"Why did Napoleon attack Moscow instead of St. Petersburg?" Topic

"Had Bonaparte shown less chivalry and more cunning during his 1812 Russian campaign, the war might have had a different outcome. Russia was saved not only by Kutuzov and Barclay de Tolly, but by the now almost forgotten General Peter Wittgenstein.

On July 22, 1812, St. Petersburg, then capital of Russia, welcomed Emperor Alexander I, who had arrived from the front lines. Two days before, the city had been illuminated and the Kazan Cathedral in the city center was a strange sight. In and around the cathedral there were crowds of people waiting for his arrival. Some had slept there for the second or third night in a row – the Emperor was expected on July 20; but, as it turned out, he was delayed in Tver after spending a couple of days with his beloved sister, Catherine Pavlovna, there…"

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Napoleon's chosen axis of advance, which was also the 'traditional invasion route, through Grodno, Vilna, Minsk, Orsha, and Smolensk would be based on Poland and would threaten both Moscow and St Petersburg.

See Map 107 of the Esposito/Elting Atlas.

because he had no clue what the should do, no strategy other than the bonne bataille, how he acted in the 1812 campaign – the former God of War, like a tottering fool.

Once again, sources please.

In my eyes a very good book on the subject is this one (in French only, I am sorry), a compilation of memoirs of several people who were close to Napoleon during the 1812 campaign:

link

indeed one of my favourites – it made me realise that Boney was a narcissist and lost his senses in the 1812 campaign.

von Winterfeldt +1. In addition, current thinking at the time was that taking the capital meant defeating a country. Nappy forgot that a country is not defeated until it decides it is defeated. He did not heed the lessons of Spain. Russian resilience, toughness, and General Winter did the rest.

it made me realise that Boney was a narcissist and lost his senses in the 1812 campaign.

Are you relying for your 'diagnosis' on the very poor article in The Sword and the Spirit?

current thinking at the time was that taking the capital meant defeating a country.

That wasn't how Napoleon waged war. His objective during a campaign was the enemy's army and its destruction, not taking his capital.

Really. The purpose of Napoleon's campaign was not to conquer Russia, but to force her to join the blockade of Great Britain. To do this, it was necessary to defeat the Russian army, and preferably in one or more successive major field battles.
In principle, he later counted on the fact that the capture of Moscow would force Tsar Alexander to sign a peace agreement and agree to its terms. Not this time…
I believe that even if both Russian capitals were captured, the struggle would not stop. This war had already grown into a guerrilla by that time. It would be an eternal nail in the ass…

Yes Boney should have known it better, 1805 – Vienna taken, peace – no, 1806 – Berlin taken – peace no – 1808 Madrid taken, peace no , 1809 – Vienna taken again, peace – no.

Due to the fact that the superior Russian strategy played out so well, refusing early battle, Boney had to march to Mosow to enforce a battle, then when he was in Moscow he waited conveniently so long till the winter broke out (needless to say despite of dire warning, but naturally a narcissist is immune to advise)

The 'superior Russian strategy' was a mess from the beginning of the campaign, with emphasis on using the fortified camp at Drissa to force the French to attack it and failing to do so. That plan fell apart early, and the oft-mentioned Russian 'plan' to entice Napoleon deeper into Russia is a badly-sourced myth.

I forgot – Moscow 1812 taken, peace no, one of the greatest military disasters due to failed strategy and ignoring advice, a big head paying with the blood of his soldiers.

This war had already grown into a guerrilla by that time.

Where did the Russian army go? And who fought at the crossing of the Berezina in November 1812?

I forgot – Moscow 1812 taken, peace no, one of the greatest military disasters due to failed strategy and ignoring advice, a big head paying with the blood of his soldiers.

And yet, the only way the allies could beat him was to flood France with vast numbers of troops to reach Paris, which I've been told is the capital of France. Have you heard that rumor?

Yep sure did.

And the longer the allied armies were in France the longer the looting, pillaging and worse continued. The Prussians under Blucher were undoubtedly the worst.

His objective during a campaign was the enemy's army and its destruction, not taking his capital.

