"Napoleon Could Have Won the Peninsular War" Topic

Why Napoleon Departed Spain for Paris in January 1809.

If the real reason he left Spain in 1808 was to deal with an Austrian attack that started five months later (while he was still in Paris – which is preposterous in itself)…

Napoleon left Spain on 17 January 1809 and reached Paris by horseback and coach at 0800 23 January, a distance about 1,100 kilometers.

Taking a look at the first volume in Jack Gill's Thunder of the Danube from pages 81-89 makes it perfectly clear that all the strategic intelligence Napoleon was receiving in Spain from his embassies, diplomats, and commanders in central Europe, especially from Davout, clearly pointed out that Austria was preparing to go to war with the French Empire.

Additionally, Napoleon had received intelligence from Paris that Talleyrand and Fouche were up to their favorite hobby of betraying their country and the Empire. They were up to their usual intrigues of replacing the Emperor and when this was discovered by Antoine Lavallette, the postal minister and a dedicated and loyal public servant, he immediately sent dispatches to Napoleon in Spain letting him know what was going on in Paris.

Napoleon had two reasons for leaving Spain early, after engaging in a victorious campaign against the Spaniards and Moore's small British army.

What specifically is ‘preposterous' about Napoleon's actions here? And it should be noted that Napoleon usually remained in Paris as long as possible just before hostilities began. He certainly did in 1806.

Failed British Operations

It's a good thing Britain never loses a war. Oh, and Happy 4th guys!

Well said!

The following are failed British operations during the Napoleonic Wars:

-Flanders in 1793-1795.
-Holland in 1799.
-Spain and Italy in 1800.
-Naples and Hanover in 1805.
-Buenos Aires, Egypt, and the Dardenelles in 1806-1807.
-Spain and Sweden in 1808.
-Holland in 1809.
-North America in 1814-1815.

It appears that the British didn't do too well without Wellington in charge or in command…and even he had his problems with failed sieges and such humiliating retreats as from Burgos in 1812…

The Royal Navy was quite big, in case I am not mistaken, and it is usually ignored taking into the account of the British commitment in military men and hardware.

As to the Peninsular War, most of the best French infantry was ruined there.

In case I understood Boney correctly, he regarded Britain to be his most dangerous and main enemy.

The following inaccurate comments have been addressed in order to support the historical record:

His Imperial Majesty was always better at defeating hostile armies than in making friends of foreign nations. Appeasing the Iberian people was beyond him, logistics were always his weak point, and an army would have had to remain in central Europe to keep his "allies" in line.

It appears that Napoleon did very well in creating the Confederation of the Rhine. I don't believe that it was Napoleon's intent to ‘appease' anyone during his career.

The creation of the military supply battalions in 1807 with the Trains des Equipages Militaires which replaced the usual civilian contractors, especially the Compagnie Breidt. The Train des Equipages was based at Sampigny in Lorraine. There were thirteen supply battalions in 1809; twenty-three in 1812. Fifteen supply battalions went into Russia in 1812. For 1813, nine battalions were formed. And while the Grande Armee at times went hungry, it never ran out of ammunition. It came close once, at Leipzig, as the trains were cut off in Eilenberg.

What ‘allies' had to be kept ‘in line'? Troops had been stationed in central Europe after the campaigns of 1805 and 1807 to keep an eye on prospective enemies.

Napoleon finding evidence in Berlin that Spain would switch sides if Napoleon had been defeated in Prussia.

The evidence was found in Berlin after the French took the Prussian capitol.

If you come to the era without the a priori view that Napoleon was a secular modern saint who single-handedly invented the metric system, secondary education and Germany, and look at his career with a slightly less awestruck eye, you may well end up concluding that he was in fact a grudge-holding, vengeful chancer with a manipulative streak a mile wide, a determination to avoid blame for anything and take credit for everything, and a goal of turning Europe back into a Dark Ages moral wilderness, where feuding robber barons ruled, with himself as the daddy.

He wasn't a friend of the Revolution.

Napoleon supported the Revolution as a junior officer and fought for it in the campaigns of 1796, 1797 in Italy and in Egypt, but did not support or agree with the more bloodthirsty portions of it such as the Terror.

He didn't want a democracy.

None of the major powers in Europe, Great Britain included, were democracies during this period. Neither was the United States.

