"The forgotten story of Black soldiers and ..." Topic

…the Red Ball Express during World War II

"Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower had a problem. In June 1944, Allied forces had landed on Normandy Beach in France and were moving east toward Nazi Germany at a clip of sometimes 75 miles (121 kilometers) per day.

With most of the French rail system in ruins, the Allies had to find a way to transport supplies to the advancing soldiers.

"Our spearheads … were moving swiftly," Eisenhower later recalled. "The supply service had to catch these with loaded trucks. Every mile doubled the difficulty because the supply truck had always to make a two-way run to the beaches and back, in order to deliver another load to the marching troops."

The solution to this logistics problem was the creation of the Red Ball Express, a massive fleet of nearly 6,000 2½-ton General Motors cargo trucks. The term Red Ball came from a railway tradition whereby railmen marked priority cars with a red dot…"

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Armand

In the end, the Red Ball was a last ditch effort to save the Allies from a catastrophic logistics problem. It was not efficient, as the trucks had to not only haul gas to get them there, but also enough gas to get them back. It also put so much wear on the majority of Allied trucking (with no time for maintenance). So that if the war had lasted much longer the bulk of the trucks units would have been inoperable.

Had the US ended up going to war with Russia, transportation would have been a major problem.

But when you screw up, you hide your failure with stories of how amazing the solution was.

Thanks

Armand

In the end, the Red Ball was a last ditch effort to save the Allies from a catastrophic logistics problem. It was not efficient, as the trucks had to not only haul gas to get them there, but also enough gas to get them back. It also put so much wear on the majority of Allied trucking (with no time for maintenance). So that if the war had lasted much longer the bulk of the trucks units would have been inoperable.

Had the US ended up going to war with Russia, transportation would have been a major problem.

But when you screw up, you hide your failure with stories of how amazing the solution was.

Trying to understand your point here. What was the alternate solution to trucking the supplies across France?

The alternative was to capture ports nearer to the frontline. Oh, hang on though, the Germans knew that as well, so they…..

(smile)

Armand

The alternative was to capture ports nearer to the frontline. Oh, hang on though, the Germans knew that as well, so they…..

That must be why the breakout was in the American sector, further away from Germany.

In the end, the Red Ball was a last ditch effort to save the Allies from a catastrophic logistics problem.

I would offer a different summary (conclusion) statement.

The US Army adapted to the conditions on the ground, using the reasonably unique capabilities at hand of being the most highly motorized army in the world (although the British Commonwealth allies along side the US were very close on that point).

It was not efficient …

The US Army in ETO did not need to be efficient. It needed to be effective.

… if the war had lasted much longer the bulk of the trucks units would have been inoperable.

The goal was not to prolong the war through efficiency. The goal was to end the war through effectiveness.

I fear that the criticism here takes the evidence of success as an indicator of potential failure. No one denies that there would have been more challenges if/as the war continued. There is ALWAYS a potential for failure, in every endeavor. The question is whether success can be (for decisions at the time) or was (for questions of history and hindsight) achieved in the environment containing those potentials for failure.

Had the US ended up going to war with Russia, transportation would have been a major problem.

If the US had ended up going to war with Russia, there would have been a number of major problems. All would have required adaptation in the theater, on the ground.

But, oddly perhaps, the US was not fighting Germany as a part of a plan to fight Russia. Rather, the US was collaborating with Russia as a part of a plan to fight Germany.

In that, it succeeded.

But when you screw up, you hide your failure with stories of how amazing the solution was.

What a mysterious statement. What was the screw up?

US Army units went into combat with higher ready-rates than any other army in the war. More complete in men, equipment and supplies at the start of a planned operation, more complete at day 10 of an operation, more complete at the end of an operation.

I have occasionally described the US Army of WW2 as a sort of assembly line, built to deliver hurt onto an adversary. But I saw another description recently that I liked better. It was said that the US Army was the world's most complete logistics organization, which also occasionally dabbled in combat. Using the analogy of a spear, one need only look at the ratio of shaft to point to see how much truth there is in these perspectives. And one need only look at the Red Ball Express to see how creative the leadership could be on issues that would have stopped any other army of the time in its tracks (except perhaps the British & Commonwealth armies).

So I ask again, what was the screw up?

Should the US Army NOT be able to adapt to circumstances on the ground? Should it NOT be flexible enough to concentrate a resource like trucks (and crews, and military police, and roadwork engineering, and maintenance) to solve a near term problem?

Or rather, do you suggest that the US Army should have slowed its war with Germany to marshal resources for a war with its wartime allies?

