"Waterloo - What if?" Topic

I always wondered what if Napoleon had:

Marshal Soult – Right Wing Commander
Marshal Davout – Left Wing Commander
Marshal Ney – Guard Commander
Marshal Grouchey – Cavalry Reserve Commander

Different outcome?

Interestingly Peter Tsouras, one of my favourite authors, does somewhat the very thing in his book Napoleon Victorious – except he keeps Ney out altogether, which given how things turned out probably would have been a good idea

link

I think having different commanders – especially Davout, who as you know never lost a battle – might have produced a different outcome

Who do you trust to leave in Paris?

None of this makes the slightest difference. 400k plus Russians and Austrians on the way. Napoleon was going to be defeated and exiled, the only question was how much blood had to be spilled.

When Kaiser Francis got the word of Napoleon's escape from Elba, LITERALLY the first thing he did was order the mobilization of the Austrian army. Whatever their differences, and there were many, the sovereigns of Europe all agreed unanimously that Bonaparte had to be eliminated.

+1 Eumelus

If The British and Prussians had been destroyed in June 1815 would notthe Austrians and Russians sued for Peace?

The possible aftermath of a French Waterloo victory is a debatable point.

I don't doubt that a politically motivated retreat might trump a potential military victory for the Russians & Austrians. After all, the Austrians had an Austrian wife & an heir on an Imperial French throne.

The real question, IMO, was what would Napoleon have done next? A somewhat humble, conciliatory Napoleon was necessary & I'm not sure he could play that role short or long term.

I'm with Ochoin and Eumelus on this. Fun to imagine a different campaign and battle, but Bonaparte passed up a very good chance to grow old and leave a throne to his heir when he invaded Spain, and a decent chance when he invaded Russia. He just didn't have the personality for it. First among the crowned heads of Europe wasn't enough for him.

At some point, peace involves saying "I don't like what that guy's doing, but I'm not going to war to stop him doing it." That view never seems to have occurred to him. He could conquer, but not concilate.

I like the revised command structure in the original post but it doesn't include (a) a Chief of Staff and (b) a Minister of War back in Paris.

Could definitely win in Belgium but then what?

None of this makes the slightest difference. 400k plus Russians and Austrians on the way. Napoleon was going to be defeated and exiled, the only question was how much blood had to be spilled.

Makes for a boring what-if wargames campaign though.

Surprised you didn't opt for Murat as well- Napoleon didn't have to send him packing when he he arrived from Naples with his tail between his legs.
Even so, would these appointments have stopped D'Erlon shimmying back and between both battles on the 16th? That seems the biggest failure in the campaign,
The original crew were capable of winning the campaign themselves but didn't, and the same could've happened to the proposed commanders.
The assessment also seems harsh on Ney, would Davout do much better being appointed to command the left wing without any staff, bar one ADC, when it was already crossing the border. I do think Davout was the better commander but how many independent commands did he have and how many battles did he command at other than Auerstadt?

and, if he had held the throne, is it not likely that the stomach cancer would still have got him in a few years? His youthful son and Empress as regent now seem very vulnerable, both domestically and internationally. Those Bourbons could be very persistent and did have some powerful backers.

Waterloo Part II 1825?

Absolutely no chance with :
Austro-Allied Army of the Rhine under Schwarzenburg 250,000 men & 534 pieces;
Swiss Army under Bachman 35,000 men & 48 pieces;
Austro-Piedmontese Army of Upper Italy under Frimont with 62,000 men & 64 pieces;
Spanish Army of the Pyrenees under Castanos with 24,000 men & 36 pieces;
Russian Army under Barclar de Tolly with 157,000 men & 384 pieces;
Austro-Iralian Army of Naples under Bianchi with 47,000 men & 72 pieces;

In addition various other contingents were in the process of organising:
Bremen-Hamburg 4,000 men & 6 pieces being formed to reinforce Wellington;
Denmark 17,000 men & 24 pieces designated for srvice with Wellington but delayed due to pro-French faction;
Dutch-Belgian 12,500 men & 88 pieces mostly militia circa 30 battalions or line troops not yet considered fit enough for active duty or assigned to garrisons in the Netherlands proper & as the Royal Guard;
Portugal 14,000 men & 24 pieces being assembled at Lisbon to ship to reinforce Wellington; 6,000 men & 12 pieces to reinforce the Spanish Army;
Prussia 70,000 men & 200 pieces (V & VI Corps plus the Guard) – all of whom remained in Prussia;
Spain 12,000 men & 24 pieces to reinforce the Army of the Pyrenees.

