"The British Viewpoint ..." Topic

…On the Continentals and Militia…

The information provided is taken from With Zeal and Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783 by Matthew Spring:

The British Army's objectives in the war:

-'defeat and disperse the rebels' conventional military forces'

-'encourage the populace to cease supporting Congress' war effort, and even to transfer that support to the Crown'

-'induce the rebel leadership to give up the armed struggle in favor of a political settlement.' (page 3)

‘The Continental Army was the foremost obstacle to the restoration of British authority in the colonies…With the support of the local militia and state-controlled regular forces (which could not undertake major operations), the Continental Army's commanders were tasked with eliminating or inducing the withdrawal of Britain's military forces and thereby breaking her capacity and/or will to dispute American independence.'-6.

‘…if [the British] divide their forces they will fall by detachments, and if they operate collectively, they cannot command the country.'-Nathaniel Greene, May 1781.-9.

‘[The militia] are, moreover, trained four times in each year, so that they do not make a despicable appearance as soldiers, though they were never yet known to behave themselves even decently in the field'-Brigadier General Lord Percy, 15.

‘Throughout the American War, militiamen's tendency to come and go as they pleased (often taking scarce equipment with them) caused senior rebel commanders much frustration, and their inability to stand up to British regulars in the open field contributed to a number of disastrous rebel defeats, most particularly the battle of Camden.'-15.

‘These militia swarms were capable of mounting stiff resistance to small British forces…and on occasion inflicted sharp reverses on them…Similarly, British pickets, patrols, escorts, and flanking and foraging parties were at constant risk of hit-and-run attacks by prowling militia parties, especially in the south, where these ‘crackers' generally operated mounted.'-15.

‘I will not say much in praise of the militia of the southern colonies, but the list of British officers and soldiers killed and wounded by them since last June proves too fatally that they are not wholly contemptible.'-Lord Cornwallis 1781.

‘…throughout the conflict, wherever British troops were not immediately in force, the militia ensured popular compliance with the rebel government. It also forcibly suppressed loyalist activity, using terror when necessary…'-16.

‘…even on a reduced scale Crown forces could not safely attempt to subdue via direct via direct occupation a population that contained significant hostile elements while the Continental Army remained in being to threaten them with defeat in detail.'-17.

‘…whatever their private sympathies, a large proportion of the colonists…appear to have remained essentially uncommitted, taking the path of least resistance by submitting to whichever party happened to dominate locally…the loyalties of those Americans who chose to play an active part in the conflict were frequently shaped less by ideology than by prewar ethnic, political, economic, religious, and personal rivalries and were liable to change according to circumstances.'-18.

Therefore, the British realized that the Continental Army was the main enemy that had to be defeated in order to subdue American resistance. Further, local loyalties were many times an ‘iffy' proposition, and that included the militia of those areas. And the ‘Long Faces' were too many times a liability to the war effort, despite myth and legend to the contrary.

This volume is highly recommended for its viewpoints on ‘the other side of the hill.' Unfortunately, the British Army granted no battle honors to the regiments that served in North America and elsewhere during the War of the Revolution regardless of their performance in the field. And that is a great shame for those units and their descendants.

Have it in my library. agree with your assessment, highly recommended!

I,too, consider this on par with the late Christopher Duffy's excellent books- a Must Have!

Still feel the British failed to make better use of loyalist support, especially militarily.

Agree – also the Brits might have made some concessions (like granting seats in Parliament to Americans)

Yes, ZEAL is a great contribution to the literature. And Ive no quarrel with any of Kevin's quotes, of which several are exactly what I have been arguing all along:

‘…if [the British] divide their forces they will fall by detachments, and if they operate collectively, they cannot command the country.'-Nathaniel Greene, May 1781.-9.

‘…even on a reduced scale Crown forces could not safely attempt to subdue via direct via direct occupation a population that contained significant hostile elements while the Continental Army remained in being to threaten them with defeat in detail.'-17.

This is John Shy's argument in "The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War" and precisely the problem we faced in Vietnam: fighting the VC required dispersion and fighting the NVA regulars required concentration, and we hadn't the troops to do both.

‘…throughout the conflict, wherever British troops were not immediately in force, the militia ensured popular compliance with the rebel government. It also forcibly suppressed loyalist activity, using terror when necessary…'-16.