That is the company line, but how true was it in practice? Victories by themselves seldom forced Napoleon's opponents to make peace. Rather it was the consequences of those victories, opening up the enemy's heartland to invasion or preventing his opponents from recovering that heartland, that proved the determinative factor. After Austerlitz and Wagram Austria still had significant forces in the field. Russia still had the ability to wage sustained war after Friedland.

If you destroy the enemies' main army, as Napoleon did at Austerlitz, Jena and the pursuit after, and at Friedland, the allies came to the peace table. Frederick William didn't after Jena, but that was contingent on the Russians showing up.

And after the Ratisbon phase of the 1809 campaign, Charles urged his brother to make peace.

Napoleon did maneuver against an enemy's capital, but only to force a battle with the enemy's army. Taking the capital itself was not enough to end a war.

Brechtel198, I meant that in addition to the "regular" war, a popular guerrilla arose in parallel. The rear of the French army became a rather dangerous place, and foraging turned into a dangerous adventure.

Little souvenir. Trailer of the Russian film "Vasilisa" on the theme of the partisan war of 1812:

youtu.be/asdo-WXd4TA

yes it is common knowledge that partisan warfare was staged when Moscow was occupied by the army – like Denis Davidov, this was part of the Russian plan. The trailer shows the horrors of war quite vividly.

There was no main army to speak off in Spain. Other than badly organized, badly trained, and unmotivated troops. But Nappy's Marshalls lost and lost again. The guerrillas did their part, an excellent British and Portuguese force did its part. A reorganized Spanish army also did its part. And Nappy's brother lost. You can take a capital, you can destroy an army, but if the enemy does not surrender, you have not won. And if the enemy outlasts you, you lose. And, if you refuse to learn because you know you're a military genius… you have Russia!

while I agree with the main assesment, those units which went with Boney into Spain in 1808 – were experienced soldiers – but the wear and tear of the war in the Peninsular wore them down, still in 1812 I regard the French infantry in the Peninsular of being of better quality than those who went to Russia.

Does anyone consider how differently statesmen and monarchs and generals of that era regarded warfare and the purposes of warfare?

You didn't go to war to wipe out or conquer another state, typically -- you warred to achieve some modest strategic aim that was feasible in a limited time at a limited expense.

A campaign might last a season or so. If you succeeded (by siege or pitched battle) and your opponent recognized this, sued for peace, terms were settled, and life went on. The status quo was not greatly altered, except in whatever frontier district might change hands.

Napoleon upended these conventions, but only to a degree. It was when the other side declined to recognize these "rules" that he ran into trouble --Spain, and then Russia. And then he could never fully stop foes like Britain, Austria, Prussia, from resuming the game when it suited them. And finally, they all agreed to make a war to the finish against Napoleon's rule, which was a significant departure for European states of that time. But by that time, Napoleon had made himself such a threat to the established order and such a perceived upstart warmaker that his enemies felt they had to deal with him as an existential threat.

I regard the French infantry in the Peninsular of being of better quality than those who went to Russia.

Napoleon pulled units out of Spain for the invasion of Russia, such as the Vistula Legion, as well as individual replacements.

Davout still commanded in central Europe and his III Corps, redesignated I Corps for the invasion, was still the best in the army and regarded as such.

Then Eugene's Army of Italy, which was 2/3's French, was also excellent.

What might help is doing a comparison of what regiments were in Spain in 1812 and which ones went into Russia.

Would someone with better knowledge kindly remind us why the capital, St. Petersburg, wasn't the main objective instead of Moscow? (Not even the capital, not a strategic port, acres inland -- I don't get it at all.)

Wasn't Russia considered to have two capitals rather than one?

Would someone with better knowledge kindly remind us why the capital, St. Petersburg, wasn't the main objective instead of Moscow? (Not even the capital, not a strategic port, acres inland -- I don't get it at all.)

It wasn't the objective at all. Napoleon's objective was the destruction of the Russian army in the field.

See The March on Moscow by Paul Britten Austin.

Napoleon's Correspondence.

Campagne de Russe by Gabriel Fabry.

Wasn't Russia considered to have two capitals rather than one?

Yes. St Petersburg was the political capital and Moscow the traditional capital.