"Aspects of Arnhem." Topic

Yes it is that time of year again! This new book looks interesting "Aspects of Arnhem: The Battle Re-examined" by Richard Doherty and David Truesdale. Focuses more on the role of Lt Gen Lewis Brereton in the planning an execution of Market Garden. Particularly in the decisions made about drop zones and the number of lifts on day 1. It also looks at the parts played by VIII and XII Corps of Second Army and Dempsey its commander. Just bought the Kindle edition.

Thanks for the post, Fred. I'll have a look for that one.

And to piggy-back on your post, here's a list of five film and TV shows about Operation Market Garden: link

Jim

Excellent. Richard Doherty is a great author. I recently read his 8th Army in Italy book – thoroughly recommend it.
Thanks.

Robert Kershaw "It never snows in September" gives the German perspective.

I was just listening to Al Murray talking about market garden on Jon snow's podcast.
He has a book out.

link

I might get this book. The decisions on drop zones and the single lift on the 17th were probably the most critical factor in dooming Market-Garden.

Naw. A huge factor of course, but unavoidable, as simply not enough resources for three airborne divs all on the same day

As Gene Hackman says in the film, it was the Gair-Manz. Their reaction is a lesson to military to this day. The story is of 1st Airborne landing into two SS Pz Divs. The truth is various ad hoc units meeting the immediate threat and an impressive movement of reinforcements into the area, when we are told all communications were paralysed by air attack.

I remain unconvinced that XXX Corps across the Bridge Too Far would have made that much difference to May 1945.

Naw. A huge factor of course, but unavoidable, as simply not enough resources for three airborne divs all on the same day

Naw! Hollinghurst the commander of the RAF transport contingent suggested 2 lifts on D day the planes taking off for the first lift pre dawn, but the US commander of IX Troop Carrier Command Williams vetoed the idea and Brereton supported him. Had 2 lifts been done on day 1 the bulk of all 3 airborne divisions could have been in place before the Germans could have reacted. Enabling Gavin both to secure Groosbeek heights and take the Nijmegen bridge by coup de main. It would also have allowed a much larger force of 1st AD to attack the bridge on day 1.

I remain unconvinced that XXX Corps across the Bridge Too Far would have made that much difference to May 1945.

Well that remains one of the big unknowns. It certainly was useful as a springboard into the Ruhr when the advance was resumed, but given Eisenhower's penchant for vacillation I doubt it would have received the logistic support it would have needed to achieve a decisive result. His failure to follow up on the promise to Monty to provide the supplies needed for Market Garden doesn't bode well for any commitment for the needed support for following operations.

I have now finished the book and think it is a valuable contribution to the Market Garden history. It focuses on the how and why of what went wrong and looks at decisions made, particularly by Brereton and Browning, but also examines 1st Airborne's command and control and the role Urquhart played in the difficulties faced by the division. It also examines the role of Marshall and Arnold, both strong proponents of airborne forces and their influence on Eisenhower plus Eisenhower's own desire to use his strategic reserve in a dramatic way. 1st Airborne army was like a bunch of coins burning a hole in his pocket.
But it is Brereton that comes in for the most criticism and his self serving attempt to push the full blame onto 21st AG and Monty and paint the actions and planning of 1st Airborne Army as a complete success is disingenuous at best, downright dishonest more likely. The best that any of his contemporaries could say about was that he was mediocre, but I think that is over generous. His lack of any ground combat experience it is suggested lead him to make serious mistakes in planning which placed the soldiers on the ground at a significant disadvantage.
In summary recommended and not too pricy on Kindle.

I have now finished the book and think it is a valuable contribution to the Market Garden history.

Thanks for the summary, Fred. The P&P on the book is daunting (I hate trying to read on Kindle- too much time spent reading screens at work), but it will be on the way shortly.

From what you wrote it's another volume, like Neillands' and Middlebrook's, that explodes some of the mythology that surrounds M-G. Market-Garden didn't fail because Guards Armoured kept stopping for tea, as Ryan implies, it failed because both the plan and execution (particularly the choice of DZ/LZ, number of airlifts on 17 September and concentrating on securing the Groesbeek Heights instead of taking the Nijmegen bridges) were faulty. Though I've always wondered about what real use M-G was going to be, had it worked?

If everything went to plan and they seized Appeldorn airfield, so 52 (Lowland) Division could be flown in, then what? Routes out of the area into Germany are restricted and any attempt to head for the Ruhr will expose both flanks to German attack. Monty wasn't going to be able to get US 1st Army to protect his right flank, no matter how much he pushed. The Canadians were still tied up clearing the ports and would shortly have to clear the Scheldt (which should have had priority over M-G in any case). So he'd only have XII Corps to try to protect his left- too little and the terrain was not helpful for that.

