"Fictional Baltic Scenario?" Topic

I have read that the French thought about opening a second front in 1870 via an amphibious invasion in the Baltic. This might involve French naval units vs the small Prussian/German navy, along with attacks on the German port fortifications.

In reality, not very likely, but what might be the narrative for a fictional invasion campaign scenario? Any thoughts appreciated…

Funny you would ask. We did a Campaign a few years ago from a company in UK, it included a whole political angle. Short story the French did very well and Denmark came in on the French side. I set up a game with Danish and French Marines/Sailors vs Prussian Landwehr and a Division of Prussian Regulars. It's all set to go but not played…yet. I am going to game it out in the next few weeks. The French Navy is just too powerful vs Prussia in 1870 to be more than a surface raider game.

Excellent! Glad I am not alone. The Prussians did have a 3-4 decent ships but engine trouble prevented them from getting to sea. The French had trouble getting enough coal to their ships, which kept returning for fuel and leaving holes in the blockade. If we make these problems go away, there could be a couple of naval skirmishes.

Or perhaps the Germans accidently fire on a British ship. The Danes have experience from 1864, good idea.

Historical non-fictionnal planned Expeditionnary Corps under General Trochu (named 23rd july) with 30 to 40 000 men,
3 Divisions including 9600 from famous Vassoigne's Marine Infantry Division more 2 others Infantry from Marching Regiments and a fourth Cavalry Division

On August 3, 1870, the French Foreign Minister, the Duke of Gramont, was able to write to his representative in Copenhagen: The expeditionary force of 28,000 men is to leave on the 20th of this month; but it is necessary to know how it will be received, and whether the landing can take place, because if Denmark does not promise us its support, we will be forced to leave it aside and go and make our diversion elsewhere. Will we be able to land in Jutland, and will we find support there? Mr. Hall has written here that the country would declare itself for us and would drag the King along, willingly or unwillingly and come to an agreement with him.
(…)
the 6th august the Envoyé Extraordinaire from the Quai d'Orsay explains that he reminded the Danish government of the fact that the landing of a French expeditionary force capable of supporting and supervising the Danish army was conditional on the prior signing of a treaty of alliance.

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I estimated that 30 000 men of a selected infantry, a division of dismounted cavalry (whose horses could easily be found in Denmark), three pieces of field artillery per 1000 men and a siege park should form the basis of the expeditionary force, to which would be added the Danish army of 40 000 men with its equipment and reserves arranged for renewals. The whole would constitute a respectable army, strongly supported by local patriotism, by opinion, and which could operate boldly. Its immediate objective would be the siege (by combined maritime and military means) and the capture of the important, now Prussian, place of Düppel, followed by a rapid march through the revolted populations of Schleswig-Holstein, on Hanover, where it seemed beyond doubt that a revolution in favor of the dispossessed princes would break out with all the political and military consequences that were to be expected. The sea, the Danish islands and the Danish continent forming, at a short distance behind, the base of operations and the center of renewals, this forward march of the allied forces would be carried out under all desirable conditions of material security and moral support.

Marshal Le Bœuf felt how important it was that these troops, called upon to embark, sail, disembark, possibly undergo special tests, make great efforts in the unexpected and even in the unknown, should be coherent and solid. I believe he wanted the Marine Infantry Division, which should be its basis, to be joined by two organized divisions of the land Army. The Emperor refusing this, the Marshal proposed to complete the Marine Infantry with a single organized division, the third being composed of marching regiments (regiments of the moment, which will be formed in the depots with soldiers from the reserve). The Emperor, who seems to want to keep for his own operations all the organized troops available in the interior and in Algeria, did not agree to this. His Majesty intends that the Baltic Army Corps, which should in reality have been formed, (of old date) from the most tested troops of the Armée d'Afrique, is composed exclusively of a division of Marine Infantry (troops that know how to embark and disembark, valuable as such, but to which the particular conditions of its service do not give any habit of solidarity and any cohesion),: and-.of two divisions composed of marching regiments in the process of being formed!
I am ready to accept this composition, but the men of the profession will understand its full inadequacy. It will be a « bunch of troops » much more than an army corps. The operation is transformed and is no longer just an expedition whose main, and perhaps sole, goal will be to retain some Prussian troops in the North: It seems doubtful to me that for such a result, which exclusively concerns the operations of the French army, Denmark would want to compromise itself (before knowing how events will turn out) with a powerful neighbor solidly fortified on Danish territory that it embraces with its network of railways.

