Here we go:
128. Tactics of carrier platoon.-
a. Organization.
The organization of the carrier platoon, an integral part of the rifle battal-
ion (see par.
26a
and fig. 9), is illustrated in figure 112.
HQ
2-0
6 EM
1 Carrier
1 Truck, 15-owt, GS 1 LMG
Carrier section
9 EM
3 Carriers 3 Bran guns 1 AT rifle 1 2-inch mortar
(4 carrier sections, each organized as shown)
14 EM
8 Mtcl
4 Mtcl, combination
4 Submachine guns
Total personnel and weapon*:
2-O
56 EM. (5 EAt attached.)
2 Pistols. 68 Rifles. 4 Submachine -runs.
13 Bren guns. 4 2-inch mortars. 4 AT rifles.
FIGURE
112.—Organization of the carrier platoon.
b. Characteristics.
—(1) The carrier is bulletproof against rifle fire on the same level, but the crew is vulnerable to fire from
above, or
when the carrier is on a forward slope, protected vehicle only. (See fig. 113.)
It is, therefore, a partially
(2) The carrier can move fast across good country, but will bo stopped by trenches, by any obstacle which is a tank obstacle and
bv many which are not. There will be occasions, therefore, when it will be unable to follow tanks forward. Continuous scouting
will always be necessary.
(3) The light machine-gun detachment, consisting of two men cannot be expected to do more than keep the gun in action, either in
the vehicle or on the ground. Once in action, the detachment has little or no power to protect itself by observation, and is there-
fore very vulnerable to a quick attack by one or two determined infantry men If an isolated position has to be held for any
length of time the three detachments in a section must be sited to provide mutual support. Carriers cannot carry out mopping-up
operations
(4) The period of dismounting from the carrier and getting into
action is one of considerable danger to personnel and vehicle. Dis-
mounting must be carried out under cover and very quickly. The carrier, once the LMG is dismounted, is entirely vulnerable, and
must either withdraw to the cover of other troops or must be concealed close to the LMG and under cover.
(5) The fire power of the carrier platoon is considerable, and the platoon should for short periods be able to hold a front varying
from 500 yards to 1,000 yards according to the depth in which if is disposed. But, as stressed above, gun detachments are very
vulnerable unless protected from the flank and rear.
(6) The LMG can give fire as effective from 400 yards as from closer up. There is no need to move close in to a target to gain
fire effect.
(7) From these characteristics the tactical employment of the car rier may be deduced. It must be remembered that the carrier in
not a light tank; it is an armoured machine designed to convey the LMG from place to place and a machine from which the LMG
can be fircd if necessary.
c. Carrier platoon in attack.~(l) Tasks in attack.-
(a)
Close cooperation with infantry alone (figs. 113 and 114).
(b)
Close cooperation with infantry and infantry tanks
(c) Flank protection.
(d)
Consolidation.
(2)
Close cooperation with infantry alone.-
(a)
Throughout th« attack, reconnaissance by both the infantry commander and the carrier commander, especially for the purpose
of obtaining knowledge of terrain features, must be continuous. Points to be looked for are likely
carrier positions, the line of
advance and obstacles to movement
(b)
During the advance, the infantry commander may realize that some of his leading troops are held up by fire from enemy de-
fence areas. If the advance is only partially checked, he may decide to move forward his carriers, in the immediate rear of the
troops still advancing, to positions from which the carriers can bring fire to bear on the enemy from the flank or rear, and so ena-
ble the advance to continue.
(c) On other occasions, carriers may be sent wide to a flank to a position from which flanking fire against enemy resistance may
be employed.
(3)
Close cooperation with infantry and infantry tanks.
— (a) When the infantry attack is supported by a prearranged fire plan, the
carriers will usually be best kept in hand as a mobile reserve of fire power. As the attack proceeds, they may be used to infiltrate
through gaps and to turn enemy areas which are still holding out, or to guard a flank.
(b) The attack against light opposition will often be more in the nature of an advance, and will rely mainly on infiltration and
maneuver. In such cases carriers may precede the infantry, reconnoitering for gaps in the defence and flanks of enemy resistance.