Because a revolutionary struggle is about control of the population.

By 1780 the Brits had figured this out, hence the efforts to organize a Loyalist militia in the Carolinas. Breaking that up was Marion's and Sumter's principle contribution to victory.

‘…whatever their private sympathies, a large proportion of the colonists…appear to have remained essentially uncommitted, taking the path of least resistance by submitting to whichever party happened to dominate locally…the loyalties of those Americans who chose to play an active part in the conflict were frequently shaped less by ideology than by prewar ethnic, political, economic, religious, and personal rivalries and were liable to change according to circumstances.'-18.

Yes, and this, while correct, is INCOMPLETE. The militia was a mechanism FORCING commitment. Of course many wanted to keep their heads down and cheer loudly for whatever army was marching through. But sooner or later each individual man would get a summons to militia duty, at which point he either went or refused to go. Either way he has now taken a public stand for which he can ne held accountable.

Of course the British initially saw the Continental Army as their main opponent and main problem -- instead of seeing it as one of the two horns of their dilemma. After Saratoga they largely figured it out, hence the southern strategy built around the Loyalists and aiming at establishing a militia SYSTEM comparable to what the Patriots had. Not for field duty but for population control. They just ran out of time and troops.

…precisely the problem we faced in Vietnam: fighting the VC required dispersion and fighting the NVA regulars required concentration, and we hadn't the troops to do both.

Bringing Vietnam into the discussion is both way out of the period as well as being incorrect both historically and logically. After TET 68 the Viet Cong were destroyed including their political arm. The only thing the North Vietnamese could do was get the US out of Vietnam as they knew they couldn't defeat the US on the battlefield as they did the French.

Any 'parallels' between the War in Vietnam and the American Revolution are both historically flawed and largely made up in order to conform to an agenda.

Agree – also the Brits might have made some concessions (like granting seats in Parliament to Americans)

Which is exactly what British politicians (and King George) were averse to doing. They had a cozy little system and the insiders weren't about to give it up. Look at the ongoing struggle against Parliamentary reform throughout the 18th and well into the 19th Centuries. And certainly allowing Americans into the House of Lords was unthinkable.

No, the American experience in VN and the British experience in America share many common elements. See John Shy's article in A PEOPLE NUMEROUS AND ARMED.

We've done this before.

I've read Shy's book and that was an invention of the late 1970s. In short, Shy was wrong. It is a false analogy. And if we have discussed this before, why bring it up again?

Because the book YOU are touting -- and which I agree is very good -- makes the same precise point that Shy does, which is. again, that the British faced TWO requirements for pacifying the colonies: defeating their "main force" regulars, the Continental Army; AND controlling the civilian population from which the Continentals drew recruits, supplies, and political legitimacy. What prevented that second need from happening was the militia, generally too weak to oppose the British effectively by itself, but capable of dominating everywhere the British army was NOT. Dealing with Greene required a concentrated force; dealing with Marion a dispersed one. But the British lacked the troops to do both at the same time. The British recognized the militia horn of their dilemma eventually, and based the southern campaign on a plan to create a Loyalist militia. Might have worked, except for the Swamp Fox and the Over-Mountain Men.

What prevented that second need from happening was the militia, generally too weak to oppose the British effectively by itself, but capable of dominating everywhere the British army was NOT.

What about those of the population and the militia that would turn on their own people and support the British? And these were not Tories, but supposedly 'loyal' Americans…

Again from Spring's With Zeal and Bayonets Only, 19:

'…Brigadier General Stevens of the Virginia militia reported to Governor Thomas Jefferson that, as parties of fugitives from the shattered rebel army made their way northward after Cornwallis's great victory at Camden, 'the inhabitants rose in numbers, took and disarmed the chief of our men.' According to rebel colonel Otho Willians, these fugitives were betrayed by 'many of their insidious friends, armed, and advancing to join the American army. When these latecomers learned of the catastrophic rebel defeat, 'they acted decidedly in concert with the victors; capturing some, plundering others, and maltreating all the figitives they met, returned, exultingly, home.'

It certainly appears that depending on who was in control, the population and its militia would then turn on American troops in the field in support of the British.

The British army wasn't present, just retreating Americans who were being plundered and maltreated by American militia.

