""National Characteristics" for WWII?" Topic

Following up on a conversation with dal on "least favorite rule mechanisms." Suppose you were allowed (or required) to distinguish the major combatants in WWII land warfare, but instead of a complete "codex" were only allowed one or two rules per army? How would you do it? A few suggestions:

For Germany, allow a counter-attack phase after being forced out of a defensive position. At a higher-level game, give the Germans a greater ability to improvise large units out of various elements, with advantages in coordination/command & control.

For the United States, a logistical advantage: US units are less likely to run out of fuel or ammo at some tactically inconvenient moment. At a higher-level game, the US, with its greater standardization and abundance of spare parts, is able to return damaged equipment to battle more rapidly.

Great Britain would probably get an edge on artillery coordination, and Japan on morale. Other suggestions?

U.S. — Easy to break morale, but also easy to rally.

Germany — If a machine gun platoon and a mortar platoon shoot at the same target, the mortars get a bonus to hit for the built in pinning effect of the MGs, that was a practiced and unique as a standard tactical doctrine to coördinate fire.

In the latter part of the war (1944-1945), the US and UK get a bonus for coordinated artillery fire and being able to get multiple artillery battalions firing at the same target.

Jim

Col Campbell
My father claimed that during Varsity German POW were asking where the Americans got their "belt fed artillery"

I presume that was their (Germans) way of explaining the huge disparity in the availability of Arty for the Allies.

My father claimed that during Varsity German POW were asking where the Americans got their "belt fed artillery"

The Jap POWs asked the same question to the Marines after the Battle of Edsons Ridge.

Wolfhag

I'd heard that it was the Germans asking the Brits about their belt fed 25 pounder artillery 🙄

Must admit, I recalled it as being requests to see the automatic 25-prs, rather than specifically being belt-fed. Imagine changing that magazine…

Gary

For national characteristics I like the ones in Squad Leader.

The Germans had lots of leaders and good morale.

The Russians had lots of troops, not many leaders but could dig in quickly.

The Brits would tend not to run but took a bit more pushing to advance.

And the US troops had loads of everything, would break quickly but rally quicker.

Also Battlefront WWII arty was good:
The Germans had some.
The Russians had none.
And the Brits and US had masses.

Even in 1982, a captured Argentinian officer said 'Your infantry may have won the battles but your artillery won the war.' Definitely give the Brits a bonus for massed artillery and rapid coordination of same.

I think the main nations have been covered, Robert. Where it may become a bit messy is with the lesser nations. Some ideas:

Aussies- I'm too biased to make an objective judgement, but the quality could vary a lot between 2AIF and AMF/CMF units and formations- eg the refusal to advance against bunkers by an AMF company at Gona.

Italy- roll to discover morale when they first have to do a morale check. In the desert 75% chance to have low morale (it was an unpopular war that many troops disagreed with), but 50% if in Italy. I don't know how they did in other theatres.

Kiwis- well trained with good morale and discipline (Crete notwithstanding- a leadership failure, not the troops'). Rate them with the best of those categories (I'll probably be stripped of my Oz citizenship for writing that).

Canadians- nearly as good as the Kiwis (two years less combat experience) and give a bonus to morale if facing SS.

Poles (post Normandy). Good morale, average training, discipline spotty, so may charge in where Tigers fear to tread.

Any others want to contribute some of the "bit players"?

The war in Albania that was supposed to be held in Greece was unpopular with the Italian troops, as sometimes happens when you have to fight in the snow and cold of the mountains in winter--I could definitely see giving them at least a 75% chance of low morale as Dal Gavan suggests. A lot of their higher command was definitely awful, too (Lieutenant General Sebastiano Visconti Prasca is a particularly good example of this).

The morale of their Greek enemies tended to be high. Quite a few of their units had received additional training in the months preceding the outbreak of the war, so would rate as "regular" from the start, rather than spending some time as "green."

