"So! Who Did Kill Wittmann?" Topic

I ask this because there seems to be conflicting conclusions.

Can anyone point me to the sources that I should consult? And perhaps, why you agree with the sources?

Have you asked Google?
link

Visted his grave last spring

Does it matter? just another dead Nazi.

+1 King Monkey

Accounts differ. We'll likely never know.

I think it is impossible to know for certain- there are a couple of candidates British and Canadian but that is really so far as it can go now
I think the important thing is that his career came to an end whoever was responsible

There is no confusion. Wittmann and his group of Tigers came under fire from 2 Sherman Units. Neither M4 Unit knew about the other and that they both were engaging the same targets.
No one in the M4 Units knew about Wittmann and no one cared. It was not until 20 years later (mid 1960s) that the Wittmann myth became known to them. Between them they knocked out 5 Tigers. It is not know for certain which Unit (of the 2 only possible Units) hit Wittmann but it is known that between them these two Units hit all those Tigers.
All the 'confusion' are deliberate attempts to deflect and muddy the waters to try and explain away why Shermans were able to despatch these Tigers. To that end all sorts of absurd theories abound. They are bogus and do not deserve a moments reflection.

"It was beauty killed the beast."
—Carl Denham

And a "+1" to Brother mkenny.

Well said, Sir!

TVAG

It's not like a made a pilgrimage there.
Just one small part of a trip to Normandy.
And it wasn't marked any different than anyone else's at the German cemetary.

They don't let you see any of the American graves up close – you have to stay on the paved pathways.

Had never heard of him until now. Don't think I missed much.

No apology necessary, Korvessa. History is both sides, despite what monkeys say.

As long as Shermans took out Tigers, it's all good!

Wittman at Villers Bocage is so well known, but the destruction of five of his Tigers including his own is rarely mentioned.

Much like the destruction of five Panthers of Panzer Lehr by a single Sherman Firefly of 4th/7th Dragoon Guards at Longevres, or the stand by the Sherman Firefly's of the Staffordshire Yeomanry that took out six tanks of 21st panzer division from Periers Ridge when the Germans attempted to counterattack the landing beaches. None of these fit the prevailing narrative that the Sherman wasn't up to the job and the Germans had superior tanks and superior tankers.

In a similar way little is mentioned about the Duke of Cornwalls Light Infantry taking out six Panthers in an afternoon using only PIATs and a 6 pounder AT gun near Chuex village in Normandy.

The Germans may have lost the fighting war but it looks like they are still winning the propaganda war!

BillyNM

Wikipedia's entry is almost as bad as Brian Reid's 20-page Appendix dirge or that of Norm Christie's video.

I visited Wittman's grave at La Cambe with a friend. On a bleak day, the dark stone crosses made it perhaps the most somber cemetery that I have ever visited.

Drove up to Villers-Bocage and had a wonderful meal at a small cafe and bought a book on the battle at the town hall. Also did the usual D-Day stuff while in the area. I worked with a guy who was in the first wave on Omaha Beach and he always had good stories to tell at lunchtime. Thought about him at Saint-Lo.🍺

Has anyone got pictures or accurate maps of where the A.Squadron, Sherbrooke Fusiliers were situated during the battle?

Has anyone got pictures or accurate maps of where the A.Squadron, Sherbrooke Fusiliers were situated during the battle?

Click on the green dot and get a good zoomable and dowloadable 1937 air view of the area. North is to the bottom when you get the air view

link

mkenny

Thanks for that 'm'

What I would really like is opinions as to where Major Radley-Walters had positioned his 8 Shermans.

There is no fixed position for the M4s other than they were behind the stone walls of either the Chateau or the village.
However its pretty obvious where the shot that hit Wittmann came from and that is the northern end of the buildings. 007 is circled

The southern section of the wall is still there

link

Radley-Walters stated that "that wall was still there the last time I visited Gaumesnil in 1993" Which indeed it was and is

According to Radley-Waters:

I had eight tanks left with me and two equipped with 17 pounder guns. We took up defensive positions about the farm and made holes in it

Radley-Walters himself states unambiguously that his movements were "To the rear there was a large wooded area which gave good protection from view. As I can remember, I had eight tanks and two were equipped with 17-pounder guns. we took up defensive positions about the farm and made holes in the stone wall and around the village was not a problem"

And then!

