"Command and Control" Topic

A blog post on how command and control actually worked in the pre-gunpowder era, how most wargames make it work, and the different way Optio makes it work.

In Antiquity a general was usually limited to giving orders to his subordinate commanders just before the battle and being able to exert virtually no control once the actual fighting started, other than perhaps timing the execution of his orders with banners, trumpets or whatever. If his opponent's plan was better than his all he could do was watch helplessly as his army was taken apart.

Bolingar:

While I think that that was the general approach to a battle, the part I highlighted I question. For instance, at the Battle of Gaugamela, during the battle, when Alexander's right [and Alexander] were engaged, Parmenio on the Macedonian left sent more than one message to Alexander asking for help, which Alexander sent. Alexander was also able to direct his cavalry on the right AND the phalanxes toward the gap which opened up in the Persian center after the Persian right flank had moved forward and engaged Parmenio.

All of which suggests that 1. Information/messages could be and were sent between commanders and subunits during battle and 2. The commander was capable of controlling and redirecting large parts of his army during the battle.

Of course, this was the Macedonian army we are talking about, but Darius was able to release and redirect his multitudes during the battle to a lesser or greater extent. The question would be how that command control was achieved or not among the Ancient Armies.

I'd suggest our biggest problem is that for 98% of the armies we might model, particularly in the ancient period, we have no idea how good their C3I systems were. Boligar takes a reductionist approach, which I suspect is more often more accurate than less. I have tied a different approach in my latest Napoleonic rules, the player remains pretty much 'over powerful', but by lengthening the turn [i.e. increasing move distances] his ability to micromanage is constrained. It all comes down to how you want to run your game.

@McLaddie

While I think that that was the general approach to a battle, the part I highlighted I question. For instance, at the Battle of Gaugamela, during the battle, when Alexander's right [and Alexander] were engaged, Parmenio on the Macedonian left sent more than one message to Alexander asking for help, which Alexander sent. Alexander was also able to direct his cavalry on the right AND the phalanxes toward the gap which opened up in the Persian center after the Persian right flank had moved forward and engaged Parmenio.

Alex personally commanded the Companions and the two telos of the Hypaspists and the Agema (the other 6 telos were under the command of Craterus, Melanger, Ptolemy, Amyntas, Perdiccas and Coenus). He used the same tactic at Gaugamela he had used at Issus and Chaeronea: his heavy cavalry (Companions at Issus, probably Sarissorphoroi at Chaeronea) were deployed in wedges in front of his heavy infantry. The cavalry charged straight through the enemy infantry were were then finished off by the Macedonian heavy foot.

At Gaugamela Alex deployed the heavy infantry in two lines: the phalangites and Hypaspists/Agema in the front line and the Greek mercenaries in the second line, with lighter infantry connecting the ends of each line to form an immense infantry square (a bit like the Franks at the Battle of Tours). This was Alex's answer to the numerically superior Persian cavalry. The square, under orders given before the battle, turned right by subunit and marched off away from the ground prepared by Darius for his chariots.

My take is that the chariots probably weren't sent against the 6 pike-armed phalangite telos (that would have been suicide) but rather the two hoplite-armed telos of the Hypaspists and Agema. The latter were armed as hoplites in order to be able to execute an outflanking manoeuvre against the Greek mercenaries who formed the centre of Darius' line. Phalangites could not wheel once their sarissas were lowered.

Outflanking the enemy's left was a common Greek tactic, arising organically from the hoplite phalanx's tendency to contract toward its right leaving its left vulnerable, and perfected by the Spartans who would exploit this characteristic to send a mora around to the enemy's rear.

Alex's move to the right worked fine until the left flank of the phalangites was contacted by the Persians, obliging it to stop and face the threat. The other telos near the left flank also stopped in support and a gap opened in the phalanx through which the Persian cavalry poured, heading for the Persian royal prisoners who were within the square.

After drawing off the Persian left flank cavalry, Alex led his Companions and two telos forward in a double whammy, Companions first pushing through the gap in the Persian line followed by the Hypaspists and Agema who engaged the Greek mercenaries there. The point is that the army acted on prior orders until it couldn't, then it simply stopped and fought. Alex personally could control only his cavalry-infantry combination – his infantry numbering about 4000 men – that was designed to work in concert.

Alex probably led only his persona ila of cavalry to Permenion's aid, hitting the Persians in the rear and panicking them into a rout. The rest of his army were busy fighting where they stood and fancy manoeuvres at this point were out of the question.

Gaugamela represents the limit of a trained army's agility on the battlefield, not equalled until Cannae.

Alexander commanded the entire army at Gaugamela. I say that because the army-wide orders to the start of the battle were issued by him, he changed the direction of a good 60% of the army mid-battle supposedly while the the Companions and the two telos of the Hypaspists and the Agema were engaged [and presumably Alexander too.] During the battle, Permenion requested aid from Alexander, so the assumption here is that he thought Alexander could do that while his 'command' was engaged.

Now we 'know this' based on Greek and Roman accounts from Curtius Rufus, Plutarch of Chaeronea and Arrian of Nicomedia, all of whom wrote well after the event. And none of the agree with the Astronomical Diary recorded at the time saying that the Army left Darius, not that Darius ran away as later accounts claim. What we have is what we have, but a lot can be discerned by what each side are actual said to have done, regardless of a lack of information. It may be that later writers were assuming command and control based on their armies.