You either get the Napoleonic Wars going on forever or His Imperial Majesty dying in a peaceful old age leaving the throne to his heir. People--well, Bonapartist wargamers--keep wanting both.

Want a Bonaparte dynasty on the throne of France today? Napoleon rides home from Tilsit, partly stands down the army and declares peace. He adopts Prince Eugene as his son and heir and tries to make him an advantageous marriage to one of the old dynasties--Austria preferred. Job done. The Brits can rage and the Austrians sulk, but no one really can do much about it. Eight years later, that ship had sailed.

Tsar Alexander wanted Napoleon Destroyed and could created endless armies.
1816 was the year without a summer so could any nation save maybe the British feed an army?
Austria has a daughter on the French throne and a franc-Austrian heir or two
Napoleons cancer would have killed him in 1821 or sooner if he had been forced to continue campaigning.
On his death would his marshals serve a half Austrian heir? Would a civil war between them start as was the case with Alexander the Great's successors?
Its not just a battlefield scenario(s) we need to discuss.

Napoleon no longer had wife or son in custody – they were in Vienna and would forever remain out of his reach (Marie Louise was ecstatic to be home and had obtained assurance from her father than she need never return to France). So no, there is no Austro-French alliance possible – of all the powers in Europe, none were more dependent on the maintenance of the doctrine of dynastic legitimacy than the Hapsburgs.

I would extend Mr Piepenbrink's timeline and surmise that Napoleon might have had peace as late as 1813. But Waterloo victory or no, I don't see the possibility of any extension past 1815 of Bonaparte's adventure.

Personally, I am half-convinced that he knew this to be the case all along. His impulsive, outrageously optimistic overconfidence in June 1815 seems like the brave front of a gambler who knows he's going down, but wants to lose on a big glorious hand rather than peter out small pot after small pot, as had been the case in 1814. Really, his only chance had been that the quarreling and arguments at the Congress of Vienna would lead to actual conflict between Britain and Austria, on the one hand, versus Russia and her Prussian lapdog. This had nearly been the case in the fall of 1814, but by the time of Napoleon's escape from Elba the tensions had subsided.

"There are those who say that you never loved the Emperor."

I will say again. If he had a pre-cancerous lesion in his stomach in 1815 (I could name several such, although not my field of work pre retiring) he is still not going to make old bones.

Marie Louise is already being tupped senseless by that Austrian Hussar, her escort. The poor offspring of her and Boney, the Wingless Eagle, was not the healthiest either and died young. A very nasty vacuum opens up over France and its leadership.

A good place to fight it all out might be south of Brussels, but 28 Years Later, (a film which has had rave reviews)

My "what if", posed here before, is the reverse. As he "rides within range" Christopher Plummer says " of course you may try a shot". They blow his head clean off. The Marshals, the generals, gather around and think…."Oh dear, what will we do now? Is there any point?" Many many thousands then live to an old age, bridges and stations get a different name, wargamers lose interest completely in that period, as none of the other pre 1815 skirmishes really mattered (I might concede the side shows at Borodino, Salamanca and Leipzig). I have watched Ridley Scott's film so I know this now.

