"Panther's Ins and Outs" Topic

"The Tiger tank no doubt holds the title of the most famous German tank of WW2. The tank is often mentioned as an example of the idea of "quality over quantity", Tiger aces widely known, and the tanks and battles they fought in are often recreated in movies and video games. However, a more dangerous opponent appeared on the battlefield in July of 1943. The Panther tank had more effective front armour, a more powerful gun, and most importantly the odds of running into a Panther was much higher. The Allies spent a lot of time and effort on finding out its weaknesses. This article will cover the results of British investigations.

Panthers first appeared on the Eastern Front. The Western Allies found out about it pretty quickly from the July 24th 1943 edition of the Red Star newspaper. The information contained in this article was imprecise, but the information exchange continued. More or less accurate information was available by September, and in December of 1943 the British came across a treasure trove. A notebook belonging to a scout from the 26th Reconnaissance Battalion that contained notes on the tank's characteristics fell into the hands of the 8th Army in Italy. The British discovered that the tank fired three kinds of rounds: armour piercing, subcaliber, and high explosive. The armour piercing rounds were effective at a range of up to 2000 metres, but in some cases it was permitted to fire at a range of 2500 metres. The armour piercing shell penetrated up to 138 mm of armour at an angle (the angle was not noted). Subcaliber shot could be used to engage heavily armoured targets at a range of under 2000 metres. It penetrated up to 194 mm of armour. The high explosive round had a range of up to 4000 metres. The scout noted that the HE shell could not deal significant damage to an enemy tank but could still jam the turret of a Matilda or T-34 tank with a good hit…"

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Armand

The final paragraph summarises the whole article very well. It is a very good read.

Unfortunately, the United States Army was apparently completely disinterested in the Panther tank and the threat that it posed until they were formally introduced to it at Normandy in June of 1944.

B

Before the first U.S. troops with their M3 tanks set foot in North Africa the U.S. Army understood the need for something heavier and with a more powerful gun than the M4. Prototypes for a heavier tank were in the works in mid-1942. Variants of the Sherman with more armor or more powerful guns were produced before Normandy.

Unfortunately, the United States Army was apparently completely disinterested in the Panther tank and the threat that it posed until they were formally introduced to it at Normandy in June of 1944.

This is incorrect. The problem (for the western allies) was that they never met the Panther until 1944 and had no vehicle to study. They got the first two at almost the same time. One in Italy and one sent from Russia which arrived in the UK in May 1944.They could not destructively test the vehicle in the UK (as they only had one) so a report was rushed out in early June which gave theoretical penetration data and that is the source of the much repeated 'aim for the bottom of the mantlet for a deflection downwards' myth. Once they landed in Normandy they got access all the Pathers they needed for testing. It can not be emphasized enough that the first inkling that the Panther could be a problem arrived in June 1944 and it was very much 'learning on the job'. The information they got from 1943 Russian testing led them to believe the Panther could be countered. It was not until June 7 1944 they began to realise they had a problem on their hands.

Happy you enjoyed it my good friend…

Armand

No, it's not incorrect.

US liaison officers assigned to the Soviet Army were provided the opportunity to physically inspect a captured Panther shortly after Kursk. They prepared a detailed report accompanied by full Kubinka test and evaluation data provided by the Soviets. All this was in the hands of AGF before the end of 1943, where it appeared to arouse exactly zero concern or interest. US Army tactical guides for identifying and tactically engaging opposing German tanks, prepared and distributed for Operation Overlord, covered the MK III, the Mk IV and even the Mk VI (Tiger I) in excruciating detail. The Panther was completely omitted – not even an ID photo, not even a brief footnote.

The ex post facto argument was that the Panther was assumed to be a limited production specialty vehicle and likely only to be encountered in very small numbers …. yet The Tiger I, classified as exactly the same sort of specialty limited production vehicle unlikely to be encountered in any meaningful numbers was covered in great detail.

