"Validating your model" Topic

Its again interesting (I clearly have too much time on my hands) that the objective to Challenge the players can be different.

While you are correct that emergency situation management is valid approach. It may be an issue of how challenged the player is to start with whether additional events are considered worthwhile.

When (many moons ago now) I trained up for Scuber Diving it was all about emergency drills, if it all went well there was almost nothing to do but look at the scenery.
However in our group war games group challenge is an issue. In writing scenarios for some of our folk I am required to produce "no Paracetamol Headache" versions. The rules are simple but they can soon become taxing with lots of options like Chess. Simple rules complex game: were I to throw events extra to the workload, they would not implement them, as it would take the game out of the set of games from which enjoyment is derived.

To be honest when playing my co-author the scenarios get interesting and are by design on the limit of our abilities under the basics. We would not consider additional semi-unpredictable (even if soundly realistic) events useful or enjoyable. While with extreme effort we could deal with them, it would push us well out of the enjoyable range. If the impact was minimal why bother that would definitely be adding useless detail, for us.

If it's was a boring scenario that did not challenge us we would not start it, the thought that an unexpected event MIGHT/Would happen would not make the game less uninteresting for the majority of the game. I'm generally better at scenarios now but occasionally we do abandon scenarios that in of themselves are not worth playing too little challenge. Ot too reliant on an external event to make it a challenge (I found some WW2 scenarios books "plagued" as I would see it with this issue, they were abandoned as having no entertainment value and no valid learning value.

There is no right or wrong here but is an interesting difference in approach to setting war game design objectives at their very basic.

Regarding modeling of rare events:

You can't account for the multitude of things that can happen but you can build them into a scenario. I recall an event in Normandy when a British infantry unit fell back because they ran into a swarm of bees disturbed by mortar fire. Rare? Of course. You can create a scenario with a bee hive location and if it gets disturbed enough the bees swarm and attack anyone nearby.

Wolfhag:
You certainly can, but building in a single unique, unexpected event either has to be kept secret or any 'simulation' value is lost. Many moons ago, the same bee hive event occurred at Antietam during the ACW. This was added to a detailed board game. The players knew where the hives were, so were avoided. Keeping it a secret only made the one-off event have far more impact for the player than in the real battle.

How to treat it statistically if one wants to simulate the rate at which such accidents occur, where, when, how and why.

For me, it's not the rate but the conditions which bring about the event.

That is one thing you can discover when statistically looking at the rates AND locations. You can't do one in any real sense without the other. The freeway study is a good example, AFTER doing the rate of accidents, then it became clear most were occurring at specific spots on the freeway during specific times of day. i.e. the conditions. Freeway 'experts' guesses at the reasons for the accidents were proven wrong once the statistics were studied. That is the power of statistics. They are much better than impressions, guesses, and some anecdotes/examples.

If the conditions are right there can be many events. If the conditions are wrong there could be none. Vehicles moving over the Golden Gate bridge will not accidentally fall off.

Why not. What 'conditions' are in place and how do you know vehicles won't fall off? [Answer: the rate at which it doesn't happen]

A vehicle moving over a hastily built bridge by inexperienced engineers may fall off 50% of the time even with an experienced driver under ideal environmental conditions.

You just provided a statistical relationship for 'hastily built bridges.'

Statistical analysis allows you to study the when [time during the day or during an engagement, where [the physical conditions or links in command] how, [the types of responses and how often] and why [the combination of the rest along with any unexpected connections.]

Depending on the scale, some unexpected events, like the bees, are significant and at others, at best a general hick-up along with dozens of similar events that can be represented by a general 'odd event' mechanic.

A meteor did 'intervene' in a battle between Rome and Pontus. a meteor reportedly fell right on the battlefield. According to Plutarch, the sky suddenly split apart and a large silvery-hot meteor resembling a giant hogshead bombarded the ground between the armies. Both forces promptly withdrew to fight another day.

Odd events do happen 'once in a great while', others like the bee swarm intervention, twice, in 1862 and 1944. Such events can't be what you design a miniature rules set around--and as scenario specific one-off events, *shrug.*

In creating simulations, a designer has to rely on statistics to determine what happens in an environment, where and how often, as well as when and why. Otherwise all you have are a few anecdotes and specific rare events dominating the environment unrealistically.

Challenges change by person and circumstance.
Things like knowledge and experience will change it… so will becoming familiar with game set up.

I agree with Wolfhag. Conditions create events… not that im talking about events of themselves. I'm adding "personality" to the "units"

Going back to falling off bridge.. a "unit" with a personality is more likely to follow behaviour. Say caution or reckless. That combined with the conditions there is a chance of an event. Without the personality we'd have some way of determining the odds of the event happening. However that for me is less satisfying. In part because a commander would understand the personality of the subunit leaders and units.

Now I recognise that's not for everyone, bit it interests me.

I still think we are skewing things Macladdie.
I understand what you are saying but regardless we are just moving that point. Skewing to where combat actually happens… or skewing to where a certain thing happens, or not.
But going back to the point of conditions. The conditions need to be in place and again its got to be impactful to the scenario and/or the roles we are playing.

We still need to consider what are we doing with our game… is it a model or simulation to see how a whole action play out. Or one where we are testing the players by confronting with challenging circumstances, which while realistic and credible may happen in these circumstances, more often than they would in reality.

While both purposes, and of course there arw others, are valid the ways of achieving them may be similar but different and have, IMO, have to be considered in light of that

Macladdie
In creating simulations, a designer has to rely on statistics to determine what happens in an environment, where and how often, as well as when and why. Otherwise all you have are a few anecdotes and specific rare events dominating the environment unrealistically.

G6
Yes and no. This is along lines from way back in the thread. As we don't have live records of events in combat even now, then even our statistics are going to be anecdotal. Now while the plural of anecdote may be data we can't say its completly stable.

It also depends on the purpose we are trying to achieve. In a "training" sim or scenario. Labelling a disrupted attack, swam of bees may be OK. Expecting the unexpected can be OK. Being familiar with "unique" events can prepare us for other "unique" events. In a game it makes for a "fun" event, once.

But the question for the player commander is not so much whether the attack was stopped by bees but how did the unit respond to the event. At least that's what I would want to know or at least consider.
That's why I'm interested in the personality of units and sub commanders. Then one can provide or allow circumstances to develop and see how they respond.

Yes and no. This is along lines from way back in the thread. As we don't have live records of events in combat even now, then even our statistics are going to be anecdotal. Now while the plural of anecdote may be data we can't say its completly stable.

Gamesman6:
Uh, what do you determine as 'completely stable?' We do have live records of events, lots of them. For instance, the Napoleonic Wars. Folks just haven't utilized them. Many, many statistics are based on a lot of anecdotal data, particularly for simulations.

It also depends on the purpose we are trying to achieve. In a "training" sim or scenario. Labelling a disrupted attack, swam of bees may be OK. Expecting the unexpected can be OK. Being familiar with "unique" events can prepare us for other "unique" events. In a game it makes for a "fun" event, once.

Yes, it does.

But the question for the player commander is not so much whether the attack was stopped by bees but how did the unit respond to the event. At least that's what I would want to know or at least consider.

Fine. So, you take the behaviors of fifty or such 'surprise' events.
You will find that:
1. Most group behaviors are similar across those events.
2. Any unique behaviors will become obvious in the statistical data, not only what, but how often.
3. Isolating those unique behaviors can show particular or similar circumstances.

That's why I'm interested in the personality of units and sub commanders. Then one can provide or allow circumstances to develop and see how they respond.

Part of the issue is that any response is an event, is a one-off. The same unit won't necessarily act the same the next time. I remember reading in Earl Hess' Civil War Tactics about a regiment that fought well in its first engagement, then divided into divisions, half the regiment sent off on a mission, the other half their own operation.
One half had a successful fight of it, the other was nearly overwhelmed and routed. When the regiment was brought back together, the 'halves' responded very differently in the next engagement, half hesitating and breaking up the regiment's attack.

So, which 'personality' is going to be used in a rule set or particular scenario? Or do you make special rules for units that are split up and reformed after different 'results'? That could only be done in a campaign game.

The personalities of regiments and sub-commanders can be different, but 'how different' and 'how often expressed' from the norm can only be discovered by a statistical analysis.

In the example of the bees in the 1944 incident, how different was the men's behavior etc. from units running into other unexpected problems? Miniature rules are generalizations of a war or theatre. Scenarios are of particular battles or events. In the rules you are going to generalize behaviors, in the scenarios you can get more particular. Depending on the rules set, there might not be a need for 'special rules' for the units.

