"Time for another Market Garden hypothetical" Topic

And no, I won't be Monty bashing. In spite of the books and the TV series, I don't think the 101 was any better than any of the other airborne units – American or British. They are all the cream of the crop as far as I am concerned.
I think Monty gave the most dangerous task to his own British paratroopers for political reasons – but that isn't the point I want to explore here. What if he had reversed the assignments of the 101st and the 1st? What would the political repercussions have been had it been the 101st that was destroyed as a fighting force? How much would that have affected the relationship between Ike and Monty?
It is a fact that the British 1st Airborne Division was destroyed and didn't really participate in any major campaigns for the rest of the war. If memory serves, the US had something like five airborne divisions in WWII, whereas Britain had two, I think the US could have rebuilt the 101 faster than the UK was able to rebuild their airborne.
The 101st would not have been ready for Bastogne of course. Had the 101 been destroyed, they would have been in England recuperating and the US 17th would have been in France. I suspect the 17th would have done just as well at Bastogne as the 101st did.
Would Ike have been willing to put half of Bradley's army under Monty in the Bulge under these circumstances? How much would that have changed things (The Germans were never going to win at the Bulge, but the battle could have been different)
The 101 would likely have done Varsity under these circumstances. I doubt that would have changed much.

We'll never know of course, but these sorts of things are fun to think about and discuss.

Would the 17th have been sent to France without having been dropped first? Maybe not as airborne sent to Bastogne; maybe there wouldn't have been a single division so ready to be committed.
Not sure the loss of the 101st would have caused much political fallout, but I could be wrong. Again, didn't the 1st have at least some heavier weapons (17pdrs?) dropped in larger gliders – which might have been part of the reason for dropping them furthest away – plus the Polish Brigade. So not sure that politics drove the airborne distribution.

I think Ike had a lot of mistrust for Monty. Bradley too and Ike and Bradley were tight. Churchill I believe wanted Harold Alexander not Monty. If the 101 gets wiped like 1st Airborne I think maybe Monty gets sacked due to political pressure with Alexander taking over. I could be wrong of course

Good question--though I agree it wouldn't have happened. Having a British division holding the Rhine crossing in victory might have been even more important than not losing a US division in defeat.

Would the 17th have done as well at Bastogne? Maybe. But there's also the dumb luck that since it was the 101st, the DIVARTY commander, now the acting division commander, was the one commanding that huge accumulation of artillery. Would William Miley of the 17th, a purely infantry officer have handled it as well? Looked in the other ways, the 17th was trained but still green, and it would have been at full strength with full TO&E. Players with suitable rules are invited to try that as a Bastogne variant.

I'd add the possibility that when Monty came close to being sacked after the Bulge, having lost the 101st might have been just enough to tip the scales. Would Alexander instead of Monty made any difference in 1945? And if Alexander rather than Monty became post-war CIGS, would that have made any difference?

Lots of horse-shoe nails in history.

Robert, family honor requires me to point out something that is often missed. There was one experienced regiment in the 17th. The 507th were Normandy veterans.
;-)

Great point about McAuliffe at Bastogne and the artillery. That may have actually made a difference compared to the 17th

Let's not give Churchill any credit for great expertise.

Would the 101 have had 38 of their transports and gliders diverted so "Boy" Browning could (unnecessarily, IMHO) take his HQ on Day 1, as happened to 1st AB DIV?

Would 1st AB DIV have captured the Zon bridge before the Germans blew it, saving the 10 hour delay while a Bailey was erected? (Probably not, unless they landed on both ends.)

Could the 101 have pressured Brereton and the air force planners to use closer LZ/DZ than those at Wolfheze, especially those south of the road bridge at Arnhem ?

There's so many variables, Robert, anything may have happened.

It's easy to overrate the importance of the commander's role in the effective employment of artillery. That work gets done layers below the CG, by the battalion fire direction centers and the liaisons for all the GS and reinforcing battalions. It was certainly fortunate that they had the guns, but I doubt McAuliffe made a personal difference. What mattered most was the networked nature of American fire support at the time, which was rivaled only by the British system. That made it a simple matter to integrate reinforcing and general support fires with a level of flexibility no other army then enjoyed.

While it's probably never a good idea to drop an airborne division on a pair of armored formations, does anyone know how the antitank capabilities of a British and an American division at the time compared? Was there sufficient difference that it could have bought the 101st time? Unfortunately, the limited gunpowder of the divisional artillery probably would not have helped them much.

1st AB DIV 1st and 4th Brigades each had two troops of 4 X 17pdr ATG, NPR, the rest were the 6pdr. However, I can only confirm one troop of four guns was landed on Day 1. The US only had the 57mm M1. No US 76.2mm M5 ATG were landed- only TD battalions had them. The bazooka and PIAT even out, though the bazooka had a longer range, the PIAT could be fired from within a building (no BBDA), whereas the bazooka couldn't. That was a major consideration for Frost's troops.