"At noon we could see movement to the east of Cintheaux. There was a long hedgerow that ran east from the village out into the fields and our artillery was shelling this area and the village when movement was spotted. It was my recollection that it was somewhere between 1215 and 1230 hours when the attack started"

He then goes on. " When we saw the attack coming in, I just kept yelling 'Hold off! Hold off!' We opened fire at about 500 yards. The lead tank, the one closest to the road, was knocked out. Behind it were a couple of SPs. I personally got one of the SPs right on the the Caen-Falaise road."

The other Tiger was engaged by the Fireflys of B.Squadron that had moved over to St. Jalousie when the counter-attack started.

Here are the locations he stated.

Here's a couple of pictures of the Chateau'

I have Reid's copy of Radley-Walters correspondence used for 'No Holding Back'. There are differences from the version used in the book. It says 10 Shermans in the original not 8, There is no mention of knocking holes in the walls and the only farm mentioned is the one on the other side of the road to Gaumesnil. The 'woods' in the village are also given more mentions. Reading the notes shows that the precise position of the Shermans is not clear.
Also if the Shermans were outside the walls then there would be no need to knock holes as that would only allow them to observe or fire INTO the Chateau grounds.
007 is much closer than 500 yards (c 500 ft) and there are 2 Tigers a good distance in front of it. Do you think they let those two pass without firing at them?

One thing to bear in mind. Wittman scored 120 of his 135 kills on the Russian front, where his tank was virtually invulnerable in frontal engagements against almost all Russian tanks. After his transfer to Normandy he survived less than two months of combat before he was ambushed and killed along with three other Tigers by a single Sherman Firefly on August 8th 1944.

As I understand it the Tigers were destroyed by a combination of Fireflies of the Canadian Sherbrooke Fusiliers and the British Northamptonshire Yeomanry.
There has been much dispute as to who got which tank, but both units accounted for some kills so good effort all round.

There are plenty of relatively unsung heroes among the Allied armour and I dont subscibe to the hero worship of "cool" Panzer Aces.
Wittman caught 7th Armoured with their pants down at Villers Bocage but his tactics in his last battle weren't the finest.

mKenny

Note: "I had eight tanks left with me and two were equipped with 17 pounder guns." which, allowing for semantics, could mean 10. Or, after clarification he did indeed mean 8. Two troops of three Shermans and one Firefly.

You say that you have an original transcript. Does Radley-Walters say that he put his tanks about the village and the farm (note the spoil marks dotted along the walls that have been pushed outwards of those walls. Including 'his wall')?

Did he mention the hedgerow running east from the village?

Does he mention that he had the wood behind him?

Would you not think that the transcript was updated after further correspondence?

Any reason for Radley-Walters to say that his wall was still there?

Why does he say that he approached the estate from the rear, travelled through the estate noting the chateau, wood and village? There are also spoil marks at the northern boundary wall, which shows how he could have entered the estate.

You mention this:

"and the only farm mentioned is the one on the other side of the road to Gaumesnil"

Have you got specific evidence for this? Because as things stand, there isn't any for that location.

Then we have the incidents of how the 5 Tigers were knocked out.

Just to add. Radley-Walters himself said that he knocked holes in the walls in an interview.

Listen from 49 minutes.

YouTube link

Don't get hung up on the minutia. The point I am making is Radley-Walters does not give enough detail to know exactly where he placed all his tanks. The 'farm' mentioned by him he places '200 yards east across the highway' over the road (the road from Caen to Falaise) which I take to be the farm directly west of the 007 wreck and it is c. 200 ft. The only other farm is Daumesnil which is over a mile away. Radley Walters also claims 2 Tigers & 2 Panthers from Panzer Lehr in an earlier morning attack from La Jalousie. 'Memory' is often faulty.
Re 'holes in the wall' I have the Radley Walters account and I have the book. Reid changes the order of the original account and (it seems) includes detail given in other versions of the story and rolls it all into one account that looks to be a single 'one-take' account. It most definitely is not.

mKenny

Don't get hung up on the minutia

What minutia is that?

