"Validating your model" Topic

The falling off a bridge analysis is no different to say the approach we take on small arms ammunition supply. We could count ammunition usage, thus allowing immense rates of ammunition fire at a particular target but then run out of ammunition. OR in effect we restrict effects on the enemy based on an ammunition expenditure commensurate with some nominal rate for the target. In our own rules we have an "assult" mode. This covers the short interval where rate of use of ammunition is at extreme levels, the "casualtie" rate is far higher at this point but in a rounderbout way it in parts represents future reduced ammunition supply.

Either of the to ways are acceptable simulation approaches, the former may be a more flexibly realistic but the computational overhead of tracking ammunition supply/falling of a bridge monitoring may be too high to warrant a minor improvement in accuracy.

As to die rolling our approach is to avoid them whenever it is possible. If you can get a credible solution without a die roll we will do so.

Wolfhag will correct me if I get it wrong here and note this is illustrative as our models look overall at wildly different time frames and if I got it wrong the illustration remains valid.

Tanks have situational awareness issues, the drivers view is very restricted, the gunner at least in combat is busy in a narrow field of view at targets and much occupied by the mecahnics of gunnery. This leaves the commander as the mainstay in maintaing situational awareness especially when unable to put his head out.

Now at least if I have got it right, the possibility of seeing events outside the main area of observation is controlled in part by a die roll in Wolfhag system. Effectively in glancing around he may see X he may not.

In our system that is not permitted, the commanders view is binany, he sees it or if out of arc he does not.
This is a design issue. We have different approximations, we chose ours as although in some ways less accurate it is far swifter to evaluate than the former, die rolls have a significat time penalty to execute, whether this is a worthy overhead depends on the overall system design.

just as an aside, we consider our sytem acceptable on the basis typically, though not in all such circumstances where out of arc perception is required, the "gods eye view" of the player mitigates some of issues with the the binary nature of our approach.

Again there is a vast number of ways a system can be approximated, not all needing to be controlled by die. I believe there is a Napolionic game that has no typical random factor system, I.e, no cards or die.

Macladdie
If you can create a game that has no procedures or mechanics, go for it.

G6
Hmm I didn't say that in the part you quoted. I said do we need them "to deal with all these variables."

Clearly we need them as with out them it isn't a game. Even a child playing with their toy soldiers will have some form of implicit procedure.

My goal is to have them such that allows as few as possible, to apply them to as many different situations as possible and that aid in immersion.

As you seem to have thought I'm aiming for no procedure. My goal is to have a procedure that isn't obviously a procedure. Nor again my quoting. The art is to not see the art.

So the tank falling off the bridge isn't a probability, its the result of the conditions and circumstances intersecting with the decisions the driver makes.

So we can have a model where we gather statistics to determine the likelihood of it happening (assuming the accuracy of that) then assign a probability of it happening. In most all games it will be a numeric value, which is tested against, most commonly though not exclusively (like is said I've been around and have looked at most ways of putting games to gether) this results in the player looking for a certain numeric value for success/failure. However people experience reality not as probabilities and numeric values. Hence me saying the conditions are what I want to use.

Knowing statistically the probability of something happening tells me nothing of my own experience. My experience is that if the tank tries to cross that bridge fast, they fall off. Where the model would fall apart is is if crossing a sound bridge resulted in the tank falling because they crossed fast.

What we are designing is for us.. as I've said I'm designing a experience or a scenario that that the players are responding to. As such it needs to be a valid experience but it is OK for me if it happens more often than it would innreal life.

Yes I need to see the guts… but the point is that the goal is to make sure that design consideration drives things. It's not something I stick on or over at the end.

I'm frustrated by how many rules sets are basicadice games or csrd games. That fkr masquerade as a wargame. I don't want to play that kind of game.. I often read an interstinb intro to some new rules. And then I read such and such gives you a +1 🫤

Ushcha
The falling off a bridge analysis is no different to say the approach we take on small arms ammunition supply

No… but the question in all these cases is about whether we are treating as a statistical simulation or an experience. ( I'm not saying that these are exclusive by default only where the emphasis is placed)

My emphasis is less on the "numbers" but the choices. Those choices are those of the unit… not the the player. The choise to try to cross the bridge too fast. To fire too much.

My issue with dice is numeric dice. Which shift the focus to rolling certain values.

Yes I gave the napoleonic non dice rules from… 30 years ago or so… that attracted me even then. My issue with them was the number of charts etc kne needed to use. Not because of the complexity but they meant it still didn't feel right.

I was also influenced by the rules of Jim Webster who systems were about reducing dice rolls in the game. The issue was that eventually it was still about a numeric result. So instead of my focus being on the effect of the fire of a unit, it is about the number generated.

My goal is to have them such that allows as few as possible, to apply them to as many different situations as possible and that aid in immersion.

Gamesman6:
Then we need to talk about the conditions that facilitate that immersion in a game.

As you seem to have thought I'm aiming for no procedure. My goal is to have a procedure that isn't obviously a procedure. Nor again my quoting. The art is to not see the art.

It sure sounded that way to me. "A procedure that isn't obviously a procedure." Okay, is there a game or an example of that you could share?

So the tank falling off the bridge isn't a probability, its the result of the conditions and circumstances intersecting with the decisions the driver makes.

Meaning with the same conditions, circumstances and driver decisions, the tank will always fall off the bridge? 100%?

If we are talking about a non-player 'decision', the commander 'watching' it happen in a game, how do you propose to have that kind of thing occur? Obviously, the tank/bridge is just an example. Statistical probabilities take into account "conditions, circumstances and driver decisions" if we are talking about many possible tanks on bridges events being modeled.

Knowing statistically the probability of something happening tells me nothing of my own experience.

In the game or in real life??? Even if you have seen or driven a tank off a bridge, that is only an anecdote when attempting to describe a whole era or wider set of circumstances. You don't think that your experience is the only outcome possible, do you?

If you are talking about the game 'explaining' in play the conditions, circumstances and NP decisions, how do you propose to do that with an abstract set of rules? All rules are both abstract and inherently unable to cover all contingencies. [Every father trying to put together that Christmas bike with instructions knows that.]

My experience is that if the tank tries to cross that bridge fast, they fall off. Where the model would fall apart is is if crossing a sound bridge resulted in the tank falling because they crossed fast.

Okay, so not 100% of the time? So, what are you saying here? The model falls apart because of that 100% result?
Where does that leave us?

From what I gather from your explanations, which I appreciate, you are looking for a game system that:
1. Does not depend on die rolling
2. Has as few or 'invisible to the player' procedures as possible.
3. And either built on our experience or want the game experience to be explicit in why things happen [causes].
4. Uses as few probability events as possible.

Have I got that right? If so, do you have an example of a game or mechanic that does those things?

You wrote to UshCha

"No… but the question in all these cases is about whether we are treating as a statistical simulation or an experience. ( I'm not saying that these are exclusive by default only where the emphasis is placed)

What is the difference in a game between a 'statistical simulation' and 'an experience?' I certainly dislike and don't want a game that is nothing but die rolling and chance events, but your distinction isn't clear to me.

"A procedure that isn't obviously a procedure."

Is not the same as saying I don't want a procedure.

Macladdie
Meaning with the same conditions, circumstances and driver decisions, the tank will always fall off the bridge? 100%?

G6
No because then it would be fixed which not what I'm aiming for. I'd have ways to arbitrate results.

Mac
In the game or in real life???

G6
Knowing that I have a 1 in 4 chance of something happening doesn't matter to me personally. It either happens or it doesn't.
In the game it its based on the actions of the unit. The probability of it happening doesn't matter. All that matters is;

It could happen
It happening has to be impactful to the scenario and the decisions the player needs to make because of it.
It happen is based on the conditions in the game not on probabilities

Macladdie
Okay, so not 100% of the time? So, what are you saying here? The model falls apart because of that 100% result?
Where does that leave us?

