"The Declaration of Independence Was Also a List of" Topic

… Grievances

"For many Americans, the entirety of the Declaration of Independence can be summed up by Thomas Jefferson's stirring preamble: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."

But in fact, the main purpose of the Declaration of Independence was to present a compelling case that King George III and the British Parliament had broken their own laws, leaving the American colonists no choice but to cut ties and "throw off" British rule. To accomplish that, Jefferson and the Continental Congress compiled a laundry list of grievances—27 in total—meant to prove to the world that King George was a "tyrant" and a lawbreaker…"

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Armand

It had to be. Revolution is not justified simply because government does something stupid, or even corrupt: given human nature, that will always be happening, and there would be constant revolution and chaos.

What justifies revolution is when a LONG TRAIN OF ABUSES, all TENDING IN THE SAME DIRECTION, EVINCES A DESIGN to deprive the people of their liberties. So it had to be a list, a long list.

Not just grievances.

See, they are DOING IT ON PURPOSE.

It's also a great discussion of the legitimate role of government.

Very busy document, got a lot done.

They had BEEN fighting for 15 months before the Declaration.

Andrew, yes.

Calvin Coolidge, on the 150th anniversary:

About the Declaration there is a finality that is exceedingly restful. It is often asserted that the world has made a great deal of progress since 1776, that we have had new thoughts and new experiences which have given us a great advance over the people of that day, and that we may therefore very well discard their conclusions for something more modern. But that reasoning can not be applied to this great charter. If all men are created equal, that is final. If they are endowed with inalienable rights, that is final. If governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, that is final. No advance, no progress can be made beyond these propositions. If anyone wishes to deny their truth or their soundness, the only direction in which he can proceed historically is not forward, but backward toward the time when there was no equality, no rights of the individual, no rule of the people. Those who wish to proceed in that direction can not lay claim to progress. They are reactionary. Their ideas are not more modern, but more ancient, than those of the Revolutionary fathers.

Coolidge was, of course, referring to Woodrow Wilson, whose Progressivism disdained the Declaration.

Thanks

Armand

Magna Carta was the same…

Yes, good point.

The Declaration was also intended as a document to establish international legitimacy with an eye for support from France and Spain. These monarchs would not aid mere rebels. They would only aid an independent monarchy. Without enormous sums of money, material, and manpower from France and Spain, the rebels could not have succeeded.

The French and Spanish situation was complicated. They were very interested in revenge on Britain, but not much on rights of men nor colonies winning independence. What they DID want was evidence that the Americans were not going to kiss and make up with the Brits, which was a real possibility in 1776. It was what Howe was trying to achieve.

Glup!

Armand

Well Woodrow Wilson did say "(The Declaration of Independence) was a vital piece of practical business, not a piece of rhetoric; and if you will pass beyond those preliminary passages which we are accustomed to quote about the rights of men and read into the heart of the document you will see that it is very express and detailed, that it consists of a series of definite specifications concerning actual public business of the day."

The grievances were specific to time and place. We know that, of course they had to be. The principles are eternal. And the Progressives hated being bound by them, and by the Constitution and BofR.

And the Progressives hated being bound by them, and by the Constitution and BofR.

How so?

And in US history, there are two different 'Progressives.' First, those with a capital 'P' are from Teddy Roosevelt's day, and the lower case 'p' are current.

Those who now dislike or want to change or abolish the Constitution are the so-called conservatives.

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Thank goodness for men like Alexander Hamilton, George Washington, John Adams and John Marshall. Oh wait. They were guilty of it too doc. The ink was hardly dry on the documents ratifying the Constitution when those coming into power began to twist it to support their own agenda.

What so-called conservatives don't understand (among many things) is that the Founders were the liberals of their day.

The Declaration of Independence, the US Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, were hardly 'conservative' documents.