It may be the only good M-G would do would be attracting the German divisions, which Hitler was assembling for his newest "master stroke"/pipe dream in the Ardennes, so the Bulge may not have happened.

@Dal
I think the allied high command had their Barbarossa beer goggles on and like Hitler with Russia felt that one thrust into Germany would cause the whole rotten house to collapse. Difficult to know what the Germans could have scraped together for any counterattack though. Most of the Volksgrenadier divisions used in the Bulge were only just starting to form and the rebuilding of the Panzer divisions hadn't started. Any build up would also have been hammered from the air.
The thing that makes it unlikely is any sort of commitment from Ike to such an offensive. I suspect he would have bowed to pressure and returned to a broad front strategy and ordered Monty to clear the Scheldt.

I would have thought MG confidence was biased by experience. The "great swan" led everyone to believe the Germans were finally weakened enough that rapid advances could be expected.
Wasn't there also some pressure from para units to "do something, anything"?
Anyone thinking of buying Al's book but might want to listen to some of the points he makes in that podcast.

His road to Berlin TV series is worth a look if you can find it.

And he's hilarious as the pub landlord.

Wasn't there also some pressure from para units to "do something, anything"?

There was pressure from all quarters to use them. Not least Washington. Brereton was keen to use his whole command in a big operation and make his mark. Eisenhower was also keen to use them asking Brereton for plans with "daring and imagination". Ironically the one man that might have stopped it Gen Lesley McNair was killed by a friendly fire bombing incident in Normandy, the bombs being dropped by 9th Air Force, Brereton's command at the time. Bradley was mightily pleased to be rid of Brereton when he took over 1st Airborne.

Andy, thanks for the links. I usually avoid podcasts, but I've bookmarked both of those. The Black Tuesday by Al Murray was very interesting.

I would have thought MG confidence was biased by experience. The "great swan" led everyone to believe the Germans were finally weakened enough that rapid advances could be expected.

Coming to an abrupt stop at the Sigfried Line in August should have rung some bells, Andy. Metz, the Hurtgen and Aachen should have driven the lesson home- the Germans (the ones running the circus, at least) refused to believe they were beaten.

I think the allied high command had their Barbarossa beer goggles on

That's an apt description, Fred, and I agree. The reality of the efforts needed to cross the Rhine showed that- but being "First to Cross the Rhine" seemed to dazzle the stars and red tabs, and they couldn't see beyond the consequent headlines.

I agree about Ike, too. Neillands is right when he says Ike didn't "grip" his army group and army commanders. But with that collection of hyper-sensitive blown egos it's hard to blame him. I'm not sure about the broad front strategy (another name for a narrow thrust is "salient"), but I agree on the importance of Antwerp. He should have put his foot down about Antwerp, the Scheldt and getting the Channel ports going.

Strategically getting a working, high-capacity port was more important than a few bridges, "liberating" abandoned cities or driving the furthest. With Antwerp and one other functioning port 70%+ of Ike's logistics problems will disappear. Stopping the runaway advances and liberations may have sparked criticism and questions from pollies and journalists, but in the long run more divisions would be able to gear up and go, instead of many sitting in the rear because their trucks are needed for supply tasks. A "delay" (they were three to four months ahead of schedule!) to clear the Scheldt in late-August-September may have seen the WAllies moving further and faster in December, January and February.

Aspects is on the way. P&P, 20 quid, cost more than the book.

Monty wasn't going to be able to get US 1st Army to protect his right flank, no matter how much he pushed.

Why should they? First Army was pursuing its own independent offensive along a different axis than that of the 2nd British Army. Before their offensive was put on hold for lack of resources the First had crossed the Meuse and had penetrated into both Germany and the Netherlands. German forces were moving into the West Wall defenses as First Army reached them. It wasn't just Patton complaining that his operations were shut down at critical times during late August-September. It was also Hodges and Devers.

There is as good an argument that First Army might have accomplished more if British Second had pursued a less glamorous course. This is Monday morning quarterbacking though. Allied planners were having to work with the information they had, and with their own troops where they were rather than where they might wish them to be.

Why should they? First Army was pursuing its own independent offensive

I agree, Bill. Noting that Monty wanted them doesn't mean I agree with him.

There is as good an argument that First Army might have accomplished more if British Second had pursued a less glamorous course.

If First Army bypassed the Hurtgen, perhaps, otherwise it would just get tied up there a couple of weeks earlier. Had M-G never happened then any extra Bradley got would go to Patton before Hodges, anyway, so I doubt M-G made much difference.