So the net effect would be a slight disadvantage for the US against armour.

Good points all around, and I should have remembered about the 507th. (I did check, but my source didn't mention the swap out, and I only checked one. I know better.)

Nine Pound, US artillery system was good, but I always figure the boss knowing and being interested in something makes a difference if he can be kept from micromanaging. McAuliffe should probably get credit for being concerned with ammo supply very early on--rounds were sought and brought in just before all the roads were cut--pressing his superiors on artillery ammo resupply, and keeping a tight lid on ammo expended between those times. Artillery support was always available when absolutely necessary, because it mostly wasn't otherwise. Some of that I've seen reported as him personally.

Again, maybe someone else could have done as well, but we don't know.

I do like Dal's notion that the 101st might have been able to push back a little more on the drop zones. But, as you say, all this is speculative.

Thanks, Dal – that's interesting. I glanced at the OOBs in my old copy of "Command Decision," and the only material difference between them that jumped out at me at the macro level is a slight numerical advantage in field artillery for the American TO&E- slightly more 75mm pack howitzers, and a battalion of 105mm that I had forgotten about. Probably not enough to make a difference, given the scale of the opposition. Shelby Stanton's book on the US Army OOB in WWII gives the 101st the 327th, 502nd, 506th and 501st regiments as well as the 509th PIB assigned to the division during the Market Garden. If you assume all those units would have been made available for a drop on Arnhem, you would increase the number of maneuver battalions by more than a quarter (assuming I haven't missed some attachments to 1st Airborne). That might help a bit.

Still short of what you would probably want to take on a small armored corps, though.

Churchill's Commons statement of Thursday 18 January 1945 (falsely described as an apology for Monty's Press Conference) shows that he was VERY supportive of Montgomery. It is almost impossible to believe he would every agree to removing or replacing him.

Field-Marshal Montgomery at the earliest moment, acting with extraordinary promptitude, concentrated powerful British reserves at the decisive strategic point. Having been placed in command, as he was by General Eisenhower, of American Forces larger than those he holds from His Majesty's Government or from the Canadians, larger than those he holds in the 21st Army Group, he fell unceasingly on the enemy in the North and has fought the battle all the time from that part of the assailed front. The United States First Army, which was one of the group of Armies under General Omar Bradley, was severed by the inroad. It was re-inforced with extraordinary military efficiency from the Metz area by General Patton's Army, who hurled themselves on the intruders from the South side of Bastogne. But all the movements of the commanders would have been futile but for the bravery of the troops. General Omar Bradley was commanding American troops, and so was Field-Marshal Montgomery. All these troops fought in magnificent fashion and General Eisenhower, balancing the situation between his two commanders, gave them both the fairest opportunity to realise their full strength and quality. Let no one lend himself to the chatter of mischief-makers when issues of this most momentous consequence are being successfully decided by the sword. Lest it should be thought that the British Commonwealth and Empire are not playing their part in the battle of the Continent, or in the general war, let me give a few facts and figures. We are maintaining at the present time, in the field and in our garrisons, the equivalent of upwards of 100 divisions, apart from the vast Navy and Air Forces and all the workers in the munitions shops. Many, of course, are not mobile, but 67 of them are at the front and in constant or frequent contact with the enemy. We are fighting incessantly on three separate fronts, in North-West Europe, in Italy and in Burma. Of all the troops landed in France the losses sustained, in fighting, by the British Army and the United States troops have been very level in proportion to the numbers engaged. Of course, there are over twice as many American troops on the Western front as there are troops of the British Commonwealth. We, in fact, have lost half as many as our American Allies. If you take killed only, British and Canadians have lost a larger proportion than the United States, heavier though the United States losses are.

I played a lot of Victory Games "Hell Highway", and in the free setup option the optimum Allied strategy was to swap the 1st Airborne and 101st. The 101 had heavier and more numerous artillery, so was more suitable for fighting around Arnhem, whereas the 1st, thanks to the Glider Pilot Regiment , had more units so was much better suited to holding the corridor. At a tactical level, the 1st 17pdrs were also more useful against the massed Panthers of 107 Panzer Brigade.

We'd generally drop a Regiment of the 101st at the southern end of Arnhem Bridge (just accepting the Flak losses) and they'd take both ends in short order.

As ever the critical battle was at Nijmegen, where the 82nd always had a very tough time of it until Guards Armoured rolled up. With Arnhem firmly in US hands, the SS put even more units over the Rhine at Pannerden to hold the line of the Maas.

I think Ike had a lot of mistrust for Monty. Bradley too and Ike and Bradley were tight. Churchill I believe wanted Harold Alexander not Monty. If the 101 gets wiped like 1st Airborne I think maybe Monty gets sacked due to political pressure with Alexander taking over. I could be wrong of course

I doubt that would happen. It would have left Churchill with a very big political storm at home. Monty was very popular in the UK and with the troops. It would have caused a major political crisis.