But the question for the player commander is not so much whether the attack was stopped by bees but how did the unit respond to the event.

That isn't 'The Question', just one of them, and often the answer to 'how did the unit respond?' is after the engagement, not during it.

At least that's what I would want to know or at least consider.

Fine, me too. In terms of a simulation/wargame set of rules, you are going to have to statistical determine those things and how to include them in the mechanics, OR you have 'special' rules for every unit. Guess which option often is used by game and scenario designers, with lots of special rules. You know, complexity.

Mac

Part of the issue is that any response is an event, is a one-off

G6
Indeed. Which is why. What I'm working gives a personality but that only permits a chance to alter a behaviour. An "Aggressive" unit is more likely to carry out aggressive actions. Meaning there's is a chance to change passive actions onto aggressive ones. But if that fails the actions stand. So its not perfectly predictable.

Mac
Fine. So, you take the behaviors of fifty or such 'surprise' events.
You will find that:
1. Most group behaviors are similar across those events.
2. Any unique behaviors will become obvious in the statistical data, not only what, but how often.
3. Isolating those unique behaviors can show particular or similar circumstances.

G6 not sure I've implied otherwise. I'm working to have units have a personality and sub commanders too. This clearly was a thing across eras. What I'm working on is as I've said I'm not aware of seeing in other rules. Because i don't want the game to feel like the expression of a statistical exercise.

Mac
The personalities of regiments and sub-commanders can be different, but 'how different' and 'how often expressed' from the norm can only be discovered by a statistical analysis.

G6
If one is seeking to make a statistical analysis yes. It seems that we have a relatively small sample to speak with real certainty. But as I've said before I want games where the players aren't just dealing statistics but those actions which stand out.
And again I'm interested in C3I friction and FoW. At the least the history war is finding ways to over come or improve these and deal with the conflicting drives of self interest and group responsibility.

For example on could starisi4cally work out thag Custet or Prince Rupert acted impetuous 75% of the time. At at any haven't activation kne would have to roll dice with 75% percentage change of doing such. Not only would thag nkt for me feel very immersive but we'd also then have to determine what that action might be.

Uh, try some other examples. You are dealing with one man in each case and the commander at that. I would think they would be played by the gamer. If they did act impetuously 75% of the time, I'd like to know why not the other 25%. Acting impetuously is the norm, and every so often they don't…

The percentages tell you what happens how often. NOT how to represent that with game mechanics. There are all sorts of ways to do that depending on the system designed and the goals for it.

OK were going in circles again.
I'm trying to explain then difference between one way and another. I personally don't want to use percentages.

They weren't always the over all commander and even so I think that it adds value to nit allow tne player to just play themselves in certaint situations and especially when representing known historical personalities. After all that's what immintersted in.

I get thag the percentage doesn't tell us how-to represent it, which I said. Another reason I don't like the statistical representation in the game

I have ways of doing it. That's I'm working on as it creates the action, tells tne.playet what the options are and is relatively easy to tjnker with fkr different situations.
I

You just provided a statistical relationship for 'hastily built bridges.

I don't think so because I made it up and did not compare it to any real-life occurrence which would be impossible because of so many variables.

I asked ChatGPT What are the chances of a Sherman tank collapsing a bridge that was built to hold 35 tons?

Answer: The chances of a Sherman tank collapsing a bridge that is built to hold 35 tons would depend on several factors, including the specific weight of the Sherman tank model, the condition of the bridge, and any additional loads or stresses present at the time of crossing.

A typical Sherman tank from World War II had a weight ranging from approximately 30 to 33 tons, depending on the variant. If the bridge is designed to hold 35 tons, it might be able to support the weight of a Sherman tank without collapsing, provided that the tank is within its weight limit and the bridge is in good condition.

However, it's crucial to consider other factors such as the distribution of weight on the bridge, the condition of the bridge's infrastructure, and any potential weaknesses or damages. Engineers and military personnel would have assessed these factors during wartime to determine the suitability of a bridge for crossing with heavy military vehicles.

Without specific details about the condition of the bridge and the Sherman tank variant, it's challenging to provide an exact probability. Generally speaking, if both the tank and the bridge are in good condition, the risk of collapse would be lower.

I have a SNAFU Chart that has historical results like gun jams, misfires, loaded the wrong ammo, recoil system overheats, gunner passing out from fumes, etc. There is no way I can statistically or historically quantify the chances of these happening because dead men tell no tales so I made my own chart and chances.

So each time a player shoots the target player rolls a D20 and on a 1 rolls for the SNAFU. That's a 5% chance each time a shot is taken. There is a 1% chance of a catastrophic result putting the gun out of action which translates into a 1 in 2000 chance (1% of 5%).

Since my game is Time Competitive and seconds count, most of the results increase the amount of time the gunner will shoot which generally means losing the initiative to shoot next. There is no way of validating it other than does it give the right feel and does not overpower the game. About 25% of the games there is no SNAFU, 40% there are 1, 30% there are 2 and 5% there are 3.

Environmental conditions, mechanical reliability, crew training, and other factors could increase the SNAFU Chances.

What I like and what works in the game is the target player has a hand in his fate and not sitting idle which of course is not realistic or historic because the target cannot do much to influence the result other than move. He rolls at the same time the shooter rolls to see if he hits or misses so no extra time is taken. There is additional suspense created each time a shot is taken. Can I historically validate it? No, who cares?

Players can make up their own chart if they like. It also assures me that not every shooting order is going to go as planned, which I think does have some historical validity.

Wolfhag

I don't think so because I made it up and did not compare it to any real-life occurrence which would be impossible because of so many variables.

Wolfhag:
Of course you made it up. And everything is made of of 'so many variables.' That's why statistics are powerful. With enough data points, you can find out which are never seen and which are significant.

have a SNAFU Chart that has historical results like gun jams, misfires, loaded the wrong ammo, recoil system overheats, gunner passing out from fumes, etc. There is no way I can statistically or historically quantify the chances of these happening because dead men tell no tales so I made my own chart and chances.

Uh, the statistics you used for your game do that. That is why statistics work. You can quantify the chances with enough data points [@50] regardless of dead men. Enough of them have told tales. Perfect? No, but a lot closer to reality than guessing. I have been told repeatedly that I couldn't find enough information from the Napoleonic wars. It just ain't true.

So each time a player shoots the target player rolls a D20 and on a 1 rolls for the SNAFU. That's a 5% chance each time a shot is taken. There is a 1% chance of a catastrophic result putting the gun out of action which translates into a 1 in 2000 chance (1% of 5%).

And you have some reason to believe that those ratios/percentages relate to the real world/history? Or is it just a WAG.

What I like and what works in the game is the target player has a hand in his fate and not sitting idle which of course is not realistic or historic because the target cannot do much to influence the result other than move.

Me too. I like it when a player has 'a hand in his fate.'

t also assures me that not every shooting order is going to go as planned, which I think does have some historical validity.

Some? And you know this how? Have you tested it out? I agree that every shooting order shouldn't go has planned because I have read such incidents. You would want to know how often and why in the real world to simulate it.

Considering the U.S. Military does this kind of statistical analysis, I am not sure why you are sure it can't be done.

OK were going in circles again.
I'm trying to explain then difference between one way and another. I personally don't want to use percentages.

Gamesman6:

I am not sure how you can avoid them. Simulations are environmental decision-makers: What are the chances that…? How do you avoid them? I'm listening.

They weren't always the over all commander and even so I think that it adds value to nit allow tne player to just play themselves in certaint situations and especially when representing known historical personalities. After all that's what immintersted in.

Yes! That is what a dynamic simulation does. Drops the player into an environment in a particular position and they play themselves. Having rules to 'make' players act like or benefit/suffer from the historical personalities' traits doesn't work if reality is the simulation goal.

I get thag the percentage doesn't tell us how-to represent it, which I said. Another reason I don't like the statistical representation in the game.

? Why should it tell you how to illustrate it? There are a variety of systems and mechanics to represent such 'chances' I would think creatively, such freedom of expression would be a good thing.

I have ways of doing it. That's I'm working on as it creates the action, tells tne.playet what the options are and is relatively easy to tjnker with fkr different situations.

Okay, I'm listening.

Again I have to disagree about statistical chances regarding a commander acting impetiously.

If it means in a sudden way, without considering the results of your actions I think this would be a very poor commander.