Grelber

My sole WWII gaming experience is with Flames of War. (I know, I know. 🙄)
This is where I derive my dislike of "national characteristics".
A prime example is Stormtrooper. Or, as we call it "The German Cheat Move". Even the worst German unit gets it automatically.
Yet, it's something that any well trained military should be capable of.
Another is "German Mission Tactics". Again, any well trained platoon should be capable of it.

No. I'm not going to define them. My dislike of them would be enough to get the definition wrong.

Then there's the cockamamie Tank Ranges rule that mean the opposite for British and Russian. See paragraph above.

I wouldn't want to get too far out in the weeds with National Characteristics modifiers as such, but there are some good general ideas up there, I believe, that reflect individual nations' armies' training and tactics. The German concept of an ad hoc "Battlegroup" for example, and their doctrine of immediate counterattack after a reverse or withdrawal, and that might well have a place in certain scale games.

No one's mentioned the plucky Finns yet, so I will stand up and suggest that Finnish troops should have superior morale compared to other "satellite" armies and perhaps a better movement rate or initiative value.

BattlerBritain, the quality of the Soviet artillery, and the entire army, cannot be assessed equally throughout the war.
In 1941 – this army with little experience and poor command, but fighting fanatically in the most hopeless conditions. The losses are enormous, including in artillery.
In 1942 – this army with significantly disappointed personnel, uninitiative template command, with a minimum of equipment lost earlier and evacuated factories that have not yet begun mass production in a new place. Lack of everything – weapons, ammunition, equipment.
In 1943 – growth of morale, level of command, elimination of shortage of weapons and ammunition.
In 1944 – it can be said that the Soviet army qualitatively approached the level of the German army in its training.
In 1945 – this is perhaps the best land army in the world.

And now specifically about artillery. The three pillars on which the Soviet artillery was based were the versatility of guns and calibers at the regimental and divisional level, and the high mobility of these guns; the large-scale use of heavy mortars; and a powerful concentration of heavy guns in the direction of the main attack (special breakthrough artillery units reporting directly to the Supreme Command).
The huge weakness of the Soviet artillery was the insignificant amount of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery.

Thanks Cuprum2.

Yes I think the main reason Battlefront didn't have much Russian artillery was the scale of the game at mainly Company and Battalion level.

With the big guns of Russian artillery being at Regiment and above needing a lot of planning time meant that unless the scenario was a planned attack the big guns were 'employed elsewhere'.

The Russians did have lots of mortars though.

Also include mass rocket artillery, which played a significant role in the battles on the Eastern Front.

Interesting statistics in the article on Russian wars (machine translation). Among other things, the concept of "the fortitude of troops – fighting spirit" is introduced. Despite all the conventionality and averaging, this is an attempt to derive a coefficient mathematically (number of dead/number of those who laid down their arms):

link

USSR
1.7*)

Germany
0.9**)

Hungary
0.6

Italy
0.9

Romania
1,1

Slovakia
0.3

Finland
35.0

Japan (from Soviet-Japanese French)
0.15

Polish (1939)
0.16

French (1940)
0.05

@cuprum2 I like the coefficient. It puts into numbers the fighting spirit. In terms of national characteristics I've always felt the Soviets should be able to take more casualties before breaking than most other forces (Japan and Finland excepted).

I also agree that the Soviets need to be broken down by year…just disagree with 1945. I admit my sources are predominantly American and British but the impression I've had is that most of the high quality veteran soldiers are killed or wounded in 1944-45 and the force that takes Berlin is of lower quality due to inexperience relative to the army of 1944. I've also seen a lot of data suggesting that the Soviets were desperately low on supplies in 1945, to the point that they were effectively exhausted as a fighting force with taking Berlin (one of the many reasons George Patton wanted to attack the Soviets). If my impressions are incorrect or you have sources that provide evidence to support the opposite argument, I would love to read them.

It partly depends on the period and the units involved. I generally rate forces at brigade/division level on their communications, logistics and ability to do effective combined arms tactics. These things change through the war, so eg British armoured Divisions aren't good at combined arms up until late 1944, the Germans are good at it from mid 1940ish until late 1944, depending. The US have shedloads of LOG etc etc.

