"Wargame Rules Review - Hills" Topic

"Some rules are more difficult to write than others. Defending and attacking hills is one of them. In particular how to attack infantry which have been positioned behind the crest. This was a favourite tactic of Wellington, and proved very effective. It protected the defenders from artillery fire. It also provided a tactical shock to attacking infantry when they suddenly found them deployed and ready to fire when they finally reached the crest of the hill.

I have often wondered why this tactic was not used by many more commanders during the Napoleonic Wars. I think Blucher's comment just before the start of the battle of Ligny may provide the answer. Wellington had joined Blucher to coordinate their strategy for the Waterloo campaign. He commented that the Prussian infantry were very exposed on the forward slope of a nearby hill. Blucher replied "my lads like to see the enemy", or words to that effect…"

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Armand

I suspect its something to do with skirmishing. If you are going to lose the skirmish conflict then hiding behind a crest just gives enemy skirmishers a crest to hide behind while they snipe at you lines of infantry. If your line is in front of the crest the enemy skirmishers have less cover and can be sniped at by the line, preferably down a hill. Even in this case its not nice formed up in line and being sniped at by rather effective French skirmishers, as occurred at Jena, even if your line can fire back.

Thanks

Armand

One of the issues with this is, why would a player not always learn from Wellesley's thinking and use reverse slopes whenever it seemed a good idea? Should rules restrict players of non-British(led) troops' use of this tactical deployment?

Cheers,
John

(smile)

Armand

Yet have read Blucher advocated firing howitzer over hills blindly, knowing troops would be behind them.

I wonder how widespread that was. The conventional wisdom is that indirect fire was rare in this period. Certainly howitzers are typically only one or two barrels per battery.

Cheers,
John

I could see there being a psychological disadvantage to a reverse-slope position. The defending troops can't see what's going on and won't know how close the enemy is until they suddenly appear over the crest only a short distance away. Steady troops under a commander they trust (like the British under Wellington) could handle it very well, but less steady troops might be panicked by this 'surprise' attack.

I've always had the impression they were behind the crest, but typically just a couple of paces, often lying down- enough so that when they were ordered to their feet, they could see and fire over the crest. The skirmishers would be forward of it, and the field officers on horseback could see over it, so that they could easily move forward to control the skirmish line, and time their own response.

Yes, deploy your skirmishers on the front side.

Thanks!

Armand

The whole point of concealing troops behind the crest of a hill was to seek cover from direct and often morale-sinking artillery fire; without a clear target, artillery captains were loathe to waste ammunition. One other factor in favour of a rear-of-crest position was that when the British line was ordered forward it gave the advancing enemy an unexpected surprise; if this deterrent didn't work, musketry volleys ( equivalent to a machine gun) and an advance with bayonets lowered would do the trick.
This tactic was adopted because initially the British were at a disadvantage in numbers in the Peninsula; it proved to work, time after time, the name of the game being Deter/Discourage the French from any ideas of taking that position. In those days, infantry, on balance, preferred to be hit by a bullet than stabbed by a bayonet, which is why the French ran when the Brit line advanced. Commanders will rarely, if ever, change a tactic that works.
It was a different doctrine in other armies; maybe it was either a point of honour to face the enemy from the start, or an attempt to face him down..? Each way, casualties were bound to be higher.

Thanks also…

Armand

I like when rules can abstractly factor in perhaps the tactical differences of armies and in the rules Napoleonische Kriegsführung, this gets combined in an optional rule to account for their practice of staying behind hill crests where they get a +1 in the first round of close combat and their two rank formation

although I don't understand how the 2 rank formation gives any close combat advantage, I can gather that it simulates them being able to surprise the enemy perhaps as they come into close range

These rules are at a
Scale of infantry elements equalling around 1000 men so things are suitably abstracted, how well this can represent the historical effectiveness of the tactic all up I am not sure