G6
Hmm 🤔
Something that happens 100% is of no interest

I was saying that crossing a normal bridge shouldn't be tested.

Macladdie
1. Does not depend on die rolling
No numbered dice… I don't want to be thinking about getting numbers.

2. Has as few or 'invisible to the player' procedures as possible.
Er sort of… the procedure or mechanics should be part of intrinsic experience not outside of it..
Let's say I'm rolling a d6.. yes a dice… which has "hit" on one face. The player is looking for and wanting to roll "hit" not number.

3. And either built on our experience or want the game experience to be explicit in why things happen [causes].

That actions/decisions are the focus… not numbers

4. Uses as few probability events as possible.

Well.. at least where I am thinking about numeric probabilities.

Macladdie
What is the difference in a game between a 'statistical simulation' and 'an experience?

G6
An experience ad I mentioned earlier is like training a specifc scenario. Say self defence counter assault.

The probabilities of that event happening is irrelevant in this situation. What I am developing is the ability to respond to the situation when it is happening.

Ps.
I'm not looking for a game thag does what I want, I've not found one. I'm designing my own with these things in mind, some solutions I've not seen before or at least applied like this before

So here is a Straw Man of what may be a style of solution as a discussion piece.

Taking falling of a bridge scenario for purely illustrative purposes.

Among the bridges on table have three visually credible candidates. A bridge layer bridge, a rickety bridge and a narrow bridge with tight turns at entry and exit. These should be readily identifiable as possible hazards to navigation.

The "umpire" now has a matrix of causes thst could culminate in an accident. This could be as follows.

Using my teminology three speeds are of interest.
Crossing with Care- very low speeds for light vehicles, armoured vehicles head out possibly with a foot guide directing the driver.

Normal speed 5 to 15 mph

Fast 15 to 20 mph

Troop training Elite 4, normal/decent conscript 6, poor conscript 8.

Current Leadership now +6 normal decent. Poor conscript +4.
Troops get tired/fatigued during combat so are more likely to make mistakes.

Vehicle type, Civilian type vehicle. Off road/military light wheeled, tracked heavy vehicle.

Now have a matrix, thst identifies failure cases e.g.

Bridge lasye bridge
- being crossed by heavy tracked vehicle, poor consripts, in fastere than Crossing with Care.

- normal conscrips in heavy trakced passing in normal at +6 i.e fatigued.

- normal conscrips in military wheeled vehicle passing in fat at +6 I.e fatigued.

You finish the matrix how you see fit, add more potential issues like rain, dense fog et al.

This gives a deterministic failure set of causes but the identifiable point on the matrix mean it's requires a reasonable set of contributory conditions to actually provoke an event meaning the event has some measure of credibility if and when it occours.

To me this is the limit based on a paper set of rules, it's way past what I personally see as useful in 95% of games. However it's an attempt only to show possible forms of solutions that don't resort to any form of random. Me I may die for it if the conditions met the identifiable threat level, but that is me.

Hopefully this will provoke a more quantatative discussion on the possible forms of solution, if this is nowhere near it should through light on what is wanted in more quatatative terms.

ps board out my skull, currently a Brit in an Australian summer, too hot to do anything outside,

That seems reasonable, conventional.. but a lot of work to decide and implement… 🤔. Its a process for one set of circumstances and conditions. Yes it could be used for other situations but.

My secondary issue for me, is it is a clearly a process that is outside, in format and focus, the action of the game.

And as such not for me personally. 🫤🙂

My take… let's say actions are on cards. I draw cards to see what the unit is doing. The number of cards is dictated by skill/training, personality and experience allow re draws, this may be positive as well as negative. So an "aggressive" unit my have to redraw slow movement.

The three bridges offer different outcomes. One they can fall off. One can collapse and one they might get stuck in and block.

However the conditions are to successfully navigate any of the bridges at normal move

I'm not interested in the statistical probability of it happening, but in the challenge it offers when it happens. So it's not a certainty but comes about from choices.

Here it would be about sending which unit first… an aggressive unit is more likely to have an issue. So sending a more reliable unit first is more likely to get units across the bridge.

But the conditions are different. The choices are two bridges, rickety and s bend. Failure either destroys the bridge or blocks it. That may not be worth the risk

The Bailey bridge it falls off. So sending the aggressive unit might loose a tank but the unit is across it may be worth the risk as I've now got an aggressive unit across the obstacle.

For me all this keeps the focus on the situation and I'm weighing up risk reward as I would in real life not by calculating how a numeric value totals up.

I'm thinking actions, personality of the unit. The conditions and how it all interacts and at no point to I need to consider a number to run it.

So the trick on the roads thing as an example, we have obvious road limits, take a tank down a light road, even if there are no bridges it ruins the road. light vehicles now cannot travel at full speed along it. Really a quick visual of a dodgy bridge or a wet looking area gives that impact, but that's normal

The card sytem when you make agressive commanders move faster looks suicidal. that not aggression it's just moving forward suicidal.

PART of a good aggressive commander may be to tolerate more losses to achieve an objective. was Rommel a great commander or an idiot. I am persuaded at least I'm part the latter, in the end he took one risk to many. I would class him as agressive. How you encourage risk taking in a power without irrational rewards is an issue. I have seen too many sytems when last bound fever ovrtakes plsyers as the rewards are irrarionally high for the risk taken, agin that poor rules not agressive behaviour.

It may be worth digressing and detailing in some quantatative way how you want an aggressive player to behave. what are the characteristics of aggression. Rushing forward where even fools fear to tread to me is not aggression. Accepting higher losses to gain a vital objective may be, but that I am dubious is always agressive.

Gamesman6:

Okay, as UshCha notes, it is sort of a decision matrix or rubric leading to an outcome.

My take… let's say actions are on cards. I draw cards to see what the unit is doing. The number of cards is dictated by skill/training, personality and experience allow re draws, this may be positive as well as negative. So an "aggressive" unit my have to redraw slow movement.

Player calculation #1

The three bridges offer different outcomes. One they can fall off. One can collapse and one they might get stuck in and block.

So, if they make a wrong choice with the cards and bridge, those outcomes are guaranteed? But the players don't know the 'right' combination of cards/conditions?
Calculation #2

However the conditions are to successfully navigate any of the bridges at normal move.

So, the players don't know that, and that "normal move" is the solution 100% of the time?

But the conditions are different. The choices are two bridges, rickety and s bend. Failure either destroys the bridge or blocks it. That may not be worth the risk.

I am not sure how players make decisions visa vie the bridges and the 'successful' choice[s]. What exactly do the players know about the process? Do they have enough information about risk/rewards to make meaningful decisions? Risk implies that there are no bullet-proof--risk-free decisions. It sounds like the player makes the successful decision with the correct combination of cards/conditions/situation/units. How much of such decisions do you see as chance events or inherent risk?

I'm not interested in the statistical probability of it happening, but in the challenge it offers when it happens. So it's not a certainty but comes about from choices.

The choices have to be based on something, some overarching way the process works, so the players can make meaningful choices…if there is only one combination of decisions to success, it will be a one-off experience and quickly become a dull game. I certainly have played games where there were no chance involved and all uncertainty came from player decisions. I've mentioned Complete Brigadier.

I'm thinking actions, personality of the unit. The conditions and how it all interacts and at no point to I need to consider a number to run it.

Then you have to figure out how to have the players think about the actions, situation and personality of the unit within the game procedures. This requires very specific things of the game components to run the procedures where players make decisions from them. The risk/benefit events have to provide the players with information to make the decisions about, even if incomplete… which then the game would have to provide in influencing the decision outcome. This isn't counting any opposing player decisions.