In the main this sort of rating system is entirely driven by Nationalism. Which army you think did best is mainly driven by what country you live in. The posty-war love-in with the German Military has fatally poisoned the minds of the current generation and we will have to wait until all of us are gone before rational conclusions become the norm.
When Bayerlein was being questioned in Allied custody after WW2 it is amusing to see what he told his captors when they asked him to 'rate' the various Allied Armies performance. His answers were entirely different and depended on which nation was questioning him.

So, I still don't see why we are looking for special rules.

Nothing in this list requires special rules. If someone's artillery has a higher rate of fire than others, then give them a higher rate of fire. Or if unit moves faster, give it a faster movement rate. and so on.

Martin Rapier, I think the introduction of time periods for assessing the morale of troops makes sense for all armies that have been fighting for a long time. The experience of commanders at all levels changed, successes and defeats had an impact, the changing level of supply of troops – many different factors over time can have a significant impact.
We have played games on the theme of the Russian Civil War. Often it is a terrible supply for one or all sides. When you have a limited supply of ammunition for your guns and machine guns (for example, your gun can only fire three times per game) – this has an interesting effect on the course of the game.

mkenny, I would say on the personal bias of the authors of the rules, the book, the films, etc. …

smithsco, in my opinion, for the rank and file, it is not the length of service of veterans in the army that is important, but how long they are in their units among new recruits. It does not take several years in combat conditions at the front to gain the necessary individual experience. I think a soldier can be considered experienced enough if he has served among veterans for a couple of months in combat conditions. And ten percent of "old" servicemen in a unit will be enough to pass on knowledge, traditions and fighting spirit of the military unit to newcomers.
It is a bit more complicated with commanders – here the experience of direct command on the battlefield is important. But here it is simply natural selection that is in effect – those who are incapable either die quickly or are sent to less responsible work…
As for the exhaustion of the Soviet army, this is not so. The production of military equipment and hardware was constantly growing throughout the war. In addition, lend-lease gained momentum precisely at the end of 1944-45.
I can recommend you a professional scientific article on the topic of supplying Soviet troops in the Berlin operation with many figures and links to sources. But alas, it is in Russian. You will have to download it and translate it yourself:

link

USA: Really good artillery, often on call at a moment's notice.

eto, you've been at small arms level too long. Let's go with that one.
MG's have different rates of fire. Artillery pieces, joking aside, have number of rounds alloted--or number of tubes the FO can call on. In a well-documented historical engagement, you can follow the history. In a hypothetical, you go with historical norms for the time and place--which usually means more rounds available for the US, or more tubes which can be called in by the British, and less of each for the Germans.

And once you say "this (British) observer can call on more tubes" or this (American) battery has more rounds available" because this is the norm, you've arrived at national characteristics whether you like calling it that or not.

Yes, of course national characteristics can be abused. So can armor class, speed or rate of fire. The trick is not avoiding shorthands. That can't be done. The trick is finding the combination of them which make for an interesting and historically plausible game. I don't normally use them for my WWII gaming, but it's not a tool I'd leave out of the box, either.

you've arrived at national characteristics whether you like calling it that or not.

I didn't say anything about there being something "wrong" with "national characteristics". There is, but I didn't say anything about that.

Whether you're idenitfying different rate of fire, number of tubes, number of rounds, they are all stats that operate within the rules you have and don't need the special rules you seem so fond of.

Now, you your point, what you are calling out are not national characteristics. You even point that out:

In a well-documented historical engagement, you can follow the history.

So, obfiously, whatever characteristic is of your concern, it is not a function of the nation, since they will vary from situation to situation for forces of the same nation.

Pretty much everything cited here is a situational modifier. It would not apply to all forces of a nation under all situations, all the time, every battle.

BTW, if artillery doesn't have ROF, you should probably tell all the USA, USN, NATO, and SEATO people who write artillery manuals. They have a lot of corrections to make …

I did two tours with the gun bunnies, eto. Wasn't fair, really. Goodall got the chimps, Fossey the gorillas and Breaute the Orangs. But I got the 13 series. It's the ammo supply that counts.

