"Radios - Use of" Topic

We have spent a considerable amount of time recently on Radio nets.

We realized as we move back in time (to 1980 -1985) how key a force multiplier the presence of a radio is. If there is only a radio at Platoon level then the dispersion of a Platoon is limited by voice/signal distances, or the speed of transmitting orders can drop dramatically especially if runners are required and there is no safe route for them. We have worked on the formations based on the radios of all the relevant levels working. Now we could have added lots of rules for when a particular radio(s) was not functioning. However this we considered was making things to complicated, particularly as this could be a game to game variable so could over time lead to confusion slowing the game down, never in our opinion a good idea.

How have you dealt with the presence/absence of radios on the speed of response of your available forces?

More an issue with Infantry. Every tracked vehicle I served on had at least one radio.

When dismounted, yes it was visual/vocal command control.

As for game mechanics, comand radius seems to cover most needs and time/ground scales. Even Vehicles try to stay in sight of at least one other vehicle.

If trying to model reality, just having a radio is not assurance that you will get to the right level of command! The key is access to "the net". Sometimes ya gotta wonder if it was designed that way. Example: You are being approached by a large enemy formation. You want to call in for an artillery strike and want it to arrive before they get danger close.

Well, in order to get that support (unless you have dedicated assets just for you) you will have to go thru the chain of command. You may not even have a radio capable of going direct to arty support! BUT, your next level up probably does and possibly a FAO in the HQ. One must always provide actionable intel to your next level up so they can be aware of developments up front. So for the next layer of command, you are probably thankful that 2LT Jones cannot call for arty support himself! This also helps to ensure actionable intel actually gets to thru to the right channels.

If you are lucky, you have radio communication within your subordinate units within your command. That could quickly make the job of internal coordination assemble subordinate commanders for mission assignments to delay, defeat or maneuver against the enemy.

I have always wondered about the Russians in WWII. German Tigers were high priority targets for Russian artillery but reading German accounts, the Tigers would move to another location, under orders- they were used as fire-brigades on the eastern front, before the Russian artillery hit where they just left…30 minutes ago! German infantry got plastered but they held the Stug crews in high regards as they didn't bug out and stayed to support the infantry.

Because maybe only 1 tank in 10 had a radio R/T or Receiver AND Transmitter). The physical location of Russian Tank Companies had to keep an eye on the lead tank for flag signals. (Less time to look around for threats). This reduced the frontage and increased the density of company's deployment. Did that make them easier to hit? The tank losses of the Russians WERE quite high. Could this situation (lack of or distribution of radios) have contributed to higher losses? What was cheaper- a receiver/transmitter in every tank or replacing a KO'd tank and crew? Guess they didn't really care with Lend-Lease and all…(Yeah, several had radio receivers but not all had transmitters). Just wondering of unplanned consequences of strict adherence of doctrine.

I wouldn't regard the provision of radios as a universal panacea, certainly as far as infantry are concerned. An invariable rule of infantry contact, up until the 1990s, was that all communications below battalion level would fail. Which was why soldiers spent a great deal of effort planning military operations rather than just randomly ordering units around.

Since the advent of more modern comms technology at the turn of the century, that situation has changed of course, particularly wrt GPS. As one my pals put it, who served in both eras, finally they had both reliable comms with units AND they actually knew where they were. Which certainly wasn't the case in the 80s.

I'd have to agree with everything UshCha said based on me being a Platoon Radioman in the early 1970s.

In WWII (SCR 300) distances were determined by static (greater) or moving (less) and some early radios only worked when stopped. Also terrain and weather. During the Cold War, the PRC-25 had about the same effectiveness as the SCR 300 but was lighter. Also if you used the short or long antenna.

PRC 25: link
SCR 300: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SCR-300

The Rifle Platoon Leader can call the CO or Weapons Platoon Leader for light mortars that can arrive pretty quickly and the mortar FO may be connected to the mortar team by field phone to make adjustment.

To get Battalion Level Support (normally medium or heavy mortars) you need a dedicated FO with a radio or the CO makes the call.

I think the speed of response would be determined by how much time is in a turn. If a turn is 1-3 minutes there could be a chance of not working. If it didn't connect you would try moving to a new or higher location. Sometimes another unit could relay for you.

Usually, Platoons and the CO were no more than a few hundred yards apart and normally closer than that. If the radio does not work send a runner.

Wolfhag

Dye4minis Even with radio the system can be close to unusable. In Normandy the Brits FAO at the front could call a Taxi rank airstrike direct.

As I understand it the US process was far more involved requiring release at a much higher level and hence taking far longer. The US seemed not to trust there lower levels as much as the Brits did. That's even with radios working.
The Italians a tanks lacked radios below platoon commander. They were fitted for radios but there were never enough to go below platoon level. The cost of a radio and its quality my depend on how much of the system is built by the country and how much has to be imported, and whether you have to pay for it if its lend lease.

Radio in a merchandised system is a definite force multiplier. Which is why Holbart did his best to ensure early Brit tank forces had a full compliment of radios.