He didn't oppose hereditary monarchy.

He did oppose the Bourbons in both France and later Spain.

He just wanted it to be his clan who were the hereditary monarchs.

Napoleon's ‘clan' was his family and although he was not the eldest son (Joseph was) he believed himself responsible for taking care of his family after his father diedNapoleon's civil accomplishments and reforms were his greatest legacy:

…would on balance still be a force for net bad, to some extent or other.

That is the Corelli Barnett/Alan Schom viewpoint which is historically incorrect and peppered with inaccuracies.

The Corsican parvenu planted no colonnades. If he did anything that happened to benefit future generations, it was incidental to the real reason he did this, which was that it benefited him, right then and now.

Nonsense. Anything such as these accusations are made, they should be supported by evidence.

Napoleon was born on Corsica after the island became part of France. Therefore, he was French.

Napoleon's civil accomplishments and reforms were his greatest legacy. And a good portion of his civil and governmental reforms are still in force in France today.

-Introduced the Civil Code, followed by other legal codes such as a new Penal Code, one which was less punitive than that of Great Britain.

-Restored the Church, and allowed religious freedom.

-Issued a ‘pardon' to the emigres and urged them to return to France.

-Ended the political and social problems in the Vendee, ending the civil war there.

-Completely revamped French public and private education. Napoleon spent more money on education than on any other civil function.

-Built new roads, canals, harbors, bridges, and drained swamps.

-Established orphanges and hospitals, and public sanitation.

-Established a Paris fire department.

-Established the prefect system.

-Reformed the National, later Imperial, Gendarmerie.

-Guaranteed basic civil rights.

-Guaranteed freedom of religion.

-Granted Jews full citizenship.

-Introduced gas lighting.

-Introduced the smallpox vaccine to the European continent.

-Abolished feudalism within the Empire
.
-Built three trade roads through the Alps.

-Trees were planted along France's roads.

-Established a government office to protect France's forests, lakes and rivers.

-Established better water and sewer systems for Paris.

-Balanced his budgets and established a sound financial system.

-Because of his insistence on public finance, the franc became the most stable currency in Europe by 1810.

-Encouraged and sponsored improvements in agriculture.

-Insisted on honesty in his officials and established an agency to ensure that occurred.

-Was a patron of the arts.

-Established the Legion of Honor, open to all both civil and military.

-Established France's first bureau of statistics.

-Reestablished horse-breeding in France.

-Improved French industry.

-Brought full employment, stable prices, and an improved balance of trade.

-Law and order was reestablished in France after the chaos of the Revolution while keeping in place the social gains of the Revolution.

-He was the first French ruler that cared if the people ate or starved.

-abolished the Inquisition in Spain and the Papal States and abolished the last Jewish ghetto in Rome.

Supporting Documentation on Napoleon

Part I

The following might be helpful when discussing Napoleon, his government, and his character:

From Baron Fain's Memoirs:

‘Examples of [Napoleon's] political generosity are not lacking. Who has not heard spoken of the mercy granted to the Polignac brothers, the pardon of the Prince of Herzfled, etc.? For myself, I did not know the following. I take it from a memoir which fell into my hands: ‘Senator Lanjuinais found himself compromised in two successive conspiracies. Napoleon did not even have him questioned, despite the fact that he disliked Lanjuinais.'

‘As for his political opinions, they were liberal. But I will not dissemble: the apparent contradiction of his actions and biases that a jumble of times, principles, and men inspire in the new constitutional school of 1814 requires that I explain myself…Napoleon's political education, begun with reading the writers of antiquity, was completed in the camps of the Republic. The early impressions were never erased…In the informality of private life, memories of his patriotic youth stirred constantly and in all guises. If he was unconsciously humming a tune, It was ‘Allons, enfants de la Patrie' or ‘Let us watch over the safety of the Empire!' [the latter being a Republican song written by A. Boys, the second line being ‘Let us watch over the preservation of our rights.' During the period, ‘empire' and ‘nation' were largely synonymous].'
‘However, after his rise to commander in chief, he feared nothing so much as revealing the opinions of his bygone youth, and his policy in this respect went so far as to cultivate and even to seek out men of opposing opinions. He acquired this false sense of shame on his arrival in Paris towards the middle of the year III. Transported too abruptly from the bivouacs of the army in the Var to the gilded salons of Thermidorian reaction, he could not defend himself against all the prejudices that assailed him…It was here that he heard for the first time that the Republic was not defensible; that the Reign of Terror had killed it; that is was merely a system of dupes and ambitious men without means, that anyone of good company was breaking away from it…Not being able to resign himself to appearing in this society as a man of bad taste, Napoleon then began to keep his opinions to himself…If men of opposing causes found him accessible and favorably inclined, it was only in relation to them personally, by reason of their own merit and the generous biases he willingly granted in their favor; but not to the profit of their opinions nor their systems which he never ceased to treat as enemies. The reconciliation of all men of worth with the interests created by the revolution and the fusion of all kinds of superiority in a purely national system became his favorite idea. This is the modification his republican ideas underwent long before the calculation of his own interests had led him to listen to what could also work to his advantage.'

