"Army Foraging???" Topic

Have been reading contradicting information on armies ability to forage during the ACW….imagine that info about ACW that is contradicting.
Unlike Napoleons time when army foraging for what they needed on the march was a common practice I have read info suggesting that ACW armies relied alot more on supply to be able to eat and fight. But then there are cases like Shermans march to Atlanta in which his army "lived off the land".
So I suppose I am asking for impressions as to weather it would be difficult, easy or so-so for an army of 60K troops to be able to eat and fight if out of supply? I am assuming that populated areas would prove easier and that a smaller force would have a better chance than a large one?? Thanks, happy gaming all.

In general, the population density of the southern states was considerably less than that of western Europe. Armies of 60k would have to have a rail line (or navigable river) to supply food for the troops and, above all, fodder for the horses. McClellan's army on the Peninsula, to use an example, required over 600 tons of supply PER DAY, all of which had to come by water (and then by rail, once West Point was secured). Wagons would only suffice to disperse supply to the units from the railhead, not for significant extension of strategic range.

There are exceptions. Sherman's march was from Atlanta, not to it, and was made possible by (a) no organized resistance from Confederate forces, (b) a drastic reduction in the number of guns supporting the infantry, and (c) a willingness to strip the countryside of consumables with no intention of stopping or retracing steps. A similar sweep was made in the Shenandoah valley the same year. Lee's army supplied itself quite nicely in the rich farmlands of Maryland and Pennsylvania; if he hadn't been forced to retreat he could have remained north of the Potomac the entire campaigning season and given the beleaguered farmers of northern Virginia a rest (one of the principal objectives of the two invasions of the North).

But as a general rule, ACW generals were far more tied to their lines of communication than, say, French commanders of the Napoleonic wars were. This is also one reason why it was so difficult to translate battlefield victory into strategic gains. The losers were retreating to intact rail lines, while the winners were sometimes having to repair every captured mile.

That tracks with all of the reading I've done over the past 50+ years. That's why in the west almost all of the Union offenses were tied to rivers or major rail lines. The major exception, of course as Eumelus states, was Sherman's march from Atlanta to the sea.

Jim

As far as individual soldiers, they were just like any other soldiers in history. They forged freely if and when they could get away with it. You can read many first hand accounts. Probably with just some searching on the web.

I believe they had to wear the correct cap while doing it…

No slouch or kepi? It had to be a " forage" cap? 😉

As noted, armies could 'live off the land' in some circumstances, but when the armies found themselves stationary, like when facing each other across the Rappahanock River, or in a siege like at Petersburg or Atlanta, they needed rail or river transport to sustain themselves. One result of this, which had not been seen much in prior wars in Europe, was that armies could entrench themselves very strongly because they did not have to go out and forage. They could stay in one spot and not starve. The rifle-musket is often pointed to as the reason why you see elaborate entrenchments in the later part of the Civil War, but the railroad was every bit as big a factor.

Where I grew up, Sherman's march was known as Sherman's retreat to the sea.

Campaign foraging has several factors to consider. As with other elements to research , there is not one premise. Many variations. Whether the campaign is in friendly or hostile territory determine allowable forage actions.
When front lines were stagnant, the raids were frequent into hostile territory. Examples include the multiple expeditions into the Shenandoah Valley and the raids along the Mississippi during the Vicksburg operation.
As Col Jum commented the Union control of rivers dictated a lot. In Alabama Union forces attacked northern Alabama along the Tennessee River. An aside, the Horse Soldiers incident of the teenage cadets attacking Union raiders happened at the military school at Athens . After the skirmish, the mothers burned the red whit and blue uniforms. Lol.

During Sherman's March to the sea, several Union raids were conducted into Alabama. For several months a Union force based near present day Anniston conducted sorties into neighboring areas like Talladega. They burned until Confederate respons troops from Sylacauga arrived, then they retreated. One recorded skirmish occurred at Montfort Stagecoach Station.

I had a great grand parent tell mr that her father would say that he would go out hunting game which actually meant he was going out to ambush Union outriders.

Where I grew up, Sherman's march was known as Sherman's retreat to the sea.

Some justification for that. It arguably was costing the Army of Tennessee more to try and hold Atlanta than it gained Sherman to take the city.

Thanks guys, all makes sense and as I suspected. Sounds like game wise it could be justified to allow foraging attempts by large armies out of supply but chances of success should be very low and most likely the force will start to suffer "casualties" from desertion, sickness, lack of bullets, etc until the force either gets in supply again or eventually will evaporate and no longer exist………

If you are doing a campaign and using area or point to point maps, you might want to use a forage sustainable rating system. Several have used over the years. Most end up with a form of force reduction for poor forage areas.

Yeah, and after he reached Savannah he fled back north.

Interesting point, Scott.