"June 25 and 26, 1876, Captain Frederick Benteen guilty?" Topic

Hello everyone,

After having reconnoitred the terrain,the Captain Frederick Benteen received an order from the Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer ordering him to join him as quickly as possible with ammunition in preparation for the attack he was preparing to carry out against a large Native American encampment.

The Captain Frederick Benteen would have refused to carrying out this order would constitute one of the most controversial points of the battle, which ended with the complete destruction of the five cavalry companies component the Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer's two battalions.

The intervention of the Captain Frederick Benteen was, however, decisive in preventing the Major Marcus Reno's battalion from being wiped out…

Yours aye

Paskal

May I see the charges and specifications?

And may I know exactly what the officers of Reno's and Benteen's commands knew or surmised, minute by minute?

I'm not sure the order could have been carried out. An order to walk on water may be a lawful order, but no one gets court-martialed for failure to obey. Good reason to believe that by the time the pack train caught up with Reno/Benteen, the fight on Custer Hill was over. Some reason to suspect the officers on Reno Hill knew this from the view at Weir Point. I suspect Benteen might have gone on without the pack train, and reached Custer before it was all over. That might have added another three companies to the body count--plus maybe the pack train or Reno later.

But I'd need unbiased observers at the scene with synchronized watches, and a recording of the conversations between the surviving officers.

Where I think Benteen may have failed was earlier in the day, when he may have gotten further from Custer than had been the intention. But Custer's orders were verbal and vague to a subordinate he knew didn't like him. So Custer has to take some of the blame there.

'some' is doing a lot of work in that last sentence, Robert ;)

True, advocate. I'd go as far as "most," but not "all."

The thing is, I'm inclined to see the Bighorn as part of the Custer package, if you will. Armies need aggressive cavalry commanders who will disregard some of the pessimistic intelligence reporting, move fast, strike hard and make decisions quickly without spending a lot of time building a consensus. That's how Custer worked. That's how Tarleton worked. But if that's the sort of commander you are, there's probably a Cowpens or a Little Bighorn in your future.

No fair the superiors who promoted and placed such men taking credit for their successes and then blaming the officers themselves when things go wrong. That single catastrophic fail was always in the cards.

And the blame shouldn't all go on Custer regardless. Reno could have sent more useful reports from the valley, retreated in better order and not gotten drunk afterward. Benteen could have said "Colonel, I'm not sure I understand. Can you explain your orders a little?" And when he found Reno, his first question should have been "where's Custer?" Maybe his first order should have been to send a few men to look. Contrary to the old cliche, defeat usually has quite a number of fathers.

Custer was simply following tactical doctrine that had been successful in the past. His big mistake was not reconnoitering the size of the village first. That may, or may not, have changed the course of events. Ego certainly also played a part. Robert has great points about aggressive cavalry commanders. Blaming the subordinate commanders is a moot point in my opinion regardless of faults. Mistakes were certainly made.

"That's how Custer worked. That's how Tarleton worked."

And specifcally advocated by L. Nolan, Captain, 15th Hussars.
"With the cavalry officer almost everything depends on the clearness of his coup-d'oeil, and the felicity with which he seizes the happy moment of action, and, when once action is determined upon, the rapidity with which his intentions are carried into effect. There is little time for thought, none for hesitation; and, once the movement is commenced, its successful accomplishment is the only thought allowed to pass through the mind of the commander…"
(Preface, Cavalry- its history and Tactics)

Not a lot to argue with there.

Let's not forget, that even though Martini got to Benteen, that does not mean that Benteen could make it to Custer. I am by no means a Benteen supporter, but by not following his orders, he saved his command and Reno's. I think the Indians could have gone back and wiped them out too. Why they didn't can only be answered by the Indians.

Really, cavcrazy? Boston Custer was with the pack train, which lagged far behind Benteen. He was able to reach Custer with no problem. We can be almost certain that Boston having ridden throught Benteen gave Custer every reason to believe that Benteen would arrive quite soon. But Benteen dithered and did not do so. He spent too long at the watering hole and doomed Custer's battalion by his slow response.

His actions later at Reno Hill were heroic and he saved the rest of the command. So there was no chance he would suffer the consequences of his not following his orders in the trial later. I also do agree that Custer has his share of blame too. But bottom line is both commanders failed in their orders that day. Custer's battalion paid that price for all the command failures.

Thanks

John

You are absolutely right John, I had forgotten about Boston Custer. That being said, Boston didn't have to wait for the packs, he left immediately and on his own. Benteen chose to wait for the packs. And we know he didn't rush. By the time Boston had gotten there the path was clearly open…but we all know Benteen didn't follow that path.

Yes, but Boston by himself would have been moving faster than the pack train--which is why I wrote that I thought Benteen might have gotten through if he'd not taken time to sort out the situation on Reno Hill and let the pack train catch up. I can't shake this image of eight companies dead with Custer and all the military historians, wise after the event, saying "Benteen was ordered to bring up the pack train and didn't do it." Or, most of Benteen's and some of Custer's command survive, but the Indians finish off Reno and overrun the pack train. Then the historians get to say "Why didn't Benteen bring up the packs as ordered and take a few minutes to sort out the situation on Reno Hill?"

My understanding is that Custer was somewhere around what's now known as Weir Point when he could first see the entire village, and sent orders to the Pack Train, to Benteen and presumably to Reno, the last never getting through. I think that's the last time the 7th had a good chance of getting out in one piece. Custer could have rallied all the elements back, around Reno Hill or Weir Point, accepted the failure of the mission and started preparing his defense for the almost inevitable court martial. It was his decision to go for the win--to find a way to attack the village and rally forward--which put him in a position only "Custer's luck" could have gotten all the 7th out of. Too many moving parts, and too few of them things Custer could influence.

But the sort of people who would accept a minor defeat rather than risking it all for a win don't get command of cavalry brigades two years out of West Point.

Would this be the Captain Nolan who carried the orders that led to the Charge of the Light Brigade?

I spotted that too, Alan, but it fit so well with my argument about aggressive cavalry and the inevitable disaster…

Yes, Captain Louis Nolan, 15th Hussars, ADC to Lord Raglan, 25th October 1854.

I agree with John L (we have shared thoughts on LBH a few times).
One thing I will note. At Washita, Custer did not send out a party to find out what happened to Major Eliott. He and hi sgroup of about 18 (IIRC) were all killed.
Benteen was besties with Eliott. He never forgave Custer for that.
Then he went and did pretty much the same thing to Custer at LBH.
Interesting what if. I suspect Yates of Keough would have tried harder to get through.

What I don't understand is why Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer did not order Captain Frederick William Benteen to attack the Indian camps from the West as Major Marcus Albert Reno was ordered to do from the south and as Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer tried to do from the east.

Now since Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer did not imagine the size of the opposing force, he could have ordered this…

Because as in the Battle of the Washita River, a single cavalry regiment can do nothing against an Indian camp of such size…

When Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer realized his mistake, why didn't he attempt a general withdrawal of its 5 companies to the South or better, to the East and then return to join Major Marcus Albert Reno ?

One thing to keep in mind.
Throughout most of the Indian wars, be they Scioux or Apache, the cavalry was more concerned with catching them than with defeating them.
If you look at it from that context, that Custer was just trying to find them and keep them from running away, most of his decisions make a lot more sense.

Yes it may also depend on the orders received or their appreciation by the troop commanders?