How much would that have changed things (The Germans were never going to win at the Bulge, but the battle could have been different)

No Monty in the Bulge means the loss of US 7th AD and the rest of the St Vith garrison. Hasbrouk US 7AD commander credited Monty with saving the division after he countermanded Ridgeway's order to hold. They only just made it out in time the Germans were close to cutting the remaining road west.

Sure, Robert- but those are in essence the kind of big picture logistical , economy of force and strategic consumption issues you would expect a senior officer to be focused on. Fire support is a very different process, and the examples you cite aren't specifically something that an artilleryman would necessarily have a better grasp on than anyone else. McAuliffe was a competent general, no doubt, but that competence wasn't an inherent product of being an artilleryman, rather than an infantryman or a tanker.

If you find a set of rules that gives you a modifier because the CG is an artilleryman, let me know…..they might make interesting reading.

Very good considered discussion with respect shown for different opinions. Well done to everyone.

Dal,
A very minor point. I think the US Airborne used the British 6pdr Mk III rather than the 57mm M1, the version modified to be carried in a glider. I suspect they may also have had APDS ammunition. There is a picture of US airborne forces loading an APDS round in late 44/early 45. Here's a link to a US glider being loaded with what looks like a 6pdr MkIII.

link

I rechecked that CD OOB for the US Airborne division in 1944-45, and interestingly enough, it lists the 37mm, rather than the 57mm as the equipment for the AT units in the US parachute and glider infantry regiments. Is that correct, and if so, did they obtain the 57mm unofficially?

Thanks for the article, Trockledockle. Interesting to read an account from the 319th (although I had to smile at the sergeant's quote: there are 6400 mils in a circle, presumably he meant to imply they were shooting 3200 mils off the azimuth of lay, i.e., directly backwards).

That picture at the top was commissioned by the 319th Regimental Association from Jim Dietz in the mid-90s, and the original hung in the Divarty headquarters at Ft. Bragg (I got a number print, but that went the way of all flesh on a move). Makes me wonder, where did it go when the Divarty was shut down in the early Oughts, and the gun battalions went to the maneuver brigades?

I don't think it was unofficial but also not entirely official. According to Zaloga's Osprey on US Anti-Tank artillery the 37mm was on the official establishment but both the 82nd and 101st had 33 MkIII 6 pounders each in Normandy.- 9 in the glider regiment and 24 in the AA battalion. There was no US designation for the equipment but they were successful in repulsing attacks by Stug IIIs. There may be more information in his Osprey on US Airborne divisions but I don't have that.

Thanks, Trockledockle. I didn't know that, I just assumed they'd be the US versions. Still, it's amazing what you can find in your webbing, if you look. Well done those men. :-) I wonder if an 37mm M3 were in use, in the ETO, after D Day? They'd still be good for light armour, at least.

Sorry if this rambles- a bit of a headache going.

For the "what if" we'd have to change the drop rosters for 1st AB DIV and 101 AB DIV. There weren't enough aircraft to drop the divisions as complete units, hence the decision to drop over two to three days (which blew out due to the weather). A lot of aircraft were required to help moving supplies going to 12 and 21 AG, because the Germans had been destroying ports. Over-the-beach and Mulberry landing of supplies wasn't efficient and the long tail back to the cost just exacerbated the situation. So less planes to drop bods into the Netherlands.

The situation was not helped by Eisenhower not making Antwerp[ a priority objective, Monty having his eyes fixed on the Rhine, not taking a major port, and Patton disobeying orders to slow down and conserve fuel- though Metz would achieve that later. So:

101 dropped on 17 September without their inherent artillery. Taylor (GOC 101 AB DIV) decided he needed all his battalions if he was to capture all his objectives, so the guns were rostered for a later drop. If the 101 was landing at Arnhem, would Taylor have left a regiment and taken his artillery?

Urquhart lost 38 gliders/transports to Browning's little picnic party on Groesbeek. That meant 1st AB DIV would only have 1 Para Brigade and 16 Air Landing Brigade- a total of six battalions- plus the two "Wings" formed by the glider pilots, about six small companies, in the first drop. Is that enough to reach, let alone seize and hold, all the objectives around Eindhoven, Zon and Veghel?

Would Gavin (egged on by the clown Browning, who should have stayed in England) still ignore the main objective for 82 AB DIV- the road and rail bridge at Nijmegen- and concentrate on repelling the imagined mass panzer attack on Groesbeek?

If so then it doesn't matter what division lands at Arnhem, the delays in securing a crossing of the Waal in Nijmegen are going to be the biggest stumbling block.

A more plausible what if- 9 and 10 SS Pz all get the galloping trots and are, literally, caught with their pants down in 17 September, so react more slowly.