Point being, we don't know much, but what happened is agreed upon in general by the writers, including battlefield communication by both sides.

As for Darius, he had organized and so ordered his army that he was able to release various commands at his direction after the start of the battle, such as the right wing cavalry, left wing cavalry, chariots etc. regardless of the purpose or result.

Alex probably led only his persona ila of cavalry to Permenion's aid, hitting the Persians in the rear and panicking them into a rout. The rest of his army were busy fighting where they stood and fancy manoeuvres at this point were out of the question.

Well, we don't know that Alexander led them, let alone needed to to send support to Permenion. That is an assumption that doesn't have any historical support that I know of. Assuming that the timing was such that Alexander could rout the Persian center and then feel free to personally disengage and turned to attack the Persian right engaged with Permenion is presuming a lot. That is particularly true if Alexander is the impetus for the attack on the Persian Left. We do know that a force of Alexander's troops crossed the battlefield from right to left to provide that support. In ancient terms, that is fairly 'fancy.'

First of all, there was no "command range." On a real battlefield, the dust, noise and confusion would reach such a pitch that a general could make his mind clear only to the unit he was actually with.

If that is true, then how did Alexander lead the Companions and the two telos of the Hypaspists and the Agema? How is it that more than those thousands, other units followed him, AND changed direction mid-advance towards the Persian center, supposedly at Alexander's direction.

I noticed you never said anything about a directing unit or the typical ancient battle setup with the elite units on the right flank… which Alexander followed. There is a great deal of army command control in that arrangement.

@McLaddie

Alexander commanded the entire army at Gaugamela.

Of course he did. My point is that he couldn't move it around freely during the course of a battle using telepathy. He gave pre-battle orders to his subcommanders. But they couldn't control their commands by telephathy either. Each subcommander could make his personal unit go where he wanted, however other units had to be connected to that unit in battleline or column and understand they were to keep pace with the commander's unit. Syntagmata had standard bearers and trumpeters, clearly meant to transmit simple orders like Stand or Advance so the units would know how they were to keep pace with the subcommander's unit. But the subcommander could not tell a syntagma at the other end of the line to wheel 40 degrees and catch the Persian cav in its ZOC.

I say that because the army-wide orders to the start of the battle were issued by him, he changed the direction of a good 60% of the army mid-battle supposedly while the the Companions and the two telos of the Hypaspists and the Agema were engaged [and presumably Alexander too.]

Not quite. The shift of the giant infantry square to the right took place before Alex engaged the Persians. The left flank of the pike phalanx stopped the move when the Persians contacted it, and on the right it stopped just before the chariots charged. by the time Alex's units were engaging the Persian cavalry there was no more manouevring going on. From then on Alex controlled only the Companion-Hypaspist-Agema combination and then only to the extent of advancing with it against the enemy – as per preplanned orders. The ilae of Companions kept pace with Alex's ila and the Hypasists and Agema troops followed on behind. Simple enough.

Well, we don't know that Alexander led them, let alone needed to to send support to Permenion. That is an assumption that doesn't have any historical support that I know of. Assuming that the timing was such that Alexander could rout the Persian center and then feel free to personally disengage and turned to attack the Persian right engaged with Permenion is presuming a lot. That is particularly true if Alexander is the impetus for the attack on the Persian Left. We do know that a force of Alexander's troops crossed the battlefield from right to left to provide that support. In ancient terms, that is fairly 'fancy.'

I need to have another look at the sources. But the bottom line is that whatever happened at this point, Alex was not longer conducting army-wide manoeuvres. Pre-battle orders had been completed and the various units were simply fighting the Persians that hadn't yet routed. But a general could always lead or send his unit over to another part of the battlefield. Fancy was possible for a smallish body of men.

If that is true, then how did Alexander lead the Companions and the two telos of the Hypaspists and the Agema? How is it that more than those thousands, other units followed him, AND changed direction mid-advance towards the Persian center, supposedly at Alexander's direction.

See above.

I noticed you never said anything about a directing unit or the typical ancient battle setup with the elite units on the right flank… which Alexander followed. There is a great deal of army command control in that arrangement.

Sure, as I mentioned. The directing unit could be anywhere: right or left or middle in the case of an infantry wedge.

Bolingar:

I think that command control issue we are discussing: "In Antiquity a general was usually limited to giving orders to his subordinate commanders just before the battle and being able to exert virtually no control once the actual fighting started.

ALL the battles I have read about, from Antiquity to the 20th century have one thing in common: When lower level units were once engaged with the enemy, that is in firefights and melees, higher level commanders didn't have control. Marshal Marmont and General Longstreet write about this fact.

The question is when this 'fighting started', for which units and for how long? Alexander AND Darius controlled when this point of engagement occurred. They knew they wouldn't then be able to influence the results when the spears and swords crossed in combat. Not unless the commander himself used direct intervention. That was true at Austerlitz and Gettysburg as much as Gaugamela and Issus. Until that point, Alexander had command control of his army, and those units not engaged after 'the fighting started.'

