"Napoleonic Economics" Topic

-‘God made Bonaparte, and then rested.'-La Chaise.

-‘God should have rested a little earlier'-Comte de Narbonne.

A good summary of Napoleon's economic reforms is on pages 195-196 of Vincent Cronin's biography, Napoleon Bonaparte: An Intimate Biography.

Three good references for both the French economic system under Napoleon and the financial system established and used by Napoleon can be found in the following volumes:

-France Under Napoleon by Louis Bergeron.
-The French Revolution and Napoleonic Era by Owen Connelly'
-Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms by Owen Connelly.

The French economic system created and put in place by Napoleon lasted until the at least World War I, when the income tax was introduced. It was put to use intact by the Bourbons in 1814. See France Under Napoleon by Louis Bergeron, Chapter II.

France was not bankrupt during the period after Napoleon became head of state. Again, see Bergeron. Further, according the Owen Connelly in The French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, the French franc was the most stable currency in Europe, more stable than the British pound sterling.

Upon becoming First Consul, there was 167,000 francs in cash in the French exchequer. The national debt was 474 million francs. Napoleon's new system of tax collection drew 660 million francs annually from the income tax and public property. And Napoleon was very careful not to overspend. He created the Bank of France on 13 February 1800 and established both a Ministry of Finance and a Ministry of the Treasury with both keeping an eye on the other regarding the annual budget. Napoleon created an Audit Office which checked everything that was spent by the government.

His Auditors of the Council of State investigated ‘complicated frauds' and were a hank-picked group that were trained as high-level civil servants as well as ‘high-level misdoings.' These were probably the ones who investigated and found out Bourrienne's extortions in Hamburg in 1810.

We need him NOW!

May I ask how much was in the exchequer and how much was owed at the time of the First Abdication?

His greatest legacies to France and maybe Europe were not on the battlefield.

There was an earlier version of a French Central Bank founded by John Law of Edinburgh but it failed. His great nephew was Jacques Lauriston, the commander of V Corps at Leipzig. Lauriston is an estate on the west of Edinburgh owned by the Laws and Lauriston's name was more correctly Jacques Law de Lauriston.

This thread made me wonder why Britain was able to support its allies if it had a less stable currency. I did a little research and found this article.

A Tale of Two Currencies: British and French Finance During the Napoleonic Wars
Michael D. Bordo and Eugene N. White
The Journal of Economic History
Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jun., 1991), pp. 303-316 (14 pages)

The authors' conclusion is that Britain had a financing system based on borrowing while France was unable to borrow to the same extent and hence had to rely on taxation (within France and in other countries). Why was France unable to borrow? The Ancien Regime and Revolution had destroyed France's reputation as a reliable borrower while Britain had always met its obligations. Even in 1810-11, French borrowing was at an interest rate 1 to 1.5% higher than that paid by Britain. The British budget was passed by Parliament and the details were freely available while France's was not. Napoleon implemented very necessary reforms which helped but he was not able to match the British system which was less stable but more effective.

Please note both what Brechtel says and what he does not. He says France was "not bankrupt" during the First Empire. That is, the French state did not declare bankruptcy and wipe out debts, as several Renaissance and early modern monarchies did. (It tends to play hob with subsequent interest charges, as Trockledockle notes.) He does not say that French tax revenues--or total revenues--met French expenses. Bonaparte levied fines on defeated enemies and occupation taxes on states he'd conquered, sold off church lands confiscated by the Revolutionaries and other territories--think the Louisiana Territory. He's taken out large-scale loans. And even at that the pay of his conscripts was notoriously in arrears, and one of his difficulties in raising troops in 1815 is that even his military suppliers have past due bills running sometimes more than ten years--not money on which they're collecting interest, you understand: just money His Imperial Highness, like some pre-Revolutionary aristocrat, hasn't paid the tradesmen. Which is why I asked Brechtel just how deep a hole France was in by 1814. I can't find the numbers either, but you need them to make sense of the 1800 figures.

Understand, I don't think anyone could have made ends meet waging war on a Napoleonic scale. And while a LOT of inefficiencies (and debt--paid off in assignats) were wiped out by the Revolution, I'm sure he was a very able administrator. But like all of us, he's a whole package. The military genius and the tireless administrator come in a man totally dedicated to promoting his own interests and those of his immediate family at whatever cost to others, and a tendency to view a military solution as a first option rather than a last.