9th and 10th SS at Arnhem are always the problem.

Dropping paras on them on day 1 gives them lots of targets landing in their laps, targets not best suited to fighting back against armour.

I always wondered why try and drop the 3 Airborne at the same time?

Wouldn't it make more sense to have dropped 1 division first, the one closest to the ground troops starting point, let the ground troops get to them or pretty close to them, then drop the next one?

That would have woken the Germans up and at least start to draw them south without hinting that Arnhem was the objective?

Then let the ground troops fight their way through before attempting the next drop.
Shorten the time delay between the drops and ground troops linking up.

Just ideas.

Thinking modern version and availability of helicopters how would it be done?

Dal,

I've seen a photography of a 37mm being towed through a ruined town in Normandy so there were still some around. Of course I can't find it! There are a couple more pictures of airborne 6 pounders in US service in this link.

link

An interesting question is whether they were supplied with the same ammunition package as the British Airborne troops I.e APDS.

Nine Pound Round

The Wiki article on the 37mm says that it was officially replaced by the 6pounder in the December 1944 TOE. It references the Zaloga Osprey on US Airborne Units.

Wouldn't it make more sense to have dropped 1 division first, the one closest to the ground troops starting point, let the ground troops get to them or pretty close to them, then drop the next one?

Th one advantage that the airborne troops had was surprise, BB. If they signalled their intentions by phased drops then the Germans would have garrisoned every major bridge with as many troops and flak guns as they could get together, so the next drop would probably become impractical.

9 and 10 SS were about 20 and 30 miles from Arnhem, respectively, so a battalion, or even a brigade, dropped south of the bridge was fairly safe from any immediate reaction from them. The air forces ruled out a drop south of the bridge on Day 1, due to a flak concentration supposedly at the bridge and "unsuitable ground', but deemed it safe to drop the Polish brigade (paras and gliders) there on a subsequent drop.

***BTW, in my last post "16 Air Landing Brigade" should be "1 Air Landing Brigade". Ask my fingers why they made that mistake, because I have no idea what they were doing.

Cheers, mate, that's a good photo, showing the British globular muzzle brake. I'd be surprised if 82 AB and 101 AB did get their hands on much of the APDS supply. From what I've read it was in somewhat short supply, like the 6pdr HE rounds. I'll be happily corrected if I'm wrong (about HE or APDS). But they may have had access when the were in the UK. Troops on the hunt for good gear can be very "innovative".

The 82nd sure was. One of my NCOs once said, in a moment of good-natured exasperation, "sir, if you ever drop this bunch someplace, there won't be a beer, a dollar, or a virgin for ten miles in any direction."

"What if he had reversed the assignments of the 101st and the 1st? "

Since it was probably the most important objective of them all, why didn't he drop BOTH there? (Ego and politics aside, of course… ;-)

Since it was probably the most important objective of them all, why didn't he drop BOTH there?

Not enough aircraft to drop another division (if one was available) to take the 101's historical objectives.

A point, Nine pound round, though in my (brief) time with them, I wouldn't necessarily have put the 101st in my top five finalists for banditry.

Hmmph. Let me hedge that. There was an NCO in the brigade 2 shop who not only "acquired" the brigade commander's cot, but got a little huffy when they made him give it back. (He'd been a supply sergeant in a former existence.)

NPR and robert, I think an ability to "acquire necessities" is a common skill set, one we all pick up in recruit/officer training. I remember when I handed my gear back on discharge. Half of it wasn't on my Q record and I don't know how I came to have it. Fortunately the RQMS was an old mate.

Well, it's not like you can wait for the Army to give you everything you need to get the job done, now, can you?

The amazing thing is how much stuff you can stash away in a Hummvee, a conex, or a supply room.

Very true, NPR. I always found it a little depressing how much business the Cavalry Store at Fort Campbell did selling us stuff the Army was supposed to provide for free.

On the other hand, I was once colocated with a unit which shall remain nameless with a much higher supply priority. Just walking past their dumpsters was an educational and profitable experience.

mkenny, don't confuse the speech a politician gives after a decision is made with his actual feelings and beliefs, if any. Several first-hand sources say it was a very close call. Korvesa wants to avoid Monty bashing, and I won't divert the thread, but I think it's fair to observe that as a subordinate he was a difficult personality, which cost him some support his abilities should have earned.

My understanding (primarily from Buckingham's book Arnhem) is that the RAF chose drop/landing zones for the Commonwealth and Poles but the US Army dictated to their Army Air Force colleagues. If the 101st decided that eight miles was a ridiculous distance to drop from Arnhem bridge then it would be amended instantly.