‘Equality of rights was everything in Napoleon's eyes. He saw all the good of the French revolution expressed there is a single phrase, and he brought great honor on himself by keeping this vital principle safe and sound. He overestimated the gratitude that would one day be his for this, while the orators of the counterrevolutionary party proclaimed from their side that ‘his greatest triumph for posterity would be having defended against all rebellions of the human spirit a social order about to disintegrate.'

Supporting Documentation on Napoleon

Part II

‘As for the running battle that Napoleon waged against ideologists, it is enough to remember that there is ordinarily little agreement between great kings and philosophers. Thomas assures us that their greatness is shocked and repelled.'

From the former Bishop of Malines de Pradt:

‘Napoleon has been portrayed as a man-eater, a brutal and ruthless! Nothing could be further from the truth. His bark was worse than his bite; the storm clouds dispersed in a hail, a hurricane of words to which he himself attached no importance the next moment. I have heard him say, following a fierce outburst against one of his relatives: ‘The poor wretch! He makes me say what I do not think and what I would never have meant to say!' A quarter of an hour later, he would call back those he had abruptly dismissed and return to those he had offended: I have had this experience.''

From the Napoleonic Revolution by Robert Holtman:

‘In addition to the Civil Code, five other codes were drawn up. The Rural Code was never adopted; those which went into effect were a Code of Civil Procedure in 1806, a Commercial Code in 1807, a Code of Criminal Procedure in 1808, and a Penal Code in 1810. The Penal Code was both progressive and reactionary; reactionary in that it provided for severe and unjust penalties-among them branding, and the cutting off of a hand for parricide in addition to decapitation; progressive in its provision for minimum and maximum rather than fixed penalties. The Code of Criminal Procedure was reactionary in that it permitted arbitrary arrest and partially reestablished the secrecy of court proceedings that had prevailed during the ancient regime; the accused could no longer hear the testimony against him.'-93.

Supporting Documentation on Napoleon

Part III

‘The Imperial police has been slandered. It was arbitrary, that was in its nature; that's why in free countries people disapprove of a so-called [ministry of] general police…For my part, I can guarantee that, in all the ministerial correspondence, I never saw anything that could offend the conscience of an honest man, and I often found there liberal principles that would vindicate, if that were possible, an institution condemned at all times by public opinion…If one considers the obstacles and the perils that ceaselessly threatened the Emperor and the Empire, I can guarantee that in terms of arbitrary actions the imperial police remained far inferior to the police in states that were more solidly established.'-Antoine-Clair Thibaudeau, prefect of Bouche-du-Rhone.

‘I was as perfectly free as I am in England, I went whithersoever I was desirous of going, and was uniformly received with the same politeness and hospitality as while pace still subsisted between the two countries [Britain and France]. I never witnessed harsh measures of the government but towards the turbulent and factious; I saw everywhere works of public utility going forward; industry, commerce, and the arts encouraged; and I could not consider the people as unhappy, or the government as odious…I have found speech everywhere as free in France as in England; I have heard persons deliver their sentiments on Bonaparte and his government, whether favorable or unfavorable, without the least reserve; and that not in private companies only, among friends all known to each other, but in the most public manner, and in the most mixed societies, in diligences, and at tables-d'hote, where none could be previously acquainted with the character or sentiments of those with whom they were conversing, and where some one among the company might be a spy of the police for anything that the others knew to the contrary-yet this idea was no restraint upon them.'-Anne Plumptre, A Narrative of a Three Years' Residence in France…from the year 1802-1805

Supporting Documentation on Napoleon

Part IV

From ‘Imperial France in 1808 and Beyond by Thierry Lentz contained in The Napoleonic Empire and the New European Political Culture edited by Michael Broers, Peter Hicks, and Augustin Guimera:

‘That the regime introduced by Napoleon was an authoritarian regime can hardly be disputed. That we can characterize it simply as a dictatorship however seems excessive…the presence of opposing powers, the durability of certain principles limiting the action of the executive, and the circumstances themselves all contrived to reduce the head of state's room to maneuver.'-26.

