"Wellington's forces at Hal 1815" Topic

According to Esposito / Elting Atlas at the 18th about 17,000 troops were stationed at Hal.

All I could find out is the the 7th British division – MacKenie and the Hannoverian Reserve Division were not present at the battle of Belle Alliance.

Do these represent the Hal detachment and why did Wellington place such a big number of units at Hal? When did he detach them, respectively did not recall them for concentration on the battle field?

@vW
Hussey presents decent detail on this in volume 2 of his recent study. In summary:

p33-34:
De Lancey was then called upon to issue two instructions, both dated 17
June. The first was sent in the afternoon, as it directed Prince Frederik of the
Netherlands ‘to move from Enghien this evening' to take position in front of
Hal, with two battalions in the château there, and for Estorff's cavalry brigade
to fall back from the south-western frontier to place itself under Frederik's
orders at Hal. The second was addressed to Major-General Sir Charles
Colville, commanding the 4th Division:
'The army retired this day from its position at Quatre Bras to its present
position in front of Waterloo. The brigades of the 4th Division at Braine-le-
Comte are to retire at daylight tomorrow morning upon Hal.
Major-General Colville must be guided by the intelligence he receives
of the enemy's movements in his march upon Hal, whether he moves by the
direct route or by Enghien. Prince Frederick of Orange is to occupy with his
corps the position between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long as
possible.
The army will probably continue in its position in front of Waterloo
tomorrow.
Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens will inform Major-General Sir Charles
Colville of the position and situation of the armies.'
We see the clear concern that the river valleys of the Senne and Senette
that join at Tubize, just south of Hal, should be firmly blocked, stopping
any western approach to Brussels through Hal, but also rendering it more
dangerous for a French force to move against Braine l'Alleud and Merbe
Braine on Wellington's western flank. That Wellington considered that
Napoleon could plan such a flanking attack was emphasised by his warning
to Colville that he might have to make a detour via Enghien, which is some 8
miles north-west of Braine-le-Comte.

p68:
On his own front Wellington had the bastion formed by Hougoumont–
Merbe Braine–Braine l'Alleud, and he had placed a strong force on the
next great chaussée to the west at Tubize and Hal, blocking the Senne and
Sennette river valleys: a blocking force of about 17,000 Netherlands, British
and Hanoverian troops, with 22 guns. It should be noted that downstream
north of Hal the river could be crossed at three places in the next five miles,
at Huysinghem, Lot and Ruisbroek, so that Hal covered several escape
routes for a force retreating westward. Prince Frederik was nominally in
command, but with Colville as the foremost British officer, and there can be
no doubt that Lord Hill would have joined them and taken command if the
main attack had indeed developed there.

I am away at the moment, but I am sure someone will step in and list the formations, composition and numbers for you.

Kind regards
Allan

Pages 49 and 50 of Adkins' "The Waterloo Companion" show that Colville's 4th British Division, Prince Frederick's Netherlands Corps and Estorff's Hanoverian Cavalry Brigade (less Cumberland Hussars) were detached to the Hal and Tubize area with a strength of 17,559.

As far as I can recollect, Wellington placed the forces at Hal to guard his western flank against a French envelopment that could have cut his lines of communication with the Channel ports of Belgium.

Jim

Ron McGuigan's article "Anglo-Allied Army in Flanders and France – 1815" on Napoleon Series Forum link
shows 4th Anglo-Hanoverian Division less 4th British Brigade & Rettberg's Foot Battery were at Hal; the Netherland Corps under Lt General Prince Frederik was at Hal, & the Hanoverian Cavalry Brigade less the Cumberland Hussars were at Hal.