What if…. the French had a dozen Main Battle Tanks (even French ones)?
When are the Fanboys going to give up? Everything the French did during the Waterloo Campaign, including the Command appointments, was the direct responsibility of Bonaparte. He was well beaten by two better Commanders. By 9pm on 18 June 1815 the entire French Army was running for its life and the country was utterly defeated within days.

the myth of overwhelming allied troops so it didnt make a difference if Napoleon won at waterloo he would lose the war. I hav e a french book and it sets the stats for recruits coming to the colouurs in depots from original records, what Napoleon needed was time and a victory over Blucher and Wellington and opening up recruitment in the low coutries would have been a thundernbolt to the timid allies. Over a decade agon now my clkub played out the scenario and in the end it turned int a narrow victory for the emperor. Also the need wasnt for different commanders at waterloo, i#t was better control and use.
1 – Make Gerard a marxshl on the field of Ligny something he was well over due for , and a rank he eventually attained.
2 send Gerard in command of his corps and Pajols cavalry poss with Testes division too prod the Prussins
3 waterloo fought with Excelmens cavalry corps and Vandammes infantry corps extra, plus Grouchy in charge of the cavalry, the battle would have been totally different the cavalry would have acted better, and with more infantry the entire gaurd young + could have assaulted a worn down Wellington

Let's be real. To beat Wellington at Waterloo the French had to

A. 1) Not send Grouchy on an indeterminate chase after Ligny (decision by Bonaparte)
2) Not sit around at Quatre Bras (decision by Ney)
3) Not send all the cavalry against a fleeting glimpse of retreated wagons (Ney)
4) Not re-enforce the Hougoumont attack (Ney, Bonaparte)
5) Not send in infantry attacks unsupported at Brigade level (Bonaparte)
6) Not rely on artillery to soften up the enemy (Bonaparte).

Logic would dictate these commanders should be replaced.

Who by?

B. By those who had faced:

1) British infantry in line before and stretched them.
2) Wellington's forward strongpoint tactics.

The only tactics capable of stretching the ability of the thin British lines at Waterloo were:

1) Simultaneous attacks across the whole front
2) Combined arms and alternate arms attacks at brigade level
3) Simultaneous flank attack on Wellington's right.

The only commanders who had previously fared creditably against the British were:
Marshals Masséna (Fuentes de Onoro, Bussaco)
Soult (Albuera, Pyrenees),
Reille (Vitoria and Bussaco) and
d'Erlon (Pyrenees)
Division Generals Brenier (Vimeiro, Almeida) and
Delaborde (Rolica).

Soult and Messena were both highly gifted commanders. Soult missed some chances but used flank attacks to good effect. Messina pursued battles until the end and was willing to impose new tactics. Reille's reminiscences reveal he had a grasp of the tactical changes required to face British infantry lines but was never given the chance in that battle.

Battle plan: left and right wings attacked simultaneously, Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte engaged but not seriously. Left wing flank attack including Guard. Cavalry mostly dispersed to brigade level. Guard supports on left wing.

Therefore I would have:

Left wing, I Corps: d'Erlon
Right wing, II Corps: Reille
Imperial Guard: Delaborde
No cavalry reserve.
Flank attack: Soult with Brenier
Army Commander: Masséna.

The battle Waterloo was fought like most battles, the victors reported the battle, I set in the above to take mre troops nd have grouchy as Cavalry commander to stop the rash Ney wasting it. The actual tactics used during the battle where designed to kill the British the rest Hanovarian, Dutch Belgian etc where to raw, or too confused on loyalty or just didnt want to get killed. Cacdores sets out a list of commanders he woould use, but some stayed away being officers and gentlrement they wouldnt break there oaths to Louis while he was in Europe – hence generals of Brigade , division etc all promoted upo and some with not the ecxperience of command as there was a dearth of officers. An attack on the left flank of the French ( the british Right) wouldnt have worked Hal etc was garrisoned abd the ground was so wet that the low lying ground would have slowed down the french and allowed the British right to re deploy but the french would be embroiled with thousands of Dutch troops in buildings.Sadly at that time the only real way was to punch a hole through. the only reason it didnt work with Derlons attack is after it failed they hadnt the troops to immediatleyy attack – Hence if Napoleon had taken Vndammes corps with him he could have attacked with that and given time for D Erllons corps to recover and attack again

To put a wargaming note in this, it's often said that in a wargaming re-fight of Waterloo, the French invariably win.

I've fought it twice on the tabletop…& the French won both times.