'200 yards east across the highway' over the road (the road from Caen to Falaise) which I take to be the farm directly west of the 007 wreck and it is c. 200 ft.

No it does not. Radley-Walters states that he moved into the estate from its rear then moved to the south of the wood which offered more cover, observing the Chateau as he went. Then stationed his tanks behind the walls of the village and the farm. He said that his wall was still there. But! The wall to the village was no longer there. He states that there was a hedgerow running east to the n158 from the village. Which can clearly be seen.

All Radley-Walters had ever said has pertained him taking his tanks into the Gaumesnil estate and position his tanks to the south of the wood and put his tanks behind the walls to the village and farm.

He mentioned nothing about placing any of his tanks east of the N158.

Did you listen to what Radley-Walters said in his own words regarding the walls and the holes he put in them?

Re 'holes in the wall' I have the Radley Walters account and I have the book. Reid changes the order of the original account and (it seems) includes detail given in other versions of the story and rolls it all into one account that looks to be a single 'one-take' account. It most definitely is not.

Did he knock holes in the walls? Are you contending that he did not?

Is there evidence of holes (or gaps if you like) being knocked into those walls in the 9th August 1944 aerial photo?

Regarding this part of the battlefield. I do have knowledge of it.

Reid's notes say ''I had 10 tanks at this time consisting of 2 Firefly and the remainder were Sherman 75s''

I never said that tanks were stationed east of the highway only that there was a farm there. I suspect Reid confused this mention and garbled it to placing tanks behind the wall 'in the farm'.

And:
''I recall the woods at the rear of the village and the hedge-rows around the village gave good cover so moving into this location and taking up positions behind the stone wall, and around the village, was not a problem…About 200yds east of the Chateau and across the highway I recall there was a farm with a house and outbuildings however only one small building remains the last time I visited the area ''

Radley does not mention that he ''stationed his tanks behind the walls of the village and the farm'' in the notes. I have no idea why Reid makes that claim

Radley Walters visited in 1993. This is a 1991 air view and you can see by this date only one building is standing from this 'farm across the highway'

I recall the woods at the rear of the village and the hedge-rows around the village gave good cover so moving into this location and taking up positions behind the stone wall, and around the village, was not a problem

But it does mean where he stationed himself and his tanks.

About 200yds east of the Chateau and across the highway I recall there was a farm with a house and outbuildings however only one small building remains the last time I visited the area ''

But he says nothing about occupying this area. But he goes into detail about occupying the walls south of the woods inside the Estate grounds and village.

I'll ask again! Did Radley-Walters make holes (or gaps) in the walls.

Is there evidence of the walls having holes put through them?

Did Radley-Walters take up position behind these walls?

Is Radley-Walters talking BS during the interview in the link I posted above?

I make no claims that anyone is talking . I only give you what Radley said in the notes Reid used to write his book. Clearly some differences have cropped up between interview and print version. The notes are not specific as to where the tanks were located and as 007 was the rear-most Tiger the group were not engaged when they were broadside to the Chateau grounds.
Note Radley says there was an earlier attack where his tanks knocked out 2 Tigers and 2 Panthers and that the Panthers were from Pz Lehr. This attack is mentioned by Reid on page 234 and whilst it lists Radley as one of the sources (footnote 22) the awkward bits are left out. No mention of Walters saying 2 of the knocked out tanks were Panthers and that they were from Pz Lehr. My main point is valid. The exact location of all the M4s is not known.

What awkward bits do you mean?

As for not knowing the the exact location of every M4. We can say the same about every tank engagement up to the modern era. But then, Radley Walters had only half a squadron to work with. I'm sure that he wouldn't weaken it more by sending tanks off in all directions.

