"How are battle damaged tanks repaired?" Topic

I have no idea how my post made it to the top of the thread. 🤷 There were at least 4 posts ahead of me.

Belton Cooper wrote "Death Traps" about repairing American Sherman tanks. It's very informative about REPAIRING tanks and getting them back into action.
Unfortunately, he uses his experience as an excuse to rail against the Sherman.
For a month or two after I read the book, I believed him. 🙄
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I keep hoping for some nice dull statistical summary of how many tanks were sent back to the factories and what became of them, but I haven't seen one yet--just individual tanks which had to have been through the process because a "C" model now has guns and armor of an "H" model.

It did not work. Homeland Repair was overwhelmed. The main reason for all the German problems is they were all 'fur coat and no knickers'. That is everything was geared to getting the maximum number of complete tanks out the factory gate and not enough production of spare parts.
It may be true to say the Germans were better at recovering a battlefield wreck than the Allies but in terms of actual repairs to actual tanks the Allied system was a generation ahead.

As above, anything which had burned out was a writeoff, it is as just too much effort to restore.

Otherwise it was just a matter of replacing or repairing the damaged components, which could be a trivial job or a huge one, particularly for vehicles which didn't have properly standardised parts (ie most British ones).

The bulk of 'knocked out' tanks had trivial damage, some didn't have any damage at all and the crews just bailed. Others required enormous amounts of repair. The main trick was recovering them in the first place, before enemy demolition teams could fully destroy the hulks.

John
I had the same experience when I read Cooper's book.

Robert. This subject for the Germans is extensively covered on Thomas Jentz'z book "Panzer Trouppen part 2". He actually uses actual reports from German sources. Indeed, repairable vehicles beyond the capabilities of local resources were ordered to be sent back to Germany for repair. Those successfully repaired were not returned to the organization but were used to outfit new units with. (usually in France for units made up from East Front survivors). All nations utilized whatever they could recover and repair. Lots of trucks for sure. The Germans always suffered from lack of spare parts. "We have 6 new parts- do we send them out to the field or use them to produce 6 new tanks?" – kind of priority decisions to be made at OKH. If the needed parts were not available then send the carcass back for repair- Quicker/easier to fix and add to the new units being created.

As for US practice, Casemate's book on the Sherman is a good start. There were great advantages in having multiple manufactures making/using standardized parts. Without doubt, the unsung heroes of WWII (and probably still to today) are the recovery crews. (IIRC, it was a court marshal offense for American soldiers to enter/view the interior of their KOd tanks unless you were authorized as a recovery crew. The view was not pretty and didn't want knowledge get back to demoralize the troops.

I seem to recall the the book "A Bridge to Far". Before the battle, some German tanks were being loaded on trains to be send back for repairs. The German commander managed to hold onto some for his units own use.

repairable vehicles beyond the capabilities of local resources were ordered to be sent back to Germany for repair. Those successfully repaired were not returned to the organization but were used to outfit new units with.

What should have been done was not what was done. Units would keep these wrecks at the front as they knew once it went 'home' it was lost to them. Far better to keep a source of spares than lose a complete tank. All Homeland Repair' tanks were total losses as they were beyond the ability of front-line workshops to repair. As such they were to be recorded as a total loss on the Unit numbers. The failure of the Germans to do this allowed these total losses to stay in the 'Long term Repair category and thus, because they are in repair it can be claimed they were not losses after all.

Burned out means to far gone and most like that the fire has caused chemical changes to the properties of the steel and armour. Beyond salvageable repair.

For most things, the Sherman was actually a pretty good thing. Repairs would and could be done by crew, squadron and company level or battalion/regiment level or even brigade level. Division, corps and army group are the level of complete rebuilds.

I am more familiar with the commonwealth system tbhan the US but I suspect that the Us could not have been far different. Maybe differentiating what was done at what level being more dependant on part immediate availability and training of the REME or maintainance folks.

For most Shermans, parts standardiazation was a godsend. The US stuck to either the Ford or the Wright engines Similarly the UK in the unit holdings and even hopefully brigade level they really did try to keep to as few models as posible of engine at one time. Either all Chrysler multibank or diesel or Wright.

Fixing was alays done as far advanced as it could be with the bigger the problem meaning the further into the system backwards it went until it was at a level where they could repair it.

Are you looking for what work was done at what level or did you have a specific repair in mind?

"Bob Crisp comments on how much better German unit repair facilities were than their British counterparts" A situation not improved until the invention of the "Yellow Handbag"!!

Tally Ho!

The only factory rebuilds that applied to Shermans was one massive effort to rebuild earlier models to later standards after they had been used up quite a bit for training in the US. Such things as engine and transmission rebuilds as well as parts udates including welding additional armour plates over the hull sides and the turret front. It was a couple thousand that went through it and then they were forwarded to mostly europe.