Strategically getting a working, high-capacity port was more important than a few bridges, "liberating" abandoned cities or driving the furthest. With Antwerp and one other functioning port 70%+ of Ike's logistics problems will disappear.

The supply 'problem' was not an Allied problem but a US Army problem. Montgomery had his own ports and he did not need Antwerp. Bradley however desperately need a port as he had abandoned the pre-invasion plan to take an Atlantic port and build CHASTITY. Not for the last time was Montgomery tasked with correction Bradley's error. You can argue that Bradley was correct to give up his supply base in order to advance east but it was a mistake that thrust extra unplanned responsibility on to Monty. It also has the added bonus that all the supply problems could then be falsely blamed on Monty (cue 'he stole Patton's gas) and thus 'save the ass' of the real culprits.

Montgomery had his own ports and he did not need Antwerp.

I haven't come across that before. I thought the allocation was made by SHAEF while the stores were in the UK, then shipped forward to 12 and 21 Army Groups. I'm happy to be corrected if you can send me a reference, mate. Monty was having the same issues with supply allocations, hence the pleas to Ike for 21 AG to be given operational (and therefore supply) priority.

I think you'll find that most of the Channel ports captured weren't useable before late '44, mate, and until then most supply was still coming in from Arromanches. That's why Monty had to "borrow" the trucks from at least one infantry division (49th) just to get stores forward.

The German garrisons did a good job of rendering the Channel ports useless, while Dunkirk held out until the end of the war. Even with Dieppe, which wasn't defended, it took until early September for the port to be capable of handling cargo again. Also, the Channel ports taken weren't deep water ports capable of handling the large ships and volume of cargo needed. For that they needed Antwerp, Hamburg and Kiel.

Even when opened Antwerp never lived up to expectation and because of the V2 bombardment ammo was not unloaded there. 21st AG grounded most of its infantry divisions to use the trucks to keep the advance going and that had nothing to do with a supply shortage.

Thanks, mkenny, I didn't know about that restriction on Antwerp, nor about the V2 threat, which did surprise me. Antwerp didn't live up to expectations, but then none of the ports did. It happens when wishful thinking meets reality.

21st AG grounded most of its infantry divisions to use the trucks to keep the advance going and that had nothing to do with a supply shortage.

I'm not sure I understand what you mean. Neillands (whose The Battle For the Rhine 1944 I have recently finished reading again) said that's the reason the 49th DIV lost its trucks, and doesn't mention a general grounding of the infantry divisions. If the trucks weren't used for supply, what were they used for?

Note, I'm not looking for an argument about it. I know a bit about the period, but there's people on the board that know a lot more- and I'm hoping to benefit from their posting what they know. :-)

There are some well developed threads on Market Garden and Antwerp on Axis History Forum (plus, lots of arguments), and more threads (with far less arguments) on ww2talk as well.

There are some well developed threads on Market Garden and Antwerp on Axis History Forum (plus, lots of arguments), and more threads (with far less arguments) on ww2talk as well.

The argument(s) were instigated by a US based multi-ID Monty-hating poster who had just finished a 3 month ban for disruptive behaviour.
The thread in question did a very thorough demolition of the false claim Montgomery was responsible for Bradley's supply problems when in fact all the trouble stem from the decision to abandon the pre-D Day plan to supply Bradley direct from the Atlantic coast using Brest and CHASTITY. Rather than causing the problems Montgomery was called upon to fix Bradley's mistake and secure a port for him. It was not the first time Monty was asked to help out Bradley nor would it the last.

Thanks for the rec's, SR. I'm already a member on ww2talk, but read much more than contribute. The "ambience" of the Axis History forum doesn't appeal, though.

the pre-D Day plan to supply Bradley direct from the Atlantic coast using Brest and CHASTITY

I thought Cherbourg, not Brest, was to be Bradleys main LOC terminal? Whoever came up with that plan was having a lend of themselves. Brest was was 200km+ further from Bradley than Cherbourg, and wired up and made inoperable before the US VII Corps got too close. Six weeks of battle didn't help things much, either.

Montgomery was called upon to fix Bradley's mistake and secure a port for him.

Monty had already tasked Crerar with clearing the channel ports, so what special effort was to be made for Bradley? Or did Bradley get Dieppe, about the only port captured and made taskworthy before priority was given to securing the Scheldt?

There's a whole back story to the post-Falaise campaigns that I haven't considered before, mkenny. Apart from Neillands, are there any other books (bar the official fairy ta.., I mean histories) you can recommend?

