"Should Hannibal Gone Full Fabian at Zama?" Topic

I was wondering what might have happened had Hannibal adopted the Fabian Strategy when he landed his army in North Africa to face Scipio's invading Roman army. Given Sciipio's winning streak over Carthaginian armies in Spain and North Africa, might it have been better for Hannibal to avoid a battle with a Roman army led by Scipio? Would it have been better for him to shelter inside the walls of Carthage and wait out Scipio.

During the First Punic War the Carthaginian army stayed inside the walls of Carthage for awhile and waited out the Romans. During the Third Punic War it took the Romans three years to break the Carthage defenses.

So Hannibal arrives in North Africa with the tattered remains of his army in Italy, collects a few more troops and then marches inland to confront Scipio at the Battle of Zama. There, his army is destroyed and the Second Punic War is essentially over.

On the other hand, had Hannibal landed his army in Carthage and taken his time training his new army largely of unproven recruits, might he have eventually prevailed over the Roman army and force them to live off of the land for food and forage as long as they remained in North Africa. Once Hannibal's North African army was in better shape, he could have ventured out of the city and met Scipio on ground of his own choosing.

The one counterpoint to this strategy is that the Romans enjoyed naval superiority in the Mediterranean Sea and probably could have resupplied Scipio's army with food and reinforcements by sea.

I believe that Rome would still have won the Second Punic War if for no other reason than their dogged determination not to lose or give up.

What do you think?

Interesting.
Looking forward to responses from thos more knowledgeable than I

I think his army would just be trapped in a besieged city and starved out.

We have no information on the political pressure Hannibal was under to prevent a protracted siege by facing Scipio in the field. Also, was he in contact with his former ally Masinissa to switch sides mid-battle?
As ever, we only have the Roman view of things.

PS; Another possible cause of Zama could be 'The Napoleon complex', Hannibal may have thought he was still better than any Roman army, despite Scipio Africanus's re-organisation of the army towards a Cohort formation.

Or indeed, it could be a mixture of things!

I believe that Rome would still have won the Second Punic War if for no other reason than their dogged determination not to lose or give up.

Jim, you have touched on one of my more unpopular opinions on TMP. 😄
I've long held that the various Roman "genius battlefield tactics" were ordinary at best.
What's the typical history of Rome at war? They lose disastrously for the first few battles. But they're stubborn bastards, and never give up. The Romans got trounced in the first few battles of the 2nd Punic War. But they didn't give up. We can endlessly debate, and Lord knows we have, if Hannibal himself should have taken Rome immediately after Cannae. But he didn't.
So, Rome came back, meaner and more stubborn than ever. 🤷
If Hannibal had followed a Fabian strategy, what would have happened? He might have built up a stronger Carthaginian army, won a few battles, etc.
But the stubborn Roman character would have prevailed. Carthage didn't have that stubbornness.
I still don't think that "superior Roman tactics" won at Zama. The Carthaginian army was simply not well trained enough, and tactically inferior because of that.

Hannibal was the period's foremost expert on ambushes, ruses, and underdog tactics. Given no other evidence at all, it's reasonable to guess he thought a Fabian strategy wasn't going to work in the Carthaginian hinterland, or he would have done it.

The Numidians were already siding in superior numbers with Rome against Carthage when Hannibal arrived in North Africa; Massinissa's defection was reputedly the reason Zama was lost. The Numidians were hardy back-country raiders, and the Romans had their own savvy veteran general; Hannibal might have deemed it unwise to try to outfox the side with a superiority in foxes. Or maybe Hannibal just thought there was no way to outlast the Romans in a war of maneuver and avoidance when the Romans had more friends in-country than the Carthaginians did.

It's possible Hannibal just didn't have an army suitable for Fabian tactics. His veterans from Italy would have been perfect (they already knew him and his tactics), but the levies from N. Africa might have been unsuited somehow. Maybe the levies were on a short-term conscription…? He might have been under pressure to get the affair overwith before his army dissolved.

It's also possible his hand was forced by his erstwhile masters in Carthage, though it's hard to imagine he couldn't have maneuvered his way out of that too. He wasn't a politician, but he spent years after the end of the war proving he could become a political threat to the ruling class, which helped lead to his exile. Still – he was actually new to Carthage, so maybe just didn't have the political connections to resist the oligarchs yet. His inability to conclude negotiations for peace with Rome before the oligarchs voted him back to open war would seem to indicate his political power inside Carthage was limited.

- Ix

It seems to me that since he lost anything Hannibal tried different may have yielded a different outcome.

Dave

Jim and John have it right – no matter what happened, the Romans would never, ever give up – having no quit in you makes you pretty hard to beat

Also agree that Hannibal did not exactly have free rein – especially on home soil, the Carthaginian political leadership likely would have had a hard time buying into a Fabian strategy

Agree with John, YA, and Frederick: Carthage was an army of allies with little Carthaginian core. Rome utilized allies but always had a Roman core larger (I understand) than Carthage had. Allies melt away much easier than countrymen who have to face their neighbors. (Guess I am just repeating, Sorry.)

Hannibal was arrogant, and thought he could win in one decisive battle— a common failing in generals who believe their own press. Apparently he failed to realize that his own success consisted of winning battles, but not the war itself. He fought many "grand decisive battles" that nevertheless decided absolutely nothing.

Most over-rated general in history. Though that's a close race.

If I'm being generous Hannibal might have realized that he couldn't win using his old tactics in Italy— because he didn't win there with those either, did he? That would have been a worthwhile moment of self-realization— that he wasn't the genius everybody said he was, and genius alone doesn't win battles, and that he'd not actually won the war in Italy at all, and wasn't going to win this one, either.

It is true that the Romans would not have voluntarily given up when Hannibal was campaigning in Italy. Africa? Imagine Hannibal defeats Scipio at Zama. Is Rome going to equip and ship another field army to North Africa. I doubt it. There were strong forces at work in the Senate that wanted to keep Rome an Italian power. A Roman defeat in NA brings them to power.

Also, if Hannibal wins at Zama that unleashes another civil war amongst the Numidians depriving the Romans of significant cavalry assets. The cost/benefit analysis eventually kicks in.

As far as the OP, how would a Fabian strategy work in Carthaginian NA? The circumstances are very different from those in Italy that Hannibal faced after his victories.

no matter what happened, the Romans would never, ever give up

That seems the Roman pattern both in the first and second Punic Wars. They lost multiple fleets with horrendous casualties to both the Carthaginian Navy and the weather in the First Punic War and kept rebuilding the Navy. Regulus got stomped by Xanthippus at the Battle of Tunis yet Rome kept coming. In the Second Punic War the Romans got hammered at Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae far more decisively than Carthaginian losses in Spain yet they just rebuilt their armies and kept coming.