‘Once this justification for the definition of the regime as a military dictatorship has been eliminated (that based on the origins of the regime), we can ask whether the First Empire was a military dictatorship. And the answer is no.'-27.

'It is unlikely that the army has ever played such a limited role in France, and it certainly did not play a practical role in the maintenance of law and order, a task which was fulfilled by the gendarmerie and the police.'-Gilbert Bodinier

Supporting Documentation on Napoleon

Part V

‘Napoleon was constantly on guard against the generals' ambition and the people's discontent; he was unceasingly occupied with stifling the one and preventing the other. He was seen throughout to observe the greatest reserve as regards his generals; he always kept them at a great distance from him.'-Chaptal.

‘We often get the impression that the army had a predominant place in Napoleonic society, and this impression is fuelled by the fact that many generals accepted posts of responsibility at the heart of its institutions and administrative bodies. The presence of military pomp and grandeur at the numerous ceremonies and the precedence accorded to superior officers seem like further proof. It is important, however, to put these facts into perspective, even though, during this period of conflict, the army gives the impression of being one of the mainstays-more symbolic, it must be said, than active, at least domestically speaking-of the imperial regime.'-27.

‘Despite appearances, the First Empire was not a military dictatorship. We can therefore trust Napoleon was sincere when he said: ‘Military authority has no place or use in the civil order. The Emperor appears to have earned the respect of Roederer who, immediately post-Brumaire, stated that he (Napoleon) was ‘the most civilian of generals.'-30

Supporting Documentation on Napoleon

Part VI

‘Napoleonic power was not exerted arbitrarily but within established judicial norms. The fundamental law of the First Empire was the evolutionary series of reforms begun in 1789, which Godechot called the ‘irreversible options': equality before the law, the abolition of feudalism, and a constitutional and representative government. With a few organizational readjustments (the concentration of the executive, the reorganization of national representation, the division of the legislature) there was constitutional activity under Napoleon, which could even be described as lively. Understanding the interpretation, application and evolution of these constitutional principles without being constrained by ‘liberal thought'-dominant today but not at the time-allows us better to understand the evolution of the Napoleonic state as it gradually but ineluctably advanced towards the ‘legislation' of the exercise of power in France.'-31.

‘Bonaparte was already a partisan of strong government, as can be seen in his letter to Talleyrand, itself a sort of first draft for his constitutional project: ‘In a government in which every authority emanates from the nation, in which the sovereign is of the people, why include in the legislative power such things that are foreign to it?…The power of the government, in all the breadth I give it, should be considered the true representative of the nation, and it should govern in according to the constitutional charter…It would comprise the entirety of the administration or the execution, which is by our constitution conferred on the legislative power…[The] legislative power, impassive, without rank in the Republic, without eyes or ears for that which surrounds it, would have no ambition and would no longer inundate us with a thousand circumstantial laws which are self-defeating through their very absurdity, and which make us a lawless nation with three-hundred large tomes of laws.'-32.

'Truly it is difficult to conceive of a constitution which offers more guarantees for the rights of the people. It is difficult to leave less to the arbitrary judgment of the head of the government. The limits of power are clear and unconfused.'-Chaptal

Supporting Documentation on Napoleon

Part VII

‘Apart from its leader, the State now stood at the center of French society. One author has even written of a ‘Napoleonic Revolution.' Napoleon succeeded where Louis XVI and his ministers had failed in the 1780s. He strengthened and modernized the state, again imbuing it with both unity and authority.'-34-35.