Which is why I keep responding to Brechtel when he posts these little hagiographical snippets. Because, no PaulB, we DON'T need a ruthless would-be hereditary monarch now, but if we keep saying "we need a Napoleon" we might very well wind up with one.

Here is an article that may help with some of the figures. In broad terms, taxation in France paid for about 58% of the cost of war and 42% was extracted in various forms from other countries (1.8 billion francs) from 1803 to 1814. In addition, it seems that another 500 million was left as a debt for the next regime.

link

I'm not sure what this has to do with wargaming.

Simply put, if you were a French ally you were coerced into it and were then robbed and looted. If you were a British ally, you joined voluntarily (or you had been attacked), and you were assisted financially and materially.

Napoleon was running a Warsaw Pact avant la lettre and Britain was running a NATO.

…if you were a French ally you were coerced into it and were then robbed and looted.

The older states of the Confederation of the Rhine were not 'robbed and looted' until 1813-1814 when they were coerced by the allies.

And the Confederation was originally made up of states that didn't want to be ingested by either Austria or Prussia.

Which is why I keep responding to Brechtel when he posts these little hagiographical snippets.

…'these little hagiographical snippets' are done by recognized historians of the period. They are not hagiogrpahy. Have you read any of them?

the linked article is quite revealing, reading eye witness accounts of Russian officers in 1814 showed a depressed ruined country by Napolóen the Emperor of the French by the Grace of God and traitor to the Revolution

