"Challenging the "Butcher" Reputation: General Grant's" Topic

… Strategy in the Overland Campaign

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Armand

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Armand

I thought the butcher reputation was based on his actions at Cold Harbor?

Horace Porter pointed out that Grant lost fewer men in successfully taking Richmond than his predecessors had lost in trying to take it and failing.

His reputation as a butcher primarily came from the post-war Lost Cause poor-looser Rebels, who claimed that they were only defeated by the clumsy use of overwhelming numbers. (As if that was somehow unfair.)

Thanks also.

Armand

"His reputation as a butcher primarily came from the post-war Lost Cause poor-looser Rebels, who claimed that they were only defeated by the clumsy use of overwhelming numbers. (As if that was somehow unfair.)"

I'd like to see your references to validate this statement of yours.

"Horace Porter pointed out that Grant lost fewer men in successfully taking Richmond than his predecessors had lost in trying to take it and failing.

Oh and speaking of Ol' Horace Porter…

"Although they did not know the details of their objectives, the Union soldiers who had survived the frontal assaults at Spotsylvania Court House seemed to be in no doubt as to what they would be up against in the morning. Grant's aide, Lt. Col. Horace Porter, wrote in his memoirs that he saw many men writing their names on papers that they pinned inside their uniforms, so their bodies could be identified. (The accuracy of this story is disputed as Porter is the only source.) One blood-spattered diary from a Union soldier found after the battle included a final entry: "June 3. Cold Harbor. I was killed.""

Yeah…sounds like a lot of "Lost Cause Poor Loser (btw… that's how it is spelled") Rebels…"

*smh….

(smile)

Armand

Lost Causers embraced those ideas Don because there was more than an element of truth to them.

Compared to Sherman's Atlanta campaign there wasn't a much tactical brilliance in the Overland campaign. Success came from a sheer willingness to keep slogging on. Taking the hits knowing the manpower losses could be replaced. Makes me wonder how things might have been different if Hooker had accepted his subordinates recommendation to keep fighting at Chancellorsville, or even if rain and a thaw hadn't hit Burnside in the Mud March after Fredericksburg. Plus its clear one of Lee's biggest problems in 1864-65 was his inability to replace his losses.

OTOH I don't see how Grant at Cold Harbor was that different from Lee at Malvern Hill or on July 3 at Gettysburg, or from Bragg on January 2 at Stone Mountain.

Or Hood at Franklin

How could I forget Franklin?

Lee deserved the title as much as Grant did, I have always thought. Gettysburg was his Cold Harbor in the sense that he should have realized what would happen with Pickett's charge. No justification for it, and the impact was that he would never again have a chance to win the war.

Grant just kept pounding him. He surrendered too late, lost too many more men after he could not win. Surely he knew …if he was as brilliant as we were always told. I am not saying he was not an exceptional commander. But Grant got the short end of the stick for too long.

I would love to read an objective, modern, narrative about him,if anyone has suggestions. Maybe I would better understand the choices he made in his life. Grant has been restored to his rightful place in history by White, Chernow,and others.

That is why I rate Lee a step below Grant. Butcher or not, he knew he had the manpower to sustain those types of casualties and Lincoln's backing as long as he progressed forward.

Lee should have known his Army could not sustain the casualties and replace them. But he did it anyway.

I've read many books on the Gettysburg Campaign. No matter what I have read, the negatives outweighed the positives on Lee's Northern campaign.

I still believe, no Gettysburg campaign and there would have been no Grant in the East as early. The Union would have had to launch a campaign against South under whatever General was in charge, Hooker, Meade or someone else out of the Army of the Potomac, and I believe another defeat in the South with the Northern army on the offensive.

Would that have changed the results of the 1864 election? Would Lincoln have refused to leave office if McClellan won? I believe all or any are possibilities. 🤔

He had already done other things

"Presidential Proclamation 94 of September 24, 1862, by President Abraham Lincoln suspending the writ of Habeas Corpus."

"Restrictions on the Northern press during the Civil War

Throughout the war, newspaper reporters and editors were arrested without due process for opposing the draft, discouraging enlistments in the Union army, or even criticizing the income tax."

"On September 15, 1863, President Lincoln imposed Congressionally authorized martial law on Maryland and Missouri. The authorizing act allowed the President to suspend habeas corpus and civil rights throughout the entire United States (which he had already done under his own authority on April 27, 1861)."

We can also thank his administration for the income tax

"A tax on income was established in 1862 but was abolished after the war. "

So would he have refused to leave office in time of war? I think it was a possibility. 🤔

I agree about Gettysburg. Lee should have talked more about it with Longstreet. They never wanted to fight on unfavorable ground before. They could have slipped around once they saw what was happening maybe? Move toward Washington, start a panic. Choose the field.

Lincoln's case is an unusual one. His situation was unique. He did take some serious liberties. But without him, no USA. I can't really fault him too much. Secession and open warfare from the other side seem a lot worse.