And not a TO&E out there which hasn't had exceptions from time to time. When we do historicals and know the exceptions, we use that knowledge. In hypotheticals, we use the norm for that nation. I see no reason why the same principle can't be applied to other aspects of an army.

I posted intemperately, and I ought not to have done so. But has anyone seen the advantages of US and British artillery in WWII attributed to the superior rate of fire of the guns, and not to US logistics or British training and doctrine?

There isnt much point having a higher rate of fire of you haven't got the ammunition to fire, nor the control systems to locate and engage targets in a timely fashion.

The real source of national distinctions is doctrine and training, and the US field artillery organization affords us the best example of that. The US Army spent a lot of time and effort in the 1930s in developing fire direction centers at the battery and battalion level- the former for technical fire direction, the latter for tactical fire direction. This did two things: it elminated the old practice of a battery's commander going forward and calculating a firing solution from an OP, which meant the battery was no longer available to support only that observer. It also created a doctrine that allowed effective and rapid massing of fire, not just for the battalion, but for general support or reinforcing battalions that were assigned those missions in support of the direct support battalion.

By the end of the war, it wasn't unusual for a battalion fire direction center to mass the fire of as many as five or six battalions in response to a single forward observer's call for fire. The British Army came closest to the level of responsiveness this delivered, but the Germans never did. And the US Army put a lot of tubes behind it. In game terms, though this is far from a national characteristic, save for the ability to control off board artillery through one FO.

That comment about artillerymen being like monkeys was neither funny nor insightful- but that wouldn't be the first time someone who passed a career in intelligence overestimated his own.

has anyone seen the advantages of US and British artillery in WWII attributed to the superior rate of fire of the guns,

It's the ammo supply that counts.

So, you could probably try reading what I wrote instead of replying based on what you wanted me to write.

ROF, ammo supply, C2, training … doen't matter to my point. Any characteristic doesn't need a special rule, just a different value for different forces, based on their situation.

And not a TO&E out there which hasn't had exceptions from time to time.

Which is exactly in line with my point that: (1) A TOE is a specific characteristic for a force in a specific situation, not a new set of rules for it/ (2) Nations change their equiment, doctrine, training, etc. battle to battle across a war as they mix and match what is availble for specific engagements. None of it is static. So none of it is a national characteristic except in the context of a single battle (an not necessarily then).

etotheipi +1

I agree, and prefer the game should reflect training, TOE, doctrine and equipment. For example, early war USSR artillery should be pre-plotted and be dependent on either a unit with a field phone or runners that go off board to request artillery since they did not broadly have access to radios or a structured FO system and their doctrine was thus based on pre-plotted fires. Towards the end of the war the Soviets had broad access to radios (courtesy of US Lend-Lease) and had adopted more flexible artillery doctrine that included trained teams of FOs with radios.

So -- do that. I try to reflect that in my games.

I can't see how you can realistically play late WW2 without giving the Western Allies superior artillery. Wargamers, being what they are, will give the Germans mechanically reliable Panthers and King Tigers and ignore logistics. The Western Allies will have struggle along with 75mm Shermans.

A further point on logistics, I understand that US forces had severe shortages of artillery ammunition in late 44, early 45 to the extent that some units equipped with 25pounders and German field pieces.

Observation and documentation are one thing but the underlying reason for actions and why is entirely something else.

It's documented that US troops in Europe were rather easily suppressed but rallied quickly. How and why?

In my opinion, there was no hurry to take most objectives and try to avoid casualties. If the infantry attack bogged down, pull back, take a smoke, and let the artillery and air support soften up the targets. You rally quickly because you are probably not under fire, and seeing the enemy get plastered by HE is a real morale booster. IIRC I read somewhere that if an attacking US infantry unit was stopped three times they quit attacking for the day.

As Cuprum2 said, the Russian Army was not the same during the war. Early in the war Russian Human Wave attacks were hard to stop because the NKVD blocking force "motivated" them to attack (Ukraine, too). However, later in the war, the Russians used infiltration attacks, infiltrating small units through German gaps in the line and attacking the Germans from the rear. Another tactic was during a heavy artillery barrage to lift the barrage in a 100-200m front to allow Russian units to quickly exploit the gap and attack the German defenses from the flank and rear when the prep barrage was lifted. This would catch the Germans emerging from their underground shelters before they could form up for a defense.