In my opinion a Fabian strategy wouldn't have worked. Hannibal had two major obstacles to such a strategy; 1) he didn't have a lot of real estate to retreat from Scipio into and 2) he had to defend Carthage itself.

During the Italian campaign Fabius had all of Italy to operate in so could always avoid battle when he wanted to. Hannibal had the area immediately around Carthage itself. No room to retreat.

Fabius didn't really have to worry about Rome itself. Hannibal had shown he didn't have the resources to capture the city. If he captured other cities in Italy it didn't really matter, because Rome was safe. Once the Roman army got to Carthage it was all over. The Romans were known for their siege skills and controlled the ocean.

Additionally, if you adapt a Fabian strategy you lose the initiative and the other guy decides, in general terms, where the war will be fought.

Just my thoughts.

Regulus got stomped by Xanthippus at the Battle of Tunis yet Rome kept coming.

But the Romans never sent another army to Africa to replace Regulus' and they did make peace with Carthage after their immediate war aims were satisfied. Assuming Scipio's defeat in Africa I think it is quite reasonable to think that the Romans would have made peace and confined Carthage to being an African power.

But that was supposed to be the result of Scipio Africanus' victory. Carthage was placed under a rule that it could not ever declare war without approval from Rome. It could continue to function as an economic place, but not a military one.

The violation of this treaty by attacking the Roman ally Masinissa led to the Third Punic War and the ultimate destruction of Carthage.

So at the time, Rome was indeed content to let Carthage alone. Had Scipio lost, I suspect that would only have resulted in Rome doubling its efforts and embracing the idea of total destruction before Cato ever got around to calling for it.

Hannibal was arrogant, and thought he could win in one decisive battle

How do you know the state of mind of a person who lived 2000+ years ago? Just asking.

Had Scipio lost, I suspect that would only have resulted in Rome doubling its efforts and embracing the idea of total destruction before Cato ever got around to calling for it.

I don't think you are taking into account the political and economic situation in Roman around 202BC. There were strong interests in the Senate who wanted to limit Rome to an Italian powerhouse and who resisted moving into the broader Mediterranean power structures. They did not require the war to end with a total Carthaginian defeat.

Marcus Brutus: I know it as well as Livy did.

But let's examine— Hannibal crossed the Alps with elephants. He seemed to think that militarily this was A Good Idea. And, yes, we're all stunned by the feat. However, most of the elephants died on that march, and the ones that survived never amounted to any significant military benefit in Italy and were dead themselves in relatively short order. That in itself is evidence of gross military hubris and poor logistics.

Heck, the invasion of Italy was gross military hubris. Hannibal was *not* going to win that war from the beginning— as should have been evident to anyone with any strategic planning ability. It was not a sustainable conflict, which he should have soon learned. But, no, he had to bring death and destruction to the people of Italy as well as his own forces before he finally realized it was a Bad Idea and withdrew. The man couldn't even take Rome, which was the whole point of the frickin' campaign!!!

And according to Livy's account of Scipio Africanus's post-battle meeting with Hannibal, Hannibal continued to assert his own military genius after just having had is you-know-what thoroughly handed to him on a platter by the Romans.

Hubris, arrogance, refusal to see what was plainly before him…
Call it whatever you like, the results speak for themselves.

I sense a well deserved disrespect for Hannibal here… 😄

What's the typical history of Rome at war? They lose disastrously for the first few battles. But they're stubborn bastards, and never give up.

Unashamedly quoting myself from above. 😄
I forgot to add that the first or second Roman defeats were accompanied by an equal damage to the "opposing" forces. Carthaginians, Jewish state, Gauls, Germans, etc. Add your own favorites here.
So, the Romans came back, meaner. And the opponents had been weakened.
That explains the Roman Empire far better than the common knowledge of the alleged superiority of the pilum.

Parzival, I think Hannibal's exploits in Italy reflect the mind of a military genius. Defeat Roman armies and in the process shatter its Italian Confederacy. Against almost any other power it would have worked. Unfortunately for Hannibal he happened to come up against a genius of another order. The confederacy held and that signaled Hannibal's ultimate defeat.

As an aside, Hannibal didn't need to take Rome. All he had to do was destroy Rome's alliance structures and leave Italy in political chaos. He came very close to doing so.

"Heck, the invasion of Italy was gross military hubris. "

I have to disagree here. Just because it didn't work doesn't mean it couldn't work.

It's the same as people criticizing Hitler for invading Russia, or Yamamoto's Midway Campaign plan, or any number of military campaigns. Look what the Zulus accomplished against Chelmsford's column, or what the Brits did at Roarke's Drift, Alexander invading the biggest empire of the time from little Macedonia, etc.

Failure to acknowledge at the outset the possibility of failure is indeed hubris. Even worse is failure to adequately consider the probability of it.
I contend that the invasion of Italy was destined to fail from its conception. Hannibal was not going to win that campaign.
Y'all say that Hannibal didn't need to take Rome to win. But then, he didn't take Rome, did he? And he did cause chaos in Italy, didn't he? Yet, he also didn't win, did he?
So not taking Rome: Check.
Causing mass chaos: Check.
Winning: Not so much.
So what y'all are suggesting is that if he'd just caused a little more chaos, and persisted in not-taking Rome, he'd have won?

I think y'all are clinging to a myth about Hannibal rather than considering what he actually did. And that's understandable— it was Rome who sold the myth!
"Look," they said, "Hannibal was the greatest general in all of history— and we beat him! That means we're awesome, and will certainly beat YOU!"

History is indeed written by the victor, and the most clever victor inflates the prowess of the foes he faced. It's the ancient equivalent of the soldier at the bar saying, "No , there I was…"

I contend that the invasion of Italy was destined to fail from its conception. Hannibal was not going to win that campaign.

The question is why didn't Hannibal succeed in his invasion of Italy. It certainly wasn't for lack of success. He won three large battles against the Romans in Italy. Hannibal played the politics of Italy very well and many Italian cities went over to his side. Certainly in the immediate years following Cannae it looked like Rome was facing defeat. Hannibal failed for reasons that neither he nor the Romans could fully anticipate. The Roman alliances structures in Italy held, even in the midst of catastrophic defeat. Again, I want to stress that neither Hannibal nor the Roman political elite knew in advance that these alliances would hold in a time of extreme crisis. The only reason you and I know that Hannibal's invasion was doomed is because we have a retrospective advantage that he did not have. You are using your advantage unfairly in my estimation.