How you encourage risk taking in a power without irrational rewards is an issue. I have seen too many systems when last bound fever overtakes players as the rewards are irrationally high for the risk taken, again that poor rules not aggressive behaviour.

UshCha makes a good point here. Within the game, how do you illustrate a set of behaviors [say aggressive] without reverting to a quantitative profile? [i.e. numbers]

It may be worth digressing and detailing in some quantitative way how you want an aggressive player to behave.

There may be qualitative ways to do that, but it does lead to some system complications. If it is a matter of an aggressive unit/leader having a X chance of creating a blocked bridge or going off the bridge, that is a probability to be established by some randomizer. Does the player know the odds of it happening in the game?

The bottom line of course, is player experience. It might help to describe the experience you want the player to have, and if that is in relation to some history or current reality.

Clearly I failed to make a point about the bridge scenario, the primary aim was to depict bridges and situations where the player in real life would assess the thing as risky. Now you have a point that a 14 year old certanly in the Uk would not likely have the basic life experiences to make a rational assessment without help but certainly my then 14 year old would not be playing my sort of game. Now he's 40+ he is playing my sort of game and has the life experience.

Again in the second part of my missive I failed to disconect from the bridge scenario. The latter section involved a more general approach as to how and what defines personality traits.

It's the personality trait of stupidity to rush across an obviously suspect bridge, there is no need from my experience, to encourage that trait, as in my experience it is over represented in wargamers compared to real commanders already.

Ushcha
The card sytem when you make agressive commanders move faster looks suicidal. that not aggression it's just moving forward suicidal.

PART of a good aggressive commander

G6
OK it doesn't make them do it it just shifts things. And I didn't say commander I said "unit".
And now we're discussing aggressive.. the name itself is irrelevant. Let's call it impetuous instead.

You then attache Good to aggressive.. what would a Bad one do.😉

I thought the goal was to discuss the examples? 🫤 of crossing the bridge now you want to digress further. 😉

The personality of a unit or commander
Is another way to individialise things and think about how they will act/react. The names themselves are less important.

Macladdie
So, if they make a wrong choice with the cards and bridge, those outcomes are guaranteed? But the players don't know the 'right' combination of cards/conditions?

G6
That depends… I might know the order of Hands in poker but that doesn't tell me how to play a hand.

What is Right? It maybe tbe "player" needs to ask, what do I think about the bridge… in real life there isn't always a "right" answer.

Mac
So, the players don't know that, and that "normal move" is the solution 100% of the time?

G6
Well they might or they might not. 🤔
The unit needs to cross the river. They must move to cross and the system in this case provides fast or normal movement. Fast will cause an issue. The precise details will depend if the game is say squad based and the tank is the only one in the game, or is a larger game and this tank is one of many that will be crossing.

Mac
I am not sure how players make decisions visa vie the bridges and the 'successful' choice[s]. What exactly do the players know about the process? Do they have enough information about risk/rewards to make meaningful decisions? Risk implies that there are no bullet-proof--risk-free decisions. It sounds like the player makes the successful decision with the correct combination of cards/conditions/situation/units. How much of such decisions do you see as chance events or inherent risk?

G6
The players would understand enough to play the game… like any game they woild learn more as they played.
How does anyone make decision in RL an risk reward, experience and information.

Remember I'm creating a way for the player to control an entire force but those elements act in their own way.
Whether my system or Ushchas. The fact that the tank falls off the bridge is its own thing the difference how we get there.

What I'm aiming for in mine is that there are "decisions" on how to cross the bridge even if those decisions are not completely under the control of the player.

Mac
Then you have to figure out how to have the players think about the actions, situation and personality of the unit within the game procedures. This requires very specific things of the game components to run the procedures where players make decisions from them. The risk/benefit events have to provide the players with information to make the decisions about, even if incomplete… which then the game would have to provide in influencing the decision outcome. This isn't counting any opposing player decisions.

G6
Yes.. 😉 this isn't my first rodeo… like I said I've been running all kinds of games for 40 odd years, plus my job deals with making decisions.

Also what you've outlined is no different really from a new player learning any new game or experience. I didnt learn to play poker til my early 30s… but I learnt all that by playing the game.

Mac
UshCha makes a good point here. Within the game, how do you illustrate a set of behaviors [say aggressive] without reverting to a quantitative profile? [i.e. numbers]

G6
Keeping in line with the example and speed. An imperious unit would have to redraw slow cards or slow actions are bumped up to fast.
Timid would do the opposite.

Ushcha/Mac
It may be worth digressing and detailing in some quantitative way how you want an aggressive player to behave.

G6
I don't see it working in a TT game. Assigning scores/values to personality types. Just creates more calculations to be made and I don't want that in a game.
Sticking to my objective is to have things like personality as the core of a system… not as an after thought.

As a side note. I've had fun playing games where I rolled numeric dice. BUT it was a simple roll off opposed dice higher won. It was fast and simple and created some interesting stories. Certain units developed a personality out of it… 😉

Ushcha
It's the personality trait of stupidity to rush across an obviously suspect bridge, there is no need from my experience, to encourage that trait, as in my experience it is over represented in wargamers compared to real commanders already.

G6
It's only stupid if it doesn't work. Going faster than is appropriate is stupid. Breaking the speed limit is stupid…. have you ever broken the speed limit? 🤔

I though I had specified that the system I was using for tbe example had two speed of movement based on tbe actions. Move and fast move. What those actually mean will depend on unit and conditions… a vehicle will move faster than infantry. Patrol pace is faster than tracking pace. Etc.

So in the example. All fast means is that the crossing was made at a pace that created the outcome, or they drove a slow pace but still slipped off etc.

And for clarity a unit, whether a commander or a group of troops a vehicles etc. Is not just define by one personality trait. As I said you have training experience as well.
So trainjng will give the number of options. Experience allows the player to re pick options of they want a differe5n set of possibilities and personaloty,nudges which options are chosen.

Now in sompe periods, some level of stupidity which encourages attack at the cost of order was done quite well by Phil Barker in DBM, with impetious troops,but stupidity is easy to model.

Offering more/different options for say agressive or cautious units may work but the least agressive players may not opt for the designers prefered options. Rushing forward may be a good tactic, rushing forward suicidely is stupid not sgressive. Simple card impulsion is just random so can force implausible effects, to me these utterly destroy the game, those are the types of event that cause me simply to abandon the game on the basis it wastes time I will never get back. The trick is to tailor the options to the conditions, very difficult.

I agree with G6, the point about the bridge matrix was it relied on basic life skill to make the decision, the matrix should never have been shown to the player. A sensible player may ask for more generic info if the time is available or like in real life take a punt. I have been down roads with a high risk of boulders falling. I took a punt and went through, I had no additional data.

The point is and I do have some sympathy with G6's here is that the player may have to make decisions for which he may never know the real answer. In my trivial matrix how many games needed to trip all the possibilities. To the player it will almost always be a punt. but if it does go wrong there is at least some logic too it. While personaly not adverse to random and I do not consider cards different to die, they do need to be tied to some relevant issue. The "Tea Break" card to me being one of the worst unrelated events. The bound resets for no other reason than designers whim and pure random.

Now how much player experience is another matter, I did have what the player assumed I would take as a negative, the the game really needed a player to have some at least vague idea what a platoon commander was supposed to do. personal I considered that a complement.

How well a Personality trait system may work may depend on the standard of player. For instance to make decisions like rush across a dodgy bridge without weighing up the consequences as best he can shows some lack of life skills.
Could sensible units get an extra aide de memoire to look in more detail sort of the equivalent of my son's guide to a computer game walk though, not exactly analogous just blue sky thinking on how to implement a credible system.

Could a sensible unit have an option to hang back a little so as to survive better if the suicidel attack requied of them fails and when everybody breaks they could up there life chances by still being in good order while the rest rout mindlessly.