Sure, as I mentioned. The directing unit could be anywhere: right or left or middle in the case of an infantry wedge.

Yes, they could, but in controlling an army they weren't anywhere, and where they were needed to be uniform and in sync with the Army Commander's plan. Alexander advanced with nearly a third of his army on the right. That means troops were across a 1500 yards or a mile front. How did Alexander control them to change direction into the weakened center of the Persian line? The battle was fought over a 4000 yard front. The question is during battle what kinds of control did an ancient ARMY commander have up to the point of individual units becoming engaged?

The answer to that question also will reveal some of real weaknesses in Darius's ability to command his army.

@McLaddie

ALL the battles I have read about, from Antiquity to the 20th century have one thing in common: When lower level units were once engaged with the enemy, that is in firefights and melees, higher level commanders didn't have control. Marshal Marmont and General Longstreet write about this fact.

The question is when this 'fighting started', for which units and for how long? Alexander AND Darius controlled when this point of engagement occurred. They knew they wouldn't then be able to influence the results when the spears and swords crossed in combat. Not unless the commander himself used direct intervention. That was true at Austerlitz and Gettysburg as much as Gaugamela and Issus. Until that point, Alexander had command control of his army, and those units not engaged after 'the fighting started.'

True enough, but not in the sense of being able to make individual units skip around like ballet dancers. Armies were big, unwieldy clumsy things, and it would take some pre-battle planning to enable the troops to work in concert even to accomplish the simplest things.

Yes, they could, but in controlling an army they weren't anywhere, and where they were needed to be uniform and in sync with the Army Commander's plan. Alexander advanced with nearly a third of his army on the right. That means troops were across a 1500 yards or a mile front. How did Alexander control them to change direction into the weakened center of the Persian line? The battle was fought over a 4000 yard front. The question is during battle what kinds of control did an ancient ARMY commander have up to the point of individual units becoming engaged?

The answer to that question also will reveal some of real weaknesses in Darius's ability to command his army.

To be honest I don't quite follow this. Can you elaborate? Alex could control the entire army up to the point of engagement, but in the limited sense described above. He could better control the units directly under his command: the Agema, the Hypaspists and the Companions, but even they would have to keep formation with him – they couldn't go off on Lone Ranger missions.

I think pre battle orders were the main way a commander communicated. Had to be.
I would think once a unit was issued orders and headed off then that was usually the general's opportunity for input done.

I thought parmenion asked for help but was successful and didn't need it by the time help arrived.

@Andy ONeill:

Agreed. The only problem with an orders system is that it's no fun. It adds complexity and ambiguity to a game (is a player fulfilling his orders or is he stretching his leeway too far?) and IMHO takes away too much control from the player, who can do no more than perhaps time the execution of his orders and otherwise just wait to die if he has been outsmarted by his opponent. A player must always feel he can do something to turn a battle around, at least until the game is nearly over and not a couple of moves after it has begun.

I try a compromise with my system since wargaming is all about a balancing act between historicity and playability (with playability winning every argument). PIP dice do the same thing but IMHO not very well.

A player must always feel he can do something to turn a battle around, at least until the game is nearly over and not a couple of moves after it has begun.

Keep your reserves (ideally mobile or mounted) positioned and unengaged. Force him to commit his reserves first. Now everyone is locked into combat except your reserves who can strike where needed the most to turn the tide of battle.

Wolfhag

True enough, but not in the sense of being able to make individual units skip around like ballet dancers. Armies were big, unwieldy clumsy things, and it would take some pre-battle planning to enable the troops to work in concert even to accomplish the simplest things.

Boilingar:

Yes and no. Certainly not making individual units dance. I apologize if I was vague, but I wasn't sure how much I was preaching to the choir.

The question is still how Alexander could redirect a good portion of his army to attack the middle of the Persian line once his Companions were engaged, from this

link

to this:

link

Now of course, there was a pre-battle plan, where cavalry at both flanks were expected to neutralize the Persian cavalry there. Yea, Permenion. It was understood that was his command's primary mission and not linked to the phalanxes on his right.

But the pre-orders doesn't include a change of direction to the center of the Persian line after being engaged, at least according to the narratives we have. They all seem to agree on this point. Alexander changed the direction of his attack which wasn't part of the original plan.

The Macedonians were using Greek battle organization: The regulating/controlling unit operated on the right flank, always the best units. It was standard. It is even seen in the Iliad. Achilles' elite troops are on the far right and the battle line moves forward when Achilles' troops move. {Fagles, Iliad, Bk 11, lines 1-10]

This system was used by all the Greek city states. That is why the Spartans and Thebans where on the right flank in mixed armies. That is why many of those battles would see opposing right flanks successful, only to have to turn on each other to finish the battle. That is why Alexander was on the right flank with his elite troops. That is why the Roman first Cohort was always on the right flank. Etc. etc. That is why even into the 19th century, the place of honor was on the right flank.

It was so simple a method, wherever the controlling unit goes, the line follows intact. The method was used right up to the British attack on the Somme by inexperienced troops, 1916. KISS. I can show you Napoleonic and ACW and Prussian regulations detailing this as the basic method of maneuver for a battle line. Orders during battle were only used as a second option when necessary. That is why most 19th Century armies had few aides and couriers assigned to divisional and brigade-level.

