"Why America never had a decent Sherman. but the UK did." Topic

But the failure was not that no one picked up on Germany building Tigers. The failure was not to foresee that Germany would divert sufficient resources to build so many of the "big cats" that they'd be an ongoing problem. US Intel looked at a relative handful of Tigers and thought "special equipment."

Yes and no.

There was indeed a failure related to the Tiger. But not so much a failure of intelligence, which was actually pretty spot-on.

Tiger was only built in relatively small quantities. It was far too expensive for anything else. It was always a tank that could be handled by other means than re-defining your entire tank force.

But … there was a failure in assessment of the Tiger vs. anti-armor weaponry. This failure was by Ordnance. Testing was presented which showed that the 3-inch gun used by the tank destroyers, and the new 76mm gun used by the newest tank destroyers and up-gunned Shermans, was able to reliably defeat the Tiger frontally at 500 yards. And that simply was not true.

The Tiger's armor was of particularly high toughness. And while not face-hardened (as the Germans tended to do with thinner armor) it was harder than most plates of it's thickness. These were technical traits of the Tiger's armor that were in excess of what was observed in other Panzers, and most importantly in US test plates.

The 3-inch gun, and newer 76mm which was deliberately designed to match the 3-inch gun's performance, could reliably penetrate US test plates at the thickness of the Tiger's frontal armor (except the thickest part of the mantlet). But that did not mean they could reliably penetrate the Tiger's armor. That was clearly a failure.

Oddly, the cost of making such high-quality plate was factored in to the assessment that the Tiger would never be built in high numbers. Germany simply did not have access to the Nickel and Molybdenum needed to build Tiger-quality armor in larger quantities. One of the reasons that the Tiger-II armor was so much massively thicker (even while sloped) was that it was necessary to revert to lower quality armor to even make any Tigers by that point in the war.

There was an intelligence failure in recognizing that the Panther was something different. This is clear in the assessments of the Panther, both as presented and shared by the Soviets after Kursk (second half of 1943) and as published by the US at the end of 1943 and the first half of 1944.

The assessment was that it was a lower-cost way to build something like a Tiger. It had appeared at Kursk in separate tank battalions used to re-enforce breakthrough efforts, just as Tigers operated, and it was assumed that this would be its role. There was no real appreciation that this was a medium tank, a step-up for the Pz III and IV role rather than a step-down for the Tiger role.

This was not understood until the Normandy campaign.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

This is one of the very best TMP Threads ever.
So many "everybody knows" threads demolished with FACTS.

There were no sinister bureaucratic generals holding back progress.
There were no times at which "make it so" could have affected the outcome.

I apologize to everyone.

I don't see the need to apologise, mate. You've got a working knowledge of armour and tankies that few, if any, others on TMP would have. My hat badges were RAR and RAEME, so my knowledge of tanks is limited to where to aim a 106mm RCL at one, or how to fix the unimportant bits like intercom, radios or LRF.

SQ? Did you manage to "acquire" your own Leopard?

Oh no. The current neighbours wouldn\t tolerate having one on my lawn.

Troop WO=Platoon Sgt or Platoon WO

SQ=CQ only the armour version, squadron quartermaster rather than compnay quartermaster, with every bit of tool and kit known to mankind.

The SSM, squadron sergeant major equivalent to CSM, only also had anywhere up to a ten to twenty vehicle echelon to move about to support the squadron.

More info on the US heavy tank development: link

Wolfhag

Our armies share the same parentage, mate, so I know that any appointment with "Q" in the acronym means a tight-fisted, thieving, cranky offspring of unmarried parents. . We could really confuse the Yanks by talking about ASM, BSM, CSM, DSM, GSM, PSM, RSM, SSM and WSM. Or private, rifleman, kingsman, gunner, sapper, craftsman, bandsman, trooper, etc.

As far as I can tell, the original post was about why the US didn't end up with a "Firefly" equivalent Sherman (which, arguably they did with the various 76mm versions – I was interested to see how the 76mm gun compared to the 17pdr; that was news to me). Somehow, and perhaps not surprisingly, the question of the Pershing came out of that discussion, as an alternative to an upturned Sherman.

However, doing a search for "Pershing" in this thread, no one seems to have suggested the Pershing could or should have been available for D-Day. That seems to have been a straw man.

Cheers,
John

@archi-duc

Wargamers are an imaginative bunch!

Interestingly – if the Pershing had been landed – how would thir presence have affected US combat effectiveness; would that (assuming great improvement) have affected Montgomery's sacrificial strategy?

Somehow, and perhaps not surprisingly, the question of the Pershing came out of that discussion, as an alternative to an upturned Sherman.
However, doing a search for "Pershing" in this thread, no one seems to have suggested the Pershing could or should have been available for D-Day. That seems to have been a straw man.