Given rather more flexibility in choosing their own landing sites, 1st Airborne may have included a couple of coup-de-main glider assaults, comparable to Major Howard at the Caen and Orne bridges on 6th June, and what was sadly lacking at Arnhem (General Gale of 6th Airborne apparently offered to contribute another such operation for Arnhem bridge but was turned down by Urquhart/Browning). Of course the gliders of 1st Airborne Corps would have been extremely beneficial to any and all of the bridges…

Would 101st have fared better with long-range and close air support radios? Would they have tolerated the lack of comms for so long without ensuring relay aircraft over target or sending in specialist radio operators to re-establish contact? Would they have set up more flexible rules of engagement with RAF Typhoons thereby allowing rockets and cannon to assist the airborne troops (probably unlikely, given RAF rigidity)? I rather suspect that the comms fiasco that Arnhem is infamous for would have been reduced, if not eliminated.

1st Airbone suffered from poor re-supply, in part due to having to hold DZs so far from the schwerpunkt. I'm confident that 101st would not have so hampered, since most of the transport aircraft for the whole operation were from US resources.

1st Airborne had some issues with training, especially with larger formations. Strung out along a dozen miles or more and with multiple objectives, even without determined German efforts to cut the road, I fear they'd have been less effective. Chopping them to XXX Corps may have been smoother than with 101st, so tank-airborne infantry teams could have been more likely, but I doubt that 101st's efforts could have been bettered. XXX Corps were simply too slow.

don't confuse the speech a politician gives after a decision is made with his actual feelings and beliefs, if any. Several first-hand sources say it was a very close call. Korvesa wants to avoid Monty bashing, and I won't divert the thread, but I think it's fair to observe that as a subordinate he was a difficult personality, which cost him some support his abilities should have earned

It was not a speech it was part of day-long Government account on how the war was going. Several matter were commented on and a big part of it was the UK telling the USA Government to 'mind its own business' and not to try and tell it how it's foreign Policy (over issues in Greece and Italy) should be formulated. In short Churchill was sticking two-fingers up at the USA and reminding them that 'they' did not decide British Issues. That is why Churchill went out of his way to praise and support Monty and thus all those who think he would agree to replace him are deluded. Realistically what could the USA do if Chuchill had said no to their demands?

XXX Corps were simply too slow.

I keep reading this, typhoon2. In the US official history it states that when XXX Corps linked up with 82 AB DIV in Nijmegen (not at Grave), it was "33 hours behind schedule". What "schedule" was that?

That doesn't add up. Besides the difficulties of an advance to contact on a narrow front, XXX Corps had married up with 82 AB by 1100hrs on 19 September- D+2. So it had taken them 45 hours to get there. That included about 10 hours delay, due to the bridge at Zon being blown and a bailey having to be raised. The only schedule I know of was the statement that XXX Corps should be able to get there in 48 hours. Should. More realistically Horrocks said it may take them four days, depending on the enemy resistance and capturing the bridges.

Nijmegen was about nine miles from Arnhem's road bridge. If they were "33 hours behind schedule", that implies that XXX Corps were supposed to get to Arnhem by 2400hrs on Day 1. 82 AB hadn't even tried to secure the road and rail bridges over the Waal before 2000hrs, it had just sent out recce patrols. At 2000hrs two companies were sent- and ran into heavy resistance. It would take the arrival of Guards Armoured, some brave Pom sappers rowing the boats used to get the 82 AB over the river, and an amazing effort by 3rd battalion, 504 PIR, once they were over the river,to secure the bridge- late in the afternoon of 20 September. Two to three days after it was supposed to be secured.

Once the bridge was taken there was one troop of tanks that could have advanced. The Irish battlegroup was sent back to deal with the Germans who had cut the road back to Eindhoven. Coldstream battlegroup was assisting the 82 AB at Groesbeek. The Grenadier and Welsh battelgroups were still fighting to secure Nijmegen and the southern end of the rail bridge.

Not exactly "stopped for tea", as Ryan and the movie say happened.

"Too slow"? Considering the situation- enemy resistance, terrain and failure to secure vital crossings- I think XXX Corps did fairly well. Perhaps they could have done better, but how? I'll be blunt, I think they did as well as any other Allied formation- or commander- could have done. The myths around Arnhem are all part of the glory and blame game too many senior officers played after WWII.

PS, Remember,as an Aussie I'd be more than happy to blame the Poms for what happened. But there's enough failures- from SHAEF to section/squad level- to make placing blame on any one action, commander or unit just ludicrous.

@Dal Gavan – all good points. Thanks.

My 'slow' comment was based on Horrocks waiting for the transports to fly overhead before unleashing his advance guard, Guards Armoured Division sticking too closely to 'the book' and being sluggish every time they initiated a formal advance, a lack of drive and initiative in both GAD and 43rd plus failings in Close Air Support as the drive along the road continued.