That means that Alexander remained 'in control' in the midst of battle, knew if he turned the units he did command locally towards the Persian center, engaged or not, the rest of the line would follow regulating on the right-hand unit from them, attempting to maintain a solid battle line, trained to do so, whether they could see Alexander or not. [mostly not] It was part of the training and tradition.

It is also obvious that the Persians did not have this army organization. Where did Darius place himself? In the center of the army where he could stay unengaged. There he would release various part of his army by signal, but not in any coordinated operation because there was no overall method for doing that between various groups. That is why the Chariots charged alone. the cavalry charged alone. The Greek mercenaries might have a right flank controlling unit, but there was no coordination with any other Persian units.

It is why Alexander could plow through the Persians: His forces were unified with a single direction and a closed battle front. Each separate Persian unit was responding alone in reaction to this, and unable to do this with any degree of swiftness compared to the Macedonians.

Different cultures, different military traditions. Darius could release specific units, but had no way of coordinating them… you can see that in the Persian army's actions. That is why Cyrus the Great found himself isolated because of this balkanized form of organization and killed so many years before Darius.

This same process on both sides was repeated at Issus. The Greek unified training and methods were superior to the Persians, regardless of army size.

I think pre battle orders were the main way a commander communicated. Had to be.

During the battle? No. There was a battle plan, no doubt, but in the end it was the Macedonian abilities and organizational methods applied during the battle that won the day, not the orders outlined before the battle began.

I played a Command & Colors Ancients Battle of Gaugamela yesterday--serendipitously. My friend had it set up when I came over for a day of gaming. It was fun and challenging, but the game system begins with no unified command and ends with individual units wandering all over the place, more Persian in character than anything Macedonian, but historical nonsense none-the-less.

A player must always feel he can do something to turn a battle around, at least until the game is nearly over and not a couple of moves after it has begun.

Keep your reserves (ideally mobile or mounted) positioned and unengaged. Force him to commit his reserves first. Now everyone is locked into combat except your reserves who can strike where needed the most to turn the tide of battle.

While I agree with this all in general, you don't see this approach applied in any of Alexander's battles.

And like players, commanders in ancient battles wanted to "feel he can do something to turn a battle around." It's only natural. So they organized ways to do that.

It would be quite easy, within the historical parameters, to have a game where players are able to do more than wind up the army with pre-orders and set them off without further control.

In the game, the Macedonians can 're-aim' his battle line during battle as well as commit reserves. The Persian controls which units are released at what time during the battle. Unlike the Macedonians, the Persian is unable to release his entire army to move forward at once… I am sure if he could have, Darius would have in an attempt to overwhelm the Macedonians. His army just was too balkanized command-wise to seriously attempt that. It would have been a mob scene. It was to some extent anyway.

As a general rule if a scenario is well designed, the number of game-turns will be limited. This will result in minimal ability to change anything, if the game begins with both sides already deployed in line ready for battle. If the rules allows for pre-battle manoeuvring, such as the movement into the final battle lines, then decisions will be possible. On the other hand you would still hit the game-turn limit which means a major change would not be viable once the two sides are lined up and ready for battle. I suppose a general can move from one location to another with his body guard and this could have an impact.

Also I'd suggest that in a period where the CoC had little ability to issue commands to units other than uncommitted s reserves, the rules should have "choices" thag subunits can make. Ala coat of steel rules etc.

Also I'd suggest that in a period where the CoC had little ability to issue commands to units other than uncommitted s reserves, the rules should have "choices" that subunits can make. Ala coat of steel rules etc.

Gamesman6:
In what era wasn't that true?

At Battle of Gaugamela and Issus, according the the accounts we have:

**Alexander changed the direction of his attack after his local commands were engaged.

**Darius was issuing commands to various units after the battle was started. In some respects his entire army was 'in reserve' and only particular parts were engaged.

**Alexander's subordinates were sending multiple messages to him while both were engaged, apparently believing Alexander could actually do something about requests for reinforcements.

**And it seems that Alexander could decide when to disengage parts of his army.

All bodies of troops thousands strong were and are unwieldy to say the least. A rethink of just what ancient leaders could and couldn't do during a battle really needs to be revisited. Just a thought.

Hence my point about making the game abou about formulating the plan as the CoC and then having choices of sub unit commanders who are actually fighting the battles.

Too many ancient in this case rule sets are just blocks of figures base to base and people rolling dice time and agains and marking casualties.

I suppose a general can move from one location to another with his body guard and this could have an impact.

ACW generals, Cesar and Napoleon did that many times.

Wolfhag

Hence my point about making the game abou about formulating the plan as the CoC and then having choices of sub unit commanders who are actually fighting the battles.

Gamesman6:
I was pointing out that the scenario above bears little relationship to how the battles of Gaugamela and Issus developed as described by the ancients. BOTH commanders made several decisions during the battle, engaged and not, and at one point we know of changing 'the plan.' Decisions by the sub-commanders as described were few [4 cavalry on the flanks] and limited in scope.

Too many ancient in this case rule sets are just blocks of figures base to base and people rolling dice time and again and marking casualties.