‘…Bonaparte spared France from a violent, military dictatorship. The Napoleonic regime made its soldiers obedient tools of the government, not a state within a state…The gradual tightening of the Napoleonic regime is of course irrefutable. But to criticize the consular and imperial seizure of power, is to do so in the name of the French Revolution, a revolution which had little respect for the principles it sought to impose on the world.'-35

From The First Napoleon by John Ropes:

‘The fall of Toulon was followed by wholesale executions. Even Lanfrey, who invariably makes the worst of the subject of his biography, admits frankly that all these harsh and barbarous things were abhorrent to Napoleon's nature, and that he did what he could to shield those unfortunates who came under the suspicion of the authorities. As to this side of Napoleon's character, we may as well pause here a moment and consider it. In spite of all the battles that he fought, and all the death, wounds, sickness, and misery inseparable from such vast military operations for twenty years he conducted, it may safely be affirmed that Napoleon was not a harsh, still less a cruel man. All the contemporary writers of any authority admit this in so many words, even though they may consider his comparative indifference to all this suffering almost as bad as cruelty or harshness, and even though they can point to some incidents in his career that certainly look like both. But the popular accusations of Napoleon on his head proceeds on the mistaken notion that to conduct so many wars a man must have a very hard heart. A little reflection, however, will show that this need not be so at all. A statesman deciding on war may no doubt often be charged rightly with not having sufficiently considered the miseries which his decision must involve. But, culpable as this is, it does not show any unusual indifference to human suffering: it is merely the failure properly to bring these wretched incidents of war before the mind; it is a deficiency in imagination…Napoleon, bred in a military school, wrapped up in the military profession, undoubtedly considered war and the shortest and best way of settling all political disputes; and, very likely, as a military man, ‘a man of war from his youth,' many of the incidents of a campaign which to the civilian mind are most distressing were so familiar that it never occurred to him to notice them. As the ruler of the French Empire he no doubt often resorted to war when any one in his place not a military man, and accustomed as he was to military methods, would have chosen some peaceful mode of action. When at the head of an army, careful as he undeniably was of his soldiers' welfare in all respects, he used them, as any general who expects to win a battle must use them, with a single eye to the success of the day, and without allowing the imagination to raise disturbing pictures of wounds and death. Just so, a surgeon, devoted to his profession, magnifying its importance, may resort to an operation when his professional brother, the physician, would have counseled milder treatment; and, when he is performing the operation, he must, if he is a good surgeon, sue the knife unshrinkingly. Yet we all know that it would be very erroneous for us to attribute to such a surgeon any special harshness of temper or indifference to human suffering. Bearing these principles and keeping these analogies in mind, we shall understand, I think, pretty clearly what can and what cannot fairly be alleged against Napoleon in this regard. He was, as I have said, a soldier, born and bred; he was all his life in the army; he had a genius for war, and was skillful and successful beyond measure in military operations. If he sometimes engaged in a war when one more alive to its evils would have avoided it, he never countenanced unnecessary or purposeless fighting. With him, a battle was always a serious and a critical mater; the troops were spared as much as possible beforehand; it was always his plan to make the encounter a decisive one, and for this end he spared no pains. In his attention to the sick and wounded he has never been surpassed.'-15-18.

Supporting Documentation on Napoleon

Part VIII

‘…that in [Napoleon] there exited any very definite and solemn recognition of his responsibilities; that his life was a struggle to come up to the requirements of an educated and vigilant conscience. Be it so. Nevertheless, it remains true, that his powers were always at the service of the public; that his efforts as a whole were on the right side; that he was the unsparing foe of tyranny and injustice; and that he did more than any man of his time to relieve the masses of the people of Europe from the burdens which oppression and intolerance had laid upon them, and to open to them the prospects and hopes which under a liberal and enlightened government give to life so much of its enjoyment and value. He must be classed among the friends and helpers of the race.'-307-308.

‘It is not inconsistent with the views here presented of the character of Napoleon, that we should find him occasionally resorting to measures of extreme severity. Where it seemed to him to be necessary, in order to preserve his army, to suppress dangerous insurrections, or the like, he rarely hesitated to employ what seemed to him the most sure mode of accomplishing his object. It is in this way that we must account for the wholesale execution of the prisoners of Jaffa, most of whom, having been recently released on parole, were found again in arms against the French. In a similar light we should regard the severities which accompanied the final extinction of the insurrections in La Vendee, and those which he recommended his brother Joseph to employ against the fierce and obstinate resistance of the Neapolitan lazzaroni. In this unhesitating employment of force on occasions of this nature, Napoleon much resembled Cromwell.'