The historical examples of impetitious behavior like Pickets Charge and other frontal assaults without a superior advantage aren't always impulsive decisions but decisions made from desperation, poor intel, misreading terrain, etc.

There can be instances where commanders, driven by overconfidence, impatience, or miscalculation, make wrong decisions that have significant consequences on the outcomes of battles. This could happen more often in games if you don't have 100% correct intel on enemy forces, strengths and locations.

Impetuous actions in warfare were often associated with misjudgments of the enemy's capabilities, underestimating the terrain, and disregarding sound military principles.

The behavior could also be a commander ignoring the current orders to attack to exploit a gap or tactical advantage created in the enemy lines or like the Roman commander in the battle of Cynoscephalae. As this pursuit was ongoing, an unnamed tribune (upon realizing their position at the exposed rear of the Macedonian right wing) detached 20 maniples (approximately 2,500 infantry combined) and sent them into the rear of the Macedonian phalanx.

Sometimes your only choice is a desperate one like Lee at Gettysburg and the constant unsuccessful frontal assaults by both sides in Ukraine that may continue for months at a time, creating a stalemate.

There are no flanks to envelop, neither side has air power, and maneuvers are limited by terrain, minefields, drones, and defensive artillery fire. Sometimes you are desperate and don't have a choice and sometimes, against all odds, it is successful.

Personally, I'd leave it to the players to make their own right or wrong decisions unless you are attempting to design a scenario that generates a specific outcome in a battle.

Wolfhag

And you have some reason to believe that those ratios/percentages relate to the real world/history? Or is it just a WAG?

As I said: There is no way I (or anyone?) can statistically or historically quantify the chances of these SNAFUs happening because dead men tell no tales so I made my own chart and chances. Feel free to make your own.

Some? And you know this how? Have you tested it out? I agree that every shooting order shouldn't go has planned because I have read such incidents. You would want to know how often and why in the real world to simulate it.

I know it from many of the reports, training accidents, and personal AARs. There is nothing to test out as there is no way to statistically identify the occurrences. Like I said, "Dead men tell no tales" so it is impossible to gather enough valid info to make something other than an educated guess.

Compiling information only from surviving crews is inadequate as not all of these occurrences would be reported or tracked. All I can verify is that they did historically occur.

As a game designer, I or the players have the liberty of creating one that matches what they feel would be the right way to portray the experience we are attempting to create as the chances of each SNAFU are somewhat subjective. My guess is that misfires and jams make up the biggest chances. This concept has worked pretty well over the years with few complaints – unless the SNAFU happens to you.

Overall, we play highly abstracted war games with mechanics like IGYG, unit activations, command points, balanced scenarios, and random initiative determination that have almost nothing to do with military science or real tactics.

Attempting to validate or recreate real historical battle action is almost impossible mainly because real action is simultaneous and you don't have a god's eye view of the enemy's disposition. Attempting to recreate realistic opportunity fire and historical rates of fire is almost impossible too.

You can design for cause or design for effect. There is no right or wrong way to do it and no game will please everyone.

You can design a game that has enough restrictions to almost guarantee a historic outcome. I've done two of them. The outcome is determined at the start but the players get to "experience" the battle as it historically occurred. However, it has no replay value or cannot be used for other battles.

If the game mechanics and outcome give you the right "feel" and expected or enjoyable outcome you'll most likely play the game again. The realism of the visuals of the units and terrain generates the experience more than the rules. Also, the vast majority of players have no real military command or combat experience to compare the game to.

My idea of game design is to create conditions where the player gets to decide what he wants to do and is free to make the right or wrong decision for any number of reasons.

Making a decision based on the sequence he'll activate his units is a strategy based on the game mechanics more than real military science but is a strategy to master nonetheless for the sake of the game. There is nothing to validate or quantify other than the entertainment value.

Wolfhag

Macladdie
I am not sure how you can avoid them. Simulations are environmental decision-makers: What are the chances that…? How do you avoid them? I'm listening.

G6
By not talking about then or checking against then. Yes I known that whatever I am doing will be reflected in a chance of it happening but I'm not interested in that.

Mac
Yes! That is what a dynamic simulation does. Drops the player into an environment in a particular position and they play themselves. Having rules to 'make' players act like or benefit/suffer from the historical personalities' traits doesn't work if reality is the simulation goal.

G6
The "reality" player person historical events.
If I am fighting historical battle then I don't want to just be me…otherwise why would "i" have gotten to be in that time and place.. forcing the situation and then saying now you are but you aren't person " y" isn't real either.

Mac
Why should it tell you how to illustrate it? There are a variety of systems and mechanics to represent such 'chances' I would think creatively, such freedom of expression would be a good thing

G6
I already said I don't like them hence I'm trying my own thing out. And again I'm not talking about chances. Im giving the player a set of choices that are constrained by the "personality" of the unit of sub commander.

Wolfhag
Personally, I'd leave it to the players to make their own right or wrong decisions unless you are attempting to design a scenario that generates a specific outcome in a battle.

G6
Sometimes I do. And other times not. Like playing poker it's about using the cards I'm dealt. Or in this case actions.

I'm in general agreement with most of what you say and the disagreements are minor.

G6
I think we're both on the same page. If I were to play a specific historical scenario I'd include the characteristics that the leaders had too.

In my infantry version, leaders will have historical characteristics that enable them to perform certain actions better or worse but not necessarily force them into actions.

Wolfhag

I've been interested in the infantry version you talked about when I first saw your tank rules.

I'm going to backtrack somewhat regarding what McLaddie and the OP have been talking about regarding statistical analysis of an action and validating it because they do have a valid point.

There is actually a large amount of pretty accurate historical data available to model some actions. Take for example a 1:1 tank engagement. The factors, that can be measured in seconds, that come into play to get that all-important first shot off are situational awareness, reaction time, overwatch (not a specific order but the direction the gun is pointing when reacting), turret traverse speed, suppression (an unbuttoned tank is about 40% more effective than one buttoned up) and environmental factors that degrade situational awareness and reactions. The final one would be crew expertise with good crews quicker and poor crews slower. With all other factors being equal, better crews are quicker and will seize the initiative.

Also, for the first shot after the gun is on target, the gunner estimates the range and adjusts the elevation before shooting which can be accurately measured from the US M60 tank manual:

Battlesight (somewhat like a Snap Shot) is slightly less accurate and has a range limitation of about one second of the flight but is quicker. This is a Risk-Reward Decision the crew made in the middle of combat and the player can do the same.

WWII training for Sherman crews:

Combat veterans can do it in 10 seconds which may include the commander using a turret control override to get the gun on target and using a vane sight on the turret top to aim and fire without the gunner being involved. However, this was only effective if the gun elevation was set to engage a target in a specific range bracket, probably only out to 500m with a fair expectation of a hit. The gunner then takes over for the rest of the engagement. No other tank in WWII had this feature, which made the Sherman the quickest on the draw to shoot first.

This is based on the training standards for Abrams crews with grading based on how quick the crew is:

The weapons platform performance of vehicles and guns like turret traverse speed, pivot rate, and rates of fire (reload time with good crews a little quicker and poor crews take longer) is pretty well known and documented. Three-man turrets are much more effective than one or two-man turrets. The British conducted extensive post-war testing of reload time for Panther and Tiger tanks. You can observe rates of fire and turret traverse speed from combat footage too.

So if you were going to design a game or computer simulation there is much reliable historical data to use even if all sources do not exactly match up as they never do. Tanks concealed for an ambush are probably going to get off 1-2 shots before being detected.

As a game designer, there are several directions you can take that can be validated to a high degree historically.

You could add the reaction time + turret traverse time (zero if overwatching where the enemy appears) + estimate the range and aim time modified by crew type to determine how long it will take for two tanks to shoot at each other with the quicker one shooting first and the slower one shooting next if he is still alive. No additional rules are needed.

Rather than adding them up, establish a baseline for each vehicle and roll a die that would vary the amount of time in + or – seconds modified by crew type. By keeping the time values secret, you've established a FOW because you are unsure who will shoot next.

Realistically, after the shooting, the commander would be observing the results to issue his next order and the loader would be loading and a die roll would determine how long it takes to reload modified by the crew type. So basically you've created the OODA Loop which is how real action takes place without the traditional game rules and mechanics.

Creating a realistic FOW does not necessarily mean having no idea who will shoot next because historically, there was some prediction based on experience and knowledge of enemy weapons IF you were able to observe them.

I just returned from Ukraine visiting some friends of mine who have been fighting in the front-line trenches for up to 18 months and as drone operators.