Gamesman6:

As a follow-up, I would think the traits I outlined for the battles of Gaugamela and Issus would address this kind of thing.

Looking at the actual battles can illuminate the various organizations and command structure. The few we know something about aren't 'base to base' actions.

@McLaddie

The question is still how Alexander could redirect a good portion of his army to attack the middle of the Persian line once his Companions were engaged, from this

link

to this:

link

I seriously doubt the Macedonian army looked like that. Arrian affirms that Alex formed his heavy infantry in two lines – phalangites in the front and mercenary hoplites in the rear, with other troops to close off the sides, i.e. he formed a giant square – the correct disposition for infantry when facing superior cavalry. The infantry pretty much remained in that square for the duration of the battle except when the left half of the pike phalanx separated from the right half since the left could no longer continue its rightward movement as it was being attacked. But it wouldn't have been much longer after that that the right faced front again and began to assault Darius' left, spearheaded by the Companions (who remained in front of the Agema and Hypaspists throughout this part of the battle). Once facing the front the Companions plunged through the gap between Darius' centre and left wing, followed by the Hypaspists and Agema and then, getting around to Darius' rear, wheeled left and headed straight for Darius himself, who was stationed behind his own mercenary hoplites (about 8000 strong).

All this would have been part of Alex's plan, since he was essentially doing the same thing he had done at Issus: smash through the Persian left and outflank the Persian centre. The only refinement here was the leftward move of the entire army, which obliged Darius to send off his left flank cavalry to envelope the Macedonian right and stop this movement. I don't think that was a mid-battle improvisation. Darius knew he had cavalry superiority however he wouldn't have sent his horsemen against the Macedonian pikes (suicide), but rather executed a double envelopment of the Macedonian wings. Only now, his envelopment of the Macedonian right had to go further than expected since the entire Macedonian army had shifted to the right. This overextending of the Persian left is what opened the gap between it and the Persian centre.

Darius did not move his entire army in concert since that wasn't his plan. His two wings were to move independently of his centre and surround the Macedonians. Nothing suggests that he couldn't have moved his entire army as a single block in the way Alex did (though Darius' levies, behind the main line didn't move at all and were there only for show).

Could Alex have changed his plans in mid-battle and made his massive square go somewhere else? I don't know but I doubt it. The men had to know what was to be expected of them if there were to keep a formation of such size in order – they expect to march right then reform facing forwards. Full stop. A sudden and unexpected change of direction would probably result in confusion and a disintegration of the battle array. I suspect though that Alex could have done this with a single battleline – the individual syntagmata had trumpeters and standard bearers who could pass the order down from one to the next sufficiently quickly to enable the entire line to start doing something different, and those troops would be used to functioning as a single battleline anyway.

In my gaming system I now allow commands to fall directly under the control of the general if they are alongside or in front of / behind the general's command. The commands can all move as a single block under the general, i.e. the player.

One correction: Darius could not have moved his army as a single block to the left or right, as that would involved square-shaped subunits wheeling left or right to transform the line into an instant column which would then move off. The Persian army did not have anything like this degree of organisation or training.

Darius could, however, have advanced his army as a block.

Macladdie
The few we know something about aren't 'base to base' actions.

No but that's what too many, imo, systems ending up being.

2 things spring to mind

- no plan survives contact with the enemy
- order, counter order, disorder…

I think it is safe to assume that both experienced military men, Darius and Alexander were aware of Dave's comment:

2 things spring to mind
- no plan survives contact with the enemy
- order, counter order, disorder…

But it seems the argument is that once Ancient battle plans were made and troops deployed accordingly, All the CinC could do was say "Go boys' and whatever happened, happened. None of Alexander's battles play out that way for either side, not Gaugamela, Issus, or the Hydaspes River. If we look at the first battle Alexander participated in as a leader, the battle of Chaeronea, the answer is heck no!

Of course, both Alexander and Darius deployed their troops for Issus and Gaugamela exactly the same way both times. Alexanders carried this same deployment into India at the Hydaspes River, the same refused left flank. If the initial deployment [plan]was so crucial and basically the ONLY control the CinC had, why do the same thing over and over again regardless of the different terrain, opposition and their own army composition?

Was Alexander just stupidly unimaginative or a Johnny-one-note "Brilliant" commander? Any competent commander would know no plan survives first contact, and would want 'some' control of the whole army during a battle, when that 'plan' didn't survive, rather than just watch or lead his little band of retainers.

A general in 1800 had the same communication and organizational tools the Macedonians had, yet I don't read where Napoleonic Commanding generals wound up their armies, let them go, and hoped for the best.

Both Darius and Alexander made army decisions during the battle, and such control was anticipated by subordinates on both sides. The question is how that was done and why. What control did they have?

If Darius could have coordinated the various ethnic groups to advance as whole army, without it being a cluster, he would have. Darius's massive numerical advantage was the one thing going for the Persians, but instead he sent in units piece-meal in both battles. Alexander's forces moved together, and unlike Issus, at Gaugamela Alexander changes the direction of the army's attack--with the same initial deployment.