I think your statements proven my point— Hannibal failed to see that failure was possible.
In a different realm and a different time, Sun Tzu wrote: "The general who knows himself and knows the enemy need not fear a hundred battles. The general who knows himself but does not know his enemy will be victorious in half his battles. The general who knows neither himself nor his enemy will never see victory."
Hannibal knew himself— but only so far. He knew his enemy— but only so far.
He did not know his own limitations (else he never would have tried to bring elephants across the mountains, thus wasting animals, men, materiel, and money). Nor did he know the depths of Roman determination and the effectiveness of their own relationships with allied cities in Italy. Fabius knew himself; he knew Rome and her limitations. He knew Hannibal and his capabilities. Thus, he knew when to avoid battle entirely and when to offer it. And he won his war.
Scipio Africanus also knew his enemy entirely. But Hannibal did not know him. Nor at that time did Hannibal truly know the capability of his own men. Thus Hannibal made assumptions as to how the battle would turn, when he never should have engaged in that battle to begin with.
I do believe both outcomes were predictable from the onset— Fabius predicted the one, Scipio predicted the second. Hannibal failed to predict either.

It seems to me that your argument is circular. Hannibal failed in the end to accomplish his mission therefore, he must have not taken into consideration the possibility of failure. That seems a complete non sequitur to me. On what basis do you make this claim?

Fabius was the Roman reaction to their catastrophic failure in the face of Hannibal's great victories. His conservative strategy came about by necessity. What else, practically speaking, could Rome do? Risk another major defeat. That would have significantly raised the risk of total collapse.

Again, on what basis do you propose that Hannibal made assumptions about how the battle of Zama would turn. It seems to me that Hannibal's deployment shows that he understood well Scipio' grand tactical approach and did what he could to mitigate it.

As far as fighting Zama we don't really have a good grasp of the political and practical pressures that Hannibal faced upon his return to Africa in 202 BC. Without that information we are in no position to say that "he never should have engaged in that battle to begin with."

You have this tendency to use your privileged retrospective advantage to propose courses of action for people in-time who do not have access to this point of view. I think that is both unfair and distorts your historical analysis. Military leaders operate within contingent circumstances with limited data and accurate analysis has to take this into consideration.

"I contend that the invasion of Italy was destined to fail from its conception. Hannibal was not going to win that campaign."

I don't understand how you can make such an assumption. How do we know it was doomed? What if a couple more cities decided to defect to Hannibal? He might have won.

His other course of action was to stay in Spain. Any victory there would be pointless as it was Carthage's back yard instead of Rome's.

Additionally, I have to ask how you know what Hannibal knew about Rome? After 2,200 years and the sources we have, there's no way to know what he knew or didn't know.

The cult of Hannibal remains strong. But in reality, while he was certainly a tactical genius of his era, and a compelling leader who inspired his men to great achievements, never-the-less he lost both wars which he was tasked with winning. And, yes, I have the knowledge of history to support that assessment, because that's exactly what happened.
It is others who are coming back with a look on history and saying "he could have won, if…"
If, if, if, if.
There is no if.
There is what did happen and what did not.
Anything else isn't history, it's speculation.

No, I can't know Hannibal's mind nor his knowledge. But I can see his mistakes, and realize that he made such mistakes because he did not expect them to be mistakes— which means he did not understand his enemy, nor what they could and would do in the long run.

To me, any war can come down to a consideration of whether it was wise to pursue or not… and for the losing side, that consideration is almost always "not." Yes, hindsight is 20/20, but it is the job of any general to seek foresight that will prove the later hindsight to be true.

I thus assert that history's great military geniuses of any stripe who nevertheless lost their wars were far less genius than they have been assigned, precisely because they LOST. Hannibal, Napoleon, Cornwallis, Lee, Rommel, Yamamoto etc., etc.. Great leaders? Yes. Great warriors? Undoubtably. Great tacticians? Mostly… until they weren't. Great strategists? Not at all. The great strategist wins his war. (I will give Yamamoto a break— he actually knew he would lose in the long run, at least by some accounts. But he was given a duty, and did it.)

So, simply by the results, I can know that Hannibal incorrectly assessed his own ability to win the wars, and his enemy's ability to win the war. He knew neither himself fully nor his enemy fully. It's plain to see, because he lost. Had he won, the opposite could be seen.

Parzival, there is no real analysis in your argument. For one, you don't seem to take into account the resources available to the various commanders that you list above. In almost every case, the commanders that you fault for losing were fighting for the side that had fewer resources. In fact, it is only because of their strategic and tactical genius that their side endured for as long as they did.

And this get's to the second point. Hannibal didn't lose the 2nd Punic War. Carthage did. Hannibal was Carthage's leading commander and he did everything that was asked of him. In the end victory proved beyond Carthage's resources.

I might point out that you provide no evidence for your assessment of Hannibal aside from the fact that he fought for the losing side. Serious analysis provides insight why things happened the way they did. For me, your comments are simply a rant against losing commanders.

And you're making excuses for losing commanders.

Okay, let's analyze things.

Hannibal crossed the Alps. He started with an estimated 70,000 men and 37 elephants. 13,000 men died in the crossing— that's nearly 20% of his army— and anywhere from 16 to 21 elephants perished in the crossing. The rest, except for 1, died later in northern Italy's winter.
Was the crossing impressive? Yes. Did it surprise the enemy? Yes. Did it lead to a successful battle? Yes. One. Did it meaningfully impact the result of the war? Not positively in the end for Hannibal. If Hannibal had chosen a more direct route might he have wound up better off? That's speculation— maybe the Romans could have stopped him? Maybe— that's speculation. But the 13,000 men and valuable military animals lost could they have been the difference in the war, and it's hard to imagine that he would have lost that much of his force if approaching by a different, less treacherous route.

Next we have an army that must, as all armies do, "march on its stomach." Yet Hannibal had no supply lines for his army— he expected them to live off foraging and raids and possible newly acquired local Italian allies of dubious loyalty, who, rather than farming for their own people and profit would be farming for an army with whom they shared neither kinship, affinity, nationality, religion, culture or social goals. How long did he think this was going to be sustainable? It's amazing enough that it even partially was. So my analysis is that the only way he could win was to be to do so extremely rapidly— and that would mean to capture Rome. But every battle that he fought, win or not, reduced his army and its effectiveness. And every march away from an area with the Romans simply walking back in afterwards revealed that his value as an ally of any permanence was limited, or even non-existent. Thus, knowing that even from the start his campaign was utterly reliant on rapid action and the necessity of uncertain allies (whom he would be hard pressed to support in return), I say his decision to carry out the campaign was flawed.