I think this is because, with hindsight, the French commander does not make the same mistakes as happened historically – for example, attacking early & giving his army time to break Wellington before the Prussians arrived, cavalry support of D'Erlon, not getting embroiled at Hougoumont etc

To put a fine point on this, Waterloo was Napoleon's to lose. A vigorous & calculated offence should trump the most dogged defence in this period.

This really gets back to the OP – the historical French command in the battle – from Napoleon down to most of his Corps commanders – weren't up to the job.

marmont1814:
"The battle Waterloo was fought like most battles, the victors reported the battle",

Thank you. The losers also reported the battle! Bonaparte wrote an extensive encomium. Reille reminisced.

"I set in the above to take mre troops nd have grouchy as Cavalry commander to stop the rash Ney wasting it."

Would there be any benefit in grouping the cavalry? Surely it proved its worth at brigade level at La Haye Sainte. I would disperse it to the brigades.

"The actual tactics used during the battle where designed to kill the British the rest Hanovarian, Dutch Belgian etc where to raw, or too confused on loyalty or just didnt want to get killed."

The Hanoverians and Brunswickers were top troops. But the British strength was they didn't run. The French never employed tactics to defeat their one-deep lines and rolling company fire. Tactics to stretch the British existed. The American colonists and the Scots were able. But combined arms and flank moves were the key. Have a look more closely at what Soult managed at Albuera; and Massena at Fuentes de Onoro.

"Cacdores sets out a list of commanders he woould use, but some stayed away being officers and gentlrement they wouldnt break there oaths to Louis while he was in Europe"

We actually don't know. Bonaparte didn't approach Messina or Brenier to find out.

"An attack on the left flank of the French ( the british Right) wouldnt have worked Hal etc was garrisoned abd the ground was so wet that the low lying ground would have slowed down the french and allowed the British right to re deploy but the french would be embroiled with thousands of Dutch troops in buildings."

A French flank attack would have come from true West and would be timed to arrive in the area between La Straye and Braine d'Alleud after Wellington's troops had been drawn into facing II corps. The land is on higher ground approached by a number of roads and paths – there's no reason to suppose they would particularly be bogged down if they avoid trying to take the villages.

"Sadly at that time the only real way was to punch a hole through. the only reason it didnt work with Derlons attack is after it failed they hadnt the troops to immediatleyy attack – Hence if Napoleon had taken Vndammes corps with him he could have attacked with that and given time for D Erllons corps to recover and attack again"

D'Erlon's left and cavalry accompanying Ney and Kellermann achieved limited success near La Haye Sainte with a fortuitous combination of cavalry, horse guns and troops. They could have achieved more if the cavalry and artillery had been involved away from the strong-points. The French came closest to breaking the Allied line between La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont. There is no reason they could not have done the same further towards Papelotte and destroyed the Allied right with a flanking move with only the Dutch as first responders. Although, admittedly Hill was in the vicinity.

ochoin
"To put a wargaming note in this, it's often said that in a wargaming re-fight of Waterloo, the French invariably win.
I've fought it twice on the tabletop…& the French won both times.
I think this is because…."

I've yet to see any rules which give British the infantry advantages they enjoyed with:

Skirmishers who could pick off officers with the Baker rifle
Rolling company fire and fast rates of fire that invariably halted incoming French columns
Two or occasionally even one-deep lines and
The tactic of lying down behind ridges to avoid artillery
An enhanced ability to stay in place

because, of course, that would make for an unfair game.

"I've yet to see any rules which give British the infantry advantages they enjoyed with:

Skirmishers who could pick off officers with the Baker rifle
Rolling company fire and fast rates of fire that invariably halted incoming French columns
Two or occasionally even one-deep lines and
The tactic of lying down behind ridges to avoid artillery
An enhanced ability to stay in place

because, of course, that would make for an unfair game."

In my experience, Bruce Quarrie's rules did both of – most* of the above – and – made for an unfair game.