B

They prepared a detailed report accompanied by full Kubinka test and evaluation data provided by the Soviets. All this was in the hands of AGF before the end of 1943,

So where can we see this 'detailed report'. The only one I have seen is the one dated as 'recieved' on Oct 23 1943. 5 A4 typed pages (one of which is just a cover page) and a small handwritten note of the armour thicknesses in the text. This was then published in Nov 1943 in a Technical Journal with a hand-drawn illustration of the Panther tank '521' which was copied from a photo in the original paper. Page 4 of that 'Report' deals with the armour/protection in 5 lines of text and 11 thickness measurements. That is NOT a 'detailed report'. The first time the Western Allies got a Panther to test for themselves was May 1944.

B: Your focus on the U.S. response to the Panther is misplaced. The Tiger I and the most recent Panzer IVs posed a challenge to the Sherman equipped U.S. armored forces as well. The Panther may have been a better tank than the Tiger I and modern Panzer IVs. In the type of fighting the U.S. tank forces engaged in during the Normandy campaign the Panther's qualitative difference over those other German tanks probably did not matter.

Even if the U.S. did not specifically study the challenges posed by the Panther prior to Normandy, that does not mean the U.S. had not anticipated them and begun taken steps to meet them. The U.S. had approved a towed 90mm antitank gun capable of taking on Panthers (IIRC) in 1943. The U.S. was already producing M36 tank destroyers equipped with 90mm guns by the spring of 1944.

The one place where your argument might have some merit is with tank development, since the first Pershings were not deployed until 1945. The U.S. did anticipate the need for a heavier tank with a more powerful gun than the Sherman in 1942. It just took a while to come up with a tank design that was good enough to justify shutting down Sherman production facilities to retool to produce a new tank. Part of this was a dispute over the gun that new tank would have. Some argued a 76mm would be adequate. Others insisted it should be the 90mm. The choice to go with the 90mm was made before the end of 1943, so again before Normandy.

It can not be emphasized enough that the first inkling that the Panther could be a problem arrived in June 1944 …

The ex post facto argument was that the Panther was assumed to be a limited production specialty vehicle and likely only to be encountered in very small numbers …. yet The Tiger I, classified as exactly the same sort of specialty limited production vehicle unlikely to be encountered in any meaningful numbers was covered in great detail.

No, it was not ex post facto.

Please see this Intelligence Bulletin from January of 1944, which is largely based on the information provided by the Soviets (as the western allies had not yet seen a Panther in combat).

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Of note:

Like the Pz. Kw. 6's, the Pz. Kw. 5's are organized into separate tank battalions. During the summer of 1943, the Germans used many of these new tanks on the Russian front.

Before you suggest ex post facto you should take a look at the a priori documents. They can be illuminating. No one was ignoring the Panther, but no, it was not understood as a significant threat.

Many of us might know that during the Kursk battles the Panthers were indeed organized into a separate tank brigade. This was reported to the US liaison team, and it appeared that the Panther was a less expensive, somewhat lighter alternative for the Tiger -- a heavy tank that would be as rarely seen, and somewhat easier to kill, than the more expensive Tiger.

Although the Russians have found the Pz. Kw. 5 more maneuverable than the Pz. Kw. 6, they are convinced that the new tank is more easily knocked out. … The (side armor) vertical and sloping plates can be penetrated by armor-piercing shells of 45-mm (1.78 inches) caliber, or higher.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

The U.S. was already producing M36 tank destroyers equipped with 90mm guns by the spring of 1944.

It was? Then why did it take so long for them to reach units in Europe?

Yup Don. Fisher/GMC started turning out M36s in April 1944 based on a contract issued in 1943. Massey started producing them in June 1944. Alco and Montreal Loco started later.

As to why they were slow in reaching the front lines, can't help you. Eisenhower expressed a desire for M36s in July 1944, yet I am not seeing tank destroyer battalions being issued M36s until September. Even then they are units already in the field being converted. A wholesale conversion to M36s seems to have happened in January-February 1945, but towed anti-tank guns and older SPGs persisted after that.

It was? Then why did it take so long for them to reach units in Europe?

Because the normal timeline from end-of-line production to in-theater-for-unit-issue was about 6 months.