Meanwhile Fabius saw that these were exactly the requirements Hannibal had in the war— fighting quickly, decisively, and with allies supporting and supplying him. Thus, the defense was obvious— delay, avoid, subjugate the allies, cut off the supplies. Hannibal did not see that the Romans could do such things— he did not thus know what Fabius was capable of, and he overestimated what he himself was capable of. And that is why he lost.

It is the duty of a general to carry out his orders. It is the responsibility of a general to maintain his army in the face of the enemy. If the two are in conflict, then the general must know that the war is lost and not act to degrade his army or his nation further. If the general is subject to the orders of superiors, it is his duty to communicate directly and without reluctance or concern for reprisal that the war is not winnable under the conditions which exist or the goals which have been set. It is NOT his duty to gamble with his men in the face of certain failure. It is his duty to gather the information necessary to know the difference.

The greatest general in the world is the one who convinces the enemy to give up its own plans without ever resorting to battle.

"There is no if.
There is what did happen and what did not.
Anything else isn't history, it's speculation."

I agree….and don't. History is the study of what happened. However, to understand the motivations of those we study we have to ask what they saw, what they knew, and what they thought or hoped was going to happen.

"To me, any war can come down to a consideration of whether it was wise to pursue or not… and for the losing side, that consideration is almost always "not." Yes, hindsight is 20/20, but it is the job of any general to seek foresight that will prove the later hindsight to be true."

Most of the time the people who start a war and those who fight it are different. Look at Admiral Yamato. He knew war with the US was a bad idea, but fought as well as possible when other people started it. Using the same example, Yamato's Midway Campaign plan is often criticized for being too complicated with too many moving parts. Because it failed. Had the US not broken the Japanese codes it is possible that the campaign could have led to the destruction of the American carrier fleet. Had that happened the Japanese might have taken Hawaii and forced the US back to the west coast. They would effectively had another year free to do what they wanted in the Pacific.

"I thus assert that history's great military geniuses of any stripe who nevertheless lost their wars were far less genius than they have been assigned, precisely because they LOST. Hannibal, Napoleon, Cornwallis, Lee, Rommel, Yamamoto etc., etc.. … Great strategists? Not at all. The great strategist wins his war."

Interesting thoughts. If I may…
Hannibal could have won in Italy, had another city opened it's gates, Had Scipio not had his army continue to Spain when he realized Hannibal was headed to Italy, had the Romans acted differently after Cannae, etc. I still contend that just because Hannibal didn't win it doesn't mean he couldn't win.

Napoleon completely changed European warfare and had some stunning successes, but tried for too much.

Cornwallis surrendered after he overextended his army during the southern campaign. However, he was superlative in India after the revolution.

Lee was not in charge of all Confederate armies until the last few months of the war. He held off an enemy that far outnumbered him for three years and had spectacular victories that gave hope to the South and shook the North to it's core.

Rommel was never more than a theatre commander. Audacious attacks led to near victory several times but came up short at El Alamein. Had the British not been so heavily reinforced and Monty so well prepared it might very well have worked.

An interesting discussion.

"Yet Hannibal had no supply lines for his army— he expected them to live off foraging and raids and possible newly acquired local Italian allies of dubious loyalty, who, rather than farming for their own people and profit would be farming for an army with whom they shared neither kinship, affinity, nationality, religion, culture or social goals."

Who did have supply lines at this time? Most armies lived off the land. Heck, the French were still doing it in the early 1800s under Napoleon.

"If the general is subject to the orders of superiors, it is his duty to communicate directly and without reluctance or concern for reprisal that the war is not winnable under the conditions which exist or the goals which have been set."

I'm sure you're aware that the Carthaginians crucified generals who didn't follow orders and/or lost.

"The greatest general in the world is the one who convinces the enemy to give up its own plans without ever resorting to battle."

This is an interesting concept. Several of the generals you listed above wrested the initiative away from his enemies and made them dance to his tune, and still ended up losing in the end.

The likelihood that Carthage would have crucified Hannibal was virtually nil, as evidence by the fact that they didn't.

As for my concepts, they're pretty much straight from Sun Tzu.

Lots of generals can get an enemy to fight in the way they wish… but a general that can win without any fighting at all remains the greater strategist.

"To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."— Sun Tzu (Giles translation)

Or, if you prefer:

" To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."— (Cleary translation)

That's what I mean.

It is understandable that we here at The Miniatures Page focus on battles and tactics and strategies involving battles, and thus honor the names associated with such things. But in real life, the greater general is the one who had to fight no battles (or as few as possible) and won the war. Historically, that is not always the obvious thing; indeed, it may not be recognizable in some cases. Do we realize when a time of great peace or of affinity and hospitality among nations is the result of military thinking which produces peace as something desired by both sides, without any loss of blood?
If you wish to prevent an invasion, make it impossible to successfully invade— and make it obviously so. If you wish a nation to accede to your political and economic demands, make it obvious that you could force the issue with violence and succeed that way. If they believe it to be true, and know they will lose, they will in all likelihood capitulate. They may even become your steadfast ally and friend.

Which is not to say any of the above is always possible; war fever can cause a people and a nation to do inherently foolish things, even in the face of the obvious. This is even worse when the persons doing the deciding have all the say and the persons doing the fighting have none at all.

Going back to Hannibal, Fabius the Delayer was the superior general. He fought as few battles as possible, stuck to harassing Hannibal's supply lines (he did have them… any sustained field operations even in ancient times had and had to have supply lines), supported Rome's Italian allies, and refused to give battle in unfavorable situations. Hannibal later did recognize how soundly these strategies defeated him.

A clever thing Fabius did was to create multiple visual "statements" of his authority when given the consulship— even going against Roman taboos.
1.) He claimed the right to ride on horseback as a consul, and was granted it by the Senate. This may seem like nothing, but it was a powerful symbol that he had unprecedented authority in this time of crisis.
2.) He called for a massive sacrifice of produce and meat, effectively asserting the importance of Roman tradition and religion as a unifying element of society and thus of the war effort. (Incidentally, this also meant that Hannibal would find less supplies immediately available among the population of Italy… Did Fabius intend this? I don't know. But a clever general just might be happy to have an excuse to deny his enemy potential forage.)
3.) He also ordered a big party, for which the wealthy Romans were to pay a symbolic amount. Thus, he made the people happy, tied it again to their shared culture and tradition and beliefs, and sent a message that the crisis was temporary— they could party, and not be afraid for the future. Again, this is my interpretation of what happened; maybe Fabius intended it, maybe he did not. But it is certain he started with a great deal of public support, which was necessary for the hard times he certainly knew were ahead.