*Not picking off officers, but the most effective infantry shooting in the game
*fire that invariably halted incoming French columns
*two … deep lines
*I think it allowed for lying down – certainly most rules allow for deploying "behind ridges to avoid artillery"
*enhanced ability to stay in place (high morale rating)

Certainly while these were noted, the British did not win every engagement with the French, particularly if you consider parts or stages of battles, and having all this in a ruleset would indeed "make for an unfair game".

Cheers,
John

Connaughtranger asks:
"What if…. the French had a dozen Main Battle Tanks (even French ones)?
When are the Fanboys going to give up?"

Never, because *every time* we play with miniatures on the table we are speculating, "what if"-ing. It's what we do, so why should we do otherwise? Just move miniatures in predetermined ways and remove them as determined by history? Never play campaigns except on the same basis? We do and should speculate. And it isn't only the fanboys. I'm not a Napoleon fanboy but I speculate about various 'what ifs'.

Cheers,
John

+1 John

Fair point, Johann. But it does sometimes seem to me that disproportionate effort goes into finding some way for Bonaparte to bring the blessings of centralization, standardization, censorship and secret police to Europe at an earlier date. It's only real competition is from people trying to drag out WWII long enough to play with all the Nazis' drawing-board weapons. (And they don't usually reverse battles. They just say "the war has dragged on: here's my Panther II.")

When's the last time anyone posted about a way for Prussia to win Jena-Auerstadt, for the Austrians to triumph at Aspern-Essling, or for the German 1918 Spring Offensive to win WWI? Even finding some way for Lee to pull off Gettysburg is a very distant third.

"To put a wargaming note in this, it's often said that in a wargaming re-fight of Waterloo, the French invariably win."

I have gamed Waterloo many, many times with figure games, board games and computer games. I wouldn't say the French win EVERY time, but they certainly win a lot of the time. More so than the Allies. I would say that Napoleons own estimation of the odds (60:40) was correct. He rolled a 2, when a 3 or more would have done.

Robert Piepenbrink wrote (among other things):

"But it does sometimes seem to me that disproportionate effort goes into finding some way for Bonaparte to bring the blessings of centralization, standardization, censorship and secret police to Europe at an earlier date."

Agreed, the revisit Waterloo one is popular. But probably because it is one decisive battle. I have seen discussion of Zama – what if the Carthaginians had won the Second Punic War, refights of Alexander's battles etc.

"It's only real competition is from people trying to drag out WWII long enough to play with all the Nazis' drawing-board weapons. (And they don't usually reverse battles. They just say "the war has dragged on: here's my Panther II.")"

I did attempt a thread on a WWII board – arguing that scenarios that posit a German invasion of the USA would have been fought using PzkfwIIIs and IVs because they must have defeated the British and Soviets early. It rapidly turned into a "Germany could never have defeated the USA" discussion . . .

"When's the last time anyone posted about a way for Prussia to win Jena-Auerstadt, for the Austrians to triumph at Aspern-Essling, or for the German 1918 Spring Offensive to win WWI? Even finding some way for Lee to pull off Gettysburg is a very distant third."

I presume you meant Wagram, not Aspern -Essling above. I did ask once, since Napoleon only narrowly won Wagram with a significant numerical superiority, could he have won without that advantage. It didn't attract much interest.

"it's often said that in a wargaming re-fight of Waterloo, the French invariably win"

Of course that depends a lot on what the game/scenario design regards as "winning", as well as other design factors. Sure, we can all try the left hook around Hougoumont, maybe start the attack a couple of hours earlier. How do the scenario rules treat the soggy ground there? What value, if any, does it place on driving a wedge between Wellington and Bluecher, eg by holding Papelotte? Is there an appropriate limit on the number of game turns? Is it possible for the game to end in a draw? Etc etc etc.

We managed a draw in 2023!
link

I've found it almost impossible for the French to win in a wargame, they have fewer infantry to start with and the odds just get worse all the time.
I should perhaps caveat that with enforcing a historical force deployment and start time.
The French deployment is well balanced and flexible so why change it? In refights, most changes there are usually to do with hindsight over the unknown threat to their right.
The the start time is what it was because many of the French had only just arrived (some were still inbound). Games that allow an early start without removing all the troops yet to arrive are not refights.