Ushcha
It seems… despite me changing the term to impetuous to be hung up on Agressive and assuming it will cause stupidity.

I said available move actions were normal and fast. That doesn't mean they have to charge forwards to get mowed down. Only that they are moving with speed. For example I'm crossing a road… do I walk or do I run. The distinction is between moving to cover a distance in as short a time as possible or to move maximising available cover and concealment.

And I thought I'd explained that the way my system would approach the problem of deciding if the tank fell of the bridge.

Simply. as i have two types of move, Normal and fast, the one that creates the event is, fast. It wouldn't make much logic to have the slow action do.

That's not to say that it means they are trying to race across at top speed. That's an assumption on your behalf. So rather than the matrix, where a certain number is produced the tank falls off the bridge, here its the action driving (😉) the action. And as opposed to training or experince changing the number it changes the chancea of the player getting a useable out come.

As it seems is that youre stick with it being simple card impulsive. The cards, or whatever offer the choices which the player may attempt to change is they don't have a variety they want. If that doesn't pan out then they must use them cards they are dealt… or not. A player may choose to not do anything. Or the personality may force some kind of action.

I take then you dont like playing poker or backgammon?

You say the matrix has a logic… but its logic of a matrix. Most people don't think like that. Theyd approach the problem of crossing the bridge adls I need them to cross the bridge carefully.
(Without adding specific skills)

Ad to whether cards are random that depends on the set up. Almost all games have a randomiser.
In your matrix was the outcome set by the inputs or was a roll etc needed?
Without a variable you'd know before hand whether you'd succeed or fail.

If there is a variable to determine the result. dice roll etc. Then its still variable in resul… and the result is based on a number not on an "actions" which is how most people think "logically"

I get its not for everyone and I'm not trying to convince you to play it… I'm just trying to explain my approach and clear up misunderstandings.

Now I'd agree the. We stop for tea card is a bit daft… but I get why its there. Some people like anlighter hearted approach to games and obviously plays on the idea of British troops stopping fkr team. Or and one dad's friends who'd served used to say. "If in doubt, brew up"

But in my system the available actions, whether on cards or not, are limited. The base number is 6.

Now as to player experience. You've brought it up in other threads.
My attitude is that a system needs to be simple to allow it to be played as soon as possible and experience is gained through repeated play. I would Taylor the game/scenario to players experience etc.

From my research, it appears historically the problem with tanks crossing bridges was from weighing too much for a hastily constructed bridge and the bridge being too narrow for the tank. I don't think it should be much of a problem for a driver to drive in a straight line for 50m or less.

Failed bridge crossings: link

Here is a tank falling off a bridge: YouTube link

link

Mechanical issues: link

I can see reasons for driving fast over a bridge. It could happen if crossing while under attack or to take the bridge by surprise.

Wolfhag

Thanks Wolfhag for throwing a spanner in the works. 😉

In UshChas 3 bridge example one bridge sounded like the danger was the bridge collapsing.

I suppose the question the. Becomes With jn tbe frame work of one's rules can one provide a solution to an emerging situation.

So yes it may be advisable under fire to cross the bridge with a mind to crossing quickly more than being cautions and not falling off. In that case maybe they would to have both normal and fast movement to reflect bejng successful with the added parameters.

Same with collapsing bridge. One could also add an opposed draw or roll. The bridge resisting tbe effects of the tank crossing. The bridge needs to draw/roll move actions to not collapse.

Ushcha and Macladdie may not like that as it isn't statistically based 😉

But for me it's OK as it's presenting risk, engagement for the player. And at the end the bridge stands or it doesn't which is what the player needs to know. We could make it progressively more likely to happen the more tanks cross but I think there is enough to work with

You're welcome.

We could make it progressively more likely to happen the more tanks cross

It happened on the Remagen Bridge, which collapsed days after being captured after dozens of vehicles crossed.

Also, normally only one vehicle at a time crosses so it can take quite a while for a large unit to cross.

If crossing a hasty bridge, you don't know how well it will hold up until you try to cross it. After the engineers built a bridge some "sucker" needed to drive across it to test it out.

Since 85% of the bridges in Russia and Eastern Europe could not support vehicles over 40 tons the Germans needed to reinforce them. So any recon photos or reports of bridge work identified where the heavies were going which would be the sector the Germans would be attacking in a few days to a few weeks.

For me, overall statistics are interesting but I'm more interested in what drives the results.

However, statistics can be used to determine a Pk# (probability to kill) for weapons against specific targets without going into hit probability, hit location, armor, ricochet chance, etc details so you can validate the result against historical results.

The US military uses this technique in some of their simulations so I'm not completely disregarding McLaddie and UshCha regarding statistics. From what I'm working on I'm not using it. However, if I designed a modern tank-tank game with Regiment-sized battles I probably would since it would be quicker than what I'm using now.

Wolfhag

😉👍🏻

As one of us uscha I think, mentioned we shoot and hit too much.
I think that it's in part because it seems easier to gather "accurate statistics" especially as they are easier to fit in with conventional mechanics.

I'd rather shoot and hit less. And focus on the psychological parts of combat.

Again that is a whish list not a concrete model able in some way definition. what factors do you consider critical to the phycological aspects of the game. is suppression one parameter, That has been defined in the real world as bullets landing within about 4 ft of you. if i
you are hit you are out not suppressed.

Starting conditions, before combat un motivated, tired, Hungary, low on ammo, poorly lead , what is your list of key parameters you want to mske the player response to. is not knowing how well you have suppressed thr enemy a key parameter? Possibly not a key parameter, our platoon commander knows not the rules but seems to have a feel about how much should be shooting to get the effect, regardless of the rules.

As one of us uscha I think, mentioned we shoot and hit too much. I think that it's in part because it seems easier to gather "accurate statistics" especially as they are easier to fit in with conventional mechanics.

I'd rather shoot and hit less. And focus on the psychological parts of combat.

Regarding shooting: if you are playing modern games, tank historical accuracy is about 90% chance to hit even at extreme ranges. Generally, the crew does not know they are being fired at unless they are hit.

I don't know where you'd get any accurate historical psychological factors that would degrade efficiency as there are so many variables. That means you can do it however you like.

is suppression one parameter, That has been defined in the real world as bullets landing within about 4 ft of you. if you are hit you are out not suppressed.

I think I know the study you are referring to which is a guideline I use too.

I was in Ukraine visiting some Western friends last month who have been volunteers in the Legion for over a year fighting the Russians. Some were with the unit that spearheaded the Sept 2022 Kharkiv Offensive that was so successful it retook over 500 settlements and 12,000 square kilometers of territory in the Kharkiv region.

Why and How? Because of recon in-force patrols, drones, and SigInt over a 6 month period they saw how the Russians were moving units out of the AO and were not prepared or expecting an attack, mainly because early in the war the Ukrainians were not very aggressive and the Russians had not run into large Western units.

However, the Western units convinced them to push into the area. The offensive succeeded because the Russians were surprised and retreated, to the Oskul River without putting up much of a fight because they had no intel or drones on the attackers. It was the fear of the unknown and being unprepared that drove them. They didn't even blow their ammo dumps. It was more of a rout rather than an offensive that the Russians defended against.

There were no extensive minefields or fortifications to overcome. Contrast that with the Summer Offensive and the attacks going on now with both sides having extensive minefields, fortifications, artillery, and drones.

Another guy, a Marine Vet, told me how on his first recon mission into Russian lines their unit got ambushed by some Chechens up against an elevated rail line in a wooded area. A BMP pulled up and started firing its 30mm gun at them from 75 yards away. He attempted to fire an AT rocket but it misfired. He got another one and knocked out the BMP from 50 yards away. They laid down suppressive fire and assaulted into the Chechens who broke and ran. The unit was all WOT vets who had been trained on the same tactics so knew what to do.