McClellan was useless on the Peninsula, could not been trusted, a blamer. All hat,no cattle. He could never have led if he had been elected. But even so, nothing about Lincoln suggests to me that he wanted power so much that he would subvert the election. He was trying to save the USA above all else when he took the steps he did. And he his views on post war were conciliatory. He did know better than anyone what a bag of wind McClellan was. But he was not the only one.

I think the Army voted way over 2 to 1 for Lincoln over McClellan in 64.

My election theory is based on Lee NOT going North. Meade, Hooker or some other Potomac retread losing to Lee again in late 63 and Grant not arriving in time than to change the Eastern fortunes in time for the elections and a McClellan win.

Lincoln did not let the Constitution or laws stand in his way during the war. With the influence of the Republican hard liners and the war and Union in jeopardy with a McClellan win in 64, I could see them subverting the election.

It Would be interesting. Subverting the laws of the of election and Constitution in order to stop the Confederacy from subverting the Union. Would make a very interesting book. 🤔

Murphy, I can't give you a source for my impression of the Lost Cause losers (sorry 'bout the spelling above) other than a lifetime of reading.

I'm curious about the source of your quote, as my recollection is that the pinning their names on their coats bit happened at Cold Harbor, not Spotsylvania.

Compared to Sherman's Atlanta campaign there wasn't a much tactical brilliance in the Overland campaign.

True. Part of that was that Grant was up against Lee and Sherman was up against Johnston. Each had to fit their own strategy to that of their opponent. But, his Vicksburg campaign proves that Grant could maneuver as well as fight.

Vicksburg is still studied today at West Point. A brilliant campaign.

Lee couldn't unmask Richmond, losing the capitol would have broken the Confederate army. I have no doubt he knew he was losing, but there was no alternative.

Murvihill, that was another huge mistake of the Confederacy, making Richmond the capital. But that has been discussed many times.

Hey guys, interesting topic, lots of good points and what ifs. For what my 2 cents is worth couple thoughts.
I agree that Grant doesn't deserve the title of butcher any more than a couple other generals do. I will say that when it came to actual battlefield tactics Grant was not very creative and did mainly stick with the frontal assault, pound the enemy in the ground….if I recall it caused some tension between him and Mead that did want to try some flanking moves instead of continually attacking prepared positions.
My understanding is his name of butcher was not so much southern lost causers as it was northern newspapers at the time that opposed him, and Lincoln and the name was motivated for political reasons, the same group that tried to label him a drunk….I'm assuming Democrats????
I also agree that IF Lincoln had lost he may have refused the results, considering points by 35thOVI already made plus the fact McClellan was running on a "peace with honor" platform…if I remember correctly.
Yes the battle of "Get sum"(LOL) was a bad deal after the first day for the south. It has been suggested Lee was sick and well we all can have a bad day, who knows??? I can't help but think part of the reason may have been that Lee knew the south was losing and had to either take a gamble to change things around or continue doing the same and die a slow, painful death. I don't know, but have to wonder??? Not saying it was the right choice just that I try not to judge such generals all the time sense I was not "the man" in that spot at that time having so much burden to bare and NOT having the benefit of hindsight.
As to Grant and the 64 election from what I have seen it was really Sherman taking Atlanta that saved Lincolns bacon. The news showed the war weary public that "yes the war not only will be won but soon". Grant was on the offensive but in Nov 64 the eastern front was still basically a stalemate. I have read several sources that say it was Sherman that turned public support around.
Anway….sorry for all the typing, hopefully some of it was interesting input. Happy gaming all!!!

Gamer1 good point. Yes I agree that Sherman and his armies were the success that probably guaranteed the election.

But if Grant had not come East as early, as in my scenario, the grand strategy that he helped to create and which included Sherman taking over in the west, would not have happened when it did.

Still think it would make for an interesting what if book. 😉

Thanks.

Armand

Yes I agree that Sherman and his armies were the success that probably guaranteed the election.

Agreed. With a noble assist from Sheridan in the Valley and an honorable mention to Farragut at Mobile Bay.

But, as you say, it was Grant who orchestrated the whole thing.

Ah, yah, I might have missed the mark a little. Yes if you are talking grand strategy I agree Grant should get the credit. I have said before I feel Grants greatest strengths were in over all planning and seeing the bigger picture, his battlefield tactics where….okay. LOL.
Yes if say he had stayed in the "mid-west" TN area and as you say left the east to the likes of Meade then yah, could have been a different outcome for sure.
I really think after the first 18 months the souths only real chance to get its independence was the 1864 election outcome. I can't see the south ever really being able to defeat the north, just convince them the cost in blood and money was too high to keep going, like Vietnam, etc.

BTW yes that would make for a good what if book, several was it could go:)

" I can't see the south ever really being able to defeat the north, just convince them the cost in blood and money was too high to keep going, like Vietnam, etc."

I guess there was the very small chance GB or France might intervene on their behalf. Of the two, GB would have given them the best possibility of a victory.

But by 64, really only the election and more Union defeats in the East were their last hope. The North had already had to resort to the draft and many were tired of the death, bloodshed and cost of the war and no progress in the East.