That is indeed an interesting event. But it is important to distinguish militiamen as individuals from the militia system. The militia was the people. And people go every which way, as individuals, or as small groups. When, e.g., there was resistance to the draft, it came FROM THE MILITIA, because who else could it come from? And when that happened, the officers would notify the governor who would coordinate bringing in loyal militia from neighboring counties.

"Therefore, the British realized that the Continental Army was the main enemy that had to be defeated in order to subdue American resistance."

Did the British actually realize this? Consider:
Washington was defeated at New York, but the British didn't follow up to try and destroy his army.

He was defeated at White Plains, and again allowed to withdraw.

The Saratoga Campaign was an attempt to cut the New England colonies off from the other colonies

Washington was defeated and allowed to withdraw at Brandywine, a campaign that was initiated to capture Philadelphia.

With Washington screening New York, the British initiated the Southern Campaign, designed to try to bring the southern colonies back to the crown. This campaign devolved into attempts to hold outposts.

I think I can make a pretty strong argument that the British did not realize they needed to defeat Washington, but had a strategy of taking the enemy's land/capital, as was the norm in European warfare at the time. It stayed the norm in American warfare until Grant decided to ignore Richmond and concentrate on Lee's army.

I can argue that the destruction of Washington's army would have ended the revolution, but the British didn't realize it at the time. I believe that his army being the strategic center of the war is a 19th or 20th century realization.

Howe's decision in 1777 to attack Phil. was in part due, as you say, to the conventional notion that one wins by capturing key places. But surely it was also directed against GW, who would surely defend the capital?

I think GW was essential, indeed; he deserves the Father of His Country title. But his army was rebuilt almost every year, at least for the first half of the war.

Again, I suggest reading Shy's essay, which addresses these points. The British initially had a European view of the war, because of course, it was what they knew. But the southern campaign had a new strategic aim and might have been successful; they just had insufficient resources to carry it out.

"But surely it was also directed against GW, who would surely defend the capital?"

Yes, but when GW retreated from Brandywine, Howe went to Philly instead of following GW. And that's my point, the British kept going after places and ignored GW and his army.

"I think GW was essential, indeed; he deserves the Father of His Country title."

Without a doubt. Imagine what would have happened had he been outmaneuvered politically and replaced by Gates.

"But the southern campaign had a new strategic aim and might have been successful; they just had insufficient resources to carry it out."

Possibly. However, the Brits were working under a false assumption from the beginning of the campaign; that there were more loyalists in the south than the north. This was shown, with time, to be untrue. The Brits never held anything in the south outside of patrolling distance of an armed camp.

I've never accepted the premise that the colonies were equally divided amongst loyalists, patriots, and neutrals. After all, the Brits never held any territory without regular troops while the patriots held entire states without a single regular.

The one third/one third/one third was John Adams and he was not actually referring to the war. One of my profs, 60 years ago, opined that those were the groups but that it was more like 10% committed Patriots, 5% equally committed Loyalists, and 85% trying to stay neutral. Maybe 20% Pats and 10% Loyals.

There WAS a "Spirit of 76" at times. The NE response to Lexington etc brought together 20,000 men in a short time. Paine's THE CRISIS had some impact. But it was a long war . . .
My own opinion (what-if) is that the British could have created a Loyalist militia and held onto Ga and SC and maybe NC were it not for Kings Mountain and Marion and Sumter -- who did break up multiple Loyalist assemblies of hundreds of men. The Brits had the right idea but didn't execute the plan effectively.

The one third/one third/one third was John Adams and he was not actually referring to the war.

Actually, the quote comes from a letter that Adams wrote to Jefferson while the latter was Ambassador to France and refers to the FRENCH Revolution.

Remember that Amherst, who knew at least the New England colonies well, turned down the job of commanding in America in 1775, remarking that, unless the government planned to exterminate most of the population, the army would only be able to control those parts of the country within range of its muskets. And Wellington, quoting Amherst, turned down the command in America in 1814 for the same reason.

I picked up With Zeal and Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783 by Matthew Spring recently and am about half way thru it -- excellent book!!

I'd agree with something he brought up as one possible alternative to conflict that might have well been successful if attempted early in the war -- granting the colonies an American Parliament with home rule authority -- Dominion status, essentially. Problem solved, and the US stays within the Empire/Commonwealth and today would be much better off, IMHO, similar to Canada, Australia, NZ.

That's my Tory talking.