"Longstreet at Gettysburg" Topic

I just saw something on Youtube that repeated the allegation that Longstreet's actions at Gettysburg cost the South the battle and likely the war. What could he have done differently?

So he was sulking because Lee did not agree with his proposed strategy. Lee gave the orders on day 2 and day 3. Perhaps the counter-march on day 2 was questionable, but did the delay result in repulse? On day 3, Lee assigned the units for the charge, he directed where the charge was to go. Longstreet assigned the artillery portion of the attack to Alexander, who I believe was a competent artillerist. Longstreet conveyed Lee's orders to the commanders. Could Longstreet's personal belief that the attack would be a failure have such an impact on the operation so as to contribute to the failure?

I have heard comments that he failed by not arranging flank protection and not ensuring that sufficient artillery went forward with the charge. I have also read that there was insufficient ammunition close at hand to make it worthwhile to send significant artillery forward with the charge. I know the buck stops with Longstreet, however, insufficient ammunition strikes me as an Alexander problem, not a Longstreet problem. I understand that part of the problem was that replenishment ammunition had been sent farther behind the line for protection from Federal counter-battery fire. No one bothered to tell Alexander where it went?

I do not mean to be throwing bombs and I tried to search the topic, however, my search kept timing out, so I apologize if this has already been covered. Bottom line, has he been scapegoated to deflect responsibility from Lee? It strikes me that the charge was going to be a close-run thing regardless of whether Old Pete was sulking or not. I do not see how commanders at that time could micromanage a battle. You give orders to subordinates and pray that you have good subordinates.

I highly recommend you read "In the Shadow of the Round Tops." It doesn't discuss the third day and only the march and so called counter-march that occurred during Longstreet's movement to the Union's left flank on the second day. The reason I recommend it is because the author spends time talking about remembrance and how it relates to post battle letters, reports, and certainly after the war memoirs. Then you can think over who has claimed what, when they claimed it, and the overall circumstances in trying to answer your question.
My honest opinion is Longstreet's actions on the second and third day have been grossly misrepresented by a segment of Southern commanders, authors, and newspaper editors and this has continued to this day by various historians and authors. There have been several attempts ("Killer Angels" being one) to rehabilitate his reputation with varying success. I don't believe he was "sulking" and, yes, he made mistakes, but he did not cost the South the battle. The Yankees had something to do with that. Plus nearly all of the Confederate high commend, including Lee, simply had off days.

Even if the South had won Gettysburg they were not going to win the war. Lee's army would have suffered heavy losses, Washington was fortified and the Army of the Potomac would still have existed. The Lost Cause has made the battle much more important than it was.

Lee worshipers needed to find someone else to blame. There were a lot of self-serving, finger-pointing distortions of the truth -- and outright lies -- written after the war.

I found F. Gregory Toretta's Lieutenant General James Longstreet: Innovative Military Strategist to be a good exposition of Longstreet's evolving tactical and operational acumen. Longstreet is labelled by the author as "the most misunderstood Civil War general."

Jim

The following things had to do with the ANV's loss at Gettysburg.

1: The Yankees.
2: Lee losing strategic focus.
3: Lack of forward intelligence. Yes Stuart effed up, but Lee still had plenty of extra cavalry to do an effective screening and reconnaissance.
4: Lee's health. He had recently had his first major heart issue, so he wasn't in tip top shape.
5: The weather. Unusually hot this time of year.
6: Lee wanting Longstreet to be Jackson. Lee needing Jackson at that time and not having him. Longstreet wasn't Jackson. Longstreet was Longstreet. Big difference.

Lee did everything wrong at G'burg and the Union did everything right.

The war wasn't lost at G'burg. It was lost the next day at the fall of Vicksburg. That was the death knell.

I believe the artillery ammunition shortage was due to Pendleton, who moved the ordnance train too far back.

The lack of flank support was mostly due to failures of commanders on the flanks to advance in time (if at all). But one could say that a more active commander than Longstreet (or Lee) could have personally made sure that they did so.

Agree with you Murph. The war was lost in the West while everyone's eyes have remained on the East.

I would agree with most of what Murph said except that the Union did everything right.

Sickles almost cost them the battle! 11th corps was poorly handled first day. Culps Hill was weakened during the second day by 12th corps that could have been exploited. Cemetery Hill was also ripe for exploitation on the 2nd day, but confederates failed to exploit it with a halfhearted attack.

The Union did do more things right, but there were opportunities.

As for Longstreet, he ended up following his orders from Lee, even though he expressed his disagreement on both the second and third days. The loss is entirely on Lee despite his previous record of success.

Kim

Agree with Kim, Murphy and some others. Will only add that some of the controversy came about because of Longstreet's political stance after the war. He became a Republican and held some offices during Grants administration.

If the South had won the battle of Gettysburg and severely drubbed the Army of the Potomac I think that war was pretty much over even with the fall of Vicksburg a day later. Not from a materials stand point of view of course since the North could have continued the struggle. But from a political point of view I can't see how the growing peace movement would have been kept in check with a Union defeat at Gettysburg. And Lee and Longstreet came very close to turning the Union left on day 2. By day 3 I suspect that Lee knew he had a long shot chance of winning the day but a draw was really a strategic defeat for the South. Worth the gamble (although in hindsight probably not.)

KimRYoung;

I would agree with your disagreement on my statement. I was incorrect about "everything right". Sickles blunder was momentous, but I believe it could have been recovered from but not easily and at high cost.
11th and 12th Corps issues were problematic but in the long run, affected not as much in the overall effects of the battle.
The big thing is that you can't keep winning battles but losing 20-25% of your troops in your army each time you do. Lee had a bad habit of doing that. And the south simply couldn't replace those losses.

Had Longstreet scouted his route of march when Lee ordered him to flank the Federals late on the 1st day, there would not have been the counter march and the attack would have gone in much earlier. The Round Tops would not have been held by the Yanks and the Union left would have been rolled up. I tend to agree that Longstreet was sulking.

"There were a lot of self-serving, finger-pointing distortions of the truth -- and outright lies -- written after the war."

Very true. I'd note that the agreement between Longstreet and Lee to grab some good defensive terrain and make the Yanks attack was something Longstreet brought up after Lee was dead.