"a framework for hypothetical wars in America 1790 to 1800" Topic

My current project is a teachers guide to THE FEDERALIST. There are several of the early numbers by Hamilton that examine in considerable detail the potential for civil war, and foreign intervention, if the Constitution is not ratified and disunion prevails. Hamilton was an astute strategist and FEDERALIST 8, for example, compares the situation in Europe (professional standing armies and extensive border fortifications) with the situation in a divided America initially lacking those things.

Those of us with extensive AWI armies might "enjoy" all sorts of hypothetical campaigns, and it is an excuse to acquire and paint Spanish and French armies. Irregulars and state regulars, Brits and French and Spanish, in two-way or three way or four -way fights.

Here is 8. My format is to divide the original text into paragraphs and add my own numbered summary before each.

Federalist No. 8
The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
From the New York Packet
Tuesday, November 20, 1787.
Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:
1. Why, Hamilton asks, is war among the states such a very bad thing?

ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes1 of peace and war, of friendship and enmity2, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation.

2. Wars among European nations are limited in their impact by disciplined armies and extensive fortifications. Decisive victories are rare.

War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition.

3. In America, in contrast, undisciplined armies of irregulars can win dramatic victories or suffer devastating defeats, and plunder and devastation will accompany both.

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory3 and predatory. PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits.

4. Wise states, if their resources permit, will maintain standing armies for safety, and standing armies are threats to liberty. And wars bring active vigorous executive power, which threatens the power of the legislature.

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.
The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it is therefore inferred that they may exist under it. 1Their existence, however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular and effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.

5. Competition will cause many states to arm themselves, and in the process all of them will become less free.

The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors. Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural strength, which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them long to submit to this mortifying4 and adventitious5 superiority. They would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence. Thus, we should, in a little time, see established in every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge6 of the Old World. This, at least, would be the natural course of things; and our reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are accommodated to this standard.

6. These are not just guesses about what will happen, but sound conclusions based on history.

These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of human affairs.

7. In ancient Greek republics every citizen was also a soldier (and slaves did much of the work). (Hamilton does not mention it, but the same was true of early Rome under the Republic.) Modern societies are far wealthier and soldiering is now done by experts, professionals.

It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.

8. A nation seldom exposed to invasion does not need a large army, and a small army is not sufficient to coerce the body of the citizenry.

There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The rulers of the former can have a good pretext, if they are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into activity for interior defense, the people are in no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the community an over-match for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights. The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the people.

9. But if war is a constant threat, armies must be large enough to fight immediately, and so the military prevails over the civil society, threatening their rights.

In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations7 supported by the military power.

10. Britain, as an island, does not need a large army. This is a major reason why the kingdom is still relatively free.

The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent, till the militia could have time to rally and embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No motive of national policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room for the operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as the consequences of internal war. This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality8 and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had been situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have been, by that situation, to make her military establishments at home coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute power of a single man. 'T is possible, though not easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually kept up within the kingdom.

11. As long as we remain united, we are like Britain, separated from most enemies by an ocean.

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe --our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.

12. This benefit from union, and the dangers from disunion, should outweigh trivial objections to the Constitution.

This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered9 imaginations of some of its adversaries would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.

PUBLIUS.

1. This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have been taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America, most of which contain no guard at all on this subject. Back to text

In 7, Hamilton outlines all of the potential civil wars. Again, the numbered paragraphs are McBride's summaries of the following text by Hamilton. Plus, for Illinois, some additional background.

Federalist No. 7
The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
For the Independent Journal.
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:

1. Hamilton scoffs at the idea that neighboring states would lack reasons to make war upon one another. In the case of the thirteen American states, reasons are evident.

IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say--precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within our immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected if those restraints were removed.

2. The first issue is who controls the west, the vast territory extending to the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. It is essential that teachers ensure that their students understand the vital nature of this issue. The west could be either a powerful source of unity, a great resource in which all might share, or else a bone of contention. Virginia had a claim to the entire northwest from Kentucky to Canada, because its colonial charter specified no western boundary. But Connecticut had a rival claim on the same principle. And states with no western land claims nevertheless viewed access to western lands as essential.

2.1 Virginia's claim was not just theoretical. Kentucky and Ohio were already organized as Virginia counties, represented in the legislature. Moreover, George Rogers Clark's Illinois Regiment was not under the control of Congress; it was a Virginia state force, and Virginia still was in physical control of key posts. The Illinois Regiment was disbanded in 1784 but Clark and his men were given extensive land holdings in the territory they had conquered; consult Machiavelli's THE PRINCE for an explanation of why colonists are better than a garrison for holding territory.

2.2 Virginia had ceded its western claims to the union, but would certainly revoke the cession if Virginia did not ratify the new constitution. But would the other states allow that? If not, a war between them and Virginia was not merely possible but perhaps likely.

Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This cause would exist among us in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States. There still are discordant1 and undecided claims between several of them, and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. It is well known that they have heretofore had serious and animated discussion concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went under the name of crown lands. The States within the limits of whose colonial governments they were comprised have claimed them as their property, the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all that part of the Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through the submission of the Indian proprietors2, was subjected to the jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if not by any anterior3 right, the common property of the Union. If that were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle of federal compromise, would be apt when the motive of the grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of representation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made, could not be revoked; and that the justice of participating in territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different principles would be set up by different States for this purpose; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties, they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment.

3. Connecticut and Pennsylvania have an ongoing dispute over territory.

In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to interpose4 between the contending parties. To reason from the past to the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences. The circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management, something like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and States, like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their disadvantage.

4. New York likewise has disputes with other states over Vermont.

Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as well from States not interested as from those which were interested in the claim; and can attest the danger to which the peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition: one, a jealousy entertained of our future power; and the other, the interest of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants of lands under the actual government of that district. Even the States which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous5 to dismember this State, than to establish their own pretensions. These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions, discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that State, entered deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their unpropitious6 destiny to become disunited.

5. New Jersey had no good port of its own. Under the Articles of Confederation, New York was free to tax goods entering through NY City and then being sold, tax included, into New Jersey; in effect, NY taxed NJ. Such behavior is quite normal, and would spread. And wars would result.

The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent of this circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE THINGS WHICH WERE IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations, on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals7 and wars.
The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others tributary8 to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on her importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted9 in favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor would it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the way, to distinguish the customers in our own markets. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an advantage so odious10 to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent11 weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating pressure of New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity12 alone will answer in the affirmative.

6. There were many different public debts from the Revolutionary War. Each state had its own, plus some share in the Continental debt. Some was owed to foreign banks and governments, while the rest was owed to Americans. Much of the domestic debt was concentrated into the hands of a relatively small number of wealthy men who had bought up debt certificates at big discounts; these men stood to make a large profit if the debt was paid off at par (that is, at face value). How, and how much, and by whom each of these types of debt were to be paid off – or not – were huge questions.

The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the first instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterward, would be alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance13, to the payment of the domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the State in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments of the latter. The settlement of a rule would, in the meantime, be postponed by real differences of opinion and affected delays. The citizens of the States interested would clamour; foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and internal contention.

7. Some states had resources enough to pay their state debts easily: Virginia and Connecticut and North Carolina had western lands, while New York and other states with major ports could tax imports. Other states had few resources.

Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would naturally seek for a mitigation13 of the burden. The others would as naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance of these States with their engagements would be a ground of bitter discussion and altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice justify the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States would result from a diversity of other causes--the real deficiency of resources; the mismanagement of their finances; accidental disorders in the management of the government; and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies15 which produced them, and interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations, and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite, that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money.

8. States ruled by popular majorities might well choose not to pay their debts, especially if that required taxing the citizens who elected the legislature.

Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in too many instances disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we reasonably infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social justice.

9. And in conclusion, Hamilton warns that different states may reach different agreements with foreign nations, drawing America into foreign wars.

The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et impera1 must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.2

PUBLIUS.
1. Divide and command. Back to text
2. In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as possible be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them four times a week--on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in the Daily Advertiser. Back to text

Scenario: the war for New Jersey:

New England unites and draws New York into its union. (Hamilton explains why that would be likely) Meanwhile Pennsylvania re-fortifies the Delaware, rebuilds its state navy.

New Jersey collapses due to crushing debt, a "keg tapped at both ends. New York occupies New Jersey in spite of Pennsylvania's protests.

Until Pennsylvania hires a reenforced brigade of Hessians to back up the Pennsylvania State Line and invades NJ.

In response, the New England/NY Union invites the French to assist, promising to help them retake Quebec. Boston is heavily fortified (Bunker Hill, Dorchester Heights, the harbor island ) and a French fleet plus privateerrs are based there. Britain allies with Pennsylvania.

Whoopee!

Britain then seizes NYC and Long Island, allying with Pennsylvania.

Virginia has struck a deal with Spain, which yields the Mississippi Valley to Va but retains New Orleans. Virginian cargoes pay 3% to Spain and can ship into the Gulf from NO. Spain sends a fleet and a strong garrison to La.

At some point the Spanish and French Bourbons will make lower Louisiana a haven against the French Revolution.

I always thought that TMP had rules against "quoting" more than 3 paragraphs per post? Do you have a dispensation?

In any event, Old Glory has a nice Mad Anthony Wayne range to cover Wabash and Fallen Timbers.
A while back I was looking for suitable figures to cover Aaron Burr's and James Wilkinson's madcap adventures "out west". The Mad Anthony range was the closest I could find. You're on your own there.
Burr is almost exactly halfway between Wayne and 1812 ranges. Wayne range would certainly work for the Whiskey Rebellion, if you're starting afresh.

No dispensation, but how would breaking the FED Paper up aid anything?

I was thinking more of just using my AWI toys. The MAW figures are nice, though.