With artillery, the idea is to get as many accurate rounds as possible on the target in the shortest amount of time. The US and Brits have somewhat perfected this with the Time on Target tactic. The reason being training, communications, good fire control & computations and observation, adequate ammo, trained FO, and air observation.

The Russians could write up the same doctrine but not be able to carry it out.

It's popularly known that the US TD doctrine "failed" for a variety of reasons and the 3" AT gun was hardly ever used. However, the Germans considered Russian AT guns their most dangerous foe. German AT guns were very effective against the Allies in N. Africa. If the Germans were on the offensive they could have played a greater role.

The US TDs were successful under the right conditions and tactics:

Battle of El Guettar
In March 1943, the 601st Tank-Destroyer-Battalion's courageous defense against the 10th Panzer Division was a major armored victory for the US and the first of World War II. This battle was the only time US tank destroyers were deployed as an entire battalion to stop a German armored breakthrough.

Battle of Arracourt
The 37th Tank Battalion and the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion defeated the 113th Panzer Brigade, despite the Germans having more tanks and men. The Americans' tactical victory was due to their knowledge of the ground, superior training, and clever use of fire and maneuver tactics.

Most of the losses the TDs sustained were by not following their doctrine of shoot & scoot to a new firing location.

Battle of Climbach
The 614th Tank Destroyer Battalion earned a Presidential Unit Citation for their heroic stand in December 1944.

Battle across Germany's Siegfried Line
In 1945, the 614th Tank Destroyer Battalion's aggressive assault earned the respect of other front line soldiers and eventually earned them a Medal of Honor.

Under the right conditions and tactics they achieved victory. The real problem was that they were not ideal for offensive action so someone came up with the idea to use them for indirect fire.

The expected employment of the TD battalions shifted. While the formal doctrine still called for the employment of complete battalions, the Tank Destroyer Center began to emphasize a new focus on combined arms training and small-unit actions. New field manuals were prepared to discuss the independent operation of tank-destroyer platoons, and crews began to have specialized training in their secondary roles, such as indirect gunnery or anti-fortification work.

The same goes for weapons. The BAR was developed for "Walking Fire" but hardly ever used for it. The US M72 LAW was developed as an AT weapon which it was terrible at. However, it was great as a bunker buster and taking out weapons emplacements. An updated version is still used today.

After the war, the Germans stated the Americans were hard to fight because they didn't follow their doctrine. In the end, it doesn't really matter what your doctrine or training is, you'll have to fight with what you have and adapt, improvise, and overcome with local leadership initiatives and "Yankee Ingenuity."

Desperate situations mean desperate actions too. Calling in artillery on your own position or a silent infantry bayonet attack at night without prep artillery to achieve surprise or a Banzai Attack.

Wolfhag

In my opinion, there was no hurry to take most objectives and try to avoid casualties.

Trying to avoid casualties is one of the main criticisms of the British, and is why some US commanders considered them "slow" (despite their run from the Seine to Brussels) or "timid". On the other hand, the US seems to have preferred to put in hasty attacks, rather than deliberate assaults, and paid for it- Metz, Argentan, Hurtgen, etc.

That's not a criticism. When it works a hasty attack saves a lot of time and resources. When it didn't there usually was a cost in higher KIA/WIA. You can see it in US Third Army veterans response to Patton's press-invented nickname, "Blood and Guts"- "Yeah, our blood, his guts!".