The Russians had a drone up and they had to run 2km in the July heat all of the time under a barrage of Grads and 120mm mortars. They didn't lose anyone. So how do you model and validate the psychological aspects of that?

Another Marine vet was a drone operator in Bakhmut. He was on the 4th floor of a building holding his control antenna in the window when a BMP pulled up and started firing its 30mm cannot at him. The rounds hit outside the window and went through the window impacting the well behind him. He continued operating his drone and was not touched.

Suppression had almost no effect psychologically or on their performance. How do you model and validate that? Were these Marines brave, fearless, crazy, stupid, or suicidal?

This could give you some things to think over and maybe some data to validate against – if you want to:
link

PDF link

link

Wolfhag

G6,
So I was thinking about my last post and your suggestion for "personalities." I guess there would be no reason not to give an individual a personality rating of brave, fearless, crazy, stupid, or suicidal. It would allow individuals to perform feats of heroism and desperatism as many have done during every conflict.

Wolfhag

Ushcha

Of course its wish list. Otherwise someon would have been able to succefully model and wed all be playinb the same set of rules. Even the militaries don't agree on what they use

Suppression is a result of the psychological. I'm aware of the 4 foot rule. Though that will vary and seems to vary culturally.

Certainly not knowing what the effects of firing is to me very important. Both on the enemy and on your own forces.

I believe my action/personality approach does work for this, as its about how the "unit" interacts with the circumstances and conditions

Wolfhag
Thanks for the links. I'll look forward to reading them. I've dug around a lot with this stuff over the years.

I think I mentioned earlier when Ushcha said something about suicidal, it depends if you make it through.

Again much of how this stuff is applied depends on the level of resolution. Some of those could be applied to specifc leaders, or squad members at that level. Others at fire team/section squad platoon company.

But I beluve that actions. Modified by training experience and personality

I've read too many accounts and seen through my work too .any situations where the of the individual or group determines much. Training and experience play a part but personalty is key.
The approach then fkr me is to have a core process that is tweaked as needed for different circumstances rather then needing whole new processes

I had a brief sojourner into American civil war many moons ago. One book noted that green troops feared artillery but the veterans were more concerned by musket fire that killed far more.

The British I think possibly even before Ww2 which is where I am aware of the issue, believed in blooding there troops in some relatively minor actions before committing them to a full battle with all its accompanying horrors.

I read agin Wolfhag links. It made me think how we got to where we are in our rules re suppression. To do that we need digress somewhat as no one rule stands in isolation to the others. Regrettably I can't recall the details of when we decided our rules would be using, if you like half bounds. IGOUGO by elment not new, even when our last set of commercial rules was Stargrunt 2 but that system gave us the take and retake positions typical in accounts but not seen in previous rules we played. So we have IGOUGO Fiream level and 2 "shooting opertunities" potentially at a time. Then we have the old adage "you need 3 to one to win". And "First win the Firefight" and of course the military manual suppress the enemy, them Maneouver to take them.
And "to take ground you have to assult".
you cannot shoot an enemy to take ground. Suppression is mentioned in accounts as is pinning.

So also having defies our Fear/Fire/Fatigue/Ammo parameter we needed to get a result that when compared to what we had read in accounts looked credible. One of the hardest issues is correctly representing machine gun effects, suppression and otherwise.

Some rules showed laughable levels of correlation with anything published in manuals or correlation with accounts. So it was a steep learning curve. Anyway the suppression system was then devised so it reasonably correlated to our extensive reading. It does make me feel, reading Wolfhag's links we proably did as good a job as we could. Effectively integrated over 2 or so "shooting" events the impact of fear,fire and fatigue seem satisfactory, I can say little more as there is nothing quantatative to compare it too.

Now Interestingly we don't have surprise, But I don't see that as a major factor in our sytem directly, if you are "supprised" by fire out of arc I.e from where you were not expecting it, it will under our system give your enemy a very distinct advantage that will take time to recover from. We don't have routs, beyond a certain point a unit will simply become combat effective time. As an anecdote in Platoon Commander some troops were over mastered and the commander noted they were retreating like zombies rather than routing so certainly in the modern period rout is not always inevitable. On our games folk often give up a position when it becomes untenable as unlike some rules trying to have a last stand and be effective when out off ammo, fatigued does not end well in our rules. Holywood type events as far as we are concerned should stay there. There are rare events that parallel in part such things but they have no place in our system. A lifetime of playing at our level is insufficient for such an event to be likely. Victoria crosses are very rare events.

Personality is key IMO in how a units acts or responds. It also plays a part in why units of similar training and experience react differently.
And for me it's about not trying to define these things by a numeric value.

I think elements like "surprise" depend on what one wants and imo scale… I can see it being viable in a squad sized game where our "units" are individual soldiers.
Something like Rout seems in general
Appropriate to certain periods but not to others.

Reactions depend on period, culture and scale.

I was reading how in Afghanistan, coalition troops and Taliban troops redacted differently to different weapon systems.

Actions for me present a good for me as it frames actions and responses not in numeric values but to what a unit does

I also come back in my thinking about what sre we aiming out games at.
I listened to a presentation by a Marine about a set up for wargaming they have. It has two elements a Bn and then Co Plt.

While it's been tweaked its basically run off two commercial sets. Memoire 44 for the Co Plt and Littoral Commander for the Bn level.

I'm not intimately familiar with either system but it seems again that the model we use depends on the goal

I was just reminded of a comparison id seen between theories of combat and economics and so by extension many war games rules.

They tend toward models where humans act in rational and optimal ways when under stress or reacting situations

G6 but even rational is hard to define. Putins claims he is acting rationally continue using the Ukraine war. Rationally his troops would run away, but they don't, other "rational" rules apply. Even rational responces need to be understood within a certain decision space.

Rather my point. We can't define it outside the theoretical. The History of war is people not acting rationally.

The difference between theory and reality
In theory there is no difference

Ideals are peaceful history is violent.

I'd say that the majority of what we are gaming lacking in rationality… at least in starting them.

Wargames are of course a theoretical frame work of how we can play the game of war we want to play.

And to keep beating the drum against purely numeric systems, they don't lend themselves to irrationality.

Of course defining rationality is hard as it depends on conditions and circumstances. However people tend to belive they are acting rationally. So we tend to have a situation where the player acts either way all through the force they command.

Earlier you'd mentioned a fear that an action system would create suicidal attacks. I don't think it would of itself but I also mentioned that whether something is suicidal depends on whether it works.

So having a way to have units not act by default within the rational choices of the player, is for me something I want.

Even rational responses need to be understood within a certain decision space.

Good morning Gentlemen:

I agree with UshCha. Certainly, the 'rational' is always within context, but people tend to choose what they perceive as the optimal choice in a situation. They may be wrong in their assumptions, [like Putin in starting the war] and they may not know all the circumstances, but that doesn't make their choices irrational. The Hapsburg War Council in 1809 made some bad choices, and actually ignored advice from their top general. However, in their minds, with their specific goals, were they behaving irrationally?

The History of war is people not acting rationally…

That is a really broad brushstroke. I'd like to know how you came to that conclusion. Certainly there is an element of the irrational, but there is a great deal of rational thought and action too. People make choices, consciously or unconsciously that they feel are the best options for achieving their goals.

Wargames are of course a theoretical frame work of how we can play the game of war we want to play.

What takes it out of the theoretical is when the framework is tested against the real thing. That is when Wolfhag gives some research on how often tanks actually fall off bridges and Gamesman6 writes "Thanks Wolfhag for throwing a spanner in the works." That comparison between the theoretical and the evidence from the real world is what takes something theoretical into the real world. Statistics can do that in spades.