Otherwise the Sherman was quite modular. An engine or transmission replacement was done at squadron level in Commonwealth. Not sure if the US did that at Battalion level I think. Replacing parts and welding holes was not much of a challenge, especially given the modularity.

(IIRC, it was a court marshal offense for American soldiers to enter/view the interior of their KOd tanks unless you were authorized as a recovery crew. The view was not pretty and didn't want knowledge get back to demoralize the troops.

Interesting. Had never heard that before. I do recall in the late 1980s when I told my dad I was going to be an armor officer (dad was a WWII paratrooper) the look on his face, even 40 years later, when he remembered looking insode a destroyed tank.

I am reading a book on the Eastern Front right now and the author frequently mentions the Germans repairing whatever tanks that could be recovered that were not a complete write off. So, what type of battle damage can a shop repair in three weeks vs. what has to be send back to the factory or a major repair facility? What is the line between, "we can fix that" to "blow it in place"?

I understand repairing road wheels, tracks, mechanical breakdowns, etc. I suppose a tank that sustained a penetrating turret hit can have a new turret put on it, but what about a tank with a penetrating hull hit? Is that repairable?

The problems/arguments around the German repair system is (mainly) post-war and caused by those who out to preserve the uber-panzer myths. They invent a number of bogus loss categories ('fair-fight'/'one-on-one'/'combat kill') designed solely to lower the number of German tank losses in WW2.
For example The Germans disregarded their own rules on sending knocked out tanks back for 'homeland repair' and kept these hulks at the front as a source of ready spares. As a result these wrecks keep appearing in 'long term repair' when in reality they were total losses.

YouTube link

Fixing a "penetrating hull hit" means inserting a plug slightly less than the penetrating round and welding it in place. Not exactly skilled labor.

Generally--well, I'm not sure you can generalize. Bob Crisp comments on how much better German unit repair facilities were than their British counterparts, but he didn't have a broad sample. US tolerances were fairly tight, so it was relatively easy to remove damaged parts and insert spares. German repairs required more custom-fitting and skilled labor.

Pretty much everyone agrees that if fuel caught fire or ammo cooked off, that tank was a total. All the rest could be repaired if you could recover the vehicle: it was a question of expense and tools/parts required.

I suspect a serious problem with factory repair was the fear the unit wouldn't get their fixed tank back. Why give up a "hangar queen" in return for a promise? Still, it was done. I keep hoping for some nice dull statistical summary of how many tanks were sent back to the factories and what became of them, but I haven't seen one yet--just individual tanks which had to have been through the process because a "C" model now has guns and armor of an "H" model.

Interesting link.

I have read the Cooper book. It has a lot of good info.

I didn't know that tanks culled be repaired like a flat tire.

Been a while, but somewhere read a article or it's in a book about during the Battle of Kursk the Germans daily had to retrieve tanks out of commission and fix them back to service.

Reading actual reports and charts in Panzertrouppen vol 2 by Thomas Jentz, there is a column called "Total Writeoff" that helps to account for all assigned vehicles in the unit as of a specific date. It leads one to believe that the Germans could have used that as a category from the recovery efforts. (damaged beyond repair even for Depot maintenance thus saving valuable transportation efforts that retrograded damaged vehicles.) Lost in combat being a separate column. Perhaps that was used to account for keeping the hulks for spare parts to higher HQ? The Germans were meticulous in record keeping. (Oh, yeah- there is a column for recording number and type of vehicles sent back to Germany for depot repair.)

Thank you Buckeye! Others, please note that the last link there has multiple page 32's. If you scroll down to page 62 of the PDF, you'll find the page marked 32 with the discussion of fire repairability. (Short answer is that it's not an absolute: a fire-damaged tank is less likely to be repairable, and tanks damaged by gunfire are more likely to burn.)

Lost in combat being a separate column

There is no such category. It is a completely 'made up' postwar invention designed solely to mitigate the number of destroyed Panzers.
For a Unit there were 3 types of tanks. Those that were fit for action, those in repair and those tank that were write-offs. They did not keep a record that used the (widely abused) terms 'ran out of fuel' or 'abandoned by crew' etc.

These may be of interest
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pages 17-24
PDF link

pg 29 on here may be of interest pg 32 table show fire repairability
PDF link

Jentz's books were pretty clear about how 'efficient' their repair process was. He had one diagram in particular showing a tiger battalion's daily inventory, nearly full with 40-45 tanks, but only 10-15 runners per day. the rest sat in the field workshop until it was overrun, then the overall inventory dropped to about 10. Having 30 tanks at a time sitting dead in a workshop is a sign there's something wrong with the system.