""plainly the militia will fight.” Petersburg 1781" Topic

In the light of recent threads on the subject, this article in JAR might be of interest.
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'The Revolutionary Battle of Petersburg'
by William M. Welsch.
Journal of the American Revolution June 8, 2023

I posted this on the action, sometimes called the battle or action at Blandford near Petersburg:

General Muhlenberg, however, had not and his militia were shadowing Phillips. Von Steuben joined Muhlenberg and they would end up fighting a neat little delaying action with the five battalions of militia they had with them east of Blandford. Positioning the militia behind a swamp and other obstacles and gave more than they received from the British, skillfully withdrawing so as not to become decisively engaged and not running away. They left the field intact. Von Steuben praised both Muhlenberg and the militia for their performance: ‘The General…assures the militia, that from this day forward he shall always think himself honored to have such deserving men to command.' Jefferson wrote to von Steuben the next day, ‘I cannot but congratulate you on the initiation of our militia into the business of war.'

There are positive parallels between the action at Blandford and the delaying action at North Point outside of Baltimore in 1814.

Truly a neat little action with possibilities as a game. Thanks for this.

If one reads the various state papers and also Jefferson's correspondence for 1780-1781, one sees a series of adjustments to military events. Many of these had to do with the militia. The disgraceful conduct of the militia at Camden, for example, outraged the state authorities, who saw to it that as many of the deserters as possible were rounded up and formed into a unit and sent back into Carolina.

One change was how counties levied men for field service. At Camden the men were drawn as individuals from all over the county, so most were strangers to one another and to their officers. This, of course, matters a lot: you do not want to be the "coward of the county" by running when your neighbors are fighting -- but if everyone runs, you run too! And if there is nobody you know around . . .

By 1781 fielded companies of militia were drawn from specific permanent companies within each county, so DID fight with neighbors.

The state also learned to make better use of its many supernumerary Continental officers. AND remember that Continental soldiers whose term of service had expired and who then returned home were immediately re-enrolled in the county militia. By mid-1781 these veterans were being used very deliberately, as other militia paid them as substitutes.

How many of the militia were fully armed and equipped?

At Petersburg? or generally?

I suspect that most of Muhlenberg's men at Petersburg had arms. Perhaps all, given the circumstances.

More generally, that was another thing that changed over time. The state purchased a fair many muskets (mostly French, paid for with tobacco) and gradually developed an effective system of both keeping them in repair AND ensuring that when militiamen rotated home they did not carry the state's musket with them. I SUSPECT -- I've not seen any documents on the point -- that the Continental supernumeraries and the veterans had a lot to do with that.

References to the militia being armed in The Drillmaster of Valley Forge, Chapters 10 and 11 repeatedly state that the militia being mustered had many who were not armed.

Further the militia being mustered had a tendency to desert, had mustered dwarves and children, and were growing reluctant to serve, even with the British active in the state.

So, again, do you know how many militiamen showed up for duty fully armed and equipped? Seems to me, after reading the referenced chapters as well as material by John Elting, that too many militiamen did not show up for duty as they were supposed to with arms and accoutrements.

What I have read is all of the relevant primary documents of the period. Jefferson's papers, for example, run 500 pp. per volume and there is (iirc) a volume just for each year he was governor. The Virginia State Papers are an older source, a whole bunch of correspondence etc among generals and governors and Continental officers (like William Davies). There is only one court martial record book surviving (it's in the Va State Library) but that has been analyzed thoroughly. Otherwise there's not a lot surviving of internal militia records. But the way the Va system operated, any prominent Virginian political leader would have had some involvement as a militia officer, and so their papers yielded tidbits. So I'm not dependent on secondary works like the Seuben book or Elting.

So to address your question, again, provision of arms was a constant problem, widely mentioned and discussed throughout the sources. Given the circumstances (a British invasion threatening the capital and the essential workshops and stores in Richmond and elsewhere) it is certain that everyone involved would have been trying hard to get the militia into the field with working weapons. Given that Muhlenberg only had under 2000, I would guess that they were indeed mostly or completely armed. And the battle seems to indict that to be the case.

Also, whatever portion of Muhlenberg's command was western militia probably had a good many rifles, and were generally more likely to be well armed. The prospect of indian raids would have encouraged readiness.