‘But this sort of thing does not constitute a man a tyrant, or even a harsh ruler. The stability of society, the welfare of well-disposed citizens, the interests of progress and of liberal government even, may well, in times of turmoil and revolution, be more secure when entrusted to such a man, than if committed to the charge of one less practical and less inflexible.' 309-310.

Summary:

So, it appears that Napoleon did govern by the rule of law and not arbitrarily. Also, he was no tyrant. And compared with his fellow heads of state, he ruled justly and fairly. He may very well have developed into an autocrat, but the evidence shows that he ruled as a civilian head of state and not as a military dictator. The ‘accusations' that Napoleon did not govern by the rule of law are incorrect and nothing of substance was put forward to demonstrate that incorrect theory, or the other 'ideas' posted on this thread.

As an addendum to the question: 'Napoleon finding evidence in Berlin that Spain would switch sides if Napoleon had been defeated in Prussia.' On page 511 of John Elting's Swords Around a Throne it reads in part:

'One important reason for Napoleon's seizure of Spain in 1808 was his discovery two years previously that the Spanish government (then his ally) had been prepared to stab him in the back if his Prussian campaign got into difficulties.'

@Brechtel

That's a lot of knowledge. It'll be interesting how someone with a penchant to tinker with statistics and facts deals with that.

I'd like to point out that the French didnt actually lose in the Peninsula, an armistice was called and that Soult was still fighting hard until he received news of it.

Same for Waterloo, we dont know that Napoleon couldnt very well have rebounded against the allies but he lacked contnued backing by the Senate.

And yes, in both instances he abdicated. So much for absolutism.

I wonder how many times George III, Alexander I, Francis II and Frederick William of Prussia abdicated? Hmmm.

It's interesting that a few modern day persons can become so unglued over Napoleon when you consider that Francis II who had a lot more reason to dislike him gave him his daughter in marriage. That suggests that an alarming mischanneling of psychic energy over something they haven't the slightest connection to might be a a sign of something more somber.

Historical Inquiry requires the gathering and researching of facts to come to a logical conclusion. And that does require a lot of reading…and good judgment in the assembling and assessing of source material.

And as a good friend as well as a military historian told me long ago, all any of us are doing is merely scratching the surface.

I'd like to point out that the French didnt actually lose in the Peninsula, an armistice was called and that Soult was still fighting hard until he received news of it.

Are you aware that Toulouse was (is) in France?

Are you aware that Toulouse was (is) in France?

There were holdouts still in places like Barcelona until the very end.

But yes, I meant the Peninsular War. I'm fairly sure that, but for the armistice, the French would've gone back into Spain.

11 posts in a row?
Hadn't quite realised what a personal fiefdom this forum is.

I'm fairly sure that, but for the armistice, the French would've gone back into Spain.

Have you ever heard anything about the Treaty of Valençay?

It was signed by Napoleon in December 1813, before the armistice. It was Napoleon who asked for peace, recognizing Fernando's sovereignty over Spain and the pre-war boundaries.

In fact, the Treaty of Valençay was proof that Napoleon recognized that he had lost the Peninsular War. He wanted to leave Spain for good, and to use his troops against other enemies.

Just to note that the "main" theatre, central Europe, was so important that absolutely nobody commented on the anniversary of Wagram last week.

It's almost as though these short-lived, half-baked campaigns were of no account compared to where the real action was.

Regardless of the length of time spent in Spain, etc, Spain was still a secondary theater in 1809, 1812, 1813, and 1814. And in 1810-1811 it was considered a time of relative peace in the Empire with some divisions being placed on a peace footing and all ranks were put on peacetime pay.

To which 'half-baked campaigns' are you referring?

Have you ever heard anything about the Treaty of Valençay?

If i understand it, this was to buy time for Napoleon while he dealt with matters in France. I dont think it was a proper treaty, just the prelude to one; more of an armistice. Also, I believe it was never fully ratified and repudiated by the Spanish junta once Ferdinand was safely out of French clutches.

Well, Napoleon asked for peace and expressly recognized Fernando's sovereignty and Spanish pre-war boundaries. With an armistice you can buy time, but with a Treaty like that you recognize you have lost the war, renouncing any right or claim.

it ws never fully ratified and repudiated by the Spainish junta once Ferdinand was safely out of French clutches.