One guy, a US Marine vet, related a story where he got out of his trench to stand up and take a leak. Several seconds later a tank fired at him from about 1.5km away and missed as he felt the 125mm round go by him. However, from observing Russian tanks with his drone he knew the reload time was 7-8 seconds which gave him enough time to finish without interrupting his stream and jump back into the trench without pissing on himself before the tank could fire again. It's obvious the tank was overwatching the location which allowed it to fire so quickly. The same thing had happened to a new guy who panicked and immediately jumped back into the trench pissing all over himself.

So McLaddie is right regarding historically and statistically validating an action IF the data is available.

However, traditional game rules and mechanics are not historic so the best you can hope to validate is the outcome which in some cases can give a somewhat historic feel based on how good your knowledge and imagination are with the visuals playing a large part.

Wolfhag

G6
I've been interested in the infantry version you talked about when I first saw your tank rules.

I'm pretty busy getting the tank rules ready for WarGameVault right now. The overall design for the infantry rules is done and I've played them at a few conventions but I could use some help from someone else looking at them and getting them finished, no prior military experience is needed.

I spent a few years in a Marine Rifle Platoon in the early 1970s so I have a good idea of what I want to recreate.

The game uses the same Time Competitive system with infantry hand-held weapons using the same firing routine as tank guns.

email me at treadheadgames@ g----.com and we can get started.

Wolfhag

I spent a few years in a Marine Rifle Platoon in the early 1970s so I have a good idea of what I want to recreate.

Wolfhag:
If I remember right, you spent some time on their tactical training team also. [Forgot the name…]

It confuses the heck out of me how you can put up those charts and manual instructions, Do all that research along with all the statistics the Army generated from WWII and later wars you based your tank rules and infantry version around and then can say this:

There is no way I (or anyone?) can statistically or historically quantify the chances of these SNAFUs happening because dead men tell no tales so I made my own chart and chances. Feel free to make your own.

Dead men didn't tell a lot of tales regarding the Army data that generated those statistics you used, yet they felt it meaningful, a better approximation than a WAG or a few antidotes. Statistics you felt were meaningful.

"The weapons platform performance of vehicles and guns like turret traverse speed, pivot rate, and rates of fire (reload time with good crews a little quicker and poor crews take longer) is pretty well known and documented.

What does that mean? That chart is still statistics.

All simulations are built around partial, if not poor information, whether Galaxy formation simulators, political polls, production line simulators or tank survivability.

How many SNAFU tales are there? Enough to generate a data base? Even with lots and lots of dead men unable to provide theirs I bet you can find fifty or even 100. This very situation, limited information is why statistical analysis is so valuable, beyond testing folks' guesses.

I am working on combat 200+ years in the past--far more limited 'tales' than you have, by sheer quantity, if not quality. Still, I am finding enough data points to generate meaningful statistics. [I can explain that] I am not sure you understand how statistics are able to deal with such issues. You made your own chart. Based on what? Or is it your WAG? How are you going to test it to see that it has any relation to reality?

We all look at things through our.particualr filter.

Theb4bof us now have fallen in to 2 Broadly (statiscslly 🤔😉😳) the 4 die hards on this thread are divided on how we view statistics.

Then I think all agree that statistic can be useful. BUT which and when are useful.

The traverse rate of a tank turret is fixed. Research has shown that vehicles and crew served weapons suffer less degradation under stress.

Other things we are going to be less sure on… and even of we can glean enough data to make analysis. We're likely to be finding outcomes rather than causes.

Without disappearing down a "problems with statistics" rabbit hoke. They obviously can be skewed by the data entered and how it's interpreted, as can anything, but with the "authority" that its statistically based.
I'm reminded of the perhaps apocryphal story about the analysis of wwii planes being up armoured based on the damage sustained on returning planes. Whether true it highlights issues.
So don we make a system that is more intuitive in design and use… and refine it by being able to running it and iterative changes.
Or do we do something else?

I'd say we do what we want to do.. 😉

We all look at things through our.particualr filter.

Yes, which uses subjective judgment to arrive at a conclusion and why there is a multitude of game systems out there. It also allows game publishing companies to use their "filter" to publish a new set of rules every few years which are normally just a variation on a specific theme or mechanic. Since it is subjective there is no right or wrong way to do it, it all depends on your filter so do whatever you want.

The traverse rate of a tank turret is fixed.

Not for all vehicles. The Sherman had a high and low-speed traverse. The Panther A and G models and the Tigers had a variable traverse system based on engine RPM and a high and low gear the gunner could use. To get max traverse speed the driver had to rev the engine which led to engine damage which is why the Germans derated the engine to be used at a lower RPM. If a player wants to use the max traverse speed there is a chance he'll blow the engine.

IIRC the Panther D (first model) had a fixed traverse of 6 degrees per second. That means if you flanked a D model it would take up to 15 seconds to get his gun on target and a few more seconds for the gunner to line up the shot. A Sherman could probably get 3-4 shots off before the Panther fired once. A computer simulation, a Time Competitive board, or a miniature game can duplicate that in a playable manner.

The T-34 had an electrical traverse that kept moving for a few seconds after you wanted it to stop.

Wolfhag

Then I think all agree that statistic can be useful. BUT which and when are useful.

Gamesman6:
Yes, of course. However, wargames and simulations are closed systems creating decision-making environments that model real environments. You certainly can make simulations without any statistics. I described more than one to UshCha at one time.
However, creating a wargame on a game table or board game
recreating combat, it becomes impossible to not use probabilities and statistics to capture that environment with any validity. Like making a plastic model without the plastic.

The traverse rate of a tank turret is fixed. Research has shown that vehicles and crew served weapons suffer less degradation under stress.

Human beings have 'rates', particularly in groups, particularly under stress, particularly when trained to those 'rates.' Any Research into weapons stress uses the same types of data under the same 'human interpretation' for the statistics used to come to that stress conclusion.

Other things we are going to be less sure on… and even of we can glean enough data to make analysis.

Not really. No less 'sure on' than anything else.

We're likely to be finding outcomes rather than causes.

You don't understand how to use statistics to find causes, apparently

Without disappearing down a "problems with statistics" rabbit hoke.

Please don't. The problems are poorly done statistics, poor methods, human error, and a strong desire to use them incorrectly. And of course, we want to avoid those problems. Statistics is a tool, just as a simulation is a tool, or a wargame for that matter. Each can be used inappropriately.

Statistics can:
1. Find norms for behavior as well as machines.
2. Separate out differences between the norm and outliers,
creating probability curves for events and behaviors.
3. Separating out those differences can identify circumstance differences and well as causes for those events and behaviors.
4. Statistics can mitigate the last of exact information or the lack of it. It is one of its main uses.
5, Statistics can be used to validate the accuracy of wargames and simulations.

I have already shown how that works, but would be glad to do it again. Statistical analysis can be used to find out whatever you want to know and provide approximates that are closer to reality than guessing or impressions.

Yes, which uses subjective judgment to arrive at a conclusion and why there is a multitude of game systems out there. It also allows game publishing companies to use their "filter" to publish a new set of rules every few years which are normally just a variation on a specific theme or mechanic. Since it is subjective there is no right or wrong way to do it, it all depends on your filter so do whatever you want.

Wolfhag:
Yes, they do. However, if they used objective information, statistical analyses and design methods the game publishers could still produce a multitude of game systems. There were be as many options that were neither wrong or right interpretations of reality, but they would be far more valid interpretations, demonstrably so, and still see a legion of styles and presentations. Sort of all the artists who create ACW and WWII paintings. Lots of different styles while remaining historically accurate.

I am sure others could use all your research as the sole basis for a set of tank rules, which would be just as valid with a different system.

Can somebody explain why a normal wargame where one player is the commander and so massively involved in the fates of his troops, as opposed to needing rare events to make him "Feel he has his hand in fate" this is a genuine question I really can't see the diffrence, is it perhaps an issue related to multi player games? I admit my enthusiasm on multi-player games is generally low. To be fair I have played very few multi-player gamea and perhaps is also bounded buy my outlook on what makes a good wargsme, in terms of rules, players and scenarios. Our time marching element by element sequence does keep player more engaged in one player aside games.

Wolfhag
Not for all vehicles

😉 OK… I should have been clearer. The traverse is established in mechanical terms and as a machine itself can't not be affected by psychological stress like a human can. As such any deviations from that mechanical value, baring mechcical failure, is due to the operator/s 😉

Macladdie
Thanks for responses but as I said before we continue to go in circles.
I no longer want or have the time to do the kind of statiscal analysis that would be needed to make a game that functions. Regardless its not the experience I'm trying to create.
Even if we can make a functioning model. Humans don't operate with statistics, unless they are statisticians. We work with heuristics, intuitions etc.