And to keep beating the drum against purely numeric systems, they don't lend themselves to irrationality.

No closed procedural system, as all games are, 'lends itself' to portraying the irrational.

However, it can. Beyond the irrationality provided by the players, any effort to portray human behavior has to include the irrational.

For instance, behavior in combat. Statistically, there is a finite range of group behaviors. There are some that are very common among any nation's combatants, there are some that are very specific to a culture and time. Then there are the behaviors that seem to have little relationship to rational decision-making. The question is how often we see those behaviors and when. That can be covered by statistics very well. Perfectly, no. but very well.

So having a way to have units not act by default within the rational choices of the player, is for me something I want.

Any number of games provide those kinds of dynamics, both with numbers and other mechanics. Some crudely, others with little relation to the real world, but the mechanics are there. Gamers, like the real commanders, are always attempting to optimize their chances, and are finding ways to calculate the chances.

As Napoleon once wrote:

Military science consists in calculating all the chances accurately in the first place, and then giving accident exactly, almost mathematically, its place in one's calculations. It is upon this point that one must not deceive oneself…Nothing is attained in war except by calculations."

If we are going to talk about what constitutes irrational behavior and its place in war, how about describing it? If we are going to portray it, that would be a start.

Putin made a bad decision by invading Ukraine, based on erroneous information, but was it irrational?

Robert E. Lee is often accused of being irrational in ordering Pickett's Charge. However, he had experience and information that suggested it would be successful. I won't bore you with his reasoning, but does that make it irrational?

Macladdie
That is a really broad brushstroke. I'd like to know how you came to that conclusion. Certainly there is an element of the irrational, but there is a great deal of rational thought and action too. People make choices, consciously or unconsciously that they feel are the best options for achieving their goals.

G6
Exposing yourself to death and being maimed is irrational. That's why as you've pointed out before training takes place.
I didn't disagree that what is rational is dependant on the context.. tbag was ushcha thinking I was saying something else.

Emotion is a major driver to irrational behaviour. People who are in an emotionally aroused state wont be optimising their rational skills. Again why training and selection takes place.

The point if hoped would be clear is thatever stressors to their rationality the player is exeriencing. Its clearly in a different league to the actuality

MCladdie
What takes it out of the theoretical is when the framework is tested against the real thing. That is when Wolfhag gives some research on how often tanks actually fall off bridges and Gamesman6 writes "Thanks Wolfhag for throwing a spanner in the works." That comparison between the theoretical and the evidence from the real world is what takes something theoretical into the real world. Statistics can do that in spades.

G6
My response was after all the time spent discussing tank falling off a bridge was that what was the actual problem was bridges collapsing.

And tk sound like a broken record because it seems I have to. I'm not looking to run a statistical analysis of the likelihood of an event happening. I'm running games for an experience of King decisions and responding to.

I listened to a talk from a professional wargames designer. Where he said goes were for gathering data, training and experiential. In the experiential its about putting the participants in situations where its about making decisions and how they mKe those decisions.

As I've said before. Like training for a rare but deadly event.
Now if I'm gathering data then accurately modelling how often a tank falls of or collapses a bridge is vital. If I'm giving someone experiences then it is less so. Then i want to model the actions that may cause it.

Macladdie
Any number of games provide those kinds of dynamics, both with numbers and other mechanics. Some crudely, others with little relation to the real world, but the mechanics are there. Gamers, like the real commanders, are always attempting to optimize their chances, and are finding ways to calculate the chances.

G6
Again we seem to retreading old ground. Yes there are games that deal with it. None that deal with it to my best satisfaction. If there were what would be the point bin us discussing anything of a game design section.

And yes of course everyone is… what I am working on is a way to put "personality" in to those decisions.

If the system distills things to number then we are thinking in numbers but people in high stress situations like this aren't thinking like that.

The standout amoung others of that quote.
"ALMOST mathematically"
Plenty of work has been done to show how people in these positions make decisions and its not by making statistical analysis in the moment.

Regards the rational/irrational we've disappeared down that rabbit hole and we've now give it a label.

But we already have defined it… the player believes they are making a rational decision. I'm still talking about their "units" making their own rational decisions… which may be closer or further from their commanders ideas.

Again we sre trying to model the vast complexity, fog and friction of combat as 1 player on a table top so we are compromising and abstracting. The question then where when and how.

Like ushcha earlier thinking that "fast move" would make suicidal attacks. Something may seem to you irrational. Its success may decide who is right.

Of claims in self protection.. such and such a technique won't work "on the street"

The rational/irrational is that of the player and as the player operates all thr levels in the game that is transfered.

Taking your Lee example. Whether Lee made a rational decision is one thing and interesting in that he was making a decision based on the incomplete information he had. But in a game I ad the player am Lee. What is for me more interesting is why did Picket follow those orders based on what he thought was happening.

And even of he does follow the order does it get followed straight away and
Etc. And if he does what happens with the units under his command.
And to do that via one approach.. oh and so I don't feel like like I'm implementing a "system" outside what I'm am thinking about in my role.

Gamesman6:

Okay, so it is irrational to fight in a battle and rational to get the heck out of there.

Many years ago, I had the privilege to talk to a survivor of the Somme 1916. He was with the Yorkshire Yeomanry. He told me that there were less than 200 left of the 1000 in the battalion at the end of the first day. I asked why he walked into the machine guns. [It seeming to be the irrational thing to do.] He said he didn't want to disappoint his mates.

Plenty of work has been done to show how people in these positions make decisions and its not by making statistical analysis in the moment.

It depends on what you are trying to emulate. If the rules are meant to portray the behaviors of groups of non-player units, rational or irrational, the odds of those units doing X instead of Y, Z or #@! is the issue. How do you capture those behaviors has to be based on the historical behaviors… and that leads to statistics.

If we are talking about the decisions offered players, they are free to be as rational or irrational as they please based on what information they are provided or glean for themselves. If those decisions include non-player behaviors, how do you portray them without some sort of chance occurrences?

I am all for capturing the irrational in wargames, I am just not clear how you propose to do that on the miniatures table. When anyone makes a decision, they are 'calculating' the best choices based on 'something.' Those choices are often framed in terms of 'the chances' of the choice being successful.

So, what is your idea of 'irrational' behavior and how do you imagine providing players with choices that incorporate that?

The question of what delineates 'irrational behaviors' needs to be answered at this point.

I mentioned R.E. Lee and Pickett's Charge. He was depending on something no Gettysburg game or scenario provides: Past experience.

On the third day, he knew the following:

*Two months earlier he had forced a much larger and generally fresh Union army to retreat at Chancellorsville on May 3 by simply threatening to attack. Hooker said he "lost confidence in Hooker." Artillerist Alexander noted that "There were two men who knew the Southern army would win in the May 3rd assault. That was Hooker and Lee." This had been a pattern for the last year of the war in the East with Burnside, Pope and McClellan.

*Meade had taken command of the Army of The Potomac less than a week before the battle… after several other officers refused the honor. Lee knew Meade from West Point as a cautious and taciturn man. Chances are the new command would behave just as indecisively.

*The Confederates had destroyed three Union Corps, the I, III and XII after two days of fighting at Gettysburg. If the battle had ended there with a Union retreat, it would have been a bigger tactical victory than 2nd Manassas and Chancellorsville put together.

*The Union line had been strengthened on the flanks. On day two, one brigade of Confederates had briefly pierced the Union center.

*Lee knew he only had one punch left and could not remain facing the Union for very long. His supply trains were vulnerable which is one reason he hadn't taken Longstreet's suggestion to march around the right flank. The South desperately needed a major victory.

There were a number of things that went wrong with the assault in preparations and execution. Rationally, Lee had a lot of good reasons/previous experience for ordering Pickett's charge. Truth be told, Retreating was a real question asked the night of July 2nd.