(c) In an attack in which infantry tanks are cooperating, the role of the carrier platoon, provided that the ground permits of its
moving forward, is to advance from (ire position to fire position in order to
give close support to tanks moving ahead of the infantry. This implies in the first instance close support against anti-tank weapons
disclosing themselves within the area of attack and on the flank of the attack, and, subsequently, support against weapons located
beyond the objective. In an attack in which the leading echelon of tanks moves directly to the final objective, the carrier platoon
will rarely be able to accompany this echelon, but will probably move protected by the tanks of the second echelon. As the infan-
try with the second echelon of tanks approach the final objective, carriers may go forward to the objective to engage anti-tank
weapons located beyond it. But plans will vary in accordance with circumstances, and no stereotyped method can be contemplat-
ed.
(4)
Flank protection.— (a)
Flank protection consists not only in stopping enemy counterattacks, but also in the neutralization of
enemy fire coming from the flank. Efficient performance of this task depends mainly on good observation.
(6) Carrier platoons and sections employed on this task may bo attached to leading rifle companies, or given an independent task
directly under battalion control.
(c) The closest cooperation with leading rifle companies should be maintained, and carrier platoon and section commanders
should make full use of their carriers for keeping contact.
(5)
Consolidation.
— (a) On reaching an objective there will, as a rule, be some measure of disorganization, and it is then that the
attacking troops are most vulnerable to immediate counterattack. The actual objective reached may not be the best ground on
which to consolidate. The process of consolidation will therefore include the reconnaissance and organization of the position for
defence, the reorganization of troops, the replenishment of ammunition, etc. Carriers will often be most valuable to cover consoli-
dating troops during this very difficult period; and if they are used in this role, they must be relieved as soon as possible.
(6) If the ground is not suitable for the employment of carriers in a. fighting role, they may be used to bring forward ammunition
of all sorts, mortars, wire, anti-tank mines, and entrenching tools for consolidation.
d. Carrier platoon in defence.—
(1) The tasks that may be allotted to carriers in defence are—
(a) To assist the outposts.
(6) To provide a mobile reserve of fire power.
(c) To support counterattack, by dismounted or armoured action.
(d)
To give depth to the defensive fire of the battalion.
(2)
Carriers on outpost.— (a)
Carriers are suitable for employment with outpost troops, as, by day, they can be established for-
ward of the outpost line and so give early warning of the enemy's approach.
(b)
If employed in static roles for anything but short periods, they should be supported by infantry. Owing to the limited number
of men that crews can provide for observation, carriers are easily stalked and surrounded.
(3)
Carriers as mobile reserve.
—
(a)
A mobile reserve of fire power will enable the battalion commander to support hard-pressed
areas, stop gaps, and obtain surprise by fire from unexpected directions. Careful prior reconnaissance by all ranks of the carrier
platoon will be necessary in order to insure an intimate knowledge of the battalion area.
(b)
The battalion commander should, as a rule, hold all carriers under his own command in defence, and not disperse them by al-
lotment to companies.
(4)
Carriers in counterattack.—(a)
Carriers can be used quickly and boldly in the immediate counterattack, in either dismounted
or armoured action, or they may be used to provide supporting fire from previously reconnoitered positions.
(b)
Again, all ranks of the carrier platoon should acquire a good knowledge of the terrain by previous reconnaissance.
(5)
Carrier fire power in defence.
—The carrier platoon should rarely be employed in the static role of increasing the depth of the
position, unless guns so allotted can also be available as a mobile reserve. At night, or in fog or mist, the LMG's of the carrier pla-
toon can, by means of the tripod, be laid on fixed lines. If the carriers themselves can be concealed close at hand, then it may be
possible for the two roles—the provision of depth and a mobile reserve—to be linked, but the retention of a mobile reserve is the
first consideration.
e. Carrier platoon in protection.
—-(1)
Advance and gaining of contact.—
Carriers can be used in the advance and contact phase,
when useful short reconnaissances can be made to the front and flanks. The method of movement on roads or across country on
all occasions in face of the enemy will be by bounds, and carriers will often be used to take over and hold points gained by recon-
naissance troops.