No, Johann, I mean Aspern-Essling. A squeaky win at Wagram would have been better for the Austrians than a queaky loss, but Bonaparte would have recovered.

A genuine Austrian triumph at Aspern with the French army pinned against the Danube might have been game, set and match for the First Empire--the surrender of the primary field army on the battlefield which frankly struck me as silly in Tsouras' Waterloo Book. It was so close you could feel it. Instead the kaiserlicks got a sort of win on points His Imperial Majesty could spin in the bulletin.

Erzherzog Johann
"the British did not win every engagement with the French, particularly if you consider parts or stages of battles, and having all this in a ruleset would indeed "make for an unfair game".

Well, I certainly don't know of any battles from 1806 onwards where the French won. To assess British firepower the Battle of Maida that year is instructive: British line against French line.

Of course, any rules will allow you to alter the "morale rating" or endurance rating, based upon kills, of a unit. Surely it's up to you to rate the British accordingly.

Combined arms for the French at Brigade level is so important, which enjoyed limited success at Albuera and Fuentes. D'Erlon did well, bringing up horse guns, but he kept his cavalry out to the right. This is why I'd swap him for Reille, with an Army commander who'd fought Wellington before, capable of impressing tactical changes.

The French tested the British in the Pyrenees with surprises and flank movements: such as at Maya when d'Erlon under Soult outmanoeuvred Hill.

Erzherzog Johann
"the British did not win every engagement with the French, particularly if you consider parts or stages of battles, and having all this in a ruleset would indeed "make for an unfair game".

Well, I certainly don't know of any battles from 1806 onwards where the French won. To assess British firepower, the Battle of Maida that year is instructive: British line against French line.

Of course, any rules will allow you to alter the "morale rating" or endurance rating, based upon kills, of a unit. Surely it's up to you to rate the British accordingly.

Combined arms for the French at Brigade level is so important; it enjoyed limited success at Albuera and Fuentes. D'Erlon, who had fought the British before, did well at Waterloo, bringing up horse guns, but he kept his cavalry out to the right, when he should have been more ruthless with it. This is why I'd swap him for Reille, who had perhaps thought more about tactical changes.

The French tested the British in the Pyrenees with surprises and flank movements: such as at Maya when d'Erlon under Soult outmanoeuvred Hill. It would be well interesting to put those together again by putting d'Erlon on the left and Soult in a flanking move, where Hill would be the one re-aligning the Allied right wing.

As for the strategy, "winning" a Waterloo re-fight for the French, I would imagine, has to concentrate on beating the Allies. And why not? The British repulsed the French Guard before the Prussians had reached Papelotte – so there is no necessity to put major amounts of forces on that side of the table. Napoleon kept back almost a corps-sized unit of Guard and largely wasted them. Any re-fight would find a way to use them at the same time as II's advance on the left. The only room for that is a left-handed flank attack.

In my opinion, expressed before, the Battle of Waterloo was lost on the 16th June.

I have re fought this event and Mr Billy NM is absolutely correct that unless you stick to the original start time and troop arrivals you are artificially adjusting the parameters.

I saw a programme with the late David Chandler, a chap who knew a thing or two about his subject, whereby the action kicked off early. He won.

The problem with that, is the troops in reality were still deploying when the action commenced at the original.

Ney forgetting his Dragoon brigade at Quatre Bras, the D ‘Erlon fiasco and general exhaustion of the French forces following Ligny especially, meant the 16th was crucial.

Perhaps the command suggested might have brought better results but I have a limited sympathy for Ney.

He was given command at a late stage with only Hermes as his ADC. Probably exhausted he had no time to aquiant himself to his command structure before going into action.

A true baptism of fire.

Best wishes,

Chris

CHRIS DODGESON

"I have a limited sympathy for Ney. He was given command at a late stage with only Hermes as his ADC. Probably exhausted he had no time to aquiant (sic) himself to his command structure before going into action".

Do you have any evidence Ney found any problems getting his orders followed?

At Quatre Bras on the morning of the 16th he chose to spend time massing I and II corps rather than capturing the sparsely-defended crossroads as Bonaparte (at least according to Bony) had ordered him to do. That was Ney's choice.