(smile)

Armand

Pardon for picking up a moribund thread again, but the Founding documents were both radical and conservative. The Founders understood they were building a novus ordo seclorem. So not conservative. But they also understood their society to be one of -- if not THE -- freest in the world and were determined to keep it that way. The Revolution was not to GAIN freedom; it was to KEEP freedom.

No, there are not two Progressive movements. The Bull Moose Party was short-lived. Progressivism was a MOVEMENT, and an ideology, and Wilson was its daddy. Teddy R. was one too, but far more moderate about it.

One can cite numerous examples of later Americans drawing on the principles of the Declaration as eternal, and also of Wilson and FDR and Obama and others rejecting the restriction upon their power that the Constitution and BofR entail. The Federalists and the Jeffersonians did debate fiercely how to interpret the Constitution, but all those named were loyal to it (as the oath of office requires).

and also of Wilson and FDR and Obama and others rejecting the restriction upon their power that the Constitution and BofR entail. The Federalists and the Jeffersonians did debate fiercely how to interpret the Constitution, but all those named were loyal to it (as the oath of office requires).

Jefferson was the first president to expand executive power…

Well, GW was creating the executive power; everything he did set a precedent. But yes, TJ certainly acted differently when in power than when out of power. I'm sorry he abandoned strict construction but I'm glad he bought Louisiana.

Doc, I think you are making the mistake of looking at the actions of early presidents through the lens of 200+ years of history. There were things that were done in the Washington administration that were viewed as unconstitutional extensions of the powers granted in the Constitution. There were things that were done by the Adams administration that were viewed as violations of the Bill of Rights. Jefferson himself though the purchase of Louisiana was beyond the authority he possessed under the Constitution. Time and repetition, not the language of the documents as amended has sanctioned their actions.

It should also be noted that Jefferson was not party to the writing of the Constitution and in some ways he was an anti-federalist and opposed the Constitution while ambassador to France.

Further, as president he emasculated the US Navy and left the US unprepared to go to war with Great Britain under his protege, James Madison. Neither had been soldiers and didn't understand what was needed to defend the country.

The level of that misunderstanding was epic.

Bill, can you be specific as to the actions by GW and JA?

Kevin, no, we KNOW what TJ thought about the Constitution because he wrote Madison. He loved it, except he said it needed a Bill of Rights.

The two leading anti-fedralists in Va were Mason and Patrick Henry. Mason's opposition was likewise based on the lack of a BofR. Henry's was comprehensive, and TJ would never have agreed with it. (TJ and PH were bitter enemies. Indeed PH became a Federalist later, to oppose TJ. Personalities were alawys as important as principles (as today).

20 December 1787
TJ to Mad

The season admitting only of operations in the Cabinet, and these being in a great measure secret, I have little to fill a letter. I will therefore make up the deficiency by adding a few words on the Constitution proposed by our Convention. I like much the general idea of framing a government which should go on of itself peaceably, without needing continual recurrence to the state legislatures. I like the organization of the government into Legislative, Judiciary & Executive. I like the power given the Legislature to levy taxes, and for that reason solely approve of the greater house being chosen by the people directly. For tho' I think a house chosen by them will be very illy qualified to legislate for the Union, for foreign nations &c. yet this evil does not weigh against the good of preserving inviolate the fundamental principle that the people are not to be taxed but by representatives chosen immediately by themselves. I am captivated by the compromise of the opposite claims of the great & little states, of the latter to equal, and the former to proportional influence. I am much pleased too with the substitution of the method of voting by persons, instead of that of voting by states: and I like the negative given to the Executive with a third of either house, though I should have liked it better had the Judiciary been associated for that purpose, or invested with a similar and separate power. There are other good things of less moment. I will now add what I do not like. First the omission of a bill of rights providing clearly & without the aid of sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal & unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the laws of the land & not by the law of Nations. To say, as mr. Wilson does, that a bill of rights was not necessary because all is reserved in the case of the general government which is not given, while in the particular ones all is given which is not reserved, might do for the Audience to whom it was addressed, but is surely a gratis dictum, opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from the omission of the clause of our present confederation which had declared that in express terms.2 It was a hard conclusion to say because there has been no uniformity among the states as to the cases triable by jury, because some have been so incautious as to abandon this mode of trial, therefore the more prudent states shall be reduced to the same level of calamity. It would have been much more just & wise to have concluded the other way that as most of the states had judiciously preserved this palladium, those who had wandered should be brought back to it, and to have established general right instead of general wrong. Let me add that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, & what no just government should refuse or rest on inference.3 The second feature I dislike, and greatly dislike, is the abandonment in every instance of the necessity of rotation in office, and most particularly in the case of the President.