And as he says and repeated yet again here:

"I recall the woods at the rear of the village and the hedge-rows around the village gave good cover so moving into this location and taking up positions behind the stone wall, and around the village, was not a problem"

Shows that he had his tanks with him and where he placed them. He mentions nothing about sending tanks away to another location.

I listened to Norm Christie's hour or so interview with Radley-Walters (as good a tankman as any) but for some reason, the interview ends abruptly when August the 8th comes around. It makes one wonder why? Especially if one has seen Norm Christies not very accurate, Reid inspired video of how he says the battle took place and how Wittmann was killed. All Christie uses of Radley-Walters interview are edited seconds.

link

YouTube link

Does anyone know if Norm Christie released the full interview with Radley-Walters?

Forgive me for using 'BS' in my last post.

What awkward bits do you mean?
The fact that there were no Panthers or Pz Lehr in that area. Radley remarks that he was told this but goes on to insist that it is correct.
I don't know where you are getting the notion I said there were tanks 'elsewhere' because I never said it, implied it nor think it but Radley does mention he had the western group of tanks (those at the quarry)as support. I just say that the location of 007 and the other 4 Tigers mean that the lead two Tigers were allowed to pass unmolested and that the best place to get a hit on 007 (in the position where it was stopped) would be a tank right at the very northern edge of the Chateau. If all the Shermans were at the southern wall then they decided to let the Tigers pass right by them unmolested and only fired when the Tigers were to north of their position.

"If all the Shermans were at the southern wall then they decided to let the Tigers pass right by them unmolested and only fired when the Tigers were to north of their position."

Do you think that Radley-Walters had prior notification as to how and where the enemy was going to attack and with what types and in what formation?

But Walters who's tanks were behind the walls shown, engaged and knocked out the targets armoured vehicles including a Tiger, 200 yards away and on or near the N158. Wittmann passed the Sherbrooke's position but also three others too and were all knocked out.

Radley-Walters knew that he had a backstop of the Sherbrooke's B squadron at St. Jalousie which fortunately happened to do the job of knocking out the Tiger that advanced the furthest north, with the other three taken out by the Northamptonshire Yeomanry.

I was going to post this ages ago:

MAJOR Sidney Radley-Walters of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers, as reproduced by Brian A. Reid in his 2009 book 'No Holding Back' publication. (Pages 420 to 422)

"I decided that I should move forward to Gaumesnil and be in position to support the Royals (Royal Regiment of Canada) when they were ordered to capture the village. At approximately 10.30 hours I left the woods and skirted the woods to the left until I reached the railway line, then turned south past La Jalousie until we reached the rear of Gaumesnil.

I was able to get good cover during this move and had right flank protection from the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and my No.1 Troop as I moved the Squadron south behind the bush at Gaumesnil. The village was small at its eastern edge near the Caen-Falaise Highway was a large chateau with a tall stone and cement wall completely around the property, giving good fire to the east and south-east. That stone wall was still there the last time I visited Gaumesnil in 1993 (my bold), however, the chateau was destroyed. To the rear there was a large wooded area which gave good protection from view. As best as I can remember, I had 8 tanks left with me amd Two were equipped with 17-pounder guns. We took up positions about the farm and made holes in the wall so we were covered from view but could observe any targets coming north on the Cean-Falais highway and in the fields to the east of it.

I recall the the woods to the rear of the village and the hedgerows around the village gave good cover, so moving into this location and taking up positions behind the stone wall, and around the village was not a problem. It was approximately 1115 hours when the squadron was settled in position. except for a few individual German stragglers, the village was not occupied.