That is not the point. The point is Napoleon's decision.

The point is that Napoleon asked for peace and signed the Treaty. The relevant thing is that Napoleon recognized he had lost the Peninsular War and wanted to leave Spain for good.

'King' Joseph reaction was quite illustrative.

Just to note that the "main" theatre, central Europe, was so important that absolutely nobody commented on the anniversary of Wagram last week.

It's almost as though these short-lived, half-baked campaigns were of no account compared to where the real action was.

Yes, but no one noticed the anniversary of Fuentes D'Orno either.

Happy belated Fuentes D'Orno day!

The point is that Napoleon asked for peace and signed the Treaty

Well, that and the fact that Soult had already been driven out of Spain before Leipzig; Suchet had already abandoned all of Valencia, Aragon and half of Catalonia by this point too. The idea that the French were going back into Spain is ridiculous in the extreme.

Ferdinand proved to be both reactionary and incompetent.

He treated those who had fought for him in his absence badly.

Well, Napoleon asked for peace and expressly recognized Fernando's sovereignty and Spanish pre-war boundaries. With an armistice you can buy time, but with a Treaty like that you recognize you have lost the war, renouncing any right or claim.

it ws never fully ratified and repudiated by the Spainish junta once Ferdinand was safely out of French clutches.

That is not the point. The point is Napoleon's decision.

The point is that Napoleon asked for peace and signed the Treaty. The relevant thing is that Napoleon recognized he had lost the Peninsular War and wanted to leave Spain for good.

'King' Joseph reaction was quite illustrative.

I suppose it is one possible view but Napoleon was constantly negotiating with several powers to gain time.

It as very possible that Napoleon was doing this treaty to get Spain out of the war and nullify any need for an Anglo-Portuguese invasion of France.

The first few paragraphs here discuss this:

link
Apparently, in a bid to get more troops away from the Pyrenees and into the Eastern French area, Napoleon had begun issuing orders to Soult to send virtually all his troops to Napoleon.

Thus, your state of mind conclusion for Napoleon isnt ironclad.

In any case, Napoleon hadnt lost the Peninsular campaign and still had troops in Spain. It was still going on after the armistice was called.

Additionally, I believe he would've re-invaded. Possibly himself, assuming he could settle things on his Eastern frontier.

Napoleon was a brilliant legal codifier – and reformer generally. Whether people in Europe today approve of him or not, no one informed would deny the advantages of the Code Napoleon-based legal framework – a hell of a lot safer fir ‘the little man' than the common law of the Anglosphere.
Returning ro the topic of the post. Yes, he could have avoided the disaster in two ways – but he was a very human, emotional person (personally – despite the famous ‘What are the lives of a million men to a man like me?)
1) At several points, starting at the meeting in France in 1708, Ferdinand tried to persuade Napoleon to include him in the system/family as King by jarrying him to a Bonaparte princess – Paulina I think. Having met Ferdinand (a really nasty piece of work) and seen his treachery to gis father, Napoleon just could bot bring himself to do this (even if it gave him Spain down to the Ebro) and – as commented, only finally made the offer when it was all but over in late 1813. His favourite sister? Who came to gim at Elba later? No way.
2) He DID intend to return in 1810 but found himself in love with his beautiful, nubile, blonde (who liked sex and didn't play games with him like Josephine). The irony of all the criticism of Massena over Busaco (too busy with gis young mistress) is that Napoleon was doing the same thing.
He was human for God's sake.
Thus he blew both chances. If he had come to Spain in 1810 then the British would probably been bundled out of Portugal before the lines of Torres Vedras were finished – instead if which, Joseph, against orders, invaded Andalucia and neither he nor Soult could ever after bring themselves to abandon it. Hence the 1st & 4th Corps – among the best troops in Spain – basically out of the main action. Plus Marshals all squabbling.
It could have been done – as Suchet showed.

Suchet showed what? How to tread water despite being faced only by third rate Spanish, assorted irregulars and tiny Allied expeditionary forces. He contributed nothing to the wider French cause in the Peninsula but the fanboys delude themselves with "If Suchet had been in charge, we would have won". But who was it that made the appointments?

Eeeeeeeyyyyyyaaaaawwwwwwwnnnnnn!