I concur that blaming them alone is unfair, especially given that there is plenty of blame to go around (and credit to the Germans, of course), but they definitely fell short of what could have been achieved. I wonder how Roberts and his 11th Armoured would have fared, instead of GAD? An interesting What-if, as is all of this thread. At the end of the month we're re-creating the formal attack on the Nijmegen bridges, assault boats and all; it'll be very interesting to see if wargamers can emulate their counterparts eighty years ago.

I posted the below years ago, which is an extract of 2nd (Armoured) Battalion, Irish Guards War Diary entries for 15th to 17th September 1944 (transcribed by 'dbf' at ww2talk) –

15 September 1944

The Brigadier gave orders for the break out from the bridge head and the advance N to the ZUIDER ZEE. 5 GDS ARMD BDE would lead the Division and the IRISH GUARDS GROUP lead the Brigade. In support there would be 10 Fd and 3 Medium and 1 Heavy Regts RA, and Typhoons flying overhead and available on call. We were close advance N up the main road to link up with the AMERICAN and BRITISH AIRBORNE DIVISIONS at EINDHOVEN, GRAVE, NIJMEGEN and ARNHEM and then push ton to the ZUIDER ZEE at NUNSPEET consolidate and wait for the rest of SECOND ARMY to arrive. The next advance would then be on MUNSTER to cut off the RUHR. ‘D' Day was 17 Sep, and the Airborne Corps would be dropped probably at 13.00hrs. The whole operation was called MARKET GARDEN.

The Commanding Officer addressed all ranks, thanked them for their fine efforts and congratulated them on the successes gained. Afterwards religious services were held in memory of those who had been killed during the advance.

The Commanding Officer gave out preliminary orders for MARKET GARDEN, but as yet no details.

16 September 1944

The Brigade Commander held a final conference for MARKET GARDEN. H hour for us would be 14.35hrs and the S.L. the F.D.L/s some 2000 yds N of the canal. A heavy barrage lifting at 200 yds a minute, the first half Field, the second half medium guns, would lead us up through the difficult wooded country as far as a small bridge S of VALKENSWAARD. This bridge caused some anxiety a no-one knew its capacity, so a bulldozer was given us to push in the banks of the stream and make a rough crossing if necessary. A "contact man" from the 101 AMERICAN AIRBORNE DIV and the wireless vehicle controlling the Typhoons would join us as soon as possible. Enemy opposition was estimated at 3 Battalions with some A Tk guns.

Lt.-Col. J.O.E. VANDELEUR held a combined ‘O' Group at our HQ. No. 3 Sqn was to lead without infantry, and its main task was to reach the small bridge, report on it and seize it for the rest of the Battalions to pass through. The RE Recce party and bulldozer would travel with Sqn HQ. Then would come No. 1 Sqn with No. 1 Coy on "tank back", combined HQ, a Squadron of HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY REGT, No. 2 Sqn with No. 4 Coy, and finally No. 2 and No. 3 Coys in T.C.Ls.

The "contact man" with his wireless set and the Typhoon control vehicle and two Liaison officers from the RAF reported to Bn HQ, and were put in the picture. They were to travel immediately to the Commanding Officer's Scout Car.

17 September 1944

We received confirmation of the timings and news that the AIRBORNE CORPS was on its way.

The Bn formed up ready to move with Air recognition strips prominently displayed.

The leading Sqn passed over JOE's bridge up to the S.L.

The counter battery and preparatory bombardment came down.

Medium and heavy barrage lifting at 200 yds a minute covered the road from HOEK to VALKENSWAARD.

The Heavy mortars of 50 Div fired on known enemy localities to our front and flanks.

The 240 Field guns put down a concentration 1000 yds N of the S.L. and then lifted at 200 yds a minute till 14.55hrs.

No. 3 Sqn moved up to the S.L. waiting for the barrage to begin.

The Battalion advanced, keeping as close behind the barrage as possible. The clouds of dust raised made this difficult, but the leading tank managed to follow some 300 yds behind the shell bursts. For 10 minutes all went well, but suddenly the rear of No. 3 and head of No. 1 Sqns were attacked by infantry with Bazookas and Anti-Tk guns, and 9 tks were knocked out in two minutes. The remainder halted and got into defensive positions as best they could, spraying the edges of the wood and ditches with Browning and firing HE at any suspicious place. L/Sjt COWAN, No. 2 Sqn, saw a Self-Propelled gun and knocked it out, made the crew climb on the back of his tank and point out their friends positions, which they did gladly in return, as they thought, for their lives. Meanwhile Typhoons, were called for and answered immediately. In the next hour 230 sorties were flown and very low and accurate attacks made on the enemy. Our tanks burnt yellow smoke abundantly and though the rockets landed within 100 yds of them, there was never any likelihood of a mistake, so sure was the pilots' aim. It is only true to say that but for the Typhoon Squadrons' support, our advance could not have continued.