I also have wondered if there had been no Gettysburg, would Reynolds have accepted command of the Army. By 64 the AOP had a number of excellent field commanders while Lee's commanders were being lost to attrition. As I said,the AOP went 2-1 for Lincoln in the election, he was undoubtably the man at this point, with Grant on the same wavelength. At this time the AOP was a high quality force and no longer had to suffer through a revolving door of incompetents even if Grant stayed in the west.

I agree that tactics, or grand tactics, was not Grant's forte'. His general idea seems to have been: Close with the enemy and make him dance to your tune, not vice versa.

Against Lee that was especially the case, otherwise Lee would find a flank to turn somewhere.

I think even without a Gettysburg it was still just a question of how long, assume public support held up. It may have been another battle or three but don't forget it was the blockade and loss of manpower starting mid 63 that was really destroying the souths' ability to fight, not winning or losing a couple battles. You might say Grants greatest effect on the war from 64 onward was to shorten it. Other generals may have taken longer but the writing was on the wall for sure.
In my research on the issue of Europe I honestly couldn't find enough good reasons or logic why GB would declare war on the Union. France had made it clear they would not make a move without GBs navy and money. So it really came down to GB and I think we forget sometimes that yah cotton may have been king but GB did a crap load of trading with the northern states as well. The only thing I can think of GB could have used to justify a war was to keep the United States weaker in the long road and considering how powerful GB was at that time I don't think they considered the US a major threat. They were probably more concerned with Prussia/Germany, Russia….etc.
I think the only chance of war between the US and GB back then would have been from a really unexpected event spiraling out of control….like the Trent affair…which almost did start a war:) Happy gaming all!!

Thanks also…

Armand

assume public support held up.

That is the key what-if, and why the Nov 64 election was the ultimate decision point.

I believe if Lee had not moved north, then at least two divisions would have had to been sent to the relief of Vicksburg. The political pressure would have been too great to do otherwise. After all, one of Lee's arguments was that moving north would help relive Vicksburg by tying down Union resources.
Would Joe Johnston have used them, or sat on his hands as he did historically?

Cleburne1863 I agree and from what I have read many, many argued that was the right move but Davis put his trust in Lee for understandable reasons. I strongly suspect that IF that had happened, just what did happen later that year, Longstreet would have been sent with them and we know they would have been used then. IF that had happened, if the siege had been broken or never started there is a good chance Grant would have been out and a whole different timeline would have taken place. Remember Grant had failed several times before and many were getting frustrated with Grant and calling for his replacement. It's one of the great "what ifs" of the ACW.
The CSA may have then been able to hold onto enough territory to convince the northern public it was no longer worth it. McClellan and the Democrats would have won in 1864 and some type of negotiated peace would have taken place soon after since, from my understanding McClellan was running on a make peace/end the war, bring the sons and husbands home platform.
But hey, that's why we like to game these things to try and get an idea of what could have happen different, right?? Happy gaming!!

Yes, if Lee had not advanced he would have had to send Longstreet and 2 divisions west -- However, they would probably have gone to reinforce Bragg, not Johnston, much closer, especially as the railroads thru East Tennessee were still in Confederate hands.

Having just lost Jackson at Chancellorsville I don't see Lee being willing to give up Longstreet. A.P. Hill had led the II Corps administratively when Jackson wasn't available, but no other general then in the ANV had lead a corps or wing into battle.

My guess is that Lee transfers A.P. Hill's division to the west. It was the largest in Lee's army, and with Jackson gone transferring Hill would simplify who took over II Corps. Hill could pick up Davis's brigade on the way, so he'd have almost as much infantry as Heth and Pender combined led at Gettysburg. Hill probably goes to Mississippi. Bragg had already detached Stevenson's division to reinforce Mississippi, had been checked at Stone's River and to my knowledge had no offensive plans in mid-1863. Plus Hill had previously served as a division commander under Johnston.

It wasn't up to Lee, it was up to Davis. Longstreet with 2 divisions was in southeast VA & NC gathering supplies and suggested the move. Lee talked Davis out of it by proposing his invasion of PA.

As I recall Don Lee summoned Longstreet back to the ANV before Chancellorsville, and Longstreet rejoined the ANV within days after the battle ended. This was before a move north became a realistic possibility.

While I agree that it was ultimately Davis's choice who went where, Lee's input would have held great sway.

The reason I mentioned it is because I JUST finished Tim Smith's book on the siege of Vicksburg. He was not kind to Johnston. In fact, its probably the snarkiest I've ever read an author put on paper in a historic work!
But yeah, if Longstreet had arrived in Jackson, MS in late May or early June when the window of opportunity was there (before Grant's reinforcements began to arrive), then I don't think Johnston could have remained idle. I don't see Longstreet putting up with that. Maybe not in a confrontation, but I think Old Pete would have said it like it is, and Johnston's reputation would not have made it. The only reason it remained intact was because of his half hearted effort just days before the surrender. With Longstreet there, I believe he would not have let Johnston get away with that in the court of public opinion. OK, maybe not public opinion, but the official record, and then when the papers get ahold of it, etc.