If we want to see a battle where the commanders are shaping the battle as it is being fought, Alexander had no better example than battle of Chaeronea. Were there limits on CinC's battlefield control after initial contact? Absolutely for several reasons. But it did exist in various ways, obvious when studying the battles themselves.

I seriously doubt the Macedonian army looked like that. Arrian affirms that Alex formed his heavy infantry in two lines – phalangites in the front and mercenary hoplites in the rear, with other troops to close off the sides, i.e. he formed a giant square – the correct disposition for infantry when facing superior cavalry.

Bolinger: If you want to critique the specifics of how the armies were drawn, we can, but the general direction and engagements will remain the same regardless, which was my point.

All this would have been part of Alex's plan, since he was essentially doing the same thing he had done at Issus: smash through the Persian left and outflank the Persian centre. The only refinement here was the leftward move of the entire army, which obliged Darius to send off his left flank cavalry to envelope the Macedonian right and stop this movement. I don't think that was a mid-battle improvisation.

Again, at Issus, it was the left that Alexander attacked, in good Greek fashion. A Gaugamela, his left attack 'hooked' before, not after the left was flanked. Instead, he changed the direction of his attack and drove for the gap created by the Persians between the center and left forces. He didn't outflank the Persins, he struck right through them aimed at Darius in the center--with a significant portion of his army--The Companions and Hypaspists couldn't do it alone, even if Alexander could control all 12,000 of them himself.
Call it improvisation of you want, but regardless, it was different from Issus. At the Hydaspes River, Alexander did something different again with the very same initial deployment.

The similarities and initial plans aren't being questioned by pointing out that the 'plan' could be and were changed 'army-wide' in significant ways. The army that could react as a single force when 'the plan' failed to survive initial contact with the enemy had a significant advantage.

All this would have been part of Alex's plan, since he was essentially doing the same thing he had done at Issus: smash through the Persian left and outflank the Persian centre. The only refinement here was the leftward move of the entire army, which obliged Darius to send off his left flank cavalry to envelope the Macedonian right and stop this movement. I don't think that was a mid-battle improvisation.

I meant to point out that saying Darius was 'obliged' to do anything because of Macedonian movement suggest control. And Alexander either set up to the left or he moved the entire army to the left… which is it?

Moved to his right at Gaugamela after taking up position before the right of the phalanx. Take up position before the right of the phalanx at Issus.

Moved to his right at Gaugamela after taking up position before the right of the phalanx. Take up position before the right of the phalanx at Issus.

Bolingar:
Okay, so how does that relate to what you wrote before:

The only refinement here was the leftward move of the entire army, which obliged Darius to send off his left flank cavalry to envelope the Macedonian right and stop this movement. I don't think that was a mid-battle improvisation.

I am talking about large scale/army maneuvers and decisions after the plans have been made and deployment done, and after battle opens with maneuver and engagement.

You seem to feel that any such army-wide or large movements modifying any deployment plans aren't possible. I am saying that the descriptions of the battles, such as they are, apparently demonstrate that they are. No dancing units, but some ability, something that both Darius and Alexander purposely retained to respond to changing circumstances, as any commander would want.

Consider a battle before Alexander's Perian and Indian battles:

Battle of Chaeronea [I'll refrain from showing a map at this point:

There are two dominating interpretations of the events at Chaeronea. The first, firmly established by historian Nicholas G. Hammond in the 1930s and supported by Ian Worthington in the early 21st century, relies on combining the various fragments of ancient texts to provide a complex set of maneuvers used by Philip to secure victory. In that account, Philip drew the inexperienced Athenian militia out of position with a feigned retreat. As the Athenians sought to exploit their perceived advantage, the troops at the Greek centre moved left in an attempt to preserve the line. That opened a gap between the Greek centre and the Thebans, and Alexander, at the head of Philip's hetairoi ("companion") cavalry, charged through. The Thebans and allied Greeks were taken from the rear, while the Macedonians routed the Athenians.

The second interpretation dismisses many of the later, often anecdotal, ancient texts and instead focuses on the account of Diodorus, which presents a traditional phalanx-on-phalanx battle. In that description, the veteran Macedonians simply overpowered the Greeks, in part because of the Macedonians' use of the sarissa, a 13- to 21-foot (4- to 6.5-metre) spear that was roughly twice the length of the pikes used by the Greeks.

In both accounts of the battle, the superior discipline of the Sacred Band resulted in its annihilation. Source: Britannica link

Now, *most* authorities accept the first version. It would seem that there was a lot more going on that a set battle plan, certainly far more dynamic than most accounts of the Greek city states' battles.

The question is what advantages the 'discipline' of the Macedonians gave in the way of maneuver and command control once the ancient battles opened.

I can think of several that go beyond a set plan for the army that the commander in chief can't influence after it is engaged--based on the evidence, such as it is.

Part of the problem beside the lack of information is the 'generalist' way many narratives work, giving very unspecific descriptions. Sort of like modern historians saying

France made a determined stand on the Somme and Aisne rivers but were defeated by the German combination of air superiority and armored mobility in 1940.

Doesn't tell you much of what wargamers would want to know. Ancient writers were guilty of this too.

@McLaddie

Okay, so how does that relate to what you wrote before:

I got my left and right mixed up in that second quote – meant to say the rightward movement. That clarified, where's the contradiction?