Wolfhag, I wonder how much time will have to pass before this stupid myth about "NKVD barrier detachments" is dispelled? The functions of the barrier detachments are those of the regular military police. They were located several kilometers from the front line on roads and crossroads and were supposed to detain deserters and units that left their positions without orders. Nothing like what you see in Hollywood and even some Russian films and books that were politicized during the Gorbachev and Yeltsin era actually happened.
The NKVD troops are rear guard troops. They included border guards and regular rifle units, usually engaged in guarding military factories, bridges, government institutions, as well as fighting enemy paratroopers and saboteurs.
The security services also belonged to the NKVD, but to other departments (by the way, even the criminal police and fire departments belonged to the NKVD). And also the GULAG guards.
Blocking detachments in the Red Army were formed in 1942 (the famous order No. 227). Each division was supposed to have one blocking detachment of only 200 people.
The staffing table of a blocking detachment:

link

For those interested, here is a detailed scientific article about the barrier detachments, but, alas, only in Russian. You will have to translate it yourself:

link

And where would you place such a number of people to prevent the division from fleeing (at least five to six thousand armed people)? Probably best at its headquarters, to motivate commanders to manage their people wisely)))

You see, the Red Army did not have a military police. In principle. And the barrier detachments were formed to perform its functions.

"Trying to avoid casualties is one of the main criticisms of the British, and is why some US commanders considered them "slow" (despite their run from the Seine to Brussels) or "timid". "

I have read that in the last years of the war, Great Britain was simply running out of available manpower (they'd been fighting since 1939 after all, across the globe) and could not afford to replace losses as they once might. So they HAD to be extra cautious, their combat troops had to last the distance. You can see from the statistics that the UK /Commonwealth forces in Europe 1944-45 didn't increase much over time but the Americans kept gaining strength and numbers. This disparity would certainly compel British leaders to be wary of excessive casualties. American leaders may not have fully appreciated this.

I have read that in the last years of the war, Great Britain was simply running out of available manpower

That's what all the histories I've read state, Piper909, hence the constant raising of the conscription age and re-categorising of some "protected occupations", to make the conscript pool larger. It even led to some units and formations being broken up to supply reinforcements, and encouraged deliberate attacks with maximum support, rather than hasty over-runs of enemy positions- which take a lot of time to set up. I think the British commanders' mindset- from PL to BN at least- was to minimise casualties as well. The regional regimental organisation would have reinforced that as well, as (in theory) a battalion's troops would all come from the same county, if not the same town.

The US was also having some manpower issues, in particular getting enough infantry replacements, from late 1944- and they had about three times the UK's population.

The degree to which qualities such as aggressiveness spring from policies or strategic considerations, rather than inborn national traits, is also well illustrated by the differing views that senior US Army and Marine Corps commanders in the Pacific held. The Army regarded the Marines' unrelenting willingness to trade lives for land at a very high rate of speed as unnecessary and wasteful. The Marines for their part regarded this speed as a paramount need, and were willing to incur the casualties needed to minimize the exposure of the fleet off the landing beaches. There's arguably an organizational culture issue there, but the training and doctrines that created that culture spring from the perceived need of the mission, and I suspect that's true for most armies.

The US was also having some manpower issues, in particular getting enough infantry replacements, from late 1944- and they had about three times the UK's population.

By autumn 1944, a whole lot of countries taking part in the war were having trouble with manpower issues, due to the casualities taken over the years.

Not that this has much to do with national characteristics…

Diverging question but was any Army NOT having an infantry shortage/crisis of some degree by 1944? The Red Army was folding Rifle Divisions into ever smaller sizes as they shrank; the German Army we are often told was hollowed out by the latter half of 1944 so presumably this afflicted the Infantry arm as well; the US had a recognised Replacement crisis in late 1944 in the ETO at least. Perhaps the main difference with the British experience was the acknowledgement and appending 'crisis' to the situation.

One Br Inf Div, 59th, was broken up post Normandy to facilitate reinforcements for the other seven, and was replaced by 52nd Inf Div a few months later. 50th was not disbanded, it returned to the UK under Python, and swapped personnel and units that qualified for Python with those remaining in theatre. By March 1945 there were again eight British Inf Divs in 21 Army Group, as there had been in June 1944, with 5th Inf Div transferring from its policing role in Palestine.

Gary

(posted as GB was writing his post it seems!)