Incidentally, the battle was only fought the next day because Rebecque ignored a direct order, so if anything, the Allies there had the lessor command cohesion. Remember, Ney's choice prevented the French from keeping the two coalition armies apart and thus destroying each of them in detail.

Ney ordered Reille to commit everything to the extremely debilitating attack on Hougoumont. Reille diligently followed Ney's orders.

Ney commanded the attack on La Haye Sainte. His orders were followed diligently and with élan.

Ney took command of various elements of cavalry for his mass attack on the Allied squares: he even roped in the Guard which were not his command. Ney's gave orders. They were followed to the death.

Therefore I suggest that the notion he had any problems whatsoever with his command structure is mistaken.

I do agree that a bit more drive on the 16th would have aided the French. Not because it would have driven apart allied forces – the British repelled the last-ditch Guard well before the Prussians had reached Plancenoit – but because it may have forced a more general engagement while the French outnumbered the British.

Mr. C.

Having studied at length and re fought Ligy and Quatre Bras I can do no better than refer you to Andrew Fields authoritative book on Quatre Bras.

Pages 68/69 and 70 refer to Neys difficulties specifically.

I did not say that he had difficulty getting his orders followed. What I did say was that he had difficulty in acquainting himself with his command on the 15th with only one ADC to help.

Rebecque did indeed save the day be ignoring the Dukes Nivelles concentration order. The Prince of Orange confirming his decision that morning.

Whilst Bachelu's division was at Frasnes on the 16th the main body of Neys command was still at Gosselies, three hours march away. Furthermore, 1st Corps having marched twenty eight miles, skirmishing with the Prussians since a three AM start on the 15th June, would have been in need of rest and refreshment.

His Majesty, employed his favourite strategy of the ‘central position'. In keeping Wellington and Blucher apart on the 16th Ney was following orders. As the day progressed and the opportunity to crush Blucher arose at Ligny, his Majesty summoned D'Erlon . The rest is history.

That aside, it has been suggested that Ney is a good example of the ‘Peter principle' whereby one is promoted beyond one's ability.

A good Divisional Commander may not be a good Corps commander, which takes us nicely to the original question of the thread.

Best wishes,

Chris

Erzherzog Johann
"the British did not win every engagement with the French, particularly if you consider parts or stages of battles, and having all this in a ruleset would indeed "make for an unfair game".

Well, I certainly don't know of any battles from 1806 onwards where the French won. To assess British firepower, the Battle of Maida that year is instructive: British line against French line.

Of course, any rules will allow you to alter the "morale rating" or endurance rating, based upon kills, of a unit. Surely it's up to you to rate the British accordingly.

Combined arms for the French at Brigade level is so important; it enjoyed limited success at Albuera and Fuentes. D'Erlon did well at Waterloo, bringing up horse guns, but he kept his cavalry out to the right, when he should have been more ruthless with it. This is why I'd swap him for Reille, under an Army commander who'd fought Wellington before, capable of impressing tactical changes.

The French tested the British in the Pyrenees with surprises and flank movements: such as at Maya when d'Erlon under Soult outmanoeuvred Hill. It would be well interesting to put those together again by putting d'Erlon on the left and Soult in a flanking move, where Hill would be the one re-aligning the Allied right wing.

As for the strategy, "winning" a Waterloo re-fight for the French, I would imagine, has to concentrate on beating the Allies. And why not? The British repulsed the French Guard before the Prussians had reached Papelotte – so there is no necessity to put major amounts of forces on that side of the table. Napoleon kept back almost a corps-sized unit of Guard and largely wasted them. Any re-fight would find a way to use them at the same time as II's advance on the left. The only room for that is a left-handed flank attack.

I'm surprised that nobody has brought this up yet.
It was on SNL back in the previous century.
"What if Napoleon had a B-52 at Waterloo?"

I think it was already done, more or less, by Bruce Quarrie (I think that's where I read it) where he said a campaign could incorporate the possibility of technological advances, but you had to draw a line somewhere. Something about "Tiger tanks hiding in La Haye Sainte".