As you say its bad statistics… but that's an out come. Like saying many things that produce bad out comes are applied badly
"You do not examine legislation in the light of the benefits it will convey if properly administered but in the light of the wrongs it would do and the harms it would cause if improperly administered."

"More data means more information, but it also means more false information." n Taleb

But again even if properly applied I don't see it producing a game I want and if it did, it would be because I didn't "see" the statistics 'Ars est celare artem'

Of course there is some analysis underlying my approach.

But as I've said many times now I creating something based on the experience and responses to and with variable actions (even if in limited range of likely outcomes.)

We all make the rules we want… as a hobby, and play them likewise. I'm explaining why I don't want to something, however much someone else says its good

Ushcha
Not sure of your question?
We seem to have gone down a dead end talking about events… which I don't think we really were. We'll your op was I supposed.
In real battle we have FoW and friction etc etc.
Aren't we all talking about how to replicate that when we have 1 vs 1 table top game where by default we have too much information and too much control.

But again we're all looking to play the game that focuses on what we like, which is subjective

"We have too much information and too much control" I WISH!
you get on a board, you put little on and he may have none. you have no insight into the mind of your opponent, and any scenario worth playing will have options for both sides. I'll be honest that and some friction in the command system and that is as much as I would want. Planning in my head the options for me and my opponent is already daunting, but that is to me at least what it's about the uncertainty. Back in the English Civil War they were hiding units. to me you seem more to be applying plasters to a poor rule concept instead of starting with a better rule concept.

Personal experiences may vary as do rule sets… 😉😳

if you don't feel that is your experience that's great.. but that's not mine. Hence I'm coming up with my own ideas.

Again i should have said… we have too much of those things, in comparison to RL.

What you describe is uncertainty which is not too mucb different from most competitive games.

"Some" Friction and FoW… isn't that what defines war? At least according to some obscure theorists on war.

Planning options for me and them, may be daunting, but it's in chess or poker or… war and for me any game I want to play based in it needs more than that.. war and getting people individually and in groups to perform under stress is about their "personality". Recognising the good the bad the neutral and using them appropriately or if you have to dealing with them in the less than perfect circumstances

Again if that's not intersting to you. Fine. What I've gleaned about your rules seems like they would be equally unappealing to me… but so? They are your rules not mine.

You keep accusing me of applying plasters to a poor rule concept.
I'll put that down to poor explanation on my behalf rather than myopia on yours.

I find your point hard to grasp given I've not seen a solution to these issues like this. And no how something that I've not seen (it may be out there but) to a real problem in war/conflcit… is a poor rule concept? 🤔
Now I'll accept it may not be for you… but that's irrelevant… im not making it for me and those that I play with.

Wolfhag:
If I remember right, you spent some time on their tactical training team also. [Forgot the name…]

Sort of. For 6 months I was part of the Agressor/Bad Guys unit at the Basic School at Quantico. Every new 2nd LT spent 6 months at the school learning infantry tactics and how to be a Rifle Platoon Leader. Almost every day we'd be out in the woods of Virginia playing silly tactical war games at the squad level harassing, chasing, and ambushing each other. We had some VN vets with us and we took turns as squad leader, even PFCs got a chance. We "taught" them many lessons and it was great training and experience for me.

Wolfhag

This is an interesting thread not in the least beacuse I seem to be struggling with the concept you are attempting to model. From our last posts it's not simply Fog Of War based on soley on the pausity of the data available, or friction i.e. The fact that the basic order system is prone to some amount of delay. It seems more about trying to influence in some way I have yet to grasp, my issue not yours, how the player reacts/interacts to that data.

Is this closer to what your design goal is? Some sort of "personality" influence on the interpretation, possibly by skewing the data you are supplying so the decisions of the player are on the Artificially manipulated data, skewing his decision space to make the player adopt a set of decisions in line with a particular "personality" which would be different to those he would have made on the unskewed decision space?

As an example, misrepresenting data, I.e even though only limited troop deployments have been spotted the data on them is misrepresented, lower numbers than real may make the player overly aggressive given the few enemy reported, or over reporting so as to make the player more hesitant than he in reality needs be.

Not sure this can even be done, but real progress cannot be achieved untill the current art of the possible is challenged by an inquiring mind open to different options.

Yes and no. FoW is a default. C3I is a way to create more clarity on the battlefield field. How efficient/speedy and clear will depend on period and how a partticilar force aproacjes the problems.
This is difficult of course to model on the table top whether in a co-op or competitive game.
The game issue I have encountered is mechanics to create a feeling of that are;
Unsatisfactory
Overly complex to apply
intrude on the immersion in the experience.

The other issue is that with limited players filling multiple roles there is different likelihood of the kind of independence of action or misunderstanding, and "personality" we see in real life, not just in combat. And again when we do have systems to replicate this I have the same issues

Finally I want something where the player, while not all powerful, and limited compared to other approaches, still needs to give the player, something to "play" Rather than just feeling like they are just applying systems and they have little agency. I'm aware this sounds a little like I want my cake and to eat it too.

As an example, misrepresenting data, I.e even though only limited troop deployments have been spotted the data on them is misrepresented, lower numbers than real may make the player overly aggressive given the few enemy reported, or over reporting so as to make the player more hesitant than he in reality needs be.

Misinterpretation of information is another thing I've worked on. Faulty intellignece. That's a different piece of the puzzle. I've not really solved this though ive ideas that go some way. My personality action idea goes some way as while the players sees the overall pictures they are limited. Also becuae the unit or sub commanders personality it likely to influence their response. And "Aggressive" one may under report things or press on regardless and "cautious" one may do the opposite.

Again its finding solutions that tick as many boxes as possible. And also not just bolting mechanics on to a "conventional" set of rules. Parsimony of technique and making things intergrated and "intuitive"

Uscha
Not sure this can even be done, but real progress cannot be achieved untill the current art of the possible is challenged by an inquiring mind open to different options.

Indeed.. its a challenge but one I like trying to solve.

I no longer want or have the time to do the kind of statiscal analysis that would be needed to make a game that functions. Regardless its not the experience I'm trying to create.

Gamesman6:
I can understand that. It often isn't as time consuming a
one thinks.

As you say its bad statistics… but that's an out come. Like saying many things that produce bad out comes are applied badly
"You do not examine legislation in the light of the benefits it will convey if properly administered but in the light of the wrongs it would do and the harms it would cause if improperly administered."

"More data means more information, but it also means more false information."

Statistical methods need to be used correctly, the information needs to be good [garbage in, garbage out] and of course, the results have to be applied correctly, in context.

Any tool can be created wrong or used badly, that doesn't negate the positive benefits of using it correctly. There are certainly lots of bad examples in the world, but there are also a lot of correctly created and used statistics that are extremely useful.

But again even if properly applied I don't see it producing a game I want and if it did, it would be because I didn't "see" the statistics 'Ars est celare artem'.

I have been attempting to show how statistics can help you faithfully represent the real world/history, particularly when you can't avoid the use of probabilities in table top wargames.

I am not really clear on the systems or game mechanics you see accomplishing what you what to portray, or how you establish its validity. [in keeping with the thread topic]

Yes and no. FoW is a default. C3I is a way to create more clarity on the battlefield field. How efficient/speedy and clear will depend on period and how a partticilar force aproacjes the problems.
This is difficult of course to model on the table top whether in a co-op or competitive game.
The game issue I have encountered is mechanics to create a feeling of that are;
Unsatisfactory
Overly complex to apply
intrude on the immersion in the experience.

So, depending on the period, can you articulate specifically the 'feeling' you are looking for? How a game could provide that, without specific mechanics for now?

it was great training and experience for me.

Wolfhag:

If it was, then the games couldn't have been that 'silly.'

I wanted to comment on something you wrote in another thread, but it got lost, and I thought it was more appropriate here:

Science vs Art

The military, the sciences, etc. don't say that: It is the Military Science AND Art. The art is the application of the science.

The two go hand-in-hand, and if one effort is devoid of the other, it is handicapped.

For instance, theoretical physicists as well and chemical researchers and heart surgeons all speak of their art, even though dealing with very precise science.

A oil painter deals with perspective and the chemical composition of the paints. Often, artists are expression scientific concepts. The expressionists would never have appeared if not for the invention of cobalt and cadmium colors. The technical advances in paint preservation saved artists from having to mix new paint every time they wanted to paint. Ceramics involves an incredible amount of science regarding chemicals and heat.

