"Changing Interpretations of Japan's Pacific..." Topic

… WAR NAVAL DEMISE

"…Though most of the literature which concentrated on cultural factors analyzed Japan's defeat in a negative context, there was at least one exception. Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo, Commander of Japan's crack Destroyer Squadron 2 in the Solomon Islands battles, offered a balanced military analysis of Japan's defeat, blaming it on the failure to develop radar, a disunited naval command structure, and interservice rivalry with the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). Yet even Tanaka explained Japan's proficiency in night torpedo surface warfare partially in terms of cultural characteristics.2 Tanaka claimed, for example, that Japan excelled in night torpedo warfare until late 1942 because night surface engagements ". . . agreed with the character of Japanese sailors." This statement implies, of course, that other nations in the Pacific War failed at early night engagements because of a deficiency in "character" traits "suited" to nighttime naval warfare. Tanaka's statement similarly denotes that proficiency in warfare does not ultimately depend on doctrine, training, equipment, and tactics, but on "character" and "spirit". The question to be asked, therefore, is whether or not Japanese naval officers thought that the IJN lost the war after 1942 because it ultimately lacked character and spirit? Tanaka does not address this issue, but the importance of cultural and national traits as an element of naval warfare is a theme which was highly prevalent in the literature from the 1950s…"

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Armand

Isn't that a question of elan versus equipment?

The elite Italian army units prized martial qualities, particularly speed of action. They seemed to excel in WWI, but failed spectacularly in WWII.

The US Marines similarly value fighting qualities. Yet some military historians fault the Corps in its WWII island operations for overemphasizing 'guts' at the expense of planning.

Confoundingly, the Russians in Ukraine seem to lack both equipment and morale, yet continue to take ground.

I can't remember who said it, but there's an old quote; "Quantity has its own quality."

Reader….believe that was Stalin? Or was that a myth.

Thanks

Armand

Dave : that was Old Joe indeed.
Now, regarding Tanaka's opinion about the causes of Japan's defeats in night actions (given the context, I think it's what he speaks about, I may be wrong…), he's right regarding lack of radar. It's also certain the emphasis put on training DDs & cruisers to achieve torpedo attacks at night paid off nice dividends. This said, while, after Savo, the US commanders worked to perfect their doctrine (Scott at Cape Esperance actually had a plan, even unperfect, Lee at 2nd Guadalcanal was even better), IMO, their Japanese opponents kept on doing the same mistakes again & again : see their deployments at Cape Esperance & Empress Augusta, where they are both times attacked by surprise while still in road formation. If radar gave the US an advantage, a more active reconnaissance effort could have mitigated it somewhat and given US commanders a more difficult task.

Now we're speaking about Tanaka, and IMO, while he is certainly a very competent commander, didn't he have some good luck at Tassafaronga? The battle circumstances were ideal, allowing him to fire a swarm of Long Lances at the column of US cruisers, both unfamiliar with each other and unaware of the range of the long lances…

In the end, IMO, Tanaka & Mikawa being the exceptions, Japanese commanders never managed to adapt tactically to evolving technologies and opponents, culminating in their especially inept plan at Surigao Strait.

Thanks also…

Armand