Plus, Kevin, TJ was war governor for three years and understood precisely what was needed to defend the country. Your prejudice against his wartime experience is based on out-of-date accounts authored by his political enemies.

Go read his instructions to GR Clark and tell me he didn't understand war.

Iirc, neither Abraham Lincoln nor FDR had "ever been soldiers." (The Black Hawk War doesn't count!)

Just an off the top of my head a short list for actions take under Washington's administration:
1. Assumption by the National government of the debts of the states. Article 1 Section 8 limited Congress's authority to "Pay the debts…of the United States".
2. Incorporate a bank. Nothing in Article 1 gives Congress the authority to create private commercial entities.
3. Investment in the Bank of the United States. Again there is nothing in Article 1 which allows Congress to authorize the National government to invest in a private commercial entity.
4. Treaty making. The Constitution did not envision that the Senate's role would be limited to after the fact approval of treaties negotiated by the president. Washington just decided to dispense with the need to seek out the advice of the Senate before entering into treaty negotiations.
5. Executive privilege.
The above are not questions of interpretation. They are arrogations of powers not found in the words of the Constitution. Examples of interpretation would be whether the whiskey tax imposed under Washington was an excise tax authorized by the Congress, or whether those who opposed the whiskey tax committed treason.

In prior posts I have pointed out the reduction in the size of the U.S. Navy at the end of the Quasi War was recommended by the Federalist Secretary of the Navy. The reduction was directed by a U.S. Congress where both houses were controlled by Federalists, and the law directing this reduction was signed by John Adams.

The army the U.S. raised for the Quasi War with France was quite small. IIRC under 5,000 men. Enlistments were for a limited time. It was mostly discharged by John Adams before he left office. So again Federalists need to take some of the heat for this. This is without addressing the problem that Hamilton tried to keep Republicans from serving as officers in that army.

…TJ was war governor for three years and understood precisely what was needed to defend the country.

If he did understand it, then how did the British do so well under both Arnold and Phillips. Seems to me both Jefferson and Virginia were unprepared, and then Jefferson ran and abdicated his duties as governor.

the reduction in the size of the U.S. Navy at the end of the Quasi War was recommended by the Federalist Secretary of the Navy. The reduction was directed by a U.S. Congress where both houses were controlled by Federalists, and the law directing this reduction was signed by John Adams.

The process was not as simple as that and the Jefferson administration did as much as possible to hobble the US Navy and what Adams' Secretary of the Navy tried to do to preserve as much of what he had built as possible.

See The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918 by the Sprouts, Chapter 5, pages 71-93. If you don't have access to the book, I'll post excerpts from it.

Bill, sure, the "elastic clause" was very useful. TJ made those same arguments at the time, and lost.

We've done TJ as war governor, but here it is again: the Virginia state regiments might well have sufficed to defeat small invasions such as Arnold's and Phillips, IF THEY HAD BEEN RETAINED IN THE STATE. Instead of being used to reenforce the Continental army in the Carolinas. Which was the right thing to do, though it risked exposing Va to invasion.

