"Jefferson on ‘A State of the Militia’" Topic

The following is ‘taken from returns in 1780 and 1781, except in those counties [25 out of 75] marked with an asterisk, the returns from which are somewhat older.' The militia total for Virginia is 49,971.
‘Every able-bodied freeman, between the ages of 16 and 50, is enrolled in the militia. Those of every county are formed into companies, and these again into one or more battalions, according to the numbers in the county. They are commanded by colonels, and other subordinate officers, as in the regular service. In every county is a county-lieutenant, who commands the whole militia of his county, but ranks only as a colonel in the field. We have no general officers always existing. These are appointed occasionally, when an invasion or insurrection happens, and their commission determines with the occasion. The governor is head of the military, as well as civil power. The law requires every militia-man to provide himself with the arms usual in the regular service. But this injunction was always indifferently complied with, and the arms they had have been so frequently called for to arm the regulars, that in the lower parts of the country they are entirely disarmed. In the middle country a fourth or fifth part of them may have such firelocks as they had provided to destroy the noxious animals which infest their farms; and on the western side of the Blue Ridge they are generally armed with rifles. The pay of our militia, as well as of our regulars, is that of the Continental regulars. The condition of our regulars, of whom we have none but Continentals, and part of a battalion of state troops, is so constantly on the change, that a state of it at this day would not be its state a month hence. It is much the same with the condition of the other Continental troops, which is well enough known.'

From Notes on the State of Virginia, Query IX, 215-216, contained in Jefferson, Writings.

Further, on page 217 in the same volume, Query X-The Marine?:

‘Before the present invasion of this state by the British under the command of General Phillips, we had three vessels if 16 guns, one of 14, five small gallies, and two or three armed boats. They were generally so badly manned as seldom to be in condition for service. Since the perfect possession of our rivers assumed by the enemy, I believe we are left with a single armed boat only.'

An interesting anecdote on the 'state of the militia' is contained in The Drillmaster of Valley Forge by Paul Lockhart, 259-260:

A Virginia militia colonel showed up at the Chesterfield barracks in February 1781 with a young man the colonel wanted to 'present' as a Continental recruit. Von Steuben was pleased with the colonel's effort until he actually saw the young man. 'He was a mere boy, far too young for military service.'

Steuben ordered a sergeant to measure the boys height and it was found that he had lift in his shoes to make him appear taller than he was. One of the people present stated that 'The Baron's countenance altered, we saw, and feared, the approaching storm.'

Von Steuben looked at the colonel, clearly outraged, stating 'You must have supposed me to be a rascal.' The colonel was clearly frightened at the outburst and tried to deny it. Von Steuben would not have it, 'calling the colonel a 'scoundrel' for 'cheating' his country'

Son Steuben ordered that the colonel be 'forcibly enlisted in the boy's place' and told the boy he could go home. He also told the boy to 'tell the colonel's wife 'that her husband has gone to fight as an honest citizen should, for the liberty of his country.''

Excellent anecdote and well done on von Steuben's part-poetic justice.

Jefferson's "Notes" were of course written after the war. And as he noted (!) conditions changed regularly. Jefferson (and Henry before him) worked at providing French muskets for the militia, paid for with tobacco. This was a constant problem, as was keeping them in repair.

And of course the pressure to meet recruiting/draft requirements was great, as the anecdote shows.

From the standpoint of military efficiency, the militia was not very. Its primary function was political and social.

(Btw, I doubt very much that Steuben forced a militia colonel into his ranks. I'd want proof beyond Steuben's self-serving account. A militia colonel packed a LOT of weight, political and social influence, and Steuben almost certainly lacked any legal authority to impress one. The entire Virginia establishment would have raised holy hell at such a high-handed action by Steuben -- and if the general attempted it that would reveal how little he understood America and particularly Virginia.)

I would take the anecdote at face value unless information is provided to show the account is not accurate.

And if the civilian administration would violently object to von Steuben's handling of the situation why would it not do the same to combat the British incursions? Sounds like an administration with no teeth, or worse.