Later he showed great magnanimity, essentially letting his rebellious, impetuous subordinate (and would-be replacement) off the hook for acting against orders and engaging Hannibal in battle— once successfully, but a second time almost disastrously, save for the intervention of Fabius. The man could have been executed; but Fabius accepted his contrition— and this one-time political rival declared Fabius to be his own "second father" and recognizing his full authority and superior generalship— and that, too, would have influenced the populace to unite behind Fabius in the middle of a difficult war.

Thus, Fabius combined insightful generalship with skillful politics and public relations to produce the victory he knew was inevitable.

So, yes, I nominate Fabius as a far greater general than Hannibal— but a name little known outside of students of history.

Thus, Fabius combined insightful generalship with skillful politics and public relations to produce the victory he knew was inevitable.

This is pure retrospective hype that has really very little historical evidence to support it. There was nothing inevitable about Fabius' strategic thinking. Remember, Fabius' primary interest was in mitigating Roman defeat, not in promoting Roman victory. His approach in dealing with Hannibal was one of necessity. Rome simply couldn't handle another major defeat. He was the right person for the job after Cannae but he hardly represents the winning approach that Rome needed in a leader and general.

While Fabius died in 203 BC his strategic thinking was carried forward by a powerful faction within the Roman Senate that was happy to simply see Hannibal leave Italy. This approach would have left Carthage in tact as an African power unscathed by the 2nd Punic War. It was only because of Scipio's considerable fame in winning Spain that he had political power to force the Senate to support an invasion of Africa. But note that Scipio was only given the 2 legions stationed in Sicily who were the survivors of Cannae as his command. There was certainly strong opposition to Rome taking the war directly to Carthage and that can be tied directly back to Fabius' defensive strategic thinking.

Oh, please. Hannibal got his hubris handed to him on a platter.

And why are you rejecting the analysis of Fabius? Did he not do the things I said? Did he not set a strategic goal and achieve it? Should those who wish to learn about effective strategies in similar circumstances not study his approach and learn from it? There are some conflicts going on today which could benefit from his insight! After all, there have been generals who successfully followed very similar situations— including George Washington and his brilliant subordinates, Nathaniel Greene and Daniel Morgan (as you touched on above). And you can bet that Washington and Greene had both studied the Punic Wars and Fabius, the works of Polybius and Livy being parts of a classic education and a military officer's expected reading at the time.

Back to Fabius and the invasion:
At the time, kicking Hannibal out of Italy was exactly the strategic goal needed, and the one Fabius pursued, and pursued in the right way. That Fabius took over with a military position weakened by others who made HORRIBLE choices— among them violating the basic rule to never offer battle to an enemy on his own ground— is actually a sign of his ability as a then "commander in chief." He knew that Hannibal had to be GONE. And he knew that it wasn't going to happen quickly. But he also knew that Rome could succeed by using the very strategies and tactics he recommended and employed. And, even in a weakened state, he did the exact right thing to achieve the goal he desired. Hannibal did not.

Read Sun Tzu. It's all there. Had he known of Fabius and Hannibal, Sun Tzu would have rated Fabius as the superior general, and Hannibal as a reckless leader who threw away his army to no purpose at all— and that's exactly what happened.

As for the necessity of destroying Carthage, I note that Scipio himself did not do this after his victory at Zama. Instead (as I mentioned earlier), Carthage was left intact, to function as an independent nation and trading culture, but with a burden of reparations to Rome and a restriction on any military action without Roman approval. So Scipio himself did not seem to think that destruction of Carthage was necessary (as Fabius himself also believed). Whether it was or not is to me questionable— the Third Punic War was not because Carthage threatened Rome, but rather because they fought an opportunistic ally. Was it truly strategically necessary as a result to raze the city? That's open to debate. Certainly if the standard was "never attack Rome again," as it was at the time, they had not done so. That they had attacked Masinissa is not the same thing— especially as to Carthage, Masinissa was a traitor— and also as Masinissa had provoked the attack! Yes, Carthage had acted against the treaty, but did they intend to pursue yet another war with Rome? Doubtful, considering their weakened state.

So faulting Fabius for not having his war strategy be the destruction of Carthage itself is not a valid condemnation of his abilities as a commander, nor in any case does it do anything to redeem Hannibal, who failed to achieve any lasting strategic goal for Carthage at all, and if anything, contributed to its eventual destruction through his hubris.

And why are you rejecting the analysis of Fabius? Did he not do the things I said?

I am rejecting your analysis about Fabius because it is wrong in its conclusions.

I might point out that Hannibal left Italy because of his home government's inability to reinforce him or to create other strategic pressure points that would assist him in his endeavours in Italy. In fact Fabius' strategy only succeeds because of Scipio's major victories in Spain and Africa. Had for instance, Scipio suffered a final defeat in Spain or had Hasdrubal been able to reinforce Hannibal in 207 BC the Fabian strategy may have become undone.

Again, our retrospective position gives us knowledge that Fabius didn't have. His approach was the right course to take following Cannae but it did not guarantee victory. It took the real victories of Scipio to change the strategic outlook of the 2nd Punic War.

Hannibal left Italy because… stuff

Hmm. Interrupted supply. No strategic pressure points. Failure to assist his endeavors.

So, in other words, Hannibal actually lacked a clear understanding of his strategic and political situation, and assumed things would happen which did not instead happen. Which is exactly what I said. Fabius, however, understood his political situation as well as Hannibal's. Indeed, Fabius acted to prevent the very things Hannibal just thought would happen for him. Did others let Hannibal down? Yes. But so what? The great general prepares for such things, and does not stick his forces into a situation where the necessary exterior support will or may not happen. You fight with the army you have, not the army you want. You plan by the worst case, not the best.

Did Hannibal need to be defeated in Africa for the war to end in a favorable manner for Rome? Again, I think that's debatable. As it was, Hannibal could not put together an effective defense of Carthage in the manner expected for him by Carthage. This was proven by the battle at Zama. Carthage was destined to lose that fight. Did it need to be taken to them? Again, it is hard to know. After their failures in Italy and Spain, was Carthage likely to try to take on Roman might again? We don't really know. Though afterwards, Cato the Elder kept saying Carthago delenda est after every speech he gave, regardless of topic, was he really justified in doing so? Was his expectation the correct one? Whatever the answer, that pressure and attitude led to the Third Punic War, which resulted in the crushing of Carthage— which then begs the question of whether Carthage actually still was any sort of threat to Rome. Would they have returned to fight Rome again later? Who can know? They certainly couldn't muster an effective defense.