I would not characterize it as a strawman. Historical mischaracterizations were offered, some hypothesizing was added, and conclusions were proposed.

In this article is about the delays of deploying the Pershing to Europe. … It cites as one of the main problems, the opposition of Lt. Gen. Lesley McNair, the father of the "tank destroyer doctrine." …
"Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, who in 1943 directed the buildup of U.S. forces for the invasion of France and earlier was head of the Army's armored forces, advocated the replacement of the Sherman with a more powerful tank." …
I understand the logistical issues of getting the Pershing to the ETO. But apparently they were overcome because they eventually got there. They got there late due to recalcitrant opposition.

The Ord. Dept. was more interested in developing a new transmission for the Sherman. That was their priority until General Marshall slapped them down.

A question was asked.

When was the date of the Pershing being accepted?

A further hypothesis that pre-supposed the answer to that question.

… you don't stop making Shermans! You stop making Tank Destroyers. Retool and start production.

All of this was addressed, with detailed timelines for Pershing acceptance ("when was the date"), details about Tank Destroyer production completion ("stop making Tank Destroyers"), direct quotes of some of the individuals involved in the detailed timelines who's positions were taken far beyond the real context ("Devers … advocated the replacement of the Sherman", "Ord. Dept was more interested in developing a new transmission for the Sherman …. Until General Marshall slapped them down."), and some context was added about what challenges were present for the individuals who had to make decisions without hindsight to guide them.

It's easy to re-quote all the old conclusions reached by authors who don't offer their sources and want to sell books by sounding angry and telling a gullible public "that guy was a bad guy." Everyone loves a dime-novel story or a classic western where the black hats make the bad guys obvious. But if you actually go into the archives and look at the correspondence and records of the time, well that just isn't the way it happened.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Oh, yeah. This thread is full of a search for the Bad Guys who wanted to kill American tank crew. One could almost conclude that the Germans were in charge of American tank development.

Mark,
I did find your posts on the development of the Pershing thorough and interesting thanks. I just hadn't seen anyone arguing that they should have been available for D-Day, or some alternative landing day.

Cheers,
John

Blaming the enemy for trying to kill you during a war is an easy excuse.

We have gone over, production, design, engineering, manufacturing, training, shipping, logistics and deployments and even use, fairly well.

More of a good question might be when either the UK or the US Army decided to start slaying their doctrines of tank destoyers, anti-tank artillery and separation of tank roles in cruiser and infantry support. Maybe I should break down a bit.

On the US side.
When did the US change over and close down the tank destroyer force as a separate command?
When did the US last create or form a TD battaalion?
When did the US decide that the TD doctrine needed changing?

On the UK side.
When did they finally give up on the separation between a 'cruiser' and an 'infantry tank' in both design and also in practice?
Put another way, when did they accept the doctrine or concept of a universal tank?
Also for the UK, did the artillery ever give up the role of tank destroying or anti tank role? Might surprise everyone today???

Some other aspects to cover:
In the Normandy bocage country the 76, 90 and 17pdr gun barrels would have been less effective because they were so much longer than the 75 and they did not really need the extra penetration. Just think of what would have happened if the Sherman flamethrower had shown up in the bocage.

Based on the data already presented and the following my opinion is that it's a good thing the Sherman 75 was in Normandy and not any other tanks.

A Sherman would fire WP into suspected German positions on the other side of the hedgerow. I don't think the 76 had a WP in June 1944. Were there any Panthers in the bocage, or were they in the British sector? They would have had the same problem as the 76 and 17pdr.

An Allied tank would fire white phosphorus into the corners to suppress, obscure, or drive off the German machine gun crews and then keep up suppressing fire without exposing the sides of the tank.
link

Rate of Fire: If you don't have the best gun the next best thing is to shoot first and shoot more often. The Panther D model had a traverse rate of 6 degrees per second compared to the Sherman 25 degrees with commander override and a periscope for the gunner. The Sherman models were the fastest draw in the West to shoot first:

Why Tankers preferred 75 over 76mm:
YouTube link

WP and canister rounds: Only the Sherman had them in the summer of 1944. Patton was known to have said the first round should be AP.

The 75 mm gun also had an effective canister round that functioned as a large shotgun. In the close fighting of the French bocage of Normandy, the U.S. Army's 2nd Armored Division tanks used Culin Hedgerow Cutters fitted to their tanks to push three tanks together through a hedgerow. The flank tanks would clear the back of the hedgerow on their side with canister rounds while the center tank would engage and suppress known or suspected enemy positions on the next hedgerow. This approach permitted surprisingly fast progress through the very tough and well-defended hedgerows in Normandy.

The canister will also strip away camouflage.