Tidewater Virginia was essentially indefensible against an enemy with naval supremacy. The militia maintained PERMANENT outposts at the mouth of each river, to warn against British raids (by privateers) -- and that was a major drain on manpower -- but the tidewater was ALL within a few miles of navigable water and many areas were in fact between TWO navigable rivers and so attack might come from either direction. The state government was well aware of this but maintained its policy of giving priority to supporting the Continental Army anyway.

The vast revolutionary war debt HAD to be paid off. That was not even debatable, though there was hot debate as to HOW it should be done. Navies are even more expensive than armies.

If Mom and Dad are in danger of losing the house, the kids probably should not be whining about their allowances being cut.

Are you now insinuating that the War Department, the US Navy, and the US Army were 'whining'?

Which Virginia state regiments were sent to the Carolinas? There were two new continental regiments from Virginia at Guilford Courthouse, but they were raised after Charleston fell and the southern Continental regiments were surrendered by Benjamin Lincoln.

And where were the 'vaunted' Virginia militia when Arnold and Phillips showed up?

Of course the regular military establishment whines about its budget -- which always too small (except, e.g., during WWII). Often -- TODAY! -- it really is too small.

Who "vaunted" the Va militia? Of course they were ineffective against a British invasion. Whoever expected otherwise? But a small invasion was basically a raid, and could not have stayed unless in a port town supported by naval guns. They could do a lot of damage, of course. But control a large area long-term, no.

State Line Regiments:

Also in existence, ostensibly within the confines of the State, were the 1st and 2nd Virginia State Line regiments. These units were raised as Virginia's internal force, predominantly positioned to counter raiding parties in Tidewater or man frontier outposts in southwest Virginia (including defense of lead and salt mines there), but were forced to join the Continental Line after Virginia's Continental Line became prisoners at Charleston.

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The Va Continentals are hideously complex, as this explains.

Virginia provided the Regiment of Guards at Albemarle Barracks for the Convention Army.

They also maintained the Illinois Regiment under GR Clark.

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Major General Alexander Leslie arrived in Hampon Roads with over 2,000 troops in October, 1780. His attack was just a diversion to disrupt supplies and support Lord Cornwallis's campaign in the Carolinas. Leslie left after only a month in the area.

General Benedict Arnold returned at the end of December, 1780, followed by General William Phillips and finally Lord Cornwallis. Arnold established a base at Portsmouth, but as British troops marched across the state they stayed in one place only briefly. Loyalists who committed to support the invading army were exposed to retaliation as soon as the troops moved on.

On February 22, 1781, General Arnold held a public assembly in Princess Anne County to get 400 local residents to swear a new oath of allegiance to the British government. They were willing to drink and eat what Arnold supplied for the event, and willing to mouth the words in the required oath, but they were just going through the motions.

Captain Johann Ewald, commanding Hessian forces, challenged one uncommitted Loyalist to raise troops locally in order to maintain control over the county. Ewald promised that the British would provide uniforms and weapons as needed. The Princess Anne resident replied to Ewald:5

I must first see if it is true that your people really intend to remain with us. You have already been in this area twice. General Leslie gave me the same assurances in the past autumn, and where is he now? In Carolina! Who knows where you will be this autumn? And should the French unite with the Americans, everything would certainly be lost to you here. What would we loyally disposed subjects have then? Nothing but misfortune from the Opposition Party, if you leave us again.
Ewald replied initially, frustrated that his Hessians were risking their lives to assist the Loyalists unwilling to risk anything:6

But you loyalists won't do anything! You only want to be protected, to live in peace in your houses. We are supposed to break our bones for you, in place of yours, to accomplish your purpose. We attempt everything, and sacrifice our own blood for your assumed cause.

Later, Ewald recognized that Loyalists were wise to keep a low profile. He was surprised to discover that the response he heard was convincing, and provided a clear rationale for not overtly supporting the British cause. The Marquis de Lafayette articulated the same perspective in a letter to the Continental Congress, which was alarmed that Cornwallis was marching through North Carolina into Virginia without meeting formal resistance:7

You can be entirely calm with regard to the rapid marches of Lord Cornwallis. Let him march from St. Augustine to Boston. What he wins in his front, he loses in his rear. His army will bury itself without requiring us to fight with him.