So, no, I don't agree that Fabius's refusal to take the war to Africa was incorrect strategically. It was, at that point, a political decision, not a strategic one. Fabius thought it was unnecessary. The Scipio faction thought it was. Did Fabius believe the effort would not succeed? Or did he know it would, but was opposed to it for other reasons, political in nature (or even moral)? If the latter, then it isn't a question of strategic ability at all.

I really don't have an opinion on who was right in that. And as I said, it's impossible to know what the alternate choices would have produced— whatever they might have been, they didn't happen. I don't think Fabius can be praised or condemned either way on might-have-beens that never were.
And I think the same of Hannibal, in the opposite direction.
Hannibal acted as his ability and situational understanding (or lack of it) led him to act— and he lost. Fabius acted in the same manner, and he won. Subsequently so too did Scipio— but Fabius began from a position of weakness, facing an apparently more powerful foe, while Scipio was coming from a situation of power, facing a drastically weakened foe. Which demonstrated the greater strategic ability?

So, in other words, Hannibal actually lacked a clear understanding of his strategic and political situation, and assumed things would happen which did not instead happen.

The logic of you argument is that because Hannibal failed in his ultimate goal that we can infer that he lacked strategic and political judgement. I see absolutely no way one can infer this. I think the evidence shows that Hannibal had considerable strategic and political judgement. Unfortunately, he didn't all the data that would have made his calculations full proof. No one at the time did.

My contention is that key Roman leaders would have been as equally surprised as Hannibal must have been in the resilience of the Italian Confederacy. They too lacked all the data. Fabius harnessed this strength of the Italian Confederacy to maintain Rome as a viable power but his strategy did not and could not defeat Carthage. Only an African invasion could bring about Carthage's surrender. And it should be pointed out that Rome itself tired of Fabius' approach after a time and turned to other leaders to prosecute the war against Carthage.

Polybius' claims that Hannibal left Cartagena for Italy, with an army of ‘about' 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, thereby producing a grand total of ‘about' 102,000 men. Polybius has Hannibal arrive in Italy with 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, or in another reference, less than 20,000 men. The loss of 76,000 men (70,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry) represents a 75% percent casualty rate.

The loss of 76,000 men just happens to be the same number of infantry and cavalry as given by Polybius, for the Roman army that faced Hannibal's army at the battle of Cannae in 216 BC (70,000 infantry and over 6,000 cavalry). On his march to Italy, Polybius gives the size of Hannibal's army between the following various geographical locations. Polybius gives no rational reason for these deductions, especially in light of the fact Polybius claims the fighting at the Rhone River was a small engagement, so significant casualties are neither credible or supported by the narrative.

What if those numbers were nothing more than Roman fiction?

I will give Polybius some benefit of the doubt, as he was a contemporary to the wars, lived in Rome, and was a close friend of the Scipio family and was present, I believe, for Zama.

However, I agree that a 75% casualty rate is absurd. (Although it has to be admitted that some cultures even today can apparently survive such casualty rates, due either to fanaticism, implied (or real) threats to family back home, and just plain "don't-give-a-damn-for-the-sword-fodder" attitudes among the politically powerful.) Polybius was very much a Rome-aphile. He may have been quite willing to inflate or even make up numbers that made his narrative more exciting and made Rome appear more impressive (or even more aggrieved). "No , there must have been thousands of them! I swear! Another beer? Sure, don't mind at all. Anyway, there we were, facing fifty thousand hardened Carthaginian killers. Wait, did I say fifty… I mean sixty. So, there they were, every man of ‘em seven feet tall if they were an inch, with thirty-foot spears and inch-thick armor, seventy thousand strong, and…"

But take him at his worth. It's possible that his numbers included slaves and baggage handlers, as well as mercenary auxiliaries, over veteran soldiers, so much of those numbers might not have been actual combatants, and their losses were just the hazards of campaigning in a time of little to no effective medicine, or even incidents of desertion and/or escape. If the numbers are accurate, then Hannibal was a very poor campaigner indeed, though somehow an effective leader not to have his entire force desert him after such high losses.

Or maybe Polybius was just really bad at math.

The logic of you argument is that because Hannibal failed in his ultimate goal that we can infer that he lacked strategic and political judgement. I see absolutely no way one can infer this. I think the evidence shows that Hannibal had considerable strategic and political judgement. Unfortunately, he didn't all the data that would have made his calculations full proof. No one at the time did.

Well, yes, that is the logic because it is based on what actually happened. To say that Hannibal had considerable strategic and political judgment is to be basing an argument on nothing but his reputation, not his achievements. Not having the data is no excuse. Again, I point to Sun Tzu, who explicitly calls for extensive intelligence gathering including active espionage as crucial to a general's strategic efforts. He even recommends subterfuge and deceptive actions to provide an enemy with false information— and though he may have written his works some 7 centuries later, he was still operating with a level of technology and military structure not much different from that of Hannibal's time. If such military intelligence gathering was possible for him, then it was possible for Hannibal. Again, operating on assumption instead of knowledge is how you lose a battle and a war. No, you can't have perfect knowledge, even today. But you can have sufficient knowledge— which Fabius clearly had, and Hannibal was clearly lacking. And that's Hannibal's fault. He underestimated his enemy, and overestimated his own support, both logistically and politically. And yes, he can be faulted for that.

Fabius encountered political opposition from the start of his consulship. Yet he was able to withstand that opposition and even plan for it— even when a subordinate went against his orders (to some immediate political acclaim). Yet, as Fabius had predicted, that subordinate met with disaster, and rather obviously the political support shifted to other approaches.
(George Washington faced similar political and subordinate opposition in his generals and the Continental Congress, and yet maneuvered successfully, both politically and militarily, to overcome this opposition and carry out his strategy to a successful conclusion.)

There is no other standard to assessing the quality of any general than to look back over his career and see whether, in the end, he achieved the goals he sought. Good generals win battles; great generals win wars. And sometimes great generals wind up unnoticed, while the flashy battle winners get acclaim beyond what they objectively achieved.

Concerning Hannibal's losses marching to Italy:

link

This paper is outdated as it does not include Livy's claim of the Romans having 80,000 men in 222 BC. In the war against the Transalpine Gauls, that ended in the Gauls being defeated at Acerrae in 222 BC by the consuls Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Clavus, Livy (Periochae 20) says that "the authors say that the Roman people had 80,000 soldiers of their own and the Latin and Italian allies."

