"Napoleon & Francis II..." Topic

& the emergence of Prussian dominance of german states

Post 1809 campaign, Napoleon unites the two families via marriage and one would suspect cement an alliance allowing a bit of breathing room on his south eastern borders. Indeed, Austria is forced to send troops to the ill fated Russian campaign of 1812.

Fast forward to the 1813/1814 campaigns, Prussia supported by Russia begins to recapture its swagger by playing an ever important role in the battles forcing their way back to the table of post war decision makers.

Surely Austria, ever wary of the power dynamic within the german speaking states, saw this and had to have moments whereby they considered hitting pause at a certain point in the allies conquest of France proper.

Looking for good books and discussion centered around this period and political question of the 1813/1814 battles. Suggestions?

Finally, a what if query. What IF Francis either made his own peace or even flipped sides to support his son-in-law. How would that look?

TIA,
Madcam.

Less detailed than the above suggestions but giving a good introduction is:

Zamoyski: Rites of Peace – The Fall of Napoleon and The Congress of Vienna.

It is mostly focused on the 1815 Congress but the first few chapters give brief character sketches and cover 1813. The Congress is interesting as that is where Prussia and Austria really confronted each other and there was a genuine threat that war would break out in 1815 between Austria, Britain and France on one side and Prussia and Russia on the other over Saxony.

I suspect that in early 1813 Prussia wasn't the threat it became in 1815 and getting Napoleon out of Germany and Italy was far more important to Austria than allying with France against Russia and Prussia. The Austrians did a lot of dancing around but ultimately were always going to go for Napoleon.

The problem for the allies in the spring of 1813 was that Prussia and Russia lost twice (Lutzen and Bautzen) and were forced back to the Oder. They needed Austria to declare for the allies in order to win or at least have a chance.

The new 'alliance' was a done deal before Metternich 'negotiated' with Napoleon. And Metternich's price for neutrality was set at a level that he knew Napoleon would not agree to. Austria was the key to supply the needed cannon fodder for the allies.

And their first venture was the defeat at Dresden.

Interestingly, the allies when making up their different armies in the field ensured that they were made up of at least contingents and corps from different countries. That was so that if one of the armies was defeated, no one ally would fall out of the coalition. That, and the British subsidies, kept them in the war.

Metternich was orignally a disgruntled and displaced Rhineland German from the Coblenz area. His family estates at Winneberg and the serfs belonging to the estate had been taken by the French revolutionary armies.

Metternich hated the French Revolution and thereby Napoleon, seen as a product of the Revolution, although he greatly admired Napoleon's administration and its achievements. He was largely responsible for the 1809 war with France. Nevertheless, he became foreign minister after the war, replacing Stadion in that position.

For interesting narratives of the meeting with Napoleon at Dresden in June 1813 see:

-Memoires Militaires by Josef Grabowski, 95-96:

link

Manuscrit de 1813 by Baron Fain:

link

Austria was not strong enough to fight European wars on its own

Whoa, steady on.

The only country you're allowed to say couldn't fight European wars on its own here is Britain.

Carry on.

Austria certainly thought so in 1809 when, urged by Metternich and others, to invade the Confederation of the Rhine (without a declaration of war) while Napoleon was involved in his Spanish campaign.

Archduke Charles wasn't keen to go to war in 1809. Some Austrians "certainly thought so", but certainly not all.

In reality, we know that no state was ever "strong enough to fight European wars on its own", even France. How would it have faired against Austria in 1809 without Bavaria, Italy, Baden and the other Confederation of the Rhine states etc in its camp? The history of the Napoleonic wars is a history of (shifting) alliances.

Cheers,
John

When did the elusive Austrian declaration of war arrive in Paris, if it was delayed? And what is the page number of the reference given?

Declaration or not, the war was started by the Austrians in order to avenge her previous repeated defeat, 'to regain the territories those defeats had cost her', and 'to reestablish herself as an expanding empire.'

What is the 'French mythology.' to which you refer?