At noon we could see movement to the east of Cintheaux. There was a long hedgerow that ran east from the village out into the fields and our artillery was shelling this area and the village when this movement was spotted. It was my recollection that it was somewhere between 1215 and 1230 hours when the attack started …… In our area around Gaumesnil the visibility, I recall, was thick with smoke and the German attack was supported by mortars and artillery as they moved parallel with the highway towards Point 122. It was my recollection that the attack moved as a group with 5 Tigers leading the group well spaced with four at The front and a fifth leading a number of mark IVs and halftracks with jadgpanzers. One of the Tigers was running close to the highway beside Gaumesnil followed by two Jadgpanzers advancing on the main highway … When we saw the German attack coming in. I just kept yelling, ''Hold of Hold off'' until they got reasonably close. We opened fire at about 500 yards. The lead tank, the one closest to the road, was knocked out. Behind were a couple of SPs. I personally got one of the SPs right on the Caen-Falaise road.
The other Tigers were engaged not only by my Squadron but also by two Fireflys of B Squadron that had moved over to La Jalouis when when the counter-attack started. Once we started to fire, the German column turned to the North-East and headed for the wooded area south of St.Aignan de Cramesnil …… It is my recollection that we destroyed two mark IVs before the rear of the German group veered too far to the east …… When the action was over we claimed the Tiger beside the highway, a second Tiger which was at the rear of the advancing column, two MKIVs and two SPs.

Joe Ekins
Although Ekins described volunteering for the army as "the biggest mistake of my life", his skill, courage and luck in combat marked his place in history.

On 8 August 1944, as part of an Allied offensive to break through the German defences south of Caen, A squadron of the 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry positioned themselves just south of the French town of St. Aignan de Cramesnil.
Spotting the Tigers

Looking out across a flat expanse of land from the cover of an orchard Joe recalls the moment he spotted the Tigers: "There were three Tigers coming across our front, about 1200 yards away all three in a line with quite a space apart. We waited until they were at 800 yards and our tank commander pulled us out from the orchard and told me to target the rear one."

He recollected thinking: "There's no way one tank is gonna knock out three Tigers, no way! You allow five Sherman to one Tiger, there's no way they're gonna knock ‘em out, but he still sent us out on our own, I mean, I don't know how I weren't killed, I should've been, should've been."
For Allied tank crews the sight of three Tiger tanks was not a welcome one. Their reputation for having unmatchable strength – a deadly 88mm gun and almost impenetrable 120mm thick armour – preceded them so much so Allied crews believed it would take five Shermans to bring down just one.
Firing two shots, Joe hit the rearmost Tiger setting it alight. "At 800 yards the things were only tiny but I could see the gun of the second Tiger coming round to fire at us," he recalls.

It was at this point Joe realised his Sherman Firefly would be on its own against the two remaining Tigers, the ordinary Shermans that were positioned alongside Joe were no good at this kind of range and the squadron's two other Fireflies were elsewhere nearby. To this day Joe doesn't know why his commanding officer didn't re-deploy them to face the threat he was now facing alone.

The second Tiger fired two rounds and hit the turret of Joe's tank injuring the commander and causing him to jump out. With the troop officer taking command, the tank pulled out from the orchard again and Joe was ordered to fire at the second Tiger. This time one shot was enough to turn the enemy tank into a ball of smoke and flames on the horizon.
By now the third Tiger was in search of some shelter from the onslaught but two more shots from the Firefly and it too was reduced to flames. "I was frightened to death," says Joe. "After I was just so relieved and I said to the lads ‘it's not going to be us today'."
Amazingly the five rounds Joe fired on this day were the first he had ever fired in combat. He had successfully destroyed three of Germany's most deadly machines and all at a range that made them look like miniatures.

You might assume such accuracy came from extensive and rigorous training. Not so. The Fireflies had only been ready six weeks before the squadron was deployed and the number of times Joe took it out on the firing range: once!

Ekins took out 3 Tigers that day. No. 1) 314 with two shots. No. 2) 007 with one shot which ''blew up'' (the only Tiger to do so out of the five knocked out and the only one to have all the crew killed) No. 3 Tiger 008? which was ''milling about'' Again, with two shots.

Hoflinger's Tiger was destroyed by the Canadian Sherbrooke Fusiliers, as was that of the furthest forward Tiger, which was taken out by a Sherbrooke Firefly based at La Jelouise.

From the book 'Michael Wittmann Volume Two' By Patrick Agte.