What if those numbers were nothing more than Roman fiction?

Of course the critical words here are "what if". What we are dealing with in this hypothesis is pure speculation.

To say that Hannibal had considerable strategic and political judgment is to be basing an argument on nothing but his reputation, not his achievements.

No, Hannibal's reputation rests on his achievements which were considerable. Can you name me any substantial historian who supports your position with respect to Hannibal? Any first rate historian who agrees with your strategic position?

Your whole case is based on a series of conjectures and assumptions that have no evidence that I know of to support it. For instance, how do you know that Hannibal didn't do considerable reconnaissance of the Italian peninsula with respect to political and military matters before he began his campaign? What is your evidence for this claim? Please don't use the circular logic of Hannibal's failure as your proof (ie. he couldn't have done proper reconnaissance because he lost.) I need something more substantial than a unsubstantiated correlation.

As I have mentioned above, the strength and resiliency of the Italian Confederacy was untested before Hannibal's invasion and it was an unknown when the war started. It's full strength could not be deduced in advance. Asking Hannibal to fully understand this before invading Italy is simply to substitute the contingent knowledge of real life for your privileged hindsight.

As I also mentioned above, Fabius was the correct choice, in my estimation, in the post Lake Trasimene environment and after Cannae. By his last consulship in 209 Fabius' influence was weakening and his strategic approach was falling out of favour. This trend continued during the rise of Scipio. Why? Because Roman political leaders had come to realize that Fabius' strategy could not win them the war. In order to win the war against Hannibal and Carthage, Rome had to win on the battlefield. This was something that Fabius was not prepared to risk.

A historian who has put forth my view— you mean, like Plutarch? And of course, he claimed that Hannibal recognized Fabius's strategy was superior to his own. But again, that's a decidedly pro-Roman, pro-Fabian source.

No, I cannot name a modern historian who supports my view, as such, largely because it's not an area where I follow any modern discussion. I rather suspect I could find one, but why? So I can appeal to the superiority of someone else's opinion? Why should I need to do that? That would not be an argument based on fact, but an argument based on nothing but commonality of an opinion.

Of course, it is not unusual for historians to agree with a presumptive statement without consideration— and that statement is the assertion that Hannibal was a great general, which arises from pro-Roman writers declaring him to be one, because it made their heroes— the Romans— look all the better.

But I am dealing solely with the fact of his accomplishments, and the lack of his achievements towards his stated goal— the subjugation of Rome.
Was that not his stated strategic goal? Yes, it was. Did he achieve it? No, he did not.
Thus, I am correct— he lost because he lacked the strategic ability to achieve that goal. He did not achieve it when he first arrived in Italy; he had not achieved it, and was no closer to doing so, when he left. "No real progress" is not the sign of effective strategy.

The question that arises is, should Hannibal have known this possibility, indeed this probability, was the most likely outcome?

And that is where the question of intelligence gathering comes into play. No, I have no knowledge of Hannibal's efforts in this manner. But then, it's rather obvious that he was able to follow large Roman movements (not really surprising) and thus plan his battle sites accordingly. He even knew when (or how) the Romans would be aware of him, at least for that same purpose.
But he fell for some basic stratagems, could not pursue or draw Fabius's forces into battle, and never produced a successful counter-stratagem to the hits on his supply lines, attacks on his allies, or general wearing down of his forces. So his intelligence gathering on such things was demonstrably weak as evidenced by the outcomes. Either he did not know what he needed to know, and failed accordingly, or he did know what he needed to know, and couldn't come up with a strategic solution, and thus also failed accordingly. Neither conclusion is a favorable analysis of Hannibal's strategic abilities, much less his intelligence gathering efforts.

On Fabius's Strategy
I would point out that the disaster of Cannae came about because the Romans at the time rejected Fabius's strategy. He warned them, but they didn't listen… and they lost one of the most discussed battles in human history. After that, even the Roman people now recognized Fabius as being the man to listen to.

No, he never engaged Hannibal in a major battle—though it was Fabius who drove off Hannibal's forces at Geronium, thereby rescuing Minicius from yet another Roman disaster. So when they did actually meet, Fabius effectively defeated Hannibal by denying Hannibal the latter's sought for goal in that battle— the destruction of half of Fabius's army.

After this, Fabius also tricked Hannibal into leading his forces away from Tarentum, allowing Fabius to retake the city through suborning its commander. (Again, a sign of good generalship by Fabius). According to Plutarch, this is the point where Hannibal acknowledged Fabius's superior military ability.

Again, true military skill is winning without engaging in battle. Fabius did this, consistently. Hannibal did not. He sought battle, rather than avoided it. Yes, he was a master of leading headstrong enemies into battles at the place and time of Hannibal's choosing. But with "leaders" like Varro, that wasn't difficult.

But Hannibal could not provoke Fabius into attack, and when Fabius did attack, he either did so where Hannibal was not, or (at Geronium) when Hannibal did not believe that he would.

Thus, Hannibal could not deal with Fabius's strategy, and could not defeat it.

As to whether Fabius was correct about not taking the battle to Africa, it is impossible to know whether that was correct or not. Certainly, Scipio made the most of it, and drew Hannibal into a battle of Scipio's choosing (which raises further questions about Hannibal's generalship). So Scipio won his battles… but were they necessary? Impossible to truly say. By that point, Hannibal's family was largely dead, Carthage's will was rapidly fading, and Italy was essentially free.

I will say this: Fabius's strategy was right for the time and his goal, and he was brilliant at it.
Scipio's strategy was right for his time and his goal, and he was equally brilliant at it.
That the two disagreed on which was best over all really isn't relevant; they wanted two separate things. Fabius's strategy would have been the wrong one for Scipio's goal— but Scipio's strategy would have been the wrong one for Fabius's goal.
Yet we must all admit that Scipio's strategy and his goal would not have happened without Fabius's strategy working in the first place.

But Hannibal's strategy did not achieve his goal, and thus was not the correct one. History alone makes that observation unassailable.

Marcus Brutus wrote: Of course the critical words here are "what if". What we are dealing with in this hypothesis is pure speculation.

If 2 + 2 makes 4, is that speculation? Can you elaborate instead of just providing a generalisation?

What are you referring to? My initial response to the OQ was that, no, Hannibal would not have succeeded with a Fabian strategy because he did not understand how and why it worked against him— as evidenced by the fact that he never devised a strategy to defeat it! (And that is a statement of absolute fact, by the way.)