Regarding Francis, '…Francis hardly looked the emperor, being small, timorous, not too bright, and redoubtable only in his own imperial bed chamber. He knew nothing of military matters but would meddle in them and was gifted with a mutton-headed obstinacy that took Austria into wars for which it was not prepared. Also, he was utterly convinced of his personal divine right to rule, reverence, and new conquests.'-John Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 495-496.

'[Francis]…became party to successive coalitions against France and against the ideas of revolution to preserve the status quo. [Francis] was indecisive…and incapable of translating his antirevolutionary way of thinking into a consistent foreign policy. He also failed to strengthn his own position through comprehensive internal reforms…'

'…[Francis] supported Metternich's conservative policies. In the interest of preserving the existing political and social order, he favored a European balance of power. Seeing the statuse quo threatened in domestic affairs, he advocated the preventive suppression of liberal and national movements…he promoted an absolutist welfare state that did not hesitate to employ police state methods in order to keep the people in tutelage.'-Eckhardt Treichel.

Compare those 'attributes' with Napoleon's policies and governance and Napoleon comes out far ahead as a reformer and head of state. The same thing can be said of a comparison with both Frederick William and Alexander. The latter was also complicit in the murder of his father.

I do have a copy of three volumes of Krieg 1809. Thank you for pointing that out and for your gracious assistance.

incapable of translating his antirevolutionary way of thinking into a consistent foreign policy.

Could this perhaps be because the threat from Revolutionary and Napoleonic France wasn't the only threat that Austria had to worry about? Napoleon's foreign policy evolved during the time he was in power, adapting to the changing situation. Why shouldn't Austria be doing the same?

Napoleon was able to do many steps towards modernising the state

Indeed creating a police state, taking control of newspapers, opening private letters even of trusted subordinates, re introducing slavery, creating scapegoats, all very modern traits of dictators.

Indeed it is very ignored, that even when the French Revolution started Prussia and Austria were more afraid of each other than of France, this changed only gradually but then Boney by his land grapping aggressive behaviour changed it radically.

It is also interesting to see the different policies of like Thugut – Stadion – and the alas ignored Karl.

o we don't need to hear this again.

I advise to paste and copy your answer for the future.

N had issued orders to concentrate the troops in Bavaria in early March

Davout, commanding in central Europe with 90,000 troops, had developed an excellent espionage and intelligence network and discovered what the Austrians were up to with their planned offensive into Bavaria.

That is why Napoleon left Spain early in order to prepare to meet the offensive.

An excellent reference for 1809 is Jack Gill's 1809: Thunder on the Danube: The Defeat of the Hapsburgs (3 Volumes) along with his Battle of Znaim and With Eagles to Glory, the last being a study of the Confederation of the Rhine armies in the 1809 campaign.

Volume I covers the great efforts of the French, including Napoleon and Davout, in using all of their available intelligence and espionage resources to find out about the coming Austrian invasion of Bavaria. And the Confederation of the Rhine allies, such as Bavaria and Saxony, were employed with their considerable assets to sniff out the Austrian preparations.

Chapter 3 'Austria Would Not Be So Foolish' is very helpful to find out how the French used their considerable assets, including venturing into Bohemia, to find out the Austrian intentions and preparations. Napoleon was kept fully informed of what was found, including the treasonous conduct of Talleyrand and Fouche, Talleyrand being sacked for his involvement in treason.

One of the most interesting statements by the author is on page 88 of the subject volume: '…by the middle of March. Napoleon had in his hands a complete picture of Austrian dispositions along the borders with Germany and an enemy order of battle that was 95 per cent accurate: a remarkable achievement by any standard.'

Indeed creating a police state, taking control of newspapers, opening private letters even of trusted subordinates, re introducing slavery, creating scapegoats, all very modern traits of dictators.

Posting 'information' that is at the very least questionable should be accompanied by sourcing from credible source material.

Merely posting a suspect listing is both ahistorical and blatantly inaccurate.

unfortunately the contribution of Dave Hollins were deleted, I did not paste and copy those well thought replies for history repeating.