The militia colonel got what he deserved for his dishonest and dishonorable action.

You should read the MA thesis on Steuben in Va, I posted a link in the other thread.

"I would take the anecdote at face value unless information is provided to show the account is not accurate."

Well, if it didn't happen, what evidence would there be of that?

If you've got one uncorroborated source from an interested party . . .

The vital concern in a prolonged struggle is WILL. Which is based on popular support, morale on the home front, public opinion, etc. These are all political phenomena. Steuben didn't understand that, and with his European background that is not surprising. Jefferson got it; he was an excellent politician, whatever his limitations as a military man (which he never pretended to be). Jefferson had only to look south to see the Carolinas degenerating into chaos and civil war, though the worst didn't come until 1782. Could Virginia have devolved into that sort of Hobbesian state of nature? You betcha. Could the Continental commanders have demanded too much from the militia (who are the people), and brought on widespread disorder and resistance? You betcha: there were several anti-draft riots in 1780-81, suppressed by the militia officers and by Jefferson sending in loyal militia from neighboring counties. Jefferson had to balance the needs of the army with the need to maintain morale. Of course British raids harmed both -- but Virginia was nearly indefensible -- unless Kevin can explain how it might have been done? And the keys to maintaining morale and public support were the LOCAL militia officers who were the poilitical and social leaders as well as military, who knew their people, and who HAD both the power and the need to modify demands from the Continentals and from the state so as to not over-burden an already heavily laden population.

I cannot find online a good account of the building and defense and abandonment of the battery at Hood's. It was a "narrow place" where ONE of the many navigable rivers could be blocked. Steuben wanted it built up and defended, and Jefferson agreed. But when Arnold ascended the river and got a few shots from the battery, he simply landed Simcoe with 300 or 400 Queens Rangers to take the battery from the rear. The hundred or so defenders retreated, and Simcoe spiked the guns.

Understand that the entire tidewater is within 10 miles or so of a navigable river -- that is what tidewater MEANS -- and quite a lot of it is within 5 to 10 miles of TWO rivers. Blocking all of these invasion routes was far beyond the resources at hand, and forts and batteries were easily bypassed or taken in the rear.

That said, the British WERE raiders, under 2000 troops and often under 1000. A few hundred militia, if they had weapons, could put up a show of resistance and might well cause the raider (who had no way of knowing how many they were or would be facing) to withdraw. Steuben was (rightly or wrongly) perceived as being too passive, not aggressive enough.

One of my projects is to finish painting the Dunmore Ethiopians and some OG sailors as privateer crews, to raid a plantation. Maybe 20 raiders from a small craft anchored in the river on one table edge. Defenders would be a few planter types, an overseer, MAYBE a loyal body servant, and at some point part of a company of local militia -- with or without working firearms. Lots of blind cards. Attitudes of the plantation's "people" would be crucial and variable. Freedom? or the risk of being carried off and sold to a plantation in the Caribbean? (Slaves were the favorite loot.) Probably a "reaction table" with lots of variables. I have the lovely Shenandoah farm house and outbuildings and big barn, to make a nice table. Someday . . .

I really liked the quotation from Jefferson regarding the militia – specifically the problem of obtaining adequate arms for them. I think people with a history background understand that firearms were expensive and that a large portion of the population could not afford them. That is why at the beginning of the revolution the colonies were scrambling to get arms.Does anyone know how many manhours it took to make a musket such as as the "Committee of Safety" muskets?

I don't know Joseph. I think it depends in part on the ability of the gunsmith to obtain parts. It was not unusual for a firearm produced in North America to have a lock or other parts made in Europe. Even if there are gunsmiths turning out weapons, how many of those weapons are going to be available for purchase by individuals? Like imports I suspect most of the production was being soaked up by the Continental army and the states.

As the war wore on the stock of prewar firearms remaining in private hands dropped. Some were taken into service by those who joined the Continental army or standing militia forces. Some were sold to or seized by the Continental army or the states. Some just broke. As the stock of firearms in private hands dropped the willingness of individuals to risk the family firearm also dropped.