Of course the French Revolution kicks in pretty quickly. Could have FrRev units in North America -- after all, they did Haiti -- but otoh the Old Regine might flee to America and take loyal troops with them.

As a few of my professors would say, "I already know what it says. What do YOU say?"
I was sometimes allowed to "try again" the next day. Not always.

Basically they were testing if I understood it. Not if I could type. Or in this case, copy and paste.

As far as I know, the "3 paragraph rule" has never been rescinded.

As a few of my professors would say, "I already know what it says. What do YOU say?"
I was sometimes allowed to "try again" the next day. Not always.

Basically they were testing if I understood it. Not if I could type. Or in this case, copy and paste

I am reminded for my final year assessment I took that view and decided not simply to work through the set text and simply say whether I agreed with each of its 37 propositions or not, as the assigment title seemed to require. Rashly, I omitted to check my approach with the professor who without further contact tossed my essay back at me via a third party complaining I'd chosen my own question to suit myself – I saw it as a distillation- said it was first class work but marked it as B-.

That, as Jack Crabbe would say, was the end of my academic period.

Doc, back in the 1990s, I wrote several articles on minor conflicts in America for Time Portal Passages which was on MagWeb.
A few that I remember in this era was:
The Georgia vs North Carolina War over an area of NW land connecting them.
The Muskogee Free State War vs Spanish Florida. MFS recognized by Britain. They had a two ship navy of captured ships. Large number of skirmishes and fort attacks. MFS was winning until 1809 when Britain changed support. Dominated by Lower Creek towns.
The Patriot Wars involved several Georgia filibuster expeditions into Florida.
Ohio vs Michigan War.
A number of filibuster actions in Mexico prior to the Texas Rebellion. Some groups were supported by the Central Mexican government against local rebel Mexican governor.

The idea behind the Teachers Guide is two-fold. First, it allows teachers to decide which of the 85 papers they want all the students to read. I used to use a textbook that included 10 and 51 in an appendix, but there are others as valuable.

Second, if kids ARE assigned certain numbers, breaking the text into shorter chunks with commentary interspersed, and key phrases highlighted, and hard words defined, makes the text accessible.

There is typically scant room in a survey course for much of classics like THE FEDERALIST, but good teachers will try to include as much of such primary gems as they are able. This TG is in aid of that.

OH, so many possibilities.
Various northern states based on conflicting land claims. Pennsylvania vs New York or Virginia, or a fourth Yankee-Pennamite War.
Individual states with western claims vs woodland tribes backed by Britain, France or Spain.
"Burr conspiracy" wars--western territories trying to secede and join the Spanish Empire or the French Empire later--or to seize New Orleans. Either way, linking western farmers to New Orleans and European markets.
Fishing wars--New England vs Britain over the waters near Canada.
US vs Revolutionary France (Quasi War) or with Revolutionary France against Britain, as Gallatin tried so hard to bring about. With a weaker union, this might be state by state.
Raids back and forth over the Georgia-Florida border, or, as noted, New Orleans-based filibusters in Texas.
Local revolutions on the order of Shay's Rebellion, or a more successful Whiskey Rebellion--especially if the excise tax is imposed by a state. Virginia and Tennessee would be good candidates.

Maybe half or a third of these happened to some degree--mostly with a fairly low body count. But they needn't have ended that way.

And I forgot New England (or at least Connecticut) at war with New York over Vermont. I'm actually a little surprised that one didn't happen "here, in this best-documented of all possible worlds."

As One of Orania Papazoglou's characters once remarked, "the royal land grants would themselves have been cause for a revolution." (I think it's "Once and Always Murder." The Pay McKennas. Read them all.)

And no one's mentioned slave revolts. Slaves are still being imported, including captured warriors, and they're a fairly high percentage of the population in parts of the deep south. Without a British connection or a stronger central government (or the ultimate ban on the external slave trade) do revolts become more feasible? Possibly in concert with woodland Indians threatened by western expansion? I'd say Georgia and South Carolina are the obvious candidates.

Yes, it is an interesting what-if, isn't it. Only the Seminoles adopted slave runaways into the clan. What if the Cherokees or Choctaw or Creek had done so, and even encouraged runaways? That would be both a cause for war but also a rather large source of manpower.

Indeed, one of the factors discouraging runaways was that the western tribes were unwelcoming, and probably worse masters.

The example of Brazil is relevant.

Seminole's were Hitatachi Creek , the initial majority, and Muskogee Creek who fled in the first wave to Florida. The Upper Creek and some lower Creek , after the Removal fled to Florida during the early 1800s. Creek tribes ‘adopted' all sorts of runaways including Shawnees, Natchez and runaway slaves.

Already did Study Guides back in the 1990s. A waste of time for the effort you are potting into it.
Home school parents prefer videos with tests.
Our study guides ended being almost all tests. One section of multiple choice, one on short answer, fill in the blank, matching, etc. long essay, . One section on do at home school projects. Timelines, collages, book reports, maps.

Have you looked at the Teachers Guides to LAND OF HOPE? Id be interested in your opinion.