Strengths shown below are taken from Bowden and are for those present and under arms

4th Anglo-Hanoverian Division (Hal & Tubize)
6th British Brigade Maj Gen Johnstone
2nd battalion 35th Foot 36 officers 550 other ranks
1st battalion 54th foot 41 officers 564 other ranks
2nd battalion 59th foot 36 officers 506 other ranks
1st battalion 91st foot 42 officers 864 other ranks
From divisional artillery
Major Brome's Royal foot Artillery Battery (5 x 9dr guns & 1 x 5 1/2inch howitzer) 5 officers 264 other ranks
6th Hanoverian Brigade Maj Gen Sir James Lyon KCB
Field battalion Lauenberg 18 officers 553 other ranks
Field battalion Calenberg 23 officers 634 other ranks
Landwehr battalion Hoya 22 officers 620 other ranks
Landwehr battalion Nieuberg 21 officers 625 other ranks
Landwehr battalion Betheim 22 officers 608 other ranks

Hanoverian Cavalry Brigade Colonel Baron Estorff
Prince Regent's Hussars 22 officers 596 other ranks
Bremen & Verden Hussars 24 officers 589 other ranks

Corps of Prince Frederick of the Netherlands
Indian Brigade Lt Gen C. H. W. Anthing
5th East Indian Regiment (2 battalions) 55 officers 1,486 other ranks
1st Battalion Flankers, composed of the flanker companies of Battalions number 19 and 20 (total strength four companies) 29 officers 507 other ranks
10th Battalion West Indian Jagers 30 officers 674 other ranks
11th Battalion West Indian Jagers 33 officers 685 other ranks
3rd Foot artillery brigade (6 x 6pdr guns & 2 x 5 1/2 inch howitzers) 6officers 114 other ranks
Artillery Train 1 officer 109 other ranks
1st Dutch-Belgian Division Lt Gen J. A. Stedman
1st Brigade Maj Gen F. d'Hauw
16th Dutch Jager Battalion 28 officers 462 other ranks
4th Belgian Line battalion 22 officers526 other ranks
6th Dutch line battalion 29 officersw 402 other ranks
9th Dutch militia battalion 24 officers 531 other ranks
14th Dutch militia battalion 25 officers 561 other ranks
15th Dutch militia battalion 23 officers 636 other ranks
2nd Brigade Maj Gen D. J. de Eerens
18th Dutch Jager battalion 21 officers 777 other ranks
1st Belgian line battalion 23 officers 659 other ranks
1st Dutch militia battalion 23 officers 568 other ranks
2nd Dutch militia battalion 24 officers 558 other ranks
18th Dutch militia battalion 24 officers 491 other ranks
Artillery
Dutch foot artillery battey (6 x 6pdr guns & 2 x 5 1/2 inch howitzers) 5 officers 114 other ranks
Artillery Train 2 officers 104 other ranks

Apart from the Hal detachments, the 7th British Brigade was stationed in a mix of places: Antwerp (2nd battalion/ 25th foot, 2nd battalion/37th foot & 1st Foreign battalion), Nieuport (2nd battalion/ 78th foot) & Ostend (13th Veteran battalion & 2nd Garrison battalion), the Hanoverian Reserve Corps was also around Antwerp, the 2nd KGL Hussars were at Courtrai, & the 2nd battalion/81st Foot was stationed Brussels.

Thanks for all the answers, very useful, Wellington was dispersing his units very casually, the whole campaign could be easily lost by him and not by Blücher.

That's a bold statement…

Instead of concentrating and moving towards Blücher he did move away (originally concentration point was Nivelles, widening the gap), his forces were dispersed, without Constant Rebecque occupying Quatre Bras, the cross roads would be in hand of the French at the 16th and D'Erlon could fall on the Prussian right flank, and still when retiring towards Belle Alliance, Wellington kept 17;000 troops away. As good as his army performed on the tactical level at the battle, his strategic planning, ignoring reports where the French concentrated – was not stellar, but he is sacrosanct and nobody looks at the days before the first battles.

"Wellington was dispersing his units very casually"
History suggests that the Duke very rarely did anything "casually" and certainly not his conduct of military operations. His dispositions were designed to cover a number of options in an uncertain situation. Doubtless had he known that Bonaparte wasn't going to demonstrate the slightest flair or imagination, he might have changed his plans?

He knew that both armies, in case they were able to support each other were more than a match to Boney, so why not concentrate and closing the gap between him and Blücher, all reports almost pin pointing the position of the Armée du Nord.

At least he could admit that Boney stole a march on him, or better he let Boney steal a march on him despite he had good reports were Boney was concentrating.

"..all reports almost pin pointing the position of the Armée du Nord."
"almost" – with the benefit of 200+ years' hindsight. I suspect it wasn't quite so "almost" at the time.