DOC now: why does Cornwallis "lose to his rear"? The Patriot militia. The British by this point recognized the need for local security (militia) but it was too late to organize such.

If you are going to quote from a source it would be very helpful to use quotation marks.

ped·ant
[ˈped(ə)nt]
NOUN
a person who is excessively concerned with minor details and rules or with displaying academic learning:
"the royal palace (some pedants would say the ex-royal palace)"

Which Virginia state regiments were sent to the Carolinas?

This is off the top of my head.

The only time the Virginia state forces were deployed as complete regiments outside the claimed territories of Virginia that I am aware of was in 1778 when the First and Second regiments were serving in Washington's army. In 1780 Jefferson dispatched to reinforce Lincoln a force consisting of detachments of the Virginia State Garrison Regiment, the Virginia Horse and the Virginia State Artillery and some militia under Porterfield. The unit was I believe in NC when Charleston fell. It joined Gates army and at Camden IIRC it was broken up and fought as separate parts. Afterwards some of the survivors were rolled into Buford's reconstituted Virginia Continental regiment. Elements of the Virginia Horse are reported to have been at Cowpens, but may have been rolled into Washington's horse.

I believe elements of the Virginia State Artillery also served in the Siege of Charleston.

And where were the 'vaunted' Virginia militia when Arnold and Phillips showed up?

Again off the top of my head.

When Arnold stuck several hundred were serving with the Southern Army under Stevens. There were also a considerable number serving with the Flying Corps under Morgan. In Virginia the militia mobilized under Lawson were demobilized shortly before Arnold arrived because their terms were expiring. However that is just part of the story. Had they not been demobilized Steuben was planning on sending them south to join Greene. Either way they would not have been present to deal with Arnold. Nelson was able to quickly mobilize a portion of the militia in the Peninsula to defend Williamsburg. Whether they prevented Arnold from attacking the town or whether Arnold's move towards Williamsburg was intended as a feint is debatable. As Arnold's force advanced up the James Steuben had to spread his forces to cover several targets. Adding to the problem the Virginia militia that was sent to oppose a possible advance on Richmond took the wrong road.

Yes. TJ basically sent what forces were left in the state.

By 1780 the state had a great many "supernumerary" Continental officers (who had no men to command) who were sent home to recruit. These were sometimes (and increasingly) used to command militia who were mustered for field duty.

Also, as Virginia Continentals' enlistments expired, they returned home WHERE THEY WOULD IMMEDIATELY BE RE-ENROLLED in the county militia. By late 1780 there were large numbers of such veterans mixed into militia units, and by mid-1781 the practice was formally adopted of keeping trained men in the field as "militia" with the ordinary militiamen paying them as substitutes. These were the "militia grenadiers" of the Yorktown campaign.

Steuben realized, as did everyone, that Virginia was impossible to defend against raids and incursions. Too many targets to defend, too many rivers allowing free British movement while retarding American.

The process was not as simple as that

History seldom is simple Kevin. My point is that the traditional narrative that it was Jefferson and the Democratic Republicans that were responsible for gutting the navy was highly misleading. Neither party wanted to have to pay to maintain that highly expensive fleet that had been acquired to fight the French. The Federalists were the ones who tried the case. Adams signed the death warrant. Jefferson let the axe fall.

John Cropper is an example of a supernumerary colonel who took over command of his county's militia.

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For two days in late November of 1782 Commodore Zedechiah Whaley of the Maryland militia had been waging an indecisive battle during a campaign against British barges of war that had been harassing the shores and farms of Chesapeake Bay. Desperate for a victory, he sought aid from the Virginia peninsular town of Onancock, sailing Onancock Creek on November 28, 1782, and appealing to Lt. Colonel John Cropper. Cropper rounded up 25 local men in support, who boarded Whaley's flagship, Protector, and continued his siege upon the British flotilla.