But even then, I think others are correct in saying that the situations were not the same, especially on the political end, but also on the question of terrain and land area— Italy is an enormous peninsula, and the area Rome controlled both politically and physically was immense— and almost all of it fertile and capable of producing food nearly year round.

Carthage, on the other hand, had much less physical land in its immediate vicinity— yes, it was strung along the coast, but comparatively thinly. If one is to conduct a Fabian strategy, one has to have adequate areas to retreat into, as well as supply sources to back up that strategy. Unlike Fabius in Italy, Hannibal had considerably less square mileage into which he could maneuver his army— go too far along the coastal areas, and he could be bottled up while Rome savaged Carthage as they wished. Try to stay close to Carthage, and he could be brought to battle at the time and place of Rome's choosing— and unlike Carthage, Rome was fully ready and able to supply Scipio exactly as Scipio desired and needed.

So, no, Hannibal could not have pulled off a Fabian strategy. But then, as I said earlier, he was of the "one decisive battle" mindset. Alas for him, the decision was entirely for Rome.

As for the rest of my argument, I have consistently mentioned battles, actions taken by Fabius, actions taken by Hannibal, and actions taken by others, to support my position that Fabius was the superior general to Hannibal— and none of that is speculation.

Hannibal would not have succeeded with a Fabian strategy because he did not understand how and why it worked against him— as evidenced by the fact that he never devised a strategy to defeat it! (And that is a statement of absolute fact, by the way.)

How do you know Hannibal didn't understand the Fabian strategy or why it worked? I think it is quite likely that Hannibal did understand Fabius' strategy but lacked the resources to properly counter it. Why did Hannibal lack the resources for properly countering Fabius' strategy? Because he erroneously believed that he could defeat the Italian Confederacy by defeating its armies. Why did Hannibal believe that? Because there was no historical counter factual to an entity surviving the kinds of defeats that Rome and its allies underwent in the early years of the 2nd Punic War. He had no reason to suppose Rome's alliances systems were as resilient as they turned out to be. In fact, no person at the time fully understood the staying power of the Italian Confederacy led by Rome. This was not a failure of Hannibal but rather a testimony to wisdom of the way Rome engaged its conquered Italian opponents

As for the rest of my argument, I have consistently mentioned battles, actions taken by Fabius, actions taken by Hannibal, and actions taken by others, to support my position that Fabius was the superior general to Hannibal— and none of that is speculation.

You've done nothing of the sorts. You've simply ignored contra evidence given by me and others and continued to promote a view that would be treated with great skepticism by those who have studied the 2nd Punic War with great care.

I haven't ignored anything. You are the one making the assertion that Hannibal not recognizing the facts of the situation and relying on the unreliable is not evidence that he had a poor strategy.

It is one thing in a general to act upon imperfect information— that is inevitable— but once the information begins to change and becomes more perfect— as Hannibal should have rapidly realized as his plans for his Italian campaign consistently failed to come to fruition— then one must adapt one's strategy to counter this new information. Hannibal did not do this. He consistently continued to rely on unreliable allies, expected resources that would never come, and pursued a strategy of major actions intended to draw an enemy into battle who had already demonstrated that they had no need to do so— and that if they did, his victories produced no lasting effect. "Doing the same thing and expecting different results" is not the sign of an effective strategy.

Whatever Hannibal did, Fabius (and later Scipio) adjusted to. Whatever they did, Hannibal did not adjust to. The history of the war and its outcome are proof alone of this.

I have never once said that what Hannibal did was not impressive. He was the most brilliant battlefield tactician of the age— though when his enemy did what he did not expect, he did not triumph (Geronium, Zama). Coming over the Alps was also a remarkable feat— but, if accounts of his losses are accepted, was also extremely wasteful of his men and military capability. He could make up for that through his tactics and the initial surprise of the action, but how many of those lost men, elephants, and supplies could have swung the difference in Italy later? So again, tactically effective and a surprising effort, but as a part of long term strategy, in the end utterly useless, and quite possible contributing to his eventual defeat.

Could someone determine that the situation in Italy was not what Hannibal and Carthage expected? That Rome was more resilient and its alliances more secure? That Carthage did not have the means to provide reliable supplies to an invasion of Italy? Yes, indeed someone could— and that someone was Fabius. Because that's exactly the understanding which underscored his entire military effort!

You say "no one" could have predicted what the situation was— except you ignore that Fabius did so himself. Are you under the impression that Fabius basically invented guerrilla warfare without thinking he could win by doing so, or even assuming he would lose? No, clearly Fabius thought that by avoiding direct battle and attacking supply lines while continuing to assert Roman authority and leadership among the allies (and forcefully and brutally punishing betrayal) would in the end force Hannibal to give up and withdraw. And he was absolutely right.

The interesting thing is, that in terms of strategy, Fabius's efforts remain one of the most viable approaches in military action when faced with apparently superior forces. It worked then, it works now. But Hannibal's approach… we really only study that to see why it failed.

As I stated above Hannibal believed he could destroy the underpinnings of Roman power by shattering the Italian Confederacy though military defeats. This was a daring but reasonable strategic decision on his part. Unfortunately for Hannibal, even with his near perfect string of victories in battle it proved insufficient to shatter the Italian Confederacy. Again, how could Hannibal, or any commander for that matter, anticipate this kind of cohesion in a political entity like the Italian Confederacy. There was no counterfactual in all of ancient history to collapse in the face of a catastrophic defeat of the type that Rome endured. Rome's ability to endure and recover still shines as a testimony to the enduring grit of its people. It is also a testimony to the wise relations that the Roman elites in engaged in when it expanded into the Italian peninsula.

Your calculations fail to grasp the full strategic situation. Once it became clear that Hannibal could not overcome the Italian Confederacy through battle it was his strategic obligation to keep the main Roman military capability locked up in Italy. Why? Because as long as Spain continued as part of the Carthaginian Empire, Carthage had the means to prosecute its war against Rome. Should Carthage lose Spain its war fighting capability would be decisively compromised. It is interesting to note that both sides understood this. It was Hannibal's responsibility to limit the ability of Rome to support its war effort in Spain.

After Cannae the Romans decided to turn Italy into stalemate, a side show, to where the real strategic initiative lay. What you describe as the Fabian strategy was a strategy of necessity in the face of Hannibal's tactical brilliance. It was also done to allow the redeployment of forces to Spain. This proved to be the correct decision. Ultimately the Romans prevailed in Spain and this led to the collapse of Carthage's war fighting capability. Yet the war continued for 14 years after Cannae and it was principally because Hannibal handicapped the Roman war effort by tying down huge forces in Italy that could have been used overseas.