Jefferson puts out a hit on Benedict Arnold:

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To J. P. G. Muhlenberg
Richmond Jan. <29> 31. 1781.Sir
Acquainted as you are with the treasons of Arnold, I need say nothing for your information, or to give you a proper sentiment of them. You will readily suppose that it is above all things desireable to drag him from those under whose wing he is now sheltered. On his march to and from this place I am certain it might have been done with facility by men of enterprize and firmness. I think it may still be done though perhaps not quite so easily. Having peculiar confidence in the men from the Western side of the mountains, I meant as soon as they should come down to get the enterprize proposed to a chosen number of them, such whose courage and whose fidelity would be above all doubt. Your perfect knowlege of those men personally, and my confidence in your discretion, induce me to ask you to pick from among them proper characters, in such number as you think best, to reveal to them our desire, and engage them [to] undertake to seize and bring off this greatest of all traitors. Whether this may be best effected by their going in as friends and awaiting their opportunity, or otherwise is left to themselves. The smaller the number the better; so that they be sufficient to manage him. Every necessary caution must be used on their part to prevent a discovery of their design by the enemy, as should they be taken, the laws of war will justify against them the most rigorous sentence. I will undertake if they are succesful in bringing him off alive, that they shall receive five thousand guineas reward among them, and to men formed for such an enterprize it must be a great incitement to know that their names will be recorded with glory in history with those of Vanwert, Paulding and Williams. ⟨I shall be sorry to suppose that any circumstances may put it out of their power to bring him off alive after they shall have taken him and of course oblige them to put him to death. Should this happen, however, and America be deprived of the satisfaction of seeing him exhibited as a public spectacle of infamy, and of vengeance, I must give my approbation to their putting him to death. I do this considering him as a deserter from the American army, who has incurred the pain of death by his desertion, which we have a right to inflict on him and against which he cannot be protected by any act of our enemies. I distinguish him from an honourable enemy, who, in his station, would never be considered by me as a justifiable object of such an enterprize. In event of his death, however, I must reduce the reward proposed to 2000 guineas, in proportion as our satisfaction would be reduced.⟩ The inclosed order from Baron Steuben will authorize you to call for and to dispose of any force you may think necessary to place in readiness for covering the enterprize and securing the retreat of the party. Mr. Newton the bearer of this, and to whom it's contents are communicated in confidence, will provide men of trust to go as guides. These may be associated in the enterprize or not as you please; but let that point be previously settled that no difficulties may arise as to the parties entitled to participate of the reward. You know how necessary profound secrecy is in this business, even if it be not undertaken.

The important question is not how many militia reported with musket or rifle and ammunition, but whether any had to be sent home (or were not called out) because the state could not equip them. I've found no mention of lack of weapons as a constraint in Virginia or with Virginian forces in 1780-81.

Brechtel, you've been rummaging around for weeks now looking for grounds to impeach Jefferson. Have you found any reference to lack of firearms as a problem for the militia call-ups?

Nice article, 42nd. Thank you.

The lack of militia arms is noted in The Drillmaster of Valley Forge Chapters 10 and 11.

'The law requires every militia-man to provide himself with the arms usual in the regular service. But this injunction was always indifferently complied with, and the arms they had have been so frequently called for to arm the regulars, that in the lower parts of the country they are entirely disarmed.'

Taken from From Notes on the State of Virginia, Query IX, 215-216, contained in Jefferson, Writings.

Yes, we know that the militia were often poorly armed. Note that Jefferson indicates that priority for weapons (these would be, I believe, the state's imports from France) went to the Continentals, i.e. to the better trained and more reliable troops. To which one might comment, well DUH.

There seems some implication that Virginia disarmed militia of their private weapons to outfit Continentals. I would doubt that IN THE EXTREME. No mention of that in Jeferson's papers as governor, it would have been seen as illegal and far beyond his limited powers as governor, it would have been certain to provoke resistance, and the western militia in particular would have gone molon labe on anyone attempting such folly.

Which does not quite answer my question, Brechtel. doc mcb has described the purchase of weapons which were issued to the militia when called up, and placed back in store afterward, and 42nd began this thread by pointing out a battle fought by the "entirely disarmed" militia of the James valley, without bayonets, but with muskets, rifles, cavalry and artillery.

I have no doubt that regular officers would have preferred that mobilized militia show up promptly, without grumbling, physically fit and fully equipped and stay as long as the regulars desired their presence. I never heard of it happening anywhere. (The National Guard comes pretty close sometimes, but they're not quite militia as the 18th Century conceived the word.)

As a sidenote, the French supplied muskets, commonly known as Charlevilles, were by 1778 the issue musket of the Continental Army. It was preferred over the British made/designed Brown Bess.

And the 1795 Springfield musket was a definite copy of the Charleville.

"militia as the 18th Century conceived the word."

That would be well regulated, I suppose.

"That would be well regulated, I suppose."

Even in the 18th Century, that part was tricky. How about with weapons privately purchased and stored at home, serving under elected officers and picking their own uniforms, if any? The past really is a different country. It's a continual struggle not to see it in our own terms.

At the start of the war the eastern counties -- tidewater and piedmont -- were generally only in partial compliance with the militia requirements. They were far removed from any danger of Indian attack, and the coasts had been protected by the British navy. Military organizations often get "fat and lazy" in prolonged periods of peace. Virginia raised and equipped (eventually) fifteen regiments for the Continentals, as well as some state garrison regiments. Once the annoying but not really THAT dangerous Royal Governor Dunmore had gone away, there was still not much incentive to improve the militia; there were always higher priorities. Of course that changed when the British turned their attention southward.