The effect of the rockets, combined with the aggressiveness of our tanks and infantry, was almost instantaneous. Enemy came running out of the trenches trembling with fright and were sent doubling down the road in very quick time. All were still running when they passed Div HQ a mile the other side of the bridge. The 4th Bn DEVONS which had followed us up, clearing each side of the road, also dug a number of enemy out of trenches near Bn HQ with great vigour and relieved us from tiresome sniping. Interrogation showed the enemy to be mainly 6 PARA REGT with some REGT HOFFMAN. Most were new and ignorant recruits, others good fighters who had survived NORMANDY and the retreat. One DR acting as escort made his party travel at motor cycle pace. The MO enrolled others as unwilling stretcher bearers.

The medium barrage was ordered again after No. 3 Sqn had withdrawn 500 yds for safety. Some difficulty was experienced in turning around the bulldozer and it was 16.30hrs before firing could begin.

The advance continued, with Typhoons still overhead and attacking some 88 guns they had seen well in front. Prisoners were still being taken. One warrant Officer from an Anti-Tank Coy said he had owned 10 7.62 Russian guns before the battle but none were now left working and very few of his crews alive. He could not decided which was the worse, the rockets or the Browning and was sent weeping down the road. We actually saw only 4 of the guns, but no more fired, so presumably he spoke the truth.

The bridge was reported clear, intact and fit to carry tanks. No. 3 Sqn accordingly took up positions guarding it and No. 2 Sqn and No. 4 Coy were ordered to pass through them and capture VALKENSWAARD and No. 1 Sqn to mount No. 1 Coy again on tank back. Preliminary "stonks" also came down on the likely points of resistance in the town.

4 88mm guns with their crews and towing vehicles were captured. They were from 602 Heavy AA Bn, and the crews in a great state of fear. Lt. B.C. ISITT in trying to destroy one gun, managed to fire it, thereby greatly alarming Bn HQ. The enemy trucks as usual were packed with loot. Enemy opposition had not completely given in, and all the while there was quite a deal of sniping. Both the Commanding Officer and Major D.M.L. GORDON-WATSON MC, had burst of Spandau just beside them, but no Germans came so near the mark as Lt. B.C. ISITT.

The re-shuffling of the GROUP and crossing of the small bridge took some considerable time. Also the leading Sqn had to approach the town very cautiously, and it was dusk before Major E. . TYLER reported his Sqn in position covering the N exits. Again the only light was from houses set on fire by the shelling. The rest of the GROUP's soon came up and harboured around the central square, blocking all roads, Some 30 prisoners of all sorts were taken including two bicyclist scouts just back from EINDHOVEN who reported to us instead of their own commander. They were lodged for the night under the municipal bandstand, guarded by the Resistance. A German half-track later drove in – a welcome addition to the 3rd Bn's transport. A Dutch civilian reported to Bn HQ from the resistance in EINDHOVEN. He was agreeable and informative, so we took him on strength of the Bn and gave him a seat in a HONEY with which he was well pleased.

The Mayor's clerk came running in to Bn HQ with a message telephoned by the German Commander in EINDHOVEN to his subordinate whom he thought to be still holding VALKENSWAARD. This unknown officer was to defend the town to the last man, with the assurance that reinforcements were on the way. Many very rude answers were given the clerk to send back. By arrangement with the girl in the Post Office, however, we kept contact with her counterpart in EINDHOVEN until 05.00hrs next morning when the line was cut. All she could tell us though was that the enemy were still there, and no sign had been seen of the AMERICAN AIRBORNE FORCES.

Orders were issued for the advance at 07.00hrs next morning – the only difference being that HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY REGT Sqn would lead. The Bn then went to sleep. The day's fighting cost us in all 9 tanks with 8 men killed and several wounded, including SSM PARKES killed and Lt. D. LAMPARD and Lt. B.P. QUINAN wounded.

link

(includes all entries for the Bn in Europe during 1944)

Gary

My 'slow' comment was based on Horrocks waiting for the transports to fly overhead before unleashing his advance guard

@Typhoon2, I wish I knew the answer to that question, too. Guesses:

Something to do with the previous cancellations of Operation Comet and others, so he was waiting to see if the operation went forward?

Waiting to see if weather over the UK could have delayed/cancelled some/all of the aircraft serials?

Getting the artillery and FOO in place and ready to go, and getting the follow up units organised in order of march?

He's acting on what he read in his tea leaves?

What I would like to know is why they didn't/couldn't borrow "defrocked priests" or half tracks from the Canadians and US, to mount the motorised battalions in GAD and allow closer tank-infantry cooperation?

As for sluggishness in the advance, while hasty attacks(ie very soon after contact, without waiting to develop a fire plan, do a proper recce of the enemy position and organise the assault) can be quicker (US 3rd Army were masters of it against retreating Germans), they trade blood for time because they usually result in higher casualties. Taking the time to mount a deliberate attack usually means reduced casualties and, often, prevents a repulse which causes a greater delay than organising a deliberate assault. Against a prepared and reasonably well dug in enemy, a repulse of a hasty attack is highly likely. Reducing casualties was a major concern to Monty and his subordinate commanders, and the British government. Both Canada and the UK were reaching the end of their manpower reserves, as would the US by the start of 1945, so it was a valid concern that influenced planning.