It seems clear enough that Darius planned a double envelopment, the only feasible plan he had since he could not take on the pike phalanx head-on with anything on his side except possibly the scythed chariots, and they alone wouldn't win the battle for him. Alex would have known this and planned accordingly. Deploy in a huge square. Move the square to the right to get off the ground prepared for the chariots. Darius sees this and signals the execution of his plan, i.e. the two cavalry wings of his army move off the envelope the Macedonians, but his left wing has to move further to attempt to get around the Macedonian right flank. It fails as the head of its column is contacted by Macedonian cavalry and it dissolves into disorder. Alex then – also according to plan – stops the rightward move, gets his phalanx column to wheel left back into line, and advances on the Persian left with a convenient gap to expedite things (I don't think he relied on a gap appearing but it was a nice bonus). And the rest is history.

None of the major moves during this battle were on the spot improvisations.

Battle of Chaeronea [I'll refrain from showing a map at this point:

My own take (happy to cite from primary sources if you like) is that the Hypaspists and Agema were hoplite-armed to enable them to wheel left and outflank their opponent's left in good old Greek fashion – pikemen can't wheel once their sarissas are lowered. The rest of the phalanx was pike armed. Both sides understood inclined lines. So when the Hypaspists and Agema gave way before the Athenians on the right, the rest of the phalanx would have retired to form a stepped but continuous line connected to them. The Greek line would have formed a similar stepped line to remain connected to the Athenians. Again, this manoeuvre was well understood by both sides.

Incidentally, the Hypaspists and Agema defeated the Athenians by drawing them from their high ground back to a spur. Here the Macedonians, now with the uphill advantage, were able to drive the Athenian hoplites back. The Athenians – unlike the Macedonians – didn't have the training to retire in order and their phalanx collapsed. Neat trick by Philip.

On the other flank, Alex executed the first known example of the Macedonian double whammy: heavy cavalry (probably sarissaphoroi) deployed in front of the pike phalanx. The cavalry charged straight through the Sacred Band who were then finished off by the pikemen. Alex used the same deployment at Issus and Gaugamela (which is why I don't think he was counting on a gap in the latter battle – his intention was to smash straight through whatever was in front of him as he had done at Chaeronea and Issus).

I got my left and right mixed up in that second quote – meant to say the rightward movement. That clarified, where's the contradiction?

Bolinger:
Never said there was one. Just asking for a clarification… you clarified.

Thank you for your detailed descriptions of the two battles.

The issue still is how much control commanders did or didn't have over large portions of their armies during an ancient battle, specifically those involving Alexander and the Macedonians.

There are three aspects of this question:

1. The initial battle plan, which would include or dictate the initial deployment of troops.

2. The organizational details that circumscribed various units' abilities to maneuver and combat.

3. The modifications of any plan after the army was engaged, particularly involving maneuver by large portions of the army[s]. The level of unit discipline would have a large impact on this.

These three aspect of ancient combat are not separate questions, but interconnected. Here is an example from the Napoleonic wars. At the battle of Salamanca in 1812, Wellington ordered Pakenham's 3rd Division to march across the front of the French column an attack. Now, was this 'spontaneous?' Yes and no. Pakenham had his whole division marching, pacing the French for days in brigade columns of 2 men abreast regulating on the left. He was ready to order a 'face left' order at any time, and be in two rank battle formation facing left. So, Pakenham's formation allowed him to quickly march to the head of the French column, face left and quickly engage the French. The plan, dictating the organization allowed for the quick response to Wellington's orders. Aspects 1, 2, and then 3.

I am saying this is the same situation with Alexander's army.

[1] Move the square to the right to get off the ground prepared for the chariots. [2] Darius sees this and signals the execution of his plan, i.e. the two cavalry wings of his army move off the envelope the Macedonians, but his left wing has to move further to attempt to get around the Macedonian right flank. It fails as the head of its column is contacted by Macedonian cavalry and it dissolves into disorder. [I don't remember reading that!] Alex then – also according to plan – [3] stops the rightward move, gets his phalanx column to wheel left back into line, and advances on the Persian left with a convenient gap, [An opportunity he saw? Then it would be convenient, otherwise it is just serendipity. I don't think so.] to expedite things.

1. Where was Alexander when he moved that 'square' to the right, and even if that was the plan… [questionable] how does he signal it at the time? And moving any army in battle formation laterally is very difficult.

2. Darius was in control of his troops and reacted to what he saw Alexander doing. Why was THAT the impetus for him to carry out his plan? Wouldn't he simply have said go immediately?

3. Alexander is at the head of his Companion cavalry. Exactly when does he 'order' the Phalanx to wheel to the left--when the Persian left was straight ahead --particularly with the Macedonian 'right lateral move'…and attacking the left was 'The Plan' as with Issus. Wasn't the Issue attack and supposedly the Gaugamela plan. You know, ride around the left and then 'hook' back, not before hitting the Persian line at all. All the authorities I have read say Alexander hit the Persian gap between left and center and drove for Darius, no 'outflanking' maneuver.

So, Alexander seems to have been able to

1. control the direction, timing, and maneuvers of a large portion of his army, not just the Companions and maybe the Hypaspists and Agema.