Whether people in Europe today approve of him or not, no one informed would deny the advantages of the Code Napoleon-based legal framework – a hell of a lot safer fir ‘the little man' than the common law of the Anglosphere.

Says the forwardcombinglittlefat*****r fawners of the world.

If he had come to Spain in 1810 then the British would probably been bundled out of Portugal before the lines of Torres Vedras were finished – instead if which, Joseph, against orders, invaded Andalucia and neither he nor Soult could ever after bring themselves to abandon it. Hence the 1st & 4th Corps – among the best troops in Spain – basically out of the main action. Plus Marshals all squabbling.

"If" Double Eeeeeeeyyyyyyaaaaawwwwwwwnnnnnn!

If Nappy had played with his dad's gun, he could have blown his own brains out! But only 'if' mind…

I still suspect that Napoleon would have struggled with the Lines of Torres Vedras. They were started in 1809 and the main part commenced in February 1810. I suspect that most would have been in position by the time Napoleon would have crossed a Spain with a large army and reached Portugal.

It also shouldn't be forgotten that an important part of the defence was the scorched earth policy. Massena lost 21000 men out of 61000 to starvation and disease. The saying is "In Spain, small armies are cut up and big armies starve". It is difficult to see how a bigger army could have been sustained. Not impossible that Napoleon could have won in 1810 but unlikely.

Well off topic but regarding the comments about Common law versus Code Napoleon, I discussed this with someone who has had a legal training. In practice there is very little difference, it depends more on who is implementing it. There have been miscarriages of justice in both systems. Common law systems introduced individual protection earlier than other systems – the Bill of Rights was passed in 1689 in England and in 1789 in the US. In modern times, the UK has fewer cases pending with the European Court of Human Rights than equivalent countries and has a better record of implementing its recommendations than France, Italy and Germany. Ireland has even fewer pending cases.

A thoughtful answer I agree with (about Napoleon and Spain). On the ECHR, in relation to violations 1957-2022 of Western European countries, only Italy, France and Greece have note than the UK (admittedly MUCH more – esp. Italy. Taking a long view like that avoids overemphasising the effects if current policy too.
No one would deny the significance of the Bill of Rights and US revolution – but in terms of constitutions (which UK still doesn't have) the French revolution has surely had far more effect). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (or whatever is the correct name – written postwar like the Council of Europe one for the ECHR) was largely written by Latin Americans heavily influenced by the (never implemented) Spanish 1812 constitution, itself heavily influenced by the French revolution.
Anyway, back to the topic: possible but unlikely. There was a chance to do it in 1810. By Spring 1811 the tide had already turned, especially after Albuera and Fuentes.

Au Pas de Charge

What of La Rochelle, which didn't surrender until the 8th May, Dunkirk surrendered on 9th May and Saint-Nazaire on 11th May 1945?

Teodoro,

Thanks for your gracious reply. Legally speaking Britain does have a constitution but it isn't a single codified document. New Zealand and Israel are the same. I was amused to hear a US law professor say that constitutional reform is so much easier in Britain as Parliament just has to change the law!

Au Pas de Charge

What of La Rochelle, which didn't surrender until the 8th May, Dunkirk surrendered on 9th May and Saint-Nazaire on 11th May 1945?

Not quite sure what you mean. That although there were were pockets of resistance in both Wars, that doesn't mean that the war wasn't already lost?

I don't think it's a certainty but it doesn't look like Napoleon was defeated militarily in 1814 as much as he was via both French public opinion and political pressure. Both he and Soult seemed ready to fight on. By contrast, Hitler killed himself.

I don't know that things were looking great in the Peninsular War but Soult was treading water and just as the released men from the Garrisons trapped around Germany formed a nucleus of veterans for Napoleon in 1815, the garrisons in Spain could've also been helpful.

I suppose it depends on what level you examine a side's ability to win. For example, when Lee surrendered, there were still other Confederate armies in the field and Jefferson Davis wanted to continue the fight but the general will to resist had been deflated among the Southern intelligentsia.

Thus, from a social and political viewpoint, Napoleon certainly lost across the board but from a military one, he still could've won the Peninsular war.

Oh good! From what I gathered it seemed that you thought otherwise without actually letting on.

The Duke and the allies did win it.

'whatifs' are nothing but childish daydreams. Usually put forward my those who feel they have to sate the hurt for themselves and their 'hero'…Never mind.