SS-Oberfurher Kurt Mayer:
"It was clear to (Hans) Waldmuller and me that we couldn't wait for this mass of tanks to attack us. The enemy tanks could not be allowed to advance any further. An enemy division stood ready to attack on each side of the (RN158) road. We could not allow this attack to begin---we had to try to seize the initiative. I decided to defend the town of Cintheaux with the force already deployed there, and launch a lightning attack east of the road with all available soldiers and thus throw the enemy plan into confusion. I decided on the wood southeast of Garcelles as the objective. Since a huge quarry south of Cintheaux made an attack by tanks unlikely, I had no fears there. We had to risk the attack in order to win time for the liason sector. The attack was set for 1230 hours.

During the final conference with Waldmuller and Wittmann, we observed a lone bomber, which overflew the area several times and then released flares. The bomber appeared to us to be a sort of flying command post, and Iordered the attack at once in order to get the group out of the bombing zone. I shook Michael Wittmann by the hand and made fererence to the extremely critical situation. The good Michael laughed his youthful laugh and climbed into his Tiger. One-hundred-and-thirty enemy tanks had fallen prey to him so far. Would he increase his number"

SS-Hauptsharfuhrer Hans Hoflinger:
"I was awakened surprisingly early the morning of that terrible day. The reason was that Heurich's company had left its quartering area without orders from the commanding officer and was driving down the road to Caen. Michel wanted to know at once what was going on, and therefore I, as operations officer, had to catch up with the company as fast as possible and enquire as to its mission. This i did straight away, then reported to Michel. After reflecting for a few minutes, which I knew was his custom, he took a breakfast somewhat nervously. Then however, he ordered me to send both staff tanks to the Heurich company's position. I did so and hurried back at once to Michel in my Schwimmwagen and reported to him.

Subsiquently, we drove together---he in the Volkswagen, I in the Schwimmwagen---to Mayers command post to take part in a situation conference. When this was over we deliberated whether or not to carry out the attack. With us was the battalion signals officer, Untersturmfuhrer Dollinger. Suddenly, Michel said to me: 'I must go along, for Heurich can scarcely cope' Heurich was taking part in his first action that day and that in itself was dangerous. After several hours we drove back to the tanks which were sitting on the road abeam of Cintheaux. At first I wasn't meant to go with them, but all of a sudden he changed his order. This made me nervous, for I noticed that Michel was rather uncertain in his division. Shortly afterwards we climbed in and sent our tanks into cover to avoid being seen from the air"

Tiger Commanders that took part are
Wittmann. [Whos crew consisted of: SS-Unterscarfuhrer Hein Reimers (driver), Karl Wagner (gunner), SS-Sturmmann Rudi Hirschel (radio operator), SS-Sturmmann Gunther Webber (loader)]

It was Wittmann, Dollinger, Iriohn, Kisters(?) and another Tiger(?) who advanced to the right (east) of the Route-National 158. Hofflinger and Von Westernhagen set off to the left west of the Route-Rational I58. Heurich also advanced on the left (west) of the RN158.

Hoflinger's description of the attack:
Then we drove off, Michel to the right of the road me to the left, four others (Tigers) with Michel and the brother of von Westernhagen with me. At approximately 800 metres to Michel's right was a small wood which struck us as suspicious and which was to prove fateful to us.

Unfortunately, we could keep the wood under observation on account of our mission. We drove about one to one-and-a-half kilometres and then I recieved another radio from Michel which only confirmed my suspicions about the wood.
We began to take heavy fire from anti-tank guns and once again, Michel called but didn't complete the message ( Move! Attention! Atention! Anti-tank guns to the right!---Back up! My insert and bold ).

When I looked to the left I saw that Michel tank was not moving. I called him by radio but recieved no answer. Then my tank took a frightful blow and I had to order my crew to get out as it already began to burn fiercely. My crew and I dashed towards the rear and got through. I stopped to look around and to my dismay discovered five of our tanks had been knocked out.