But that line of thinking isn't provided in any game of the battle though it was a major one for Lee. Instead you read that he was sick, or couldn't carry out offensive actions [after the last year of offensive actions???] and than it was a stupid mistake….irrational.

Point being, we need to identify what is considered 'irrational' before it can be portrayed in a set of game mechanics.

Interesting info about Lee. Thanks.

Before anyone does their "Monday Morning Quarterbacking" about a commander making an irrational decision, first examine his rationale (there is almost always some) and what decision you'd make under the same circumstances, options, and intel. Yes, historically there were many stupid decisions made by commanders too, what was their rationale? It could be for personal honor and glory, forced to stick to a plan, poor intel, etc.

Understanding the rationale behind a decision that appears to have been irrational will help you in historically designing it into the game. Hiding key information from a player will allow him to make a wrong decision which in hindsight may appear to be irrational.

Someone who has never been in a position of command and responsibility in the middle of a battle with the Fog of War and calls a commander disrespectful names is a good example of hubris and I think most of us are guilty to a lesser or greater extent.

So, what is your idea of 'irrational' behavior and how do you imagine providing players with choices that incorporate that?

Personally, I find I don't have to build those things into the game because players will make enough stupid and irrational decisions on their own. The easiest way is to hide units the opponent cannot see, no rules are needed. I don't think players are going to like being forced to do something stupid or does not make sense unless it is something important in a historical scenario that actually happened.

Point being, we need to identify what is considered 'irrational' before it can be portrayed in a set of game mechanics.

LOL – good luck with that one! I'll pass.

If the system distills things to number then we are thinking in numbers but people in high stress situations like this aren't thinking like that.

OK, so what is a commander thinking in a high-stress situation? There are so many variables I don't think it can be absolutely defined. Even in the middle of a battle, a commander can gather his subordinates to discuss the situation and decide on the action to be taken.

Also, well-trained and experienced troops will normally fall back on the training in stressful situations. That's why you train over and over again so it becomes automatic to the point a unit may not need a command to react.

Being ambushed is a highly stressful event but units will train over and over on how to react so it becomes automatic without an order needing to be given.

Wolfhag

Personality is key IMO in how a unit acts or responds. It also plays a part in why units of similar training and experience react differently.

For me it is their training and experience level which can be somewhat variable depending on how well they are led. This mostly determines how well a unit will react and follow orders. The "personality" aspect is on the leader, not the entire unit.

I was reading how in Afghanistan, coalition troops and Taliban troops redacted differently to different weapon systems.

I wasn't there, but from accounts I've heard is that the Taliban will not stay long knowing air support could arrive any minute (like the VC and NVA). Afghan units perform better when led by Western units or attached to them. On their own, they were not very reliable except for some more highly trained ones. If you are losing the firefight you'll most likely sooner or later fall back or leave.

Wolfhag

We keep bouncing between players and NPC units. Players bring their own irrationality to the game, as Wolfhag says.
Generally, units behave in a limited number of ways, which Wolfhag mentions in Afghanistan.

If you are losing the firefight you'll most likely sooner or later fall back or leave.

This was a point made by Murray in his "Brains & Bullets" work on battlefield psychology. He noted for instance that in the Falkland War, the Argentines made the British pay when they attacked frontally, but left their positions without a fight once outflanked…consistently.

So, considering that a wargame provides ALL the information to a player in decision-making [apart from knowing the opponent] irrational play is ignoring provided information. Certainly, there are calculations involved, whether actions are 'safe' or 'long odds' with big payoffs.

The problem with battle is that there are times, like Lee at Gettysburg, where bad decisions are made for good reasons. That isn't being irrational, just bad luck, being misinformed or pressured to act against long odds.

All of those things can be simulated in wargames to some degree, depending on how much emphasis you want to put on it. Depending on the army, units may act 'irrationally' more often than another force. Circumstances, training and unit experience all play into that.

Reviewing what you've written Gamesman6, I see how you want to set up player decision-making. I am still not clear how that includes irrational actions, either by the players or non-player units/leaders.

OK so some interesting things here. "Players think of numbers" seems to be a consistbnt strand. I don't understand this. I cannot work out actual numbers to give me a result and I've been playing the same game for 15 Years! At best I can estimate what will typically happen if all goes to Plan (I wish).

In many cases the workload is high for us players so we miss interpret, the worst one is we foget, lose track or never know if we are facing an enemy that is weary, or fresh.
Thus I and my opponent never think in numbers. You think in units to allocate a task with some ides of there current state, you think in time, where they have to get to and roughly when thay will get there. What rough losses may you expect. At the same time you are considering what will happen if the unexpected happaens, what are the options in event of a failure for whatever reason (chance, bad intell to name a few). The guys in your head have a plan, I still act credibly irrationally, I go for short trem gains not the long game. Such actions are not programmable by cards they are far to complex for that so If that is what you want yo achieve you are doomed to failure. Somtimes the oplan errs on too much risk, it that irrational, no its a Risk reward system you make that a decision good or bad. However the risk reward system is ofent broke (weierdly some say it is more fun, to me it,s a game runiner) so its gives answeres that lack any form of credibility in the real world
.

So as I suspected at the start some of the problems you are trying to fix are problems with your basic rules, your solution is to add more rules, not fix the broke ones. Now my system is not sutitable for all so no good going into them. You need to understadn the flaws in your current system and yes there are flaws in my system, and clearly define issues.

As Wolfhag notes, the key is providing incorrect data or even just plain lies to players and they even at sub unit level will start to act "irrationally". It comeas at a cost. You cam't have stuff on the table the enemy can't see. And yes the English Civil war that ended in 1685 still has issues like that.

The key is can you define in a sufficently credible way what irrartional effects you want a sub unit to act that won't be perhaps even dafter than the tea break card? Will you players have enough sjkill to cope with the workload? Does your game go on for a sufficent number of bounds that a reasonable responce from a commander is possible to correct for an irrational act if it happens. Otherwise you are saying the game becomes dominated by the irrational act, in which case why bother playing if command counts for nought. Excessive random games suffer from this, I've played them (only once) tedious die rolling is not worth expending my life on.

Ushcha
For someone so focused on statistics you seem to be suffering a sampling bias as you consistently compare my genral observations to your small groups specific experience… with a set of rules you designed… while dismissing as a fault with my rules what I'm describing.
Despite multiple times where I've stayed my design goal is to create a set of rules that I've not encountered. I'm not saying they sre perfect but they arw scratching my itch.. like yours do for you.

Eveythjng you initially descibe is something I've encountered in 40 odd years gaming.. we encounter it in any game like chess. As I've said repeatedly i don't want that hence I'm looking at building something different. You may think it's impossible but you may be right but I'm going to keep trying and of course you may just be misinterpreting what I'm doing, as you have in other places.

Ushcha
So as I suspected at the start some of the problems you are trying to fix are problems with your basic rules, your solution is to add more rules, not fix the broke ones. Now my system is not sutitable for all so no good going into them. You need to understadn the flaws in your current system and yes there are flaws in my system, and clearly define issues.

G6
This is wonderfully arrogant presumption 😀

Ushcha
As Wolfhag notes, the key is providing incorrect data or even just plain lies to players and they even at sub unit level will start to act "irrationally". It comeas at a cost. You cam't have stuff on the table the enemy can't see. And yes the English Civil war that ended in 1685 still has issues like that.

G6
As noted several times ive dkne and continue to do manh things like this and others. These are not new problems.

Ushcha
The key is can you define in a sufficently credible way what irrartional effects you want a sub unit to act that won't be perhaps even dafter than the tea break card?

G6
OK ad I've said several times I'm not interested in irrational… as that is. Too often, a post hoc interpretation. The player as we've said people don't think they sre bekng irrational. The outcomes decides that.