Moreover, at the time I write these lines, in the state of futility of the preparation, the problem seems virtually resolved by the insufficiency of the time remaining available. Whatever is decided and done from now on, and the organization of the Baltic Corps may be as summary, incomplete and hasty as one wishes, one will not have assembled and embarked, before a month, its people, its 3000 horses (artillery, engineers, scout cavalry, transports, etc., reduced to minimums well below the regulatory requirements) and its equipment of all kinds. Add to this the journey, the organization in Denmark (where more than 1000 draft horses are to be purchased), the agreement for concerted operations, etc., and one will see that at that time the forced departure of the fleet because of the ice will be very imminent, that the army corps will have to think about preparing for its wintering during which, in given circumstances, the situation of the Danish Government would be just as fortunate as that which the events of the winter of 1864 had made it.

Général Trochu

Thank you! Excellent….quite a force, it gives a basis for a major action.

We know this did not happen, what were the reasons?

The aborted Expedition of the Baltic 1870
Vice-Amiral d'Escadre (2S) Eric Schérer

extracts from the full article
PDF link

On the German side, the French plans had not been ignored since 1869. Efforts were being made to strengthen coastal defences (artillery, mines) and the very ambitious naval plan of 1867 was being implemented. 5 armoured ships, including the very powerful König Wilhelm with its 24 cm guns and 203 mm armour, made up the Prussian squadron. It is also necessary to mention the exceptional measures taken by General Vogel de Falkenstein, responsible for the defence of Northern Germany, who called for resistance to the French invasion from the outbreak of the conflict and indicated that those who served as pilots for the French fleet would be punished with death, which was to be deprived of lights and landmarks on the coast. He then had 54,000 men to defend the North Sea coasts, but only 11,000 in the Baltic, potentially supplemented by up to 40,000 who would be transferred by rail.

A diplomatic maneuver lacking speed and realism

Putting Denmark on France's side was crucial, without alienating Russia. It is therefore incomprehensible that steps were not taken earlier with Copenhagen.
The Danish population was said to be very vengeful and favorable to the French – the passage of the two French ships, the Thétis and the Cassard on July 29 in front of Copenhagen had been greeted with hurrah from the Danish population – but the sovereign Christian IX was hesitant, even Germanophile. And above all, given the numbers present in 1870, the fear of Prussia was stronger than the prospect of a territorial advantage obtained alongside the French. Prompt and skilled in maneuvering, Bismarck obtained from the king on July 17 a declaration of neutrality that Paris, however, did not want to believe was definitive. Also, on July 27, France sent an emissary to Copenhagen who arrived there on August 1; it was very late…
France also hoped that the arrival of an impressive naval force in the North of Denmark – Bouët-Willaumez's squadron arrived on July 28 at Frederikshavn – would win the Danes' decision. On August 4, France again achieved a certain diplomatic success by obtaining from Saint Petersburg an end to Russian reluctance to lift Danish neutrality, on the condition that Christian IX appeared constrained and forced. But on the same day, the first setbacks of the French army at Wissembourg put an end to hopes: there was no question of allying with someone who was about to be defeated!

The deployment of the Navy thwarted by the needs of the Ministry of War

Minister Rigault de Genouilly would have liked to begin preparations and execution of the expedition as soon as possible, with all the players agreeing that its chances of success were real if it were undertaken before the end of July. In this regard, many naval officers would have liked to act even before the official declaration of hostilities – other navies were tempted by this breach of the rules of war… There was also some confusion, since the minister announced to certain maritime prefects that war would be declared on 16 July when it was not officially declared until the 19th.
In any case, the Navy was not very clear-sighted about the very probable imperatives of the War Dept that would slow down preparations for the expedition.
Indeed, given the weakness of the French force – a consequence of the country's demographics and the failure of the vote on the Niel law in its initial version – it was difficult to doubt the imperative need to transfer troops from Algeria to the metropolis. However, this transfer had two harmful effects on the preparation of the expedition. On the one hand, as we have seen, the need to protect the convoys against a possible Prussian raid in the Mediterranean would disrupt the concentration of the French armored fleet. On the other hand, and more seriously, the transfer of troops from Algeria had the effect of monopolizing transport vessels of the Navy or merchant navy, certainly in sufficient number, but which would have been needed to transport the army corps to the Baltic as soon as possible. Moreover, one may be surprised by the lack of anticipation of the joint commission of 1869 which had concluded that the naval resources resulting from the 1857 plan were adequate for the transport of 46,800 men and 11,425 horses and mules. The need to transport troops from Algeria should not have been a "surprise".
In any case, the Army quickly showed itself little inclined to engage in the operation…