The turret of Michel's tank was displaced to the right and tilted down to the front somewhat. None of his crew had got out. I climbed into von Westernhagen's tank and together with Heurich whose Tiger was undamaged, tried to get to Michel's tank. We could not get through. Dr. Rabe also tried it, but in vain….I can state the Exact time of the incident it was 1255 hours, near the Falaise-Caen road in the vicinity of Cintheaux"

SS-Untersturmfuhrer Helmut Dollinger's description:
On the 8th August at noontime, we attacked the English who had broken through south of Caen. The enemy secured his point of penetration through the mass deployment of artillery, tanks, fighters and bombers. Nevertheless we succeeded in advancing about three kilometres. Heavy anti-tank guns that we could not make out at all at firs, opened up from excellent positions. The enemy succeeded in knocking out several tanks. As the leading tank, our was hit and knocked out. The shell struck the turret of the tank. it began to burn at once. I myself was wounded in the forehead. Ilst consiousness for a few minutes but before I did so, I gave the order to bail out.

When I came to again and got out myself, we came under heavy artillery fire. Beneath the tank I found my driver, the artillery observer and the second radio operator SS-Sturmmann Alfred Bahlo who advised me that Oberscharfuhrer Schott was laying on the rear deck aft of the turret. We got him down immediately and were just able to drag him beneath the tank, since the artillery opened fire again and the anti-tank guns began firing at the tank.

Obersharfuhrer Schott was still fully conscious. He told me he was in no pain and just asked me to dress his wounds. His right arm had been torn off and several fragments had entered his right side.
After much effort, we managed to carry him out of the firing zone. Everyone in the crew had been wounded. I was able to summon a doctor and a Volkswagen.

Obersharfuhrer Schott had by now lost consciousness. His face was peaceful and clear. He showed no signs of pain. Thesr were difficult momments, for we knew that he was beyond human help. The doctor then loaded us both into the Volkswagen. Obersharfuhrer Schott died near Falaise without regaining consciousness. At this time, I was also unconscious again"

SS-Sturmmann Alfred Bahlo:
"I was medium-wave radio operator and machine-gunner in Dollinger's tank. My commander Dollinger was an Untersturmfuhrer and signals officer of the Panzer battalion. Oberscharfuhrer Schott was the ultra-shortwave radio operator and loader. The division of roles took place only in the so-called headquarters tanks. The driver and gunner were both Unterscharfuhrers. I've forgotten their names.
The hit which our panzer took penetrated the right side wall. The shells in the fighting compartment exploded and Oberscharfuhrer Schott was badly wounded. I myself recieved a minor injury to the neck. Where the defensive fire came from I do not know. There was later talk of a Canadian anti-tank front.

Untersturmfuhrer Dollinger, the driver and I got out of the tank followed later by Oberscharfuhrer Schott, who was seriously hampered by his serious injuries and whom I helped climb out. I attempted to get one of the retreating tanks to take Oberscharfuhrer Schott with them. This faild because Untersturmfuhrer Iriohn did not open his turret hatch, and the fouth tank was knocked out right in front of my eyes immediately afterwards. Untersturmfuhrer Dollinger and I then carried Oberscharfuhrer Schott on a makeshift stretcher to the Caen-Falaise road, where we loaded him onto a Kubelwagen which then drove away. On the way we passed the knocked out panzer of Hauptsturmfurer Wittmann; The turret was blown off. I then made my way to the aid station"

SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Dr. Rabe (in a letter to Wittmann's wife, Hidegard)
"When the attack was rolling, I drove forwards several hundred metres and covered the last stretch on foot. There was quite heavy artillery and anti-tank fire. I wanted to get to Michel's tank. when I had got to within about 250 to 300 metres I saw flames suddenly shoot from the tank and the turret fly off and fall to the ground. The tank burned out completely. I still tried to reach it but I couldn't cross the open field as the Tommy fired at solitary me with their anti-tank guns. It was unlikely Michel got out before the hit, as I would have seen him. None of the remaining crew came back either.
It must therefore be assumed that Michel was killed in action"

In the 1944 air view the buildings/trees on the east side of the road are covered by haze/smoke. The 1937 air view shows them more clearly. Any tanks at the south-facing wall could not see 007 in its final position.

Exactly!