I think it would be better to change the phrase to "national army characteristics", so that it would not sound so politically incorrect. The idea is not about differences between nationalities, as such, but about differences between the various armies: how they were organized, trained, etc.; what they were especially good at and what they were not so good at, etc.

Good points, NPR and donlowry. It's not about "barbaric" Germans or "timid" Poms, it's about how the armies trained and how they implemented their doctrines, and how the most senior officers had to deal with political and strategic realities. As pointed out above, that changes constantly through the war.

Not that this has much to do with national characteristics…

It does in a way, Griefbringer, because the need to make a big effort to minimise casualties influenced how doctrine was implemented in the British army, and others- eg the preference for time-expensive, deliberate assaults. It also created some friction between the British and US senior officers in NW Europe (although a lot of that was clash of personalities and jockeying for glory, too).

Gary, thanks for the round up of the UK divisions. I hadn't seen a detailed breakdown (or don't remember, if I have).

In fairness to the British, by 1944-45 they were struggling against some enormous financial challenges, which affected decision making calculations of risk at a lot of levels. The British government was perilously close to insolvency, and that influenced procurement and strategic decision making in a lot of ways.

I think a realistic sense that another world war was more than Britain's finances could stand probably underlay a lot of the decision making by the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments before the war, and in its first year. WWI had severely strained Britain's finances, and the maintenance of the empire was always a net drain on the Treasury: a lot of British decision making (for example, adhering to the battleship limits set by the London naval agreement when the willingness of other powers to do so was doubtful) was as much as anything else an attempt to find an alternative to a ruinous arms race or an even more ruinous war.

I haven't played a wide range of WWii rules systems but played a lot of 1st ed WRG 1925 – 50 in the 70s and early 80s.They had a plus for Soviet morale and for Japanese, with Japanese having a 'bansai' reaction when morale was low. That, as I recall, was it as far as any differentiation for different nations.

I had a long hiatus from all gaming for many years and on return mainly played Ancients, but did get my hands on the 2nd ed WRG rules at some point and played a few games with my son and a friend. I know they never really took off but interestingly they were play tested in my city, including by friends of mine back before publication in, I think, 1987. While they had a number of features that bogged down play (over-complicated off-table artillery for example), they did have an interesting approach to "national characteristics", including some differentiation for different years. Some examples from memory:

Early war Soviets were 'green', late war Soviets were 'Stubborn'.
US army infantry and most Italians were also Green.
Bersagliere were better (dashing?) US armour was 'dashing'.
US Marines, SS, British Commandos were some kind of elite – I forget the term.
Early British infantry and British (and US) para were 'stubborn'.
Late war British (NZ from earlier) and all Wehrmacht were 'skilled' (I think was the term). I can't remember if home guard units (German or British) got a specific mention, probably green.
There were a few worse (inept) troops too, (eg Italian Blackshirts), and an irregular category for Abyssinians, some Asian irregulars etc. Japanese were 'fanatic'.

The distinctions were interesting. The base subunit was the platoon, typically of around 8-12 elements for infantry. Green or skilled troops stopped advancing if one element was neutralised, stubborn 2, dashing3 etc. The subunit couldn't advance again until another of its company advanced. I remember my US infantry being pinned quite a bit . . .

In addition, certain tactical options only existed for certain morale classes. So green or dashing troops couldn't skirmish (essentially move 1/3 -2/3 of the elements and shoot with the rest), but they could move alternate platoons within a company to mitigate the pinning effect. Poorer troops (eg green) couldn't stalk (creep up on a position and be harder to detect).

It wasn't perfect but was an interesting option that did not cause game problems as it was easy to remember what your options were. I played US and Germans vs Germans and British respectively so we got to try out green vs skilled and skilled vs skilled. As the US player, I would have to keep prompting my troops to advance after they came under fire but having more radios made it easier. I felt like some of the restrictions were a bit too tough – Eg Green would have attempted to use stealth so maybe should have been worse at stalking rather than unable to do it at all.