An art that avoids all science and the resultant technology is handicapped, as is science without art.

Macladdie
I am not really clear on the systems or game mechanics you see accomplishing what you what to portray, or how you establish its validity. [in keeping with the thread topic]

G6
With 300 odd post are we even in the same country as the OP? 🤔😉

Again I've said I recognise that statistics use properly and with good data.
But I am more interested in something more qualative rather quantative approach.
I validate it by the experience it creates and by it being in line with the experiences it creates.,

Macladdie
So, depending on the period, can you articulate specifically the 'feeling' you are looking for? How a game could provide that, without specific mechanics for now?

G6
The experience/feeling i want to create is what makes combat what it is. Friction FoW. Uncertain information on what is actually happening. Uncertainty of my own units and the enemies actual actions and specifc abilities. Uncertainty about immediate outcomes. Uncertainty about communication and interpretation of orders and information.

And to do it avoiding those things I mentioned.

G6,
YOU are in the same country as the OP. I'm an ocean away <grin>. UshCha has a unique way of approaching the game. Remember, this is TMP which can stand for "The Mineisbetterthanyours Page."

I'm on the same page as you regarding your efforts. However, my approach to friction and FOW are different.

Modeling HQ and commands in a 1:1 vehicle, squad level Company level game is easy. Each platoon is given an objective to seize, move to a location, or is held in reserve. Here is a list: link

If the Company is involved in a meeting engagement there may not be enough time to get support from Battalion, just the Company Weapons Platoon. In a hasty attack, they should get Battalion support and maybe from Regiment. In a planned attack, they should get support from the Battalion and Regiment and maybe the Division. This would be outlined in the scenario. Upper-level support is normally a function of planning and time, but exceptions exist.

Platoons should be attempting to accomplish their objective without being ordered every turn (talk about micro-management). As the Platoon Radioman, it was normally just sending reports to the CO. If you run into a problem or get stalled, the CO may issue a new order like pull back, new objective, hold order, or send reserves or artillery for support.

It seems like you are attempting to portray friction abstractly, my approach is different.

Communication: Poor communication can generate a delay in taking action and misinterpreting it.

Changing environmental conditions can affect movement, situational awareness, and weapons performance.

Urban and close terrain degrades movement and situational awareness. I have friends that were in the Ukraine battle for Bakhmut and they said when you are in a building you seldom know who is in the building next to you. In close terrain, enemy units can be mistaken for friendlies and surprise attacks.

Loss of leaders and poor decisions under stress.

Ammo and equipment failures which are more common in poor conditions

Fighting insurgents who appear to be civilians

Misinterpretation of orders can occur in various ways due to factors such as communication challenges, unclear directives, or personal biases. Here are some potential scenarios I've run across where a platoon commander in a rifle company might misinterpret orders from his company commander:

Lack of Clarity in Communication:
If the company commander's orders are not clearly communicated, the platoon commander may misinterpret the intent or specific tasks assigned.

Ambiguous language or vague instructions can lead to confusion and different interpretations among subordinates.

Assumptions and Preconceived Notions:
If the platoon commander has preconceived notions or assumptions about the company commander's preferences, he may interpret orders based on those biases rather than the actual intent of the orders.

Incomplete Information:
In situations where the company commander provides partial information or leaves out key details, the platoon commander might fill in the gaps with his own assumptions, leading to a misinterpretation of the overall mission or objective.

Time Pressure:
If the company commander conveys orders under time constraints, the platoon commander may not have sufficient time to fully grasp the details, potentially resulting in misunderstandings or overlooking important aspects of the orders.

Stressful Environments:
High-stress situations, such as combat or emergency scenarios, can impair decision-making and lead to misinterpretations of orders due to the intense and rapidly changing nature of the environment.

Communication Breakdowns:
Technical issues, distance, or interference in communication systems can result in incomplete or distorted messages, making it challenging for the platoon commander to accurately receive and understand orders.

Personal Biases or Agenda:
The platoon commander may have personal biases or alternative agendas that influence how he interprets orders, leading to actions that align more with his personal beliefs rather than the company commander's intent.

Limited Experience:
Inexperienced platoon commanders may struggle to interpret complex or nuanced orders, especially if they lack the necessary background or exposure to similar situations.

Cultural or Language Differences:
If there are cultural or language differences between the company commander and the platoon commander, it may result in misinterpretations, as subtle nuances in language or context may be lost in translation.

Changing Situational Factors:
Evolving circumstances on the battlefield can alter the context in which orders are given. If the platoon commander fails to adapt his understanding of the orders to the changing situation, it can lead to misinterpretations.

Effective communication, thorough briefings, and regular feedback mechanisms can help mitigate the risk of misinterpretation and ensure that orders are understood and executed as intended.

What I'm most interested in is enemy action and suppression. A squad being fired at automatically degrades their movement, situational awareness, firepower, and communication. When you're not under fire everything normally goes according to order.

Friction: A unit under fire/suppression will take longer to react to new threats, have their firepower reduced, pass an Aggressiveness Check to move, and the leader's command distance is decreased.

I think friction from attempting to move under fire or assault is the most difficult task for squads. I use an "Aggressiveness Check" to move under fire. If they fail their check their leader can add his modifier to get them to pass. However, doing this exposes the leader to a causality check so you may lose him. When they fail an Aggressiveness Check their Aggressiveness drops one level so it becomes harder and harder to advance under heavy fire. There are way to increase the Aggressiveness Level too.

FOW is created with each unit timing to execute their order which is kept secret so no one knows who will execute next. As soon as an order is executed the player determines his next order and how long it will take. Tanks and Assault Guns are blind in their rear 180-degree arc. Anti-tank gun crew actions take twice as long under fire.

Since my system uses timing, friction increases the amount of time it takes to execute an order. I try to use "design for cause" not "design for effect".

Wolfhag

McLaddie,
If it was, then the games couldn't have been that 'silly.'

It was an attempt at humor. I try not to take myself too seriously. And yes, we did often refer to it as playing "silly games" but we did take the maneuvers and training seriously and professionally.

It was the only time in the Marines where I was told to treat officers as the "enemy" to make the training more realistic. At night we'd find their location and talk smack to them, hollar "INCOMING" and throw rocks as "grenades", disparage their manhood, and tell them we were screwing their girlfriends. Great fun and we got paid! However, we did have live fire exercises which had a few mishaps.

My favorite line was, "Hey LT, come on out here and I'll cut your balls off and shove them down your throat."

Wolfhag

It seems to me much of that list does not present too much of a stretch to model. If the player is the company commander then he will often only have a hazy plan, I'v been playing for years and still often have that problem. Again getting resources is senario based, either allocated or the procedure to get them. This could be coloured in the scenario by say limiting it to targets above a certain size, or some restriction on the number of missions available.

The issue I see that is tough and I have even a clue how to even start to suggest a starting point to even attempt a solution; is in representing the miss interpretation of useable information. If the player is hazy in his plan by definition his responce when acting a the platoon commander will be equally hazy QED. But getting the wrong end of the stick now that's hard to represent.

Howeve miss interpreting the data at sub unit level looks to be difficult. That looks to be too nuanced to be reduced to what is inevitably in all but name a tick list in a wargame. How do you represent an inexperienced sub unit commander in plausible terms. Troops can easily be made to slow there reaction speed down due to fear,fire,fatigue and training, we do and most other sytems can to a greater or lesser extent do this. However those limitation do not reasonably represent making the wrong decisions, sighting the SAW in the wrong position, rushing an attack, yup beem there done thst.

However that is the point of this section, attempting the impossible. The reasonable man sticks within the possible The unreasonable man does not. Therfore all progress is driven by the unreasonable man.

It seems we appear to be all in agreement that the desired levelof "mechanical" FOW given some compromise can be achieved. Different ways and levels but a relatively achievable goal.
Even civilians getting mixed up could be possible with some alternate models and like the real thing, some rules of engagement. They may be a challenge to write but I think that is not an insurmountable obstacle. Enforcing them is difficult and depends on co-operation. We had a great time trying to resolve a scenario written by my Co author on recovering some dowed artifacts without starting world war three. Facinating and engaging with the right folk. Many in our group however would definitely not see it as fun, but that is not the point at issue. many of my scenarios are not suitable for general consumption.