Three of four of Whaley's barges turned back under heavy British fire, leaving the Protector alone to press the fight against six British craft. Vastly outnumbered, its crew suffered heavy losses during a climactic action on November 30 in Kedges Strait among Smith and South Marsh islands in Maryland and Tangier Island in Virginia off of Tangier Sound. Twenty-five of its 65 men were killed or wounded, 29 captured, and only 11 escaped. Whaley's surrender ended the last naval action of the Revolution.

Bill, yes, and the money simply wasn't there. PLUS, navies are not the threat to liberty that standing armies are, so the opposition to building a fleet was mostly fiscal (as opposed to an ideological opposition to regular troops). Of course America had plenty of merchant ships and yards, and sailors, but they were busy making money and dodging the press gangs.

History seldom is simple Kevin. My point is that the traditional narrative that it was Jefferson and the Democratic Republicans that were responsible for gutting the navy was highly misleading. Neither party wanted to have to pay to maintain that highly expensive fleet that had been acquired to fight the French. The Federalists were the ones who tried the case. Adams signed the death warrant. Jefferson let the axe fall.

Not quite.

From The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918 by Harold and Margaret Sprout:

‘The program which President Adams and his Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, were pushing forward during their final months in office envisaged a comprehensive naval development along three lines-ships, personnel, and a supporting organization of yards and docks.' -72.

‘The Adams administration had construed this legislation as permitting not merely the specified acts, but also the purchase and development of sites for shipyards in which to build the authorized vessels and docks, and in which to store timber and other materials…Secretary Stoddert had selected sites and acquired land for navy yards at Portsmouth, NH, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, and Norfolk. These works, hastily undertaken without proper statutory authority in the last weeks of a defeated administration, represented an attempt to lay the foundation for a permanent shore organization before the Navy should fall into the hands of the hostile Jeffersonians.'-72.

‘Stoddert had taken an equally far-sighted view of the ship problem. He had commenced work on the six seventy-fours authorized in 1799. To clear the way for a sound future development, he had recommended selling all the jerry-built and improvised men-of-war acquired during the hostilities with France, and retaining only thirteen vessels whose size and condition gave promise of continuing usefulness. At the same time, he had recommended new construction sufficient to bring up the navy's strength to twelve ships-of-the line and twenty-four frigates, and additional purchases of timber and timber lands to provide for a still greater expansion in an emergency.'-73.

‘Most of Stoddert's legislative recommendations had died in Congress…'-73.

‘…As congressional leader of the Jeffersonian opposition, Gallatin had repeatedly set forth the political economics of the agrarian movement, and it will be recalled that in the notable debate on the capital-ship bill of 1799, he had mercilessly attacked, on poltical as well as fiscal grounds, the Federalist policy of building up a strong seagoing navy…'-75.

I could refer you to contrary sources. However why rely on some secondary source which might be an echo chamber for prior work based on incomplete research or biased reporting when the original material is readily available? The 1801 Act that Adams signed is online. In an act which went so far as to specify rations for naval personnel there was not one word about continued construction of ships of the line.

Then let's consider the sorry history of Stoddert's ships of the line. It wasn't just the Federalist Congress that frustrated Stoddert. Adams was not a fan of ships of the line. He stated to Varnum in 1808 that "I never was fond of the plan of building Line of battle-ships. Our policy is not to fight Squadron's at Sea, but to have fast sailing Frigates to scour the Seas and make impression on the Enemies' Commerce; and in this way we can do great things." Stoddert wanted 12 ships of the line. Congress only authorized six. The money for those six had to be shared with the acquisition of sloops as well. Then Stoddert diverted a large amount of the funding for the ships of the line to purchase sites for naval yards. IIRC the contracts for timber for the ships of the line were not let until mid-1800. The project was in trouble even before peace was arranged with France.