The original plan was to land an American Force in the UK that would cross the channel. clear Normandy and then expand to the Atlantic coast. Secure a port (Brest) and build CHASTITY in Quiberon Bay. Then there would be a pause to consolidate by shipping the rest of the US Army over to France directly from the USA to the Atlantic ports. This direct supply-line would do away with shipping men and supplies to the UK west coast, transhipping them south and then re-loading threm for shipping to Normandy landing them in Normandy. This was what ALL the US planning and resupply was geared to. They never thought they would have to keep landing stuff over the Normandy beaches. All the US post-invasion support was intended to come direct to France from US ports. Bradley failed to secure his ports and decided to cancel CHASTITY and thus completely disrupted his own carefully planned supply chain. It led directly to the disaster that was the US supply situation in late 1944.To correct this self-inflicted wound Bradley decided he needed Antwerp and thus Monty, who had carefully built his own supply chain and secured it via the channel ports (and thus did not need Antwerp at all) was then expected to stop what he was doing and correct Bradley's error. Did I not read earlier in this thread complaints that Monty was asking for some US Divisions to be attached to him and the tone was 'why should the US help Monty?' and I turn that around and say it was a US mistake so why shouldn't the US be asked to contribute to helping correct that error?

Thanks for the detailed response, mate. It looks like I've got a fair bit of reading to do. All the books I've read say that Monty would also benefit from taking Antwerp, especially from easier access to fuel. So Antwerp may not be purely for Bradley.

I thought Chastity/Quiberon were just "might be" plans. After all, why go for Brest when Cherbourg is closer to the beaches and should be secured more quickly. I suppose they picked Quiberon because it's a sheltered harbour?

As for Bradley, he and the other senior US commanders could do no wrong (what I call "teflon generals"), particularly if they wanted to keep their rank, perhaps even their commissions, post war. So they had to look for someone to blame when there were delays or things did go wrong (eg Metz, Hurtgen, Brest, Aachen, Cherbourg, Argentan, etc). Monty was the perfect problem child- an abrasive individual who was also English. I'm not a fan of him, either, but he's not the cause of all failures and every problem the WAllies had.

I thought Chastity/Quiberon were just "might be" plans. After all, why go for Brest when Cherbourg is closer to the beaches and should be secured more quickly. I suppose they picked Quiberon because it's a sheltered harbour?

It was an official operation and wasn't formally cancelled until early September.
Denny's paper summarises the reasons for the choice.

"The key advantage of Operation Chastity would be the ability to off-load Liberty ships sailing directly from the United States. A further advantage would be access to the relatively undamaged rail network outside the Normandy region, once a spur line and marshalling yard were constructed. The beaches of Quiberon Bay would also allow the unloading of LSTs at low tide.

Other attractive features of Operation Chastity were the sheltered anchorage in Quiberon Bay, that the port required only a fraction of the labor and materials committed to the Mulberry ports, and that it used standard components and available equipment."
Denny, Norman R. (2003). Seduction in Combat: Losing Sight of logistics after D-Day (PDF) (MSc.). Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

So the greater distance is offset by the access to a largely intact rail network. Also the capacity of Cherbourg even when fully operational was insufficient to fully supply US requirements.
Of course the area was never fully cleared. There is an argument that if Wood, commanding 4th Armoured had not disobeyed orders and pushed east instead of vigorously attacking his assigned objectives he could have taken them and Chastity could have been implemented swiftly. Certainly the German commander on the spot thought so.

Monty was the perfect problem child- an abrasive individual who was also English. I'm not a fan of him, either, but he's not the cause of all failures and every problem the WAllies had.

Interestingly the US commanders who served under him had very positive things to say about him. As for being a problem child that was not unique. Patton was as bad if not worse and Bradley was not adverse to throwing a tantrum at times. Monty had his faults, but I don't think he was in anyway as bad as many have painted him. Bradley was no genius either and Ike had his faults not least his tendency to vacillate.

Thanks for the detailed reply, Fred.

If Quiberon was meant for direct shipping from the US then that makes a lot of sense, as it avoids the time consuming- and inevitable mistakes- involved in sorting, cataloguing, assigning transports, crossloading and possibly backloading supplies. Cherbourg wasn't big enough, I agree, but there weren't many options. The channel ports were small, open to the weather and shallow. The relatively undamaged railway network in Brittany may have made up for the greater distances from Brest, and Quiberon to the forward supply terminals. Devers was drawing supply from Marseilles and was as severely effected as 12 and 21 AG.

As for being a problem child that was not unique.

Too true, unfortunately. I wouldn't want to share a beer or coffee with any of them, not even Ike. But I'd happily have one with Private Smith from Alabama and LCPL Jones from Conway, perhaps even a major from Bloomsbury or Boston. But not the SHAEF crowd or multi-starred wonder boys.