The experience/feeling i want to create is what makes combat what it is. Friction FoW. Uncertain information on what is actually happening. Uncertainty of my own units and the enemies actual actions and specifc abilities. Uncertainty about immediate outcomes. Uncertainty about communication and interpretation of orders and information.

Gamesman6:

Well, there have been any number of efforts to recreate that friction and FOW on the table top. Lots of different mechanics and systems. I think the most radical effort was Bob Jones' Piquet. According to him, he used cards and dice to create a system where who would do what when was very, if not entirely random. His idea was if the 19th century commander couldn't see his troops, he had no idea where they were or what they were doing. I enjoyed the challenge, but found the system far too chaotic and the players far too helpless before it to be similar to reality.

I played a terrific ACW game on a large table with a number of large woods. All units were left off the table until seen according to the LOS rules. What happened was that skirmishers came into their own. Lines of skirmishers tried to punch ahead to see what was what behind the enemy's lines of skirmishers. The number of surprises, both intentional and unintentional seemed to recreate the battlefield atmosphere without a lot of mechanics.
What kept us from repeating it much was 1. few of our figures were on the table and any one time--lack of spectacle, and 2. The experience was like 'normal' table top games.

Wolfhag has provided a terrific list of the FOW/Friction makers in a battle situation.

**Poor communication can generate a delay in taking action and misinterpreting it.
**Urban and close terrain degrades movement and situational awareness.
**Ammo and equipment failures.
**Misinterpretation of orders
**Assumptions and Preconceived Notions.
**Incomplete Information.
**Stressful Environments.
**Technical Communication Breakdowns.
**Personal Biases or Agenda.
**Limited Experience.
**Cultural or Language Differences
**Changing Situational Factors: Evolving circumstances on the battlefield.

Most all of these situations have been modeled in past game systems individually. Attempts at simulating all of them on the table top have been more abstract mechanics, too often so abstract they just seem 'gamey.' Wolfhag says Since my system uses timing, friction increases the amount of time it takes to execute an order. I try to use "design for cause" not "design for effect".

Gamesman6. That would seem to be your interest in representing causes. So, which aspects do you want to target either as causes or a resultant 'feeling?'

Of course, there is a limit to how many of those individual causes can be represented without overwhelming complexity. Some, like communication could be 'grouped' into a single mechanic.

One important point lost on Bob Jones was that armies worked hard to mitigate all the above FOW/Friction events. No army was totally successful, but well-trained, experienced troops were far less subject to them than inexperienced and/or poorly trained units.

Lots of choices and options for representation on the table top. The one thing I try to avoid is the mixing of local/battlefield issues with those of campaign/days of movement. Different circumstances and FOW/Friction for at least 19th century warfare.

Wolfhag
YOU are in the same country as the OP. I'm an ocean away <grin>. UshCha has a unique way of approaching the game. Remember, this is TMP which can stand for "The Mineisbetterthanyours Page."

G6
😄😉 I've found that spacial closeness is not related to closeness of ideas. 😄
However this discussion has been intersecting watching how the 4 of us left standing have moved around. Ushcha and I seem to be "closer" now than we have been all along. 😉 t

I agree with your points and list. The issue is in RL overcoming or neutralisinb those things. In a game its about deciding who to replicate them without the the considitions in place as they would be in RL.

That's where I belive my issues with statistics in most comes from. It may suggest what can happen and what the outcome maybe but a TT game can't replicate it.

I agree with setting up a plan, orders ina appropriate situation. SOPs etc as well.

So IMO its about deciding on what part of the problems we focus on and then create a frame work to deal with it.

I was drawn to your OODA inspired approach because it was very much along the lines I'd been thinking and inspired by

I'd also agree with what you say your interested in. Though I think we are all dealing with some abstraction because its a TT game. I like the idea of Aggressiveness test to over come adverse effects.. but that's an abstraction IMO becuse were assigning it as a value to it and using it with a numeric dice role. For me the dice role is a choke point a "middle man". As its a out side step but it seems to result in the moment to allow the player to either do something with the unit or not, if jve understood things correctly?

My objective is to solve that problem, without looking for a number value to pass/fail binary. And give the player a set of options, as that unit in that situation.

Ushcha
Howeve miss interpreting the data at sub unit level looks to be difficult.

Yes I think batting ideas and identifying principles and obstacles is what this section is for.

Ive found it hard to integrate a better way of replicating this misunderstanding of information on the TT.
The better ones ive had woild seem to need to be an isolated exercise/game rather than part of a conventional TT game.
My current feeling with my personality/action system is that its focusing on how the sub unit responds to the conditions.

I remember Piquet… ive been around for a while. 😉

Yes i remember thinking that it sounded interesting, initially but then on more reading and thinking. After the initial planning phase you committed, good or bad.
Again its the issue. A neat mechcical solution to one problem that rather breaks the game.

Yes ita a great list… but as with so many things… knowing what the problems are is only part of the problem. What conditions cause them and how do we resolve them. We should have a system that addresses them as collectively as possible.

We can say a unit will act in certain number of ways to a certain situation, filtered though its "personality"

So yes military training and doctrine is about minimising these things, we said as much on at least one occasion so far.

But rather than have a way to address or create each one I am looking to build these in to the systemor as many of them as I can. As Wolfhag said these things affect the units ability to act freely as do other aspects.

McLaddie,
Science vs Art

You could have asked for clarification. It means they are competing for parts of the overall design and go hand in hand but only one will dominate. It's not one or the other exclusively as you said.

The scientific (or pseudo-scientific for our purposes) part would include historical research and tactics and the sources I mention below at the end. Also any formulas, calculators, and info on historical causality rates and weapons platform/gun performance. Depending on the unit and scale, their performance can be measured in seconds, minutes, hours, or days.

The art part would be how the overall action is parsed in a turn using mostly abstract mechanics that are not historical. Things like IGYG variations, unit activations, random initiative determination, cards to determine actions, etc. It can be difficult to implement historical and scientific actions using abstract game mechanics. The miniatures and terrain could be considered part of art and historical/science. Art would also include the rules, layout, QRC, play aids, box/cover art, and graphics too. Since the abstract design is somewhat "free form" the designer has the agency to inject whatever he feels is important, problems for the players to overcome, unknowns and other issues he may want to include to simulate the battle and make it interesting. The end product just needs to have the right feel and be playable. It's hard to validate it against historical actions or the "scientific" aspects.

I think the art of the design is putting the different abstractions all together to make sense and be playable but no design will please a majority of the people. There is no standard way to design a game that allows publishing companies a reason to come up with new or updated versions that are mainly a variation or add some new rules or mechanics. Ideally, the finished product is playable and generates a believable session.

Example: For a painting of an apple some people would prefer a 3D realistic painting while some people would prefer various shades of red paint splattered over the canvas like a Leroy Nieman painting. They are both art.

I think the main design issue is that if you establish at the start that a game turn will be X number of minutes, hours, or days ideally the actions and order execution will be parsed based on the time values within the turn. So if a turn is less than an hour the action would be parsed in seconds. If hours are parsed in minutes, etc. A 1:1 Company-level engagement might be in seconds. Battalion and Regiment in hours and Division and up in days, etc.

Some units, weapons, and crews could historically perform more than one action in one turn. In a one-minute turn, some guns historically could fire up to a dozen times. Movement would need to be timed and synchronized with the timing of actions.

Also on the scientific end are extensive military studies published that define suppression, causality generation-based firepower and defense, direct fire accuracy formulas, and compound armor calculators that I've used.

I'm surprised no one has used the US Army Umpire Manual to get some historical realism.
US Army Umpire Manual: PDF link

and PDF link

Here are some of the "scientific" and historical sources I've used to get historical data and performance used to validate the final design:

Armor Magazine: link

Army Research Lab, Intro to the Sources of Delivery Error for Direct-Fire Ballistic Projectiles: PDF link

US Army Umpire Manual: PDF link

WWII Ballistics and Armor by Bird & Livingston (Scribd): link

Armour Magazine January-February 2001, Tank Error Budget, and Screening Policy: PDF link

Online Tank Museum: link

T-34 Mythical Weapon:
link

Sherman the American Medium Tank: link

Germany's Panther Tank: The Quest for Combat Supremacy: link

German Tigerfibel (training manual): paijmans.net/Tanks/Tigerfibel

WWII Enemy Vehicle Ordnance: PDF link

Murphy's Law of Armor (SNAFU's): link

FM 17-12 Tank Gunnery: PDF link

German 88mm antiaircraft gun: PDF link

Tank Archives (Mostly German & Soviet sources): tankarchives.ca

CIA Freedom of Information site (search Soviet sources for WWII and Cold War): link

Control Warfare: inside the OODA Loop – The War College Series: PDF link

Wolfhag

You could have asked for clarification. It means they are competing for parts of the overall design and go hand in hand but only one will dominate. It's not one or the other exclusively as you said.