Talleyrand was sacked for rapacity, just as Bourrienne was (Bourrienne in 1810 from Hamburg and Talleyrand in 1807 after Tilsit).
Talleyrand resigned, and Napoleon kept him on in the Conseil d'État.
Bourrienne wasn't sacked; his position was eliminated because Hamburg was annexed to France. Napoleon was informed of his corruption in 1807, but Bourrienne remained in office through 1810.
And than please list the government officials that were corrupt. Talleyrand and Fouche certainly were, but both were eventually sacked by Napoleon.
Neither was sacked by Napoleon for corruption.
You have of course been given dozens of examples over the years with regard to other corrupt officials. We can start with the Empress, of course. Josephine accepted bribes from a number of people for allegedly using her influence to get meetings with Napoleon. She also used go-betweens (such as Reinhard) to communicate to notables in the smaller European states that Napoleon was allegedly very displeased with them for X or Y, but might be mollified by her good offices, assuming a suitable "gift" was forthcoming. This was mentioned by Georges Servières in his l'allemagne français sous Napoleon over 100 years ago. I found corroborating evidence of Servières' narratives when I examined the papers of the Hamburg senate from those years. You yourself mentioned that Josephine was notorious for "dabbling in fraudulent army contracts." I was surprised by this and asked you to elaborate, but you declined.
Then there's the chief of police, Fouché, of whose legendary corruption you wrote: "that is old news." As with Talleyrand, Fouché was not fired for corruption, but if I'm not mistaken, became a Senator and was sent to govern Rome for a while (I probably have the sequence of that mixed-up, but the point remains: he wasn't fired for corruption, nor even really fired.)
You have never disputed that many of the marshals and generals took bribes. A number of people have provided dozens of examples to you over the years; there's even a new example on this very thread.
French police, judges, consuls and consular officials were notoriously easy to bribe. Here are some examples that you can verify using American archives:
A Baltimore shipper named John Smith complained that his ships would enter French ports, and then would mysteriously suffer damage, such as a rudder knocked off. When the American captain complained to police, the police commissioner and judge would habitually ask for a bribe. (Maryland Historical Society, Ms.1152.)
The Clifford Brothers of Philadelphia likewise had a ship seized in Brest, allegedly on the charge that she had no official papers and was therefore an "English privateer." When their agent produced documentation showing that ship's papers were genuine and in order, the judge required a payment, and suddenly all was well again. (PA Historical Society, Clifford-Pemberton collection.)
An American merchant named Philip Sadtler disembarked in Bremen in 1807 to find his ship and all his personal belongings confiscated. Four separate bribes to French officials were required to get it all back. (MD Hist. Society, Ms.1701)
The Nicholson Brothers, long-standing American businessmen in Bremen, were arrested for "looking like Englishmen."They were released after paying bribes to the police. (MD Hist. Society, Nicholson papers, Ms2340.1)
The American consul sent to Trieste in 1810 to replace his predecessor reported that no paperwork could be obtained (for US ships to dock or unload) unless bribes were paid to the French dourness and administrators. (I forget the exact file # for this, but the correspondence of the US consuls in Trieste are kept in the National Archives at College Park, and are easy to use.)
The French Douanes set up a base on an island in the Weser river in 1806, from which they launched raids with the assistance of 100 gendarmes also based there, against private homes of the wealthy merchant class, and their offices, hauling back "suspicious" materials to their magazin, which were often then re-sold on the black market. This plundering of the civilian population was extensively covered by Max Schäfer in his Bremen und die Kontinentalsperre (Leipzig, 1915).
In Frankfurt and Berg in 1810 French officials decreed the burning of any "English goods." Officially this meant anything that could be construed as having been imported on an English ship: leather, cloth, tobacco, etc. In reality, many of these were simply confiscated from the population by the French authorities, who then resold them on the blackmarket for a profit. This is documented in: Roger Dufraisse, Französiche Zollpolitik, Kontinentalsperre und Kontinentalsystem in Deutschland in der napoleonischen Zeit (Berlin, 1981). Michael Rowe has more recently written (From Reich to State, 2003) that "smuggling and fraud developed into a sophisticated industry centered on Cologne, Mainz, and Strasbourg." (p. 199-201.)
These sorts of cases are relatively easy to track, if one does the research. For instance: an American schooner named Cora is impounded at La Rochelle. The captain writes to the owner/shipper in New York, telling him what has happened (record 1). The captain then goes to the US consul in La Rochelle and lodges a formal complaint (record 2). The consul is obligated to represent the American defendant, or to find a lawyer for him (record 3). Oddly, though, there is no trial, and suddenly all is well. The police have no record of the reason for the arrest. Finally, a European agent for the shipper sends him a bill (record 4), for the cost of the bribe to the judge. Sometimes these sorts of things are even notarized by the consul.
For primary sources on Bourrienne, of course, you'll need to visit the Staatsarchiv Hamburg, but you can get a brief synopsis in: Jean Mistler, "Hambourg sous l'occupation française," Francia I(1973), 451-466.
--
I'm probably forgetting a lot, but as of now we have the Empress, the Foreign Minister, the chief of Police, a substantial number of high-ranking military men, at least two ministers-plenipotentiary, and literally countless officials in the police and douanes… involved in some sort of corruption. If we were speaking of any regime other than Napoleon's, you would be the first to assert that it had a drastic and widespread problem with corruption.
Several of the above examples were simply cut-and-pasted from previous threads in which you made the same demand for names and specific examples.
If you – honestly and sincerely – would be persuaded by more examples, I can provide them. If no amount of specific examples will ever persuade you, then perhaps it might make more sense not to keep asking for them?
I suspect the problem was just that corruption was so rife among senior officials that a real purge would have left him with a staffing problem and that he preferred to turn a blind eye and just issue occasional warnings. He tended to avoid bad publicity and a mass of corruption trials might not have suited him. He complained about Augereau exposing corruption and extortion in Barcelona but got more interested when it was rumoured (probably falsely) that Duhesme had embezzled a large sum of money there: presumably he might have been able to confiscate some of that.
Susan

When the French turned over Hannover to the Prussians in Autumn 1805, there was an awkward moment regarding the little fortress of Hameln, in which the French garrison commander, Barbou, claimed that Napoleon had ordered him to stay until he had collected the last of the overdue French contributions (1.2mil) – that's the money the French demanded from the local civilians for the maintenance of the French garrisons. Barbou had accepted a personal bribe (a "gratification") of 100,000 francs, as had Rapp, during his tenure there, to look the other way, but now he was on the spot from Napoleon (or so he claimed.) The French eventually settled for 800,000, part of which was paid by Prussia. The Prussians informed Napoleon that both Barbou and Rapp had taken bribes, but to my knowledge nothing was ever done about it.

I certainly don't need another megalomaniac narcissist.

…when in fact the French were running growing deficits from 1805 onwards. The Bank of France nearly went bust in 1805. The factoring of the Spanish subsidy by Ouvrard and its likely loss in 1807 led directly to Napoleon's invasion and seizure of Spain. France's own credit worthiness is reflected by he interest rates for borrowing being 2% higher than the UK's.

Sources?

