.

(I use a thin green yarn with fine flock glued to it).

I've done that with Rope put underneath the mousepad like battlemats. But it is thick enough that it ends up representing a ridge. With the cigar box battle mats, I could put some felt or cardboard under the cloth to represent raised areas. I also have several of the old TCS distribution resin terrain pieces that also can go under the cloth and are great for crests and hills. But those are a bit too thick to represent the 'flat' areas that are not really 'flat' but undulating and creating areas of cover for infantry. So maybe the smaller diameter string or yarn might work.

Great discussion.
I use pipe cleaners painted tan or brown for 15mm troops. Gives you a little something to hide behind.

Joe

Wait, are pipe cleaners medium or soft cover?

Martin wrote "The attack is very likely to just get pinned down hundreds of yards out by defensive area fire before anyone is even in effective rifle range. "

I suppose one answer to that problem would be to use night movement to get within effective rifle range so as to negate the above disadvantage.

Pipe cleaners are soft cover unless you glob on too much paint: )
Makes a good crestline though.

I make crest lines with small stones from the garden.

The general rule of thumb for infantry attack is to put a platoon against a section, a company against a platoon etc.

At a higher level (brigade) you can probably get away with attacking with a lower force ratio as it is going to be a series of subunits which actually fight, and can be rotated. Success will be largely dependent on artillery support.

At Army or Army Group level, 2:1 is regarded as a crushing superiority (Alamein, Bagration etc) as you can generate local force ratios of anything up to 10:1 through concentration of effort in key sectors.

Interestingly the modern British Army regards 10:1 as the required force ratio for success in urban warfare, although WW2 armies were less casualty averse than modern ones.

Thank you Martin, I appreciate all you guys feedback. Nice to always have some feedback based on real world experience when perceptions are built around books, rule sets, movies and all the 'expert' banter that one hears around the wargaming table each week.

I think the one thing I would throw in is the impact of the desert on units with modest transport capabilities. In a European or even a Far East setting, an Infantry unit or sub-unit could disengage and fall back on foot a reasonable distance. In North Africa though, the journey back to friendly lines from advanced positions could be in the hundreds of miles, which did make Infantry very reliant on MT.

As I recall there were a fair few battles centred on defensive boxes, which contained Inf and Atk elements.

Gary

Dal, when these tactics were employed, can I assume that these situations dictated that they outnumber the enemy by a certain ratio?

Those formations were used for patrolling and the advance to contact, Dan, and the ground dictated how much frontage we'd need to cover and hence what formations we'd use. In the jay it was nearly always single file with platoons in trail, but in the open we'd use wider fronts and appropriate formations were used. We were nearly always two up in open terrain, but sometimes we'd be one up, especially if we were ordered to bump and pin. (The front section/platoon would contact and (hopefully) pin the enemy and the other two would move to get on their flanks.)

When it comes to an assault then considerations of enemy strength and positions came into play. For a start we always assaulted in extended line, with everyone either at visual distance (close country) or up to 20+m apart in open. Open terrain assaults were all two up, IIRC. The rule of thumb was that we would have a 3:1 advantage before a quick assault (ie no pause to call in outside fire support, just contact, quick recce and hook in), so to take out an enemy squad we'd use a platoon, enemy platoon a company. enemy company a battalion.

For deliberate assaults (ie planned and including fire support and possibly AFV or engineer support) things were a bit more flexible. A battalion would take on more than a company if the CO liked the support he had- or he was told to by Brigade.

It's all changed these days, but back in the 70's the formations and tactics from WWII, honed in Korea, Malaya and Vietnam, were still the basis of what we did.

Same question only different…if one platoon was providing cover fire while another advances, would that work if facing an enemy of two platoons? Can one platoon adequatly supress two platoons?

No, mate. Two enemy platoons confirmed mean that it's an enemy company. So the contacting company would need to be used for fire support to have a chance of suppressing the enemy to any real affect, and the battalion would conduct the assault, probably a deliberate assault with artillery, etc, support. A company may put in the deliberate assault on an enemy company minus, but only if they had artillery support, probably armoured support- and BHQ had ordered it.

My readings of US Army studies on actual squad tactics in combat vs. theory and doctrine (not directly related to tactics in the desert) have indicated to me that tactical splitting of the squad into separate suppression vs. maneuver elements was impractical in mass conscript armies of WW2.

While it was taught and drilled, it was rarely done. Far more common was splitting at the platoon level, with full squads tasked to do either suppressive fire or maneuver, or at the company level, with full platoons tasked to suppression or maneuver. Splitting the squads was generally not done because it was impractical given the leadership span and control.

At least that's my understanding.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

tactical splitting of the squad into separate suppression vs. maneuver elements was impractical in mass conscript armies of WW2.

Probably because it rarely needed to be done in Europe, Mark? "Mass conscript" perhaps explains why- the troops would rarely have been in a situation where one section/squad was out on a fighting/ambush patrol by itself. From my reading the smallest subunit you'd get on a patrol was a platoon and, more often, a company.

It was more common in the Pacific/China-Burma theatres because the troop density and terrain meant that single sections, or "half platoons" (a section with an extra gun group added, usually commanded by the PLSGT), may be sent out on fighting patrols. The Desert and Burma were where the classic 10-man, three group section was developed, IIRC, according to some of the old pam's we had in the battalion library.

I do know that the diggers were using classic Scout Group/Gun Group/Rifle Group tactics in East Timor and at the start of Afghanistan, before going to "Brick" tactics and manning.