You could expedite small light items, like ammo, when you had something new and needed to get it over there. But in 1944 items as large as tanks (or bulk supplies of smaller items) traveled by rail and by ship. And there were limits to the availability of railcars that could carry tank-sized objects, and ships traveled in convoys that took weeks to assemble and days to unload, and there were limited harbors that could handle tank-sized cargoes. So no matter how badly you may have wanted to expedite a tank-sized item, getting it from the US to ETO was going to take months.

And … the field commanders didn't want them. Up through D-Day the unit commanders turned down even the 76mm Sherman tanks which had arrived in May in the UK (100 tanks produced in January and expedited to the UK to be available in time for D-Day). At this time everyone thought that the 76mm gun was going to be enough to handle Tigers and Panthers. Even with this expectation, no one wanted the 76mm Shermans.

US Army Ordnance did some test-firings in the UK in the spring to demonstrate their new toys to the unit commanders. They showcased both the 76mm guns already available on Shermans and the 90mm guns already being mounted on TDs (they had the guns, even though the TDs mounting them were not yet in-theater). No one seemed to want them.

That all changed in late June / early July. Then when test-firings conducted against actual Panther tanks indicated that the 76mm gun (with existing ammo) was not going to be good enough to deal with Panthers, and with the realization that Panthers were not replacing Tigers in heavy tank battalions but rather replacing Pz IVs in Panzer Divisions, all of a sudden everyone wanted the new guns and new ammo.

Ordnance had largely anticipated all of this. But AGF (Army Ground Forces) operated on a "war need" and "war proven" model -- they did not support dedicating critical shipping space to things that were not required, or not proven as reliable. If the units saw no need, then there would be no capacity dedicated to shipping. Once they did see the need, it all came over. But shipping from one side of the world to the other took time.

Or so I've read.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Thanks!

Armand

Hi Bill N.

You wrote -

B: Your focus on the U.S. response to the Panther is misplaced. The Tiger I and the most recent Panzer IVs posed a challenge to the Sherman equipped U.S. armored forces as well. The Panther may have been a better tank than the Tiger I and modern Panzer IVs. In the type of fighting the U.S. tank forces engaged in during the Normandy campaign the Panther's qualitative difference over those other German tanks probably did not matter.

Even if the U.S. did not specifically study the challenges posed by the Panther prior to Normandy, that does not mean the U.S. had not anticipated them and begun taken steps to meet them. The U.S. had approved a towed 90mm antitank gun capable of taking on Panthers (IIRC) in 1943. The U.S. was already producing M36 tank destroyers equipped with 90mm guns by the spring of 1944.

The one place where your argument might have some merit is with tank development, since the first Pershings were not deployed until 1945. The U.S. did anticipate the need for a heavier tank with a more powerful gun than the Sherman in 1942. It just took a while to come up with a tank design that was good enough to justify shutting down Sherman production facilities to retool to produce a new tank. Part of this was a dispute over the gun that new tank would have. Some argued a 76mm would be adequate. Others insisted it should be the 90mm. The choice to go with the 90mm was made before the end of 1943, so again before Normandy.

I respectfully disagree. I have read deeply in this topic, especially with regard to the T71/M36 melodrama.

Here is one useful document, which can be found on DTIC -
"The Development of American Tank Destroyers during World War II: The Impact of Doctrine, Combat Experience, and Technology on Material Acquisition"

There are other documents which I can recommend, if you are interested.

In brief, when Eisenhower discovered that the 76mm M4s and 3-inch M10s could not deal frontally with German heavy tanks he demanded immediate delivery of 90mm M36s to the ETO. However, the T71/M36 program was being slow-walked by the US Army stateside bureaucracy. Eisenhower finally had to fly a member of his SHAEF staff, General Holly, back to the USA bearing a personal letter from Eisenhower General Marshall requesting that he personally intervene to expedite immediate shipment of M36s to the ETO on a top priority basis. Marshall's direct intervention quickly broke the bureaucratic logjam and is IMO the only reason why the M36 ever reached the ETO.

I urge you to read the entire document and draw your own conclusions.

As far as other wartime armor development projects are concerned (the T26/Pershing program for example) everything was IMO infected with the same sort of bureaucratic sloth and infighting.