(2)
Flank guards.
—
(a)
Carriers can be used with advantage on flank guards, whether fixed or moving parallel to the column
which they are protecting. In both cases their ability to move quickly from point to point can be so used as to give to the enemy
the impression that the flank is wider and more strongly held than is actually the case.
(6) Carriers can also be used as detached posts on side roads. The distance of these posts will depend on. the topography, but, as
a rule, they should not be farther than is necessary to safeguard the main column from direct fire or observation.
(c)
This duty will usually consist of making temporary barbed-wire, concertina road blocks, covered by the anti-tank rifle.
(3)
Rear guards and withdrawal.
—
(a)
In a withdrawal, the carrier platoon forms a most suitable unit for holding an intermediate
position through which groups of the rear guard withdraw, whether the action takes place by day or night.
(6) In this form of action there arc unlimited opportunities for initiative. By a skillful maneuvering of the carriers behind ridges,
using either dismounted or armoured action, the enemy can be deceived as to the strength of the rear guard. As an alternative rear-
guard action, on suitable ground, carriers may be left in ambush in concealed and camouflaged positions, holding their fire until
the enemy is close enough to be so punished that his advance will be checked.
/.
Other uses in war.
— (1) Carriers have been found to be of value
in—
Reconnaissance. Intercommunication. Wood, village, and river fighting. Raids. Night operations.
(2) Carriers have also been used frequently to transport— Small-arms ammunition, grenades, etc. Tools. Mortars. Wire.
Anti-tank mines. Reinforcing personnel. Wounded.
(3)
Use of carrier as reconnaissance vehicle.
—The armour and mobility of the carrier permit reconnaissance of all kinds to be
carried out with speed and comparative safety. This reconnaissance includes
(a) Inspection of occupied defence areas by brigade (regimentill) and battalion commanders.
(b)
Flank reconnaissances to find the location and examine the, dispositions of adjacent units.
(c) Short-distance reconnaissances forward of the main line of resistance, in the nature of daylight patrols.
(d)
Reconnaissance of successive positions during withdrawals.
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(e)
Close reconnaissance by junior commanders and by intelligence personnel of elements of the defence under fire.
(4)
Intercommunication.
—During battle the carrier has been found to be a good means of intercommunication, and has been used
in this capacity by battalion, company, and platoon commanders. Its reliability in getting through messages and information under
fire has been proved in action where other methods have failed. It has, in fact, on many occasions replaced the runner in forward
areas.
(5)
Wood fighting.
—In spite of the disadvantages of being restricted to roads and trails, and of being liable to casualties from snip-
ers in trees, etc., carriers have been used to advantage in wood fighting. The method has generally been to lie hidden in the under-
growth on the near side of clearings and surprise the enemy as he emerges into the clearings. In such instances it was found
necessary to have well-reconnoitered lines of withdrawal.
(6)
River fighting.—
Carriers have been found useful in holding up the enemy at canal and river crossings, especially at some ca-
nals where the carriers could move up and down under cover, or even partial cover, of the raised banks, and then, by getting the
LMG into position, enfilade a section of the canal. Carriers have also been used to bring up troops with grenades under the banks
of canals, the troops throwing their grenades among the enemy on the far side with good effect.
(7)
Raids.
—Carriers have been used with effect to raid and bomb enemy positions held by machine guns, and groups in defence
areas. Examples for two such cases follow:
(a) On one occasion successful action was carried out when 3-inch mortars shelled some farm buildings, and the carriers, moving
around on both flanks, struck the enemy as he withdrew.
(6) On another occasion the carriers of one unit penetrated the advanced elements of the hostile infantry, thus slowing up its ad-
vance. The raid entailed a cruise along 3 or 4 miles of road within an area occupied by the enemy, and all hostile units which were
met either fled or took cover immediately. The appearance of tanks could not have been more effective.
(8)
Transport.
—On numerous occasions carriers have been used to transport munitions and reinforcements across fire-swept ter-
rain, where other means would have proved either impossible or very costly. Carriers have also been frequently used for carrying
back wounded.
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