Wolfhag:

I could have, but regardless of which 'dominates', they aren't at odds or versus one another. The parts of science and art aren't competing for parts of the overall design, but should complement each other, regardless. If they are competing, then you do have a problem.

I'm surprised no one has used the US Army Umpire Manual to get some historical realism.

It's not surprising at all if after all that research, the conclusion is that the design results are all subjective in the end.

Yes it's a a great list… but as with so many things… knowing what the problems are is only part of the problem. What conditions cause them and how do we resolve them. We should have a system that addresses them as collectively as possible.

Gamesman6:
Of course, but the list is a place to start. As Wolfhag listed them, the causes and conditions were indicated.

They could be addressed collectively/grouped into Communication, Equipment problems, Terrain, Training [or the lack of it], Doctrine, Human bias and Culture.

The overall issue is creating game processes that produce the desired experiences for the players.

Macladdie
Indeed.
I suppose the question is
Do we need procedures or mechica to deal with all these variables.

Or do we have a generali system thag allows a unit in then game a course of action that interacts with different conditions.
Do we need to spend times determining the statistic probability of driving off a bridge and a mechcic to arbitrate thag. If we have a situation where u have a vehicle
Crossing a bridge.
Or
Do we have a system where when a unit moves it moves at a standard pace and fast pace.
Any challenging mlmanuever. Crossing a Jerry rigged bridge, ditch tight bend etc is safe is done at standard movement is ok. Fast pace there's a problem.

Now as the player commander I'm watching the action thinking don't drive too fast when the tank crosses the bridge, not think don't roll (insert the probability of falling off the bridge)

I'm also allergic now to rolling numeric dice.. whether playing or reading about a game where it comes down to good or bad dice.rolling of 1s or 6s or whatever.

As i mentioned before regardless I'm guided by
Ars est Celare artem, the art is in concealing the art or science…. or statistics…. 😀🙃

I could have, but regardless of which 'dominates', they aren't at odds or versus one another. The parts of science and art aren't competing for parts of the overall design, but should complement each other, regardless. If they are competing, then you do have a problem.

They do compete because you can't have a game with 100% "science" or historical details. The "art" of the design is how you make changes and abstractions to balance.

The "problem" for me is balancing.

I got many of my ideas from "WWII Ballistics and Armor." The challenge was how to design the game with realistic ballistics and fire control tactics, ricochet chance, armor variations (weak spots, gaps, shot trap, cast and brittle armor, compound angles, etc), damage, variables of AP, HEAT, and APCR penetration.

My original design was faithful to the tank and gunnery manual but failed because the nomenclature and terminology were foreign to players unless they had been tank crewmen. I had to redesign the entire game to implement the details, making them mostly transparent to the new players but still validating the results as historical. That was the art of the design.

Some game designs are mostly art striving to deliver a playable game using abstractions that cannot be validated against historic actions real crews take.

the conclusion is that the design results are all subjective in the end.

Yes, and there's nothing wrong with that. It makes the game easy to enter without historical knowledge and besides, it's the visuals that generate the realism which can be validated as historical to a very high degree.

The overall issue is creating game processes that produce the desired experiences for the players.

Absolutely. Some players want to validate it against historical accuracy and some players don't care or do not have the historical knowledge to make a comparison. I've noticed that many players prefer specific types of game mechanics over others neither which are historical.

Wolfhag

I was interested in the comment that visuals create The realism, in that it conflicts with G6's comment that his ACW game lacked becuase so few figures on table. We (MG) strive for an empty battlefield, failing of course, as the overhead to control needs to be balanced with realism. However we fortunately are really not miniature enthusiasts, so the number of figures does not directly influence our enjoyment. Again it's probably our period but we consider based on reading that tank battles have some element of chaos in its appearance, some sections perhaps making progress
faster than others, but again the player can sacrifice speed for order.
From our own experience the IGOUG system as we implment it does can reflect reality quite well. you can get a group to brest a hill together in implimentation and get a plausible responce. On that basis I would suggest it is possible to get some credibility from the systemnso should not be rejected outright, While in no way reflecting Wolfhag very low system responce it does allow some uncertainty of who responds to what and when adding some much needed umcertainty.

They do compete because you can't have a game with 100% "science" or historical details. The "art" of the design is how you make changes and abstractions to balance.

Wolfhag:

That isn't competing. You can't have 100% science. So, how is that lack a competition with art? From the way you describe it, art takes up the slack. Again, it is a combination, not one against the other.

My original design was faithful to the tank and gunnery manual but failed because the nomenclature and terminology were foreign to players unless they had been tank crewmen. I had to redesign the entire game to implement the details, making them mostly transparent to the new players but still validating the results as historical. That was the art of the design.

Agreed. But that doesn't make it 'subjective.' I think you have the idea that art is all subjective and science is all objective. They never are.

Some game designs are mostly art striving to deliver a playable game using abstractions that cannot be validated against historic actions real crews take.

Fine, there is no reason to claim they are valid historical recreations. If the purpose of the wargame was to portray 'actions real crews take', then it fails if it can't be validated. It can still be entertaining.

the conclusion is that the design results are all subjective in the end.

Yes, and there's nothing wrong with that.

Really? You research and state that it's inclusion will add 'realism', but it still has no objective elements, no possible way to validate the game? You can't 'validate' a subjective experience. IF the claim is that the game represents the real world in some way, the accuracy of that comparison CAN BE validated.

To say it just 'feels' real is subjective and could be based on anything where players can 'feel' anything. You can't design for that without specific methods applied in objective ways. If you want players to all have particular subjective experiences playing, that takes serious design work.

It makes the game easy to enter without historical knowledge and besides, it's the visuals that generate the realism which can be validated as historical to a very high degree.

"It" being what? Subjective experience? The Visuals in and of themselves don't generate 'the realism' of the game processes to any degree. I can set up a very 'real' looking game table. If the rules are crap, the 'subjective' experience of play will be both unrealistic and probably crap too.

The overall issue is creating game processes that produce the desired experiences for the players.

Absolutely. Some players want to validate it against historical accuracy and some players don't care or do not have the historical knowledge to make a comparison. I've noticed that many players prefer specific types of game mechanics over others neither which are historical.

So what? The question is what you are designing. Are you throwing together favorite game mechanics 'cause they are fun? Done all the time. Or are you attempting to produce a game experience that models the real thing regardless of 'what players know'?

Let's talk about how to create a subjective experience in wargame play, where the designer targets particular experiences to mirror the real world experience.

Do we need procedures or mechicals to deal with all these variables.

Gamesman6:
If you can create a game that has no procedures or mechanics, go for it.

Or do we have a generali system thag allows a unit in then game a course of action that interacts with different conditions.

The system is a set of procedures and interactions have to have options and conditions. That leads to mechanicals of some sort, rules of play.

Do we need to spend times determining the statistic probability of driving off a bridge and a mechcic to arbitrate thag. If we have a situation where u have a vehicle Crossing a bridge.
Or
Do we have a system where when a unit moves it moves at a standard pace and fast pace. Any challenging mlmanuever. Crossing a Jerry rigged bridge, ditch tight bend etc is safe is done at standard movement is ok. Fast pace there's a problem.

Which ever you want. I can't see how you could avoid procedures and mechanics, rules for such game play.

Now as the player commander I'm watching the action thinking don't drive too fast when the tank crosses the bridge, not think don't roll (insert the probability of falling off the bridge)

Right. The player doesn't control the chance [probability] that the tank will fall off. It is a procedure with a chance outcome. To match reality, the chance would have to match up with the actual chances of that occurring.

I'm also allergic now to rolling numeric dice.. whether playing or reading about a game where it comes down to good or bad dice rolling of 1s or 6s or whatever.

Games don't require dice rolling. There are all sorts of methods from cards to chits grabbed out of a bag. Back in the 80's, I played The Complete Brigadier. It had no dice or random events. The only 'random' event was provided by player actions.

As i mentioned before regardless I'm guided by
Ars est Celare artem, the art is in concealing the art or science…. or statistics.

That concealment is for the gamers in playing the design. Unfortunately, as designers, we see the game system's guts spread out before us before we can achieve Ars est Celare artem.

At the moment we are mucking around in the guts. That is where the designing happens.