"Union transport vs Union invasions??" Topic

Looking for some input. I have a copy of "The Civil War" by Victory Games and think its considered one of the more accurate ones. I have used this as source material in addition to reading articles, watching historical docs, etc.
What I am curious about and am interested in input on is what I suggested in the title. By all accounts the Union was able to transport huge amounts of men by summer 1862, but amphibious invasions remained relatively small throughout the war.
I wonder if this was because of "physical limitations" like ongoing logistics, etc OR because of more abstract reasons like military strat, political reasons, etc. Gaming wise whats to keep the Union player from dumping an entire Army of say 3-5 corps on the coast of Alabama and driving north…..assuming they can spare them??
Curious on thoughts and input, don't know if this one has been talked about before or not??

Thanks

I think they'd need a river line for transport inland, to sustain any large invasion, and the Rebs seem to have been alert to that threat to an extent. Some of the rivers had an ironclad on them. Are you familiar with Dick Dowling at Sabine Pass? It didn't take much in the way of a battery to make coming up a river very difficult.

link

It's one thing to land an army – though really you need a decent port for that, most of which were defended to some extent. It's another to keep it supplied, especially by sea. As Doc says, a river would probably be the minimum needed to supply it into the interior.

"…whats to keep the Union player from dumping an entire Army of say 3-5 corps on the coast of Alabama and driving north…?"

Well, immediately, the southern rail network. Possibly also memories of Saratoga and Yorktown? That sort of thing is a very large bet that the other fellow isn't cleverer and doesn't have greater resources than you think. I still think the US was in greatest danger of losing the ACW during the Seven Days.

The logistics to support a large army OVER BEACHES
are formidable.

Raids or port captures are one thing, lodgements and
breakout/exploitation quite another.

robert, yes, interior lines are a huge advantage

One example from the Peninsula –

link

Thanks for all the input. Been taking a closer look at the naval interaction part of my game now that I have the land part ironed out pretty good. The challenge I wanted to represent is from what I historically have seen. That even though the unions ability to transport troops increased dramatically during the war its ability or willingness to launch an amphibious landing remained relatively small and do so in game terms.
From what I have found New Orleans is the best and largest example of an amphibious operation to attack and capture southern land from the sea and in terms of troops it was relatively small compared to the armies.
I assumed this was for a number of reasons as many have mentioned from physical limitations to willingness to take risk that many probably felt not necessary. The opinions have reaffirmed I know what I think I know, if that makes sense:) Happy gaming all!!!

Amateurs study tactics – professionals study logistics

To support a large number of troops you need a well functioning port – notably in the 19th century. There was a reason the Confederates kept all those troops and all that artillery in their ports – losing New Orleans early in the war was a big blow to the Confederates. It is a bit surprising that the Union did not take more advantage of it – they never sent Butler more than 2,500 infantry – although when Banks took over in 1864 and pushed up the Red River with more troops it was a bit of a disaster, although if Taylor's command had not been divided it could have been a catastrophe

I think you are overestimating the effective transportation capacity of the north. It isn't just ships that need to be considered. You have to take into consideration embarkation and debarkation points. You are not just moving men. You are also moving horses, guns and wagons which take longer to load and unload. If the forces are going to be campaigning any distance from your debarkation point you need to transport additional troops to hold the supply base. You have to move supplies to sustain the troops. You have to move supplies needed to sustain the merchant shipping that is needed to deliver those supplies. As the army moves inland, if it is going to be relying on rail transport, you need to be shipping locomotives, cars, rails, ties and bridging timbers.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac to the Peninsula involved going from an area with a built up dock network to a secured landing area. It involved a large number of ships and the distance was close enough for an almost shuttle type operation. Still it took weeks to complete.

Logistics certainly played a large part in the decision of where to send troops. I would also note that there weren't enough troops to spare to send very large forces all over the seaboard. Just look what happened during the Peninsular Campaign when Jackson, with what amounted to a division, tied up McDowell's corps as well as Fremont's command, Banks' command, and Milroy's command. A landing in Florida, for example, would mean those troops couldn't be used in Virginia for an extended period.

That said, the Federals did mount numerous amphibious campaigns. The Outer Banks in 1861, New Orleans, Charleston, Savannah, Red River, Mobile, Wilmington, etc. Some of these Union armies were considerable in size. Mobile was essentially a corps sized operation.

I agree that a port or river was needed to supply the troops and thus the Confederates could narrow down what they needed to defend because the Federals only had so many places they could attack.

Banks took over in '63 (or was it '62?) and captured Port Hudson in '63.

Add Burnside's expedition on the North Carolina coast in 1862, especially the New Bern portion. With slightly better command (and weather), it could have resulted in cutting a major rail line.

There was lots of troop transportation on the western rivers throughout the war. But the total amounts were limited as to what could be carried on the available steam boats. The main impact of river operations was in use of the gunboats. A good example is the opening of the Cumberland River after the fall of Fort Donelson and how that was exploited by a few gunboats.

Thanks again. Sounds like I need to obviously limit the size of an invasion for from sea by year, with little change and limit the amount the union can supply to a captured port strictly by sea New Orleans being the main example that comes to mind.

Lots of good points on the logistical problems of mounting such an invasion. The other Elephant in the Room is the question: Where are those 3-5 corps coming FROM? If they are landing on the Southern coast somewhere it means that they've been taken away from some other army. In the east that means the Army of the Potomac. When in its history could the Army of the Potomac detach 3-5 of its corps without becoming dangerously weakened? When would Lee not have taken advantage of such a weakening?

I agree completely that the Union would not have been able to spare that many troops from the other key "front lines". I mainly used that extreme example because from a gaming prospective we all know that gamers don't always do the logical or historic thing. Thus the need for rules to represent the historical reality, regardless of the reason that as much as a player may want to, there are some things they just can't do, as much as I don't like rules being any more restrictive than needed.
I think that might also be the best explanation why the Union never tried to launch a major offensive from New Orleans, they just didn't feel they could spare the troops or take the risk, obviously after Grant captured Vicksburg the need for such an offensive from that area was not really needed.

When would Lee not have taken advantage of such a weakening?

When he was commanding in West Virginia? or South Carolina?

the Union never tried to launch a major offensive from New Orleans

"Major," of course, is relative. But Banks launched the Port Hudson campaign from New Orleans, and later the Red River campaign. Oh, and don't forget the Mobile campaign.

Go here – link

for an overview of what was involved with even relatively unopposed ACW landing operations.

B