Cheers,
John

given that 1 236 500 men of the European-anti-French coalition invaded France at the summer 1815, again a what if who will take us far away as usual…

Lilian wrote:
"given that 1 236 500 men of the European-anti-French coalition invaded France at the summer 1815, again a serious what if as usual…"

Clearly a 'serious' discussion of it would have to involve the possibility of defections, division, or second thoughts from some of those 1,236,500 men.

I don't think anyone speculating about this seriously believes things would really have changed much, apart from more death.

Cheers,
John

Erzherzog
Lilian wrote:
"given that 1 236 500 men of the European-anti-French coalition invaded France at the summer 1815, again a serious what if as usual…"

Clearly a 'serious' discussion of it would have to involve the possibility of defections, division"

Why? The OP was limited to the subject of the Battle of Waterloo. Could those commanders have altered the outcome? It was not about the 1815 campaign.

The specific question was, as you say, would the suggested different line up of French command have altered the outcome of the battle? Lilian and others (starting as early as the 3rd response) referred to the broader strategic situation. My specific response was to that contribution.

Cheers,
John

Erzherzog Johann
Fair enough. I think "what if's" are interesting. People who can't conceive of conditionals in daily life often tend to think an "if" means we've fallen into the depths of anything goes fantasy: hence the "Tiger tanks at Hougoumont".
Bonaparte certainly could conceive of "what if's", in fact he seems to have spent much of his time on St. Helena convincing himself that Wellington should have lost and that everyone from Grouchy to Ney was to blame… but of course, not him.
It would interesting to play Slavkov as Bonaparte reported it: you know, with the mountainous terrain as opposed to the virtual plain of reality.

Rebecque did safe the whole campaign, and Wellington in particular, without him Ney would capture Quatre Bras and D'Erlon would be entirely free for any operational art of war.

Then however would Blücher made a stand at Ligny? Realising that Wellington due to his negligence to concentrate his army – and then concentrating too late at the wrong spot, wasting about a third of his army scattered across the country, widening the gap between him and Wellington's army?

von Winterfeldt
"Then however would Blücher made a stand at Ligny? Realising that Wellington due to his negligence to concentrate his army – and then concentrating too late at the wrong spot, wasting about a third of his army scattered across the country, widening the gap between him and Wellington's army"

Wellington of course, was not negligent in concentrating his army. But of a silly comment. Wellington initially ordered his army to concentrate at Quatre Bras late on June 15th, following news of the French at Charleroi moving towards Brussels. But hearing that the French were closer he then issued further orders on the 16th, for his troops to march to various points to anticipate the various routes Bonaparte could take – tis including being ready to move to the support of the Prussian Right by the Namur road.

There was skirmishing happening at various locations, not just Quatre Bras but Frasnes, near Gemioncourt and Grand-Pierrepont.
Because of the extended fighting indicating a concentration of French forces, Wellington gave orders for the final concentration point on the night of the 16th/17th.

Sounds like a commander on top of his game.

Hello Mr C.

Mr Field is very clear about the Allied situation on the night of the 15/16th June.

‘ sometime between 1.30 -2AM ‘ on the 16th Wellington issued the orders to concentrate at Nivelles. Page 77 refers.

Wellington left Brussels at 7.30 AM.

The Prince of Orange who was present at Quatre Bras on the morning of the 16th confirmed the veracity of the disobedience of Rebecque on the 15th and advised Wellington of the situation thus saving the day.

Wellington's command was widely dispersed on the 16th and indeed his cavalry did not arrive at Quatre Bras until late on the 16th.

Von W makes a valid point. Blucher, although keen to get ‘mixed in' at Ligny might not have been so eager if he knew that the Dukes promises of support on the 16th were, impractical if not disingenuous.

It must be remembered that the Duke, like many others was not adverse to polishing the facts if it suited his narrative.

Indeed when he stated ( about the Lion mound) ‘ what have they done to my battlefield' he conveniently forgot about the gifted Bossu wood that he had cleared for timber!

Best wishes,

Chris