2. He did change direction when he chose to change direction. That the army was set up for that right hand march and organize/capable of changing directions is not questioned. The issue is that Alexander communicated when and where his ARMY went during the battle.

The Battle of Chaeronea I'll address in another post if you wish. I do seriously doubt that "The cavalry charged straight through the Sacred Band," an elite force which was still in a coherent formation when it was wiped out.

@McLaddie

1. Alex was in front of the right wing of the phalanx as Arrian affirms. Same as at Issus.

There were several ways of signalling, trumpet (cornet actually I think) banner, etc. Each syntagma had several signallers as the manuals state and could easily pass on an order from one end of the line to the other.

Moving a battleline laterally is not really difficult since switching from line to column was a standard manoeuvre, but doing it in a square whilst in close proximity to the enemy was difficult, and it nearly didn't work – in fact it didn't quite work for the front line phalanx that split in the middle.

2. Darius probably wanted his chariots to disrupt the phalanx first before moving anyone else. My take is that he ordered the preplanned double envelopment earlier than expected when he saw the phalanx moving off the ground he had prepared for the chariots.

3. Alex gives the signal the moment the armies are deployed – he wants to get to as far to the right as possible before the chariots reach the phalanx.

The Gaugamela plan, like the Issue plan was to hit the Persian left – the Kardakes at Issus – smashing straight through it and then going for Darius himself. As a corollary, outflanking the Persian centre. It wasn't about outflanking the left.

And the next bit….

1. Controlling the timing of prearranged manoeuvres was certainly within the capacity of a general. But changing those prearranged manoeuvres in mid-battle wasn't.

2. As above. He changed direction as per pre-battle planning. Alex could not have made up manoeuvres like that in mid-battle.

Re Chaeronea, cavalry smashing through heavy infantry was a fairly common feature in Antiquity. The Mid-Republican Roman cavalry routinely won battles that way – passing through their own infantry and then charging to burst through enemy foot. The manuals describe what to do when charged by cavalry – thinning the line so as not to be too disrupted when the horsemen passed through. Several examples I can give if you like.

It is still a question of how much control each CinC had over their army and how they could respond to enemy movements once the battle commenced. [i.e. one or both sides moved]

Any battle plan always includes what units are deployed where, and that dictates what a commander can and can't do. At the 2nd Battle of Falluja, the U.S. forces advanced, using the right flank to 'regulate' the advance, the rest of the forces advancing in concert. No 'dancing units.' This is true throughout history, so having a battle plan and a particular deployment of assets is nothing new. Nor is the limitations it places on 'spontaneous' actions mid-battle.

Your numbered points:

1. Alexander started there, he moved further right to the Companions at some point.

2. Chariots also were facing the Macedonian right flank and the Hypaspists. Darius was trying to learn from Issus.

3. You wrote previously: "All this would have been part of Alex's plan, since he was essentially doing the same thing he had done at Issus: smash through the Persian left and outflank the Persian centre. The only refinement here was the leftward move of the entire army, which obliged Darius to send off his left flank cavalry to envelope the Macedonian right and stop this movement. I don't think that was a mid-battle improvisation."

And I have read the following several places: Seeing the opening created by the left flank cavalry move, Alexander formed his men into a wedge and quickly moved to his left and into the gap created by the most the Persian left attempting to envelope the Macedonian right, charging through the center, shocking Darius.

Forming a wedge was certainly in the plan, not defeating the left, but charging the center left was not, if an Issus repeat was the plan.

1. So, Alexander and Darius had some 'army-wide' control.
2. The maneuver wasn't 'made up'-- when and in what direction it was aimed at was. There is no indication that Alexander defeated the left at Gaugamela, he defeated the center. I think it is one reason Darius was surprised. He expected and planned for an Issus repeat.

Chaeronea:

cavalry smashing through heavy infantry was a fairly common feature in Antiquity.

What? Cavalry was almost always deployed on the flanks. If cavalry smashing heavy infantry was so common, why wasn't cavalry placed facing the heavies? Why didn't the Persian cavalry at least charge the foot companions? Without a 'fairly common' set of examples, I am going to remain skeptical of cavalry hitting heavy infantry frontally [required with the Theban Scared Band.] I'd like battle examples, please. not skirmishes as such. They Macedonians certainly opened gaps for the chariots and Romans likewise along with elephants. I don't read where it happened on the battlefield.

If we can agree that Darius and Alexander

1. Did have some control of their whole army or at least a large portion of it during the battle.

2. That Darius and Alexander maneuvered in response to each other's deployment on the battlefield. It wasn't 'easy' to move parallel to the enemy's line. It took discipline and hutzpah--and a less than responsive enemy.

3. That how Issus played out is not how Gaugamela did.

Then we may have a point to build from. If not, we will just have to agree to disagree. Remember, the discussion started with your statement:

In Antiquity a general was usually limited to giving orders to his subordinate commanders just before the battle and being able to exert virtually no control once the actual fighting started, other than perhaps timing the execution of his orders with banners, trumpets or whatever

And the problem of boring tabletop games if that is true. Have a plan and push units forward by plan until one side loses.

I think there are more interesting things that can be portrayed.