B

There was a definite optimism in the 76mm gun.
Their testing was somewhat flawed.
But I don't think it was totally obvious they needed a 90mm gun. I'm not so sure it is even a given with 20 20 hindsight.

My understanding is that the Pershing was delivered reasonably quickly. I think you could reasonably ask the question of whether the Pershing was really such a great tank.

Did they really need the Pershing?

Not for the Panther. The crews reports are pretty clear. They thought they could deal with panthers, it was Tigers bothered them more.
Helped a lot that by late 44 Jerry couldn't mass tanks, they were limited by fuel and the crews were often rather green.

B: We will probably have to agree to disagree on this one. There is nothing wrong with that, as it is possible for two people looking at the same evidence to come to different conclusions.

You have argued the U.S. was "disinterested in the Panther tank and the threat that it posed" prior to Normandy. To me the critical determinant for evaluating this claim is the timeline. Since the U.S. already had under development weapons capable of dealing with tanks possessing the characteristics of the Panther before Normandy to me your claim does not hold up.

Before closing the door I reviewed what I believe to be The Development of American Tank Destroyers during World War II document you referenced. This document shows a development process for what would become the M36 with a 90mm gun ongoing from the spring of 1943. There is a recommendation for production of between 500 to 1,000 M36s in the fall of 1943, and on October 25, 1943 a recommendation was made to terminate production of the M10 and to issue contracts to build 500 M36s. This coincides with my previously posted information about the first contract going out before the end of 1943 and the first M36s rolling off the production lines in the spring of 1944. (The production figures also indicate that 245 M36s had rolled off the production lines by the end of June 1944, and the full initial 500 were done by the end of August.) This wasn't something done in response to U.S. forces coming into contact with the Panther in Normandy. It was already in the works. This is born out by the statement in your document "At least the Ordinance Department had managed to have a self-propelled version of the 90mm gun in quantity production by D-day."

Would the U.S. have been better able to deal with Panthers in France if there had been less bureaucratic sloth and infighting? Sure. But that is a separate issue.

The crews reports are pretty clear. They thought they could deal with panthers, it was Tigers bothered them more.

Indeed. So much so the the booklet used so much by those who believe in wunder-panzers (United States v German Equipment) devotes page after page to engagements against Tigers and barely mentions problems with the Panther. Also 75% of hits on a Panther penetrated.

When the Germans ran up against the T-34 and the KV-1 in June 1941, were they ready with an upgunned tank? Well, they first had to undo their plans to refit the PzIV with the 50mm gun of the Pz III! Despite reports coming in within a week of the launch of Barbarossa in June, they didn't begin the project to upgun to a long 75 until October/November, and the new tanks did not begin production until March of 1943.

The Russians came up against the Tiger in December of 1942, and the Panther in June of 1943. It took them until August of 1943 to decide to upgun the T-34 to an 85mm gun, and it took them until the end of the year to begin production on an interim model while they finalized the gun they would use for the long-term model, which began production in the spring of 1944.

The US, on the other hand, was desperately far behind in experience with tank production compared to these two traditional land powers, and was also confronted by the need to catch up with fighters which experience was showing were behind, while ramping up new uniforms, boots, rifles, artillery pieces, bridging equipment, etc. etc., and building the worlds largest naval and merchant fleets all at once. The US had NO captured enemy Tigers or Panthers in hand to examine and test. And yet when the call came, the US already HAD both an upgunned Sherman and an even more powerful TD in production. Shame on them for being SO slow, only responding faster than either the Germans or the Russians.

But unhappily their crappy useless deathtraps had crushed the German army's super unbeatable shiny uberpanzers in the west before their new kit could show up in sufficient numbers, to the dismay of wargamers for years to come. Oh if only those useless Shermans had slowed down to give the Pershings time to get into action in a big way. Then we could hold up our heads with pride. (BTW – by the time the war ended the US had produced more Pershings than the Germans had Tigers after the 3 years of production).

It's just so sad, isn't it? Responding with new kit in less time the Germans or Russians ever managed, and yet finding that the German army in the west had been comprehensively crushed by the old useless deathtrap Shermans before the shiny new toys could get into action. We hang our heads in shame…

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)