Interesting but seems very "in the moment" to me.
Which is interesting. It criticizes our political leadership for their "in the moment" perspectives in 1944 and 45, but does so with a very heavy "in the moment" perspective from 1950 (when it was written).
In particular, the criticism of our dealings with the Soviets seems to be kind of hit-and-miss. At least from the perspectives of our moment in time.
To wit:
Our policy was founded basically on four great and false premises certainly false in retrospect, and seen by some to be false at the time. These were:—1. That the Politburo had abandoned (with the ostensible end of the Communist International) its policy of a world Communist revolution and was honestly interested in the maintenance of friendly relations with capitalist governments.
This seems to be an accurate assessment by current thinking. The idea that the Soviets were ready to give up their expansionist thinking was wrong.
Score: Good call (1950 perspective) 1; Not so clear (today) 0.
2. That "Joe" Stalin was a good fellow and that we could "get along with him." This was primarily a personal Rooseveltian policy and was based in part upon the judgments formed by Roosevelt as a result of his direct and indirect contacts with Stalin during the war. This belief was shaken in the last months of Roosevelt's life, partly by the Soviet stand on Poland.
This also seems to be an accurate statement of a basic error. The American president thinking that he understands a Russian leader based on his personal interactions, better than experts who who have observed for decades studying not the personal interactions but the policies and actions (not the words, but the deeds), was a grave mistake.
I just wish we wouldn't make this mistake again.
Score: Good call (1950 perspective) 2; Not so clear (today) 0.
3. That Russia might make a separate peace with Germany. hear[sic: Fear] of this dominated the waking thoughts of our politico-strategists throughout the early phase of the war. and some anticipated such an eventuality even after our landing in Normandy.
From modern historiography, including research done during that brief window that Soviet-era archives were open to foreign historians, validate this fear. The Soviets did consider creating a separate peace. They were intensely pragmatic on this point, considering what would serve their interests without regard for if it was or was not good for their allies. I can give a bit on the post D-Day issue, but not much. Yes, the Soviets were by that point confident they would win against the Germans, and were therefore not interested in anything but victory in the streets of Berlin. But that could have changed at any moment when their perception of their progress changed -- they were willing to consider a separate peace at any time. So I say US policy makers were right to be obsessed with this in 1942, and to still be worried about this in 1944.
Score: Good call (1950 perspective) 2; Not so clear (today) 1.
I.[sic: 4.] That Russian entry into the war against Japan was either (a) essential to victory, or (b) necessary to save thousands of American lives. Some of our military men clung to this concept even after the capture of the Marianas and Okinawa.
We now know that Russian entry into the war had a very substantial impact on the thinking of the Japanese diplomats (vs. militarists). It essentially shut off their last hope for a compromise solution, as well as opening up a new threat. I don't think they were more afraid of the Soviets than the Americans by this time, but they had been sending notes to the Soviets looking for their support in opening peace negotiations with the US. That may have been a fantasy, but it was a fantasy they clung to until August 8. After that point, and with the second atomic bomb, they had no thread, to hope, of anything to be achieved by continuing the war other than the utter destruction of Japan.
While some current talking heads attribute even greater impact to the Soviet actions than the atomic bombs, I think the record of the deliberations and actions of the Japanese leadership make it reasonably clear that it was the loss of their last hope for a negotiated settlement that was the primary impact of the Soviet declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria. The "we have to settle this" came from the atomic bombs. The extreme violence and very rapid movement of the Soviet invasion removed their one remaining thread of "well maybe they'll want to help us settle this".
Score: Good call (1950 perspective) 2; Not so clear (today) 2.
So my reading was that the Roosevelt team, in the moment, got 2 right, and 2 wrong.
And the analyst writing this criticism for The Atlantic in 1950 scored no better.
-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)
has been watching some documentaries lately set in the Western Desert, and was inspired to create this...