Or perhaps the US should have shipped more trucks to ETO to start with? That the surplus of tanks and ammunition in theater is an indication of misplanned priorities? (This one is a bit tough from the start, given the deep concerns of shortages of tanks and ammunition in theater.)

Perhaps the suggestion is that the US Army should not have fought across France and the Benelux countries of Europe? That the Germans would have been better fought in Pennsylvania, where the railroad network was still intact?

Really, what is the screw-up that is suggested here? What better solution might have been offered?

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Well reasoned and presented Mark.

May I suggest Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 by Michael D. Doubler for those wishing to further explore this topic.

Thanks

Armand

I suppose the destruction of infrastructure and rolling stock in the Transportation Plan could not easily be reversed in time…

Also the speed of the advance after the months of deadlock in Normandy was unexpected.

Also the speed of the advance after the months of deadlock in Normandy was unexpected.

Yep.

Borrowing from some research and drafting I originally did for "The Chieftain's Hatch" a few years back …

The originally planned timeline for the post-landing offensives in ETO had been drawn up by Field Marshall Montgomery (in charge of planning for the land campaign). The plan was built on a series of phase lines. It called for reaching the phase line of the river Seine by D+90 (4 September), and then pausing to assemble sufficient manpower and materiel to force a crossing of this major obstacle, which was expected to be one of the Germans' main defensive lines. Please keep that in mind as we assess just how unexpected the speed of advance might have been.

Now compare the dates that formed the expectations to these:

1 August: US Third Army breaks out of the Normandy boccage country at Avranches.

19 August: US 79th Infantry Division, of XV Corps / Third Army, reaches the Seine at Mantes-Gassincourt, about 20 miles "above" (north-west of) Paris. That same night General Bradley approves General Patton's plan for crossing and establishing a bridgehead.

20 August: The bulk of 79th Division crosses the Seine with 3 infantry regiments, a tank battalion, a tank destroyer battalion, AA and artillery. Advanced patrols capture an underground bunker command post of German Army Group B at La Roche Guyon.

22 August: Canadian First Army closes the Falaise gap, trapping about 60,000 troops of Army Group B. Army Group B is left with only about 30,000 troops, 314 guns, and about 60 tanks. These are ordered to withdraw over the Seine via ferries at Rouen to set up a defensive line, while leaving a bridgehead on west bank of the Seine as a rearguard. This rearguard prevents a rapid crossing by British 21st Army Group, but is not positioned to pose any obstacle to US 12th Army Group.

On that same day the US 5th Infantry Division of XX Corps crosses Seine at Fontainebleau below Paris.

The Seine itself is no longer a geographical barrier.

23 August: US 10th Infantry Division, 11th Infantry Division, and 7th Armored Division all make crossings of the Seine.

25 August: By this time the US 12th Army Group has five firm and consolidated bridgeheads over Seine: one above Paris, and four below.

Recognizing the hopelessness of his position, and contrary to explicit orders from Hitler, the German commander of the Paris garrison, General von Cholitz, surrenders the city to the General Leclerc's French 2nd Armoured Division (operating with US First Army). All of the bridges over the Seine within the city are intact.

30 August: The last German unit retreats across the Seine.

31 August – 2 September : US XIX Corps advances to the Belgian boarder – US 2nd Armored on left, 79th Infantry in center, 30th Infantry on right all move together. 79th Infantry Division advances from Mouy to St. Armand, then crosses into Belgium, pushing a salient 180 miles deep into enemy territory, in a period of 72 hours.

Once the deadlock of the Normandy boccage was overcome, once the US Army had achieved freedom of maneuver, it moved so quickly, overcoming or by-passing German positions so rapidly, that the Germans could not organize a defense.

It was all working. The paper specifications may have said that the Germans should be able to stop the American tanks, but it seems that nobody told the crews of the M4s this.

In the US Army the armored divisions, and even the infantry divisions, had a level of mobility that no other army could match (although the British and Commonwealth came very close). The US Army was not bound to the rail infrastructure. That was a good thing, as the allied air forces had spent months pulverizing the rail lines and marshalling facilities across Europe, and particularly across France.

This is the environment in which the Red Ball Express was created. The US Army had enough trucks in ETO to move entire divisions by road (though not every division at once). The artillery was motorized, unless it was self-propelled (which was even better). And the supply echelons were motorized. The challenge on the ground was that the distances were greater, as the front was moving FAR faster than had been planned. The ports up the coast were not being taken as quickly.

Marshalling the trucks and organizing the routes was an entirely reasonable (and appropriate) response, in my mind. It meant that everything that was not a motor vehicle moved as cargo in a motor vehicle.

Again, the question for me is -- what is the screw-up that is suggested here?

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Thanks!

Armand