@Gary, that's an excellent excerpt. Thanks for posting it. It shows there was a lot more to the advance than just swanning down the road, brushing the odd Gerry aside as the corps trundled on.

There is a very long thread on Market Garden on WW2talk (245 posts over getting on for 20 years!) and there has been some recent discussion on the timetable for the intended link ups between 30 Corps and the Airborne forces.

link

AIUI the goal wasn't simply to secure a bridge across the Rhine. It was to secure a large enough bridgehead north of the Rhine to allow the Allies to continue a breakout into the eastern Netherlands. Given the size of the German forces in the area of Arnhem I don't think it matters which division the Allies dropped there or whether they were able to be dropped closer to the bridge.

Even if the Allies managed to hold the bridge long enough for XXX Corps to arrive the Germans were likely to get close enough to bring the bridge under direct artillery fire. This would make it difficult for the Allies to move enough heavy equipment across the bridge to be able to mount a breakout from the bridgehead. Then once the attack stalls at the Rhine the Germans would be launching a counterattack on the east flank of XXX Corps salient just as they did under the OTL. Also would holding a bridgehead across the Rhine that was too small to quickly break out of have delayed Allied efforts to open up the Port of Antwerp?

As for Montgomery being relieved, that was only going to happen if the British decided it needed to happen. I suspect if Eisenhower lost faith in Montgomery he would have chosen to work around him rather than trying to have him sacked.

Thanks for the link, Gary.

Good points, Bill N. Kershaw makes it fairly clear that German ready reserves were running out, but expanding the bridgehead would have been difficult in any case. However, if the bridgehead had been established, would the forces collected for the Ardennes be used instead- to drive out of the Reichswald, cut the MSR to the bridgehead and drive on Antwerp, instead of taking the scenic route via Namur, as planned for the Ardennes breakout?

Most histories deal with M-G in isolation and, unfortunately, seem to concentrate on who was responsible for failing to get to Arnhem, and why. Or, sometimes, why the resources weren't used elsewhere. I just find the operation fascinating.

Also would holding a bridgehead across the Rhine that was too small to quickly break out of have delayed Allied efforts to open up the Port of Antwerp?

M-G and "Berlin by Christmas" had already distracted Monty from his primary objective- securing Antwerp's approaches. (To be fair, though, he wasn't the only commander who lost sight of the strategic aim.)

The Canadian 1st Army could have used the resources earmarked/deployed for M-G to advance on Antwerp/the Scheldt. They could have started in early/mid September, borrowed XII Corps to close off the Beverland Peninsula and have had the approaches pretty much cleared by mid-October. But Monty and Ike- Monty's boss, who should have kept Monty focussed on the strategic priorities, not the glory of a Rhine crossing- took their eyes off the ball and got tied up with the "sexy" para drop and drive over the Rhine.

As for Montgomery being relieved, that was only going to happen if the British decided it needed to happen.

Monty's sunny personality had certainly upset a few people. It wasn't just Patton and Bradley (after the Ardennes) who loathed him. Tedder, Coningham, Smith and others were all vocal members of the 'Monty Fan Club'.

Monty's sunny personality had certainly upset a few people. It wasn't just Patton and Bradley (after the Ardennes) who loathed him. Tedder, Coningham, Smith and others were all vocal members of the 'Monty Fan Club'. evil grin

Looking through that list all those gentlemen had their own vocal "fan clubs"! And although Smith was no fan of Monty he did go to Eisenhower and recommend Monty take over the northern half of the Bulge after Strong, Whitely and Betts approached him with the suggestion.

Looking through that list all those gentlemen had their own vocal "fan clubs"! And although Smith was no fan of Monty he did go to Eisenhower and recommend Monty take over the northern half of the Bulge after Strong, Whitely and Betts approached him with the suggestion.

Too true, Fred. Ike and Bedell Smith could put dislike aside and work with other commanders, something most of the others couldn't, and in Tedder's and Patton's cases, wouldn't, do.

But the high command squabbles in WWII (and other periods) always remind me of very selfish three-year-old kids squabbling over who gets the most cake.

Gary, I've been reading through the WWIItalk posts. I don't contribute much on that site, just keep quiet and learn from some very knowledgeable people. However, on page 12 of the "A Bridge Too Far" subject they settle the "schedule issue"- there was no schedule. Horrocks hoped/planned to get to Arnhem in 48 hours, Browning told Monty that the paras could only hold for four days. So any schedule is the invention of whoever wrote the histories- or whoever told the authors that there was one.