First, Ouvrard was a crook. He was imprisoned the first time in 1800. Napoleon had him released in 1802. Ouvrard's plan in 1804 to bring Mexican gold to mainland Europe on British ships. The complicated plan took too long and caused problems for the Bank of France. Because of this, the French Treasury Minister was dismissed and Ouvrard went bankrupt. He involved himself in 1810, along with Fouche, in a treasonable attempt to negotiate peace with England. Fouche was dismissed and Ouvrard went to prison for the second time until October 1813.

By the law of 7 Germinal AN XI (28 March 1803) Napoleon established the franc germinal. 'For the first time in its history France was provided with a clearly defined 'real money' which coincided in value with its money of account'-Godechot. It became the strongest currency in Europe and by 1811 it was superior to the pound sterling by 1810.

Napoleon created the Bank of France in 1800 and was established on a sound financial basis. In 1805, the war with Austria and Russia 'put the bank in jeopardy' because of a lack of funds. Napoleon reorganized the bank in 1806 and placed it under the supervision of Mollien, the Treasury Minister. By 1813 the bank had three branches-in Lille, Lyons, and Rouen. The Bank was retained by Louis XIV and the bank became a permanent institution.

A currency that has to borrow at higher interest rates than another is not stronger. The interest rate is an indication that the lender is taking a greater risk lending money and wants to be compensated for that risk. The French government was always paying at least 1 to 1.5% more interest than the British government on its borrowings and often more. The reference for this is Bordo and White listed above. It shows a graph of consol interest rates for each country.

Harold T Parker wrote this for Owen Connelly's Dictionary, 180:

'The fiscal result of these measures was a vigorous, durable fiscal administration. The French people were habituated to punctual discharge of their tax obligations. Even during the turbulent, disastrous years of 1814-15 they paid regularly, to the amazement of the prefects. The government debt had been kept moderate and could be assumed without great distress by the Restoration monarchy. The new franc de Germanal was stable and in 1811 commanded a better exchange rate than the pound sterling…[Napoleon] tried to run a tight financial operation, and in the process he kept his own regime going and founded structures that endured.'

From France Under Napoleon by Louis Bergeron, 38:

'The financial achievement of the Napoleonic years is summarized in the creation of a good administrative instrument, which had been lacking in the old monarchy.

Lauriston's name was more correctly Jacques Law de Lauriston.

His full name is Jacques Alexandre Bernard Law Lauriston. He was born in Pondicchery, India of a Scottish family. He was the artillery specialist among Napoleon's Imperial Aides-de-Camp beginning in 1800 and was promoted to general of division in 1805.

I can agree that he created robust administrative financial systems but Britain had been borrowing and repaying for a hundred years and was hence able to fund the war. France had an abysmal earlier record as a debtor and these measures were unable to create sufficient confidence in the time he had available to reduce the higher interest rates that France had to pay. Interest rates are the measure of the strength of a currency.

Regarding the balanced budget, it was often balanced by making other countries pay for French troops on their territory and fines imposed by treaties. For more detail see
Did the war pay for the war? An assessment of napoleon's attempts to make his campaigns self-financing, Pierre Branda, Dans Napoleonica. La Revue 2008/3 (N° 3)

"I'm not sure what this has to do with wargaming."

Campaigns?

Erzherzog Johann,

I quite agree – see my comment on the 18th but I suppose that we can take a very broad view of Napoleonic discussions.

I would like to add:

Napoleonic Reforms: After the revolution, France needed a stable financial system, and Napoleon successfully reformed the tax system, created the Bank of France, and established the ministries of finance and the treasury, which effectively controlled the country's budget.

Stability of the Franc: The currency was very stable, even more so than the British pound, which was a significant achievement at the time. This indicated a high level of confidence in Napoleon's economic policies.

Corruption: Despite numerous reforms, corruption remained a significant issue. Many high-ranking officials, including Josephine, Talleyrand, and others, were involved in corrupt schemes. This complicated state governance and could negatively impact economic stability.

Debt Obligations: France had a substantial debt and was not always able to service it effectively. Napoleon often resorted to coercive measures in conquered countries to finance his military campaigns.

Legacy of Reforms: The economic and administrative structures created by Napoleon proved to be quite robust and outlasted his rule, maintaining stability until at least World War I.

These aspects demonstrate the complex nature of Napoleonic economic policy, which, despite its successes, had its drawbacks and challenges. During my student years, I wrote a paper on this topic and would like to mention that I sourced many facts from https://essays.edubirdie.com/finance-assignments which is the best resource of its kind for students. If anyone is interested in learning more about France's financial system during Napoleon's era, feel free to reach out to me; I love discussing this topic.