And as I've said several times. It provides a set of actions based on personality training experience and orders.
That the player can then use to implement their plan.

Ushcha
Will you players have enough sjkill to cope with the workload?

G6
Another issue you seem to have😀
Well I'm not designing a game my players can't play.. also as my goal is to reduce work load it better have..😁

You end being locked again on to the irrational. A concept you've introduced.

Let's use bad decisions instead ofirrational.

Can they recover? Who knows… can anyone recover from a bad decision in any event or game? That's the skill or luck

Finally, I'm not adding excessive randomness that's your presumption and based on your intolerance of any external randomness. 🤔

Again my whole reason for designing my own set of rules and in a very different way is I've not found any that do what I want… which I'm assuming is why we're all here in a design forum. The reason I'm starting from the bottom up… is because I'm tired, despite what you claim, of fixing a problem in the rules… and want instead to make what I want. Which I recognise may not be what other people want… and is clearly not what you want. 🤔👍🏻

Can they recover? Who knows… can anyone recover from a bad decision in any event or game? That's the skill or luck

Now as a games designer you should have some grasp on this issue, your statement clearly shows some lack of understanding.

If the non steriotypical event occoures say in bound 2 could the player reasonabley be able to react to that before the end of the game. If there were not enough bounds for even the best general/player to counter the event then the game is then entirely dominated by thet event. In effect the game ceases to be anything to do with generalship but only to do with the none typical event occourance.

Whether you consider this a good or bad thing is your peroghative, but as a game designe you should understand the boundaries, otherwise you would have no idea on what the finnished product is. A design whose performance is not even vaguely understood by the designer is by definition a random event generator as you have no idea what it will do or what limits it has. You could generate a game that was an utter failure in 1 bound one. Not sure your players would see that as fun. As you claim to have no understandiung of the limits of the model as you see it then, by definition you cannot realisticaly say it can't happen as you don't understand your own model.

OK. You keep getting hung up on events. And seem to assume that my approach is about them of themselvesI'll put that down again to my explanations and not your thinking

An event is made by tbe decisions the player makes.

What I'm doing is working in an approach that reflects the decisions my sub units make.

Ushcha
Now as a games designer you should have some grasp on this issue, your statement clearly shows some lack of understanding.

G6
Once again wonderfully piece of arrogance.😉

We seem to keep re discussing things that aren't a part of what

Your assumptions
There are events of themselves? I thought we'd cleared that up. The events are made by players choices

A player can rectify bad choices… if its in their power to do so… how long will it take who knows. Will it happen. How big a problem. We'

I've played all kinds of games where one bad choice ended the game for me. The end may have been slow or fast.
I've had the same in real life, I've read the same in accounts of war and other things.

Should I assume that whoever designed the "crimea war" didn't give the light brigade chance to rectify the non stereotypical event?

That's of course assuming that a non stereotypical event is always a negative or can't be exploited.

Or that, say chess were i can loose in a few moves is poorly designed?

Now that's not to say a bad choice is impossible to recover from.. but as I initially said that depends on a totatality of factors…

G6 from the start the idea as I understood some sub units to were not going to follow the "typical" response either offensively or defensively, they were going to not behave as the player would respond, good or bad.

Unless bounded in some way it could result in a rapid decent into a simple die rolling exercise not a game of skill if the sub unit was of sufficient size that it's none typical response could not be corrected by the commander being able to correct the response.
Have changed your mind and now the player can be given an option of a non typical response as well as the normal typical response? He may well not chose the optional response, in which case the game may be completely unaffected. In that case also he would never chose a negative non-typical response.
In game design terms in some respects there is no good or bad. Good for one player is bad for the other so the game could be equally rendered as pointless if the response to any sub unit acting none typically if it is sufficiently large.

It may be useful to have a rough idea of the size of a sub-unit you expect could be subject to having a non typical response in terms of overall combat power, 5%, 10%, 20%? That would at least approximately bound the impact on the game. I appreciate to some extent this is a design issue and that is a choice to be made only by the game designer but it is a choice that has to be made. Not choosing a value may be considered as acceptable. but most certainly the game could then go out of the set of interesting games for many players.

Ushcha
G6 from the start the idea as I understood some sub units to were not going to follow the "typical" response either offensively or defensively, they were going to not behave as the player would respond, good or bad.

G6
No. Units have a set of "action" types currently I'm working with 6. How many will be available and what they are depends on training and experience as well as "personality". This also allows the player to try to alter what they recieve to better fit what they want the unit to do.
As such the player may or may not be able to have the unit do exactly what they want.

Ushcha
Unless bounded in some way it could result in a rapid decent into a simple die rolling exercise not a game of skill if the sub unit was of sufficient size that it's none typical response could not be corrected by the commander being able to correct the response.

G6
Well it's not about being about being non typical. It about having the unit not be an extention of the players will.
The skill will be in making a plan that allows for the units under your command and then using what emerges to still achive the outcome.

For me it's like playinb backgammon. The skill is in using the dice rolls you get to achive your goal while being in conflcit with the opponent.
Or poker where you are playing the hand you are dealt as well as the other players and the way you bet. In both games there is a lot of randomness and d uncertainty but the skill is in how one uses that to defeat thenopponent.

For me in too many rule sets the skill is is in setting tbe circumstance and conditions to achive your goal. But then it comes down to a dice (or whatever) roll or card draw.

I was listening to a talk about designing wargames for education from the former head of wargaming at the US naval college.
A players in one exercise where dice were used. They stated… this isn't a wargame its a dice game.

Ushcha
Have changed your mind and now the player can be given an option of a non typical response as well as the normal typical response?

G6
I've not changed my mind. As it seems you been assuming things about the system and therefore interpreting me changing my mind.
If nothing else this whole discussion highlights the difficulty in communication via written orders and how personality affects how information is recievd understood and passed on. 🤔😉

Ushcha
He may well not chose the optional response, in which case the game may be completely unaffected. In that case also he would never chose a negative non-typical response.

G6
No.. this is what I working against. In games the player can make mistakes. But we don't have situations where subunits do things differently to what the player wants. We have delays we have success or failure. But we don't have units doing what they "think" is best.
My goal will allow this at least to more of a degree than I have seen before
A design challenge has been to allow players to play but without having the degree of control commonly found in rules.

Ushcha
In game design terms in some respects there is no good or bad. Good for one player is bad for the other so the game could be equally rendered as pointless if the response to any sub unit acting none typically if it is sufficiently large.

G6
It's a bit difficult to respond to your points and questions when they are based on the misunderstanding of key points of my design concepts.

Ushcha
It may be useful to have a rough idea of the size of a sub-unit you expect could be subject to having a non typical response in terms of overall combat power, 5%, 10%, 20%?

G6
I'd mentioned before im working on tbe 1 up 2 down model
So the player will be controlling in game. Genrally two levels lower than their top role.
So if the player is the company commander in 20th/21st century setting. They will be fighting down to tbe level of the squads.

Ushcha
That would at least approximately bound the impact on the game. I appreciate to some extent this is a design issue and that is a choice to be made only by the game designer but it is a choice that has to be made.

Not choosing a value may be considered as acceptable. but most certainly the game could then go out of the set of interesting games for many players.

G6
Well I know my players… but also on 1 level I don't care if others outside that don't get it. But I believe they fulfill another design goal which is to make a system that need minimal learning of Rules.

An event is made by the decisions the player makes.

What I'm doing is working in an approach that reflects the decisions my sub units make.

G6:
So, your non-player sub-units are going to make decisions. Other than a rubric kind of process, using all the circumstances you've mentioned like training, terrain etc. what are you thinking? Cards? Lots of information can be placed on cards. How do you see players determining sub-unit decisions?

It does leave the question of what information about those sub-units does the player have or can have? What information do you see the players having to make decisions with?