Sherman gun sights. This must have been a real pain to use effectively. But if the target is within 1 second time of flight (about 700 yards) it won't really matter:

Defender advantage: This was the main reason for Germany's effectiveness in Normandy. When defending you are normally in a concealed ambush position with a pre-made range card. This had an almost 100% chance to hit on the first shot. The Germans also had flashless powder (the Allied did not) making them even harder to spot when they fired.:

HE versus German tanks: They can be effective, especially with the rapid rate of fire from a platoon of them:

Facing Stugs and Panzer IVs in the bocage:
Panzer IV: turret/mantlet 50mm, glacis 90mm
StuG: Casemat 90mm, mantlet 80mm

The Sherman 75 can penetrate 80-85mm at 100-200m.

If they ran into a Panther at close range they could pretty easily put a round into the shot trap at the bottom of the mantlet.

Poorly trained German drivers: Most drivers were trained on older tanks and sometimes on captured enemy vehicles. These had a different steering mechanism than the Panthers and Tigers. The result was over revved engines and accidents.

Why not the 17pdr:

Sherman Transmission: The big problem with the Sherman transmission was that it could not skid turn or pivot in place. It had to make a "Y" turn similar to a car. Here is why the US wanted to replace the Sherman transmission. If I were a tank crewman I would too. I've also read 1st person accounts of this problem:

The Shermans had helical gears in the final drive and transmissions which were much better than the straight tooth gears. The Panthers had them in the transmission but not on the final drive where the problems occurred.

Were the Allies the last to mount an AA gun on a tank? The US experimented with a 90mm on a Sherman but it didn't work out.

Were there more Panthers and Tigers in the British sector rather than in the bocage?

Wolfhag

Troop it is not strictly true that Britain didn't produce any decent engines they just didn't put them in tanks. I always thought the Kestrel would have made a decent tank engine had they bothered to pursue it. It wasn't too bulky and would have had a decent power output.
As for the info on the Chrysler Multibank my info comes from my Great Uncle who was REME and served through last 2 years of the war and into peacetime. He worked on all the Sherman variants the UK had, the Meteor engined tanks, but hardly on any of the early engines as they going out of service. His favourite was the Meteor engine. They had a Cromwell ARV that they took the governors off and could get it well over 40mph. Least favourite was the M4A4 and in his opinion it was a poor engine. The 5 engines were difficult to keep in time. Even simple maintenance required an engine pull, it was prone to engine fires and fuel leaks.
As for the Sherwood Foresters getting the M4A2 prior to D-day may have been because they switched to DD tanks, that didn't stop them being heartily glad to be rid of A4‘s.

Never thought about the Kestrel. Good point about having them but not putting them into tanks. The meteor was only thought of once production was high enough that they could divert some effort.

The multibank in comparison to the peers is not the best thing. However, compared to quite the variety of pre and early war engines is a thing of wonder. It all depends what you compare it to.

About adjusting the governors on the Meteor. I had a friend who did that in his Centurion. He always had to put it back to the governed settings, when ever the tank went to the shop or for service. Scottish Avaiation rebuilds over the Dutch rebuilds every day of the week!

The Twin Bedford in the Churchill was probably one good exception to early and mid war engines. After development and a year of use it was actually reliable.

I really would like to have been a fly on the wall of the design shop hearing their arguments about what engines were available? Who they would have to bribe at what ministry to get something decent vs what was in production that they could both combine and fit. I think I left out the crazy UK competitiveness of refusing to use the major assemblies of any competitor.

Mind the twwn Bedord, it was the same concept as either the twin diesel of the Sherman M4A2 or the M4A4 Chrysler multibank in combining multiple engines to get the minimum power required as well as what would fit.

Wolfhag, yes the concentration of armour as well as heavy armour was on the British and Canadian area. Including a number of the heaavy FLAK batteries for the open areas.

That area was also quite a bit more open in terrain rather than the tight bocage country where the bulk of US forces had to fight through. Rolling low hills, wheat fields, Carpiquet airfield. Open areas with 500-800m distances between villages and woodlots.

Funny the emphasis on the transmission. For a really bad transmission and driver control, the Russians lived in fear of having to road move KVs through towns with narrow streets and damage to bridges.

Getting 2 engines to work together is a lot easier than getting 5 to do the same. The early development of the Meteor they have to scavenge Merlin's from downed aircraft and rebuild them. It wasn't until the heads of Rover and Rolls Royce got together and did a deal where Rover got the Meteor and Rolls Royce the Whittle jet engine that they actually made progress.

Also Packhard in Detroit was ramped up on line as well.

I really would like to have been a fly on the wall of the design shop hearing their arguments about what engines were available? Who they would have to bribe at what ministry to get something decent vs what was in production that they could both combine and fit. I think I left out the crazy UK competitiveness of refusing to use the major assemblies of any competitor.

Of course prewar we built mostly tankettes, light tanks and even the Vickers Medium only had a 90 HP engine. No development work was done on tank engines unlike the aero engines. Power outputs of aero engines virtually doubled in the decade upto the start of WW2.