British troops had an artillery advantage (calling down an "uncle" barrage with batteries that were cheap in points to buy because they weren't always available. US had an FAO per company, which gave them added options. It was artillery I recall being the biggest problem in the game – it seemed to take ages to work out who could do what. Playing more would definitely have helped. Again, there were 'national characteristics' to reflect doctrine. There were things the US artillery couldn't do, although reading some of the comments above, Phil Barker may have got some of that wrong.

Overall, I think it was interesting for a rule set written nearly 40 years ago.

Cheers,
John

Diverging question but was any Army NOT having an infantry shortage/crisis of some degree by 1944?

After some consideration, what about the Free French forces? From September 1944 onwards they would be able to recruit quite a number of personnel from the recently liberated Metropolitan France. And quite a number of those would have had military training from their conscript service in the 1930's, while others had been participating in the resistance movement during the occupation.

That said, until then they been rather limited in the available manpower resources.

Starfury Rider, regarding the lack of men in the Soviet division to the number prescribed by the staffing table by the end of the war.
Previously, I thought the same as you, but in one discussion I was given an interesting counter-argument… The total number of people at the front did not change, despite the reduction in the number of people in the divisions… And this means that it is not a shortage people, but by increasing the number of divisions, increasing the level of command (more senior officers per soldier) and increasing the level of mechanization and heavy weapons per soldier in such a division…

Hi Cuprum, it is a few years since I did my Red Army research now. The info from pamyat-naroda as I recall detailed staged reductions to be applied as Divisional strength fell to certain figures. I don't know whether the Order of Battle (not something I any experience of for the Redd Army) showed a steady increase in formations (Divisions, Corps, etc) through 1944-45 that would compensate for the reductions made in longer serving formations as you describe.

I can't pretend to know anything about the replacement and reinforcement system in use by the Red Army. I think the interpretation in western circles has been that there was an emphasis on making the best of the personnel and weapons resources available, and planning for these to constantly decrease, rather than seeing temporary dips in strength that would be made up by reinforcement drafts, as would be expected in British and US forces.

Gary

The Army regarded the Marines' unrelenting willingness to trade lives for land at a very high rate of speed as unnecessary and wasteful. The Marines for their part regarded this speed as a paramount need, and were willing to incur the casualties needed to minimize the exposure of the fleet off the landing beaches. There's arguably an organizational culture issue there, but the training and doctrines that created that culture spring from the perceived need of the mission, and I suspect that's true for most armies.

I think that after Normandy the Army got an idea of what the Marines were up against assaulting the defended beachhead. They also found out the hard way on Okinawa, where the Army went south into the main Jap defenses while the Marines cleared the lightly defended north until the Marines relieved them in the south and finished the battle.

We still had the "hey diddle-diddle right up the middle" opinion from the Army during VN. Unfortunately, there was little opportunity for combined arms mechanized flanking operations on Tarawa, Guadalcanal, Saipan, Iwo Jima, etc. or in the jungles of VN. The Marines have always had the "assault" mentality.

At Tarawa, they needed to finish quickly fearing the Jap Fleet sortie from Rabaul.

Okinawa had the Kamikaze attacks that killed slightly more Naval personnel than Marines.

At Iwo Jima, they needed to finish quickly so the B-29s could use it as a landing strip. It was being used before the battle ended.

There's kind of a tradeoff as to how hard you push. Normally, the longer it takes the more casualties you'll have.

Wolfhag

Since this was posted to the TMP Poll Suggestions board, I would like to ask:

1.) How would you convert this into a poll? Putting all the different combatants into a single poll would probably make a mess, necessitating a separate poll for each.

2.) What would be the actual options, and how many would a participant be allowed to vote for?

1.) How would you convert this into a poll? Putting all the different combatants into a single poll would probably make a mess, necessitating a separate poll for each

I agree. I think the idea is just to look at the concept of NC in WWII, mate, and (secondly) whether they could be applied simply. There's so many different rules sets for the period, for games organised for the strategic, operational and tactical levels of combat, that a simple way of adopting any rules to show NC is probably not practical (if possible). Still, it gives an interesting insight into how other people view the different armies and how ingrained personal biases can be (and yet still be denied- "I'm not based!" ).