"Hot" planning and sluggish preparation, symptomatic of a desire to act that was not shared

While the Navy was not exempt from reproach in terms of planning from the start of the crisis, the Army proved to be very reluctant from its very beginnings.
Indeed, aware of the significant imbalance of forces, at the very origin of the idea of ​​a diversionary operation in Northern Germany, with some hoping to immobilize up to 200,000 men in this region by the threat of a Franco-Danish army of 70,000 men – 30,000 French and 40,000 Danes – the War Ministry quickly realized the difficulty of diverting resources essential for the North-Eastern front to the benefit of this peripheral operation. Because the distribution of troops envisaged at the beginning of July with 350,000 men in 10 army corps to be placed on a war footing, supplemented by the Imperial Guard, all intended for the Army of the Rhine, and 50,000 men (an army corps with two infantry divisions and a cavalry division) with Berlin or Kiel as their objective, quickly came up against the principle of reality: not only was the Army clearly outnumbered, but German mobilisation was proving extremely rapid. On 29 July, the strength of the Northern Confederation was estimated at 300,000 men ready to fight plus 450,000 regular troops ready at very short notice, not counting the Landwehr. Also, on July 19, during the Council of Ministers where the Emperor, ill, hardly intervened, War Dept only proposed National Mobile Guards for the combined operation, in addition to the 4 Marine Infantry regiments and the Marine Artillery Regiment under this ministry. In fact, on July 24, the Navy was alone in continuing preparations for an operation in which many officials no longer believed. Until August 6, it continued to arm its transports, to transform them as much as necessary to accommodate horses, to plan the methods of supplying food and coal to the fleet that had already reached the Belt and that was going to move further south, to seek the service of Danish pilots necessary for crossing the straits and navigating the Baltic…

A start of execution, but the setbacks on the north-eastern border led to abandonment

If the War Dept had quite clearly stopped its work in favor of the expedition, although Trochu was still involved in it by trying to form march regiments, the Navy continued its preparations, making proposals to form the landing force. For example, it was counting on the French occupation brigade of Roma repatriated by its transports and therefore seaborne; this would not be a question for the War Dept.
Rigault de Genouilly had the Northern squadron set sail on July 24 for the Baltic, in the presence of the Empress, in relative haste: workers were still on board for adjustments, Bouët requested Danish maps on July 27 and, above all, the force only included seven ships out of the fourteen initially promised. His mission, as described by some actors and in the absence of any trace in the archives, consisted first of all in rallying the Kattegat and detaching the Cassard towards Copenhagen in order to show himself to the Danes. Bouët was then to block the Prussian squadron at Wilhelmshaven, while waiting for the rest of the armored fleet, initially the division of Rear Admiral Penhoat, finally replaced by the evolution squadron of Vice Admiral Fourichon, which was to extend its mission to the blockade of the North Sea coast. On July 30, it seems, to further impress the King of Denmark, Bouët was ordered to enter the Baltic with his entire squadron which then became "of the Baltic". Vice Admiral Le Noury ​​was appointed to command the transport fleet which was to arrive later, protected by the blockade curtain, as were the floating batteries. On 5 August he completed a very imperfect transport plan for 15,017 men, 4,509 horses and 610 vehicles (4 Marine Infantry regiments, the Marine Artillery Regiment supplemented by Army batteries, a cavalry regiment – ​​where did it come from? –, the general staff, the train, the ambulance and the administration, a large division, far from the army corps initially envisaged) involving 23 transport ships that would have had to be supplemented by steamers from the Compagnie générale transatlantique and the Messageries impériales. This was decidedly far from the plans drawn up by the joint commission of 1869. Fourichon did not set sail from Brest until 7 August at the head of the new Northern squadron, but the maneuver was too late: the same day, news of the defeats of the 6th at Frœschwiller and Spicheren was received. The cancellation of the combined operation was in fact decided by the minister, the Marine Infantry regiments and the Marine Artillerymen having to reach Paris, from where the former should leave for Chalons. This order shows that their transit for embarkation in Cherbourg on Le Noury's ships had not even begun on this date…

Great! Much thanks for this background.