"Testing the Narrative of Prussian Decline..." Topic

…. THE RHINELAND CAMPAIGN OF 1793

"On 14 October 1806, the Prussian army, long considered Europe's best, collided with Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte's Grande Armιe at the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt. In these engagements, Prussia suffered one of the worst military disasters in modern history. In a single day, the Prussian army effectively ceased to exist as a fighting force. In the following year, Napoleon forced Prussia to accept a peace that made it little more than a subordinate ally. However, over the next six years, a group of Prussian officers attempted to reform the Prussian army and state at almost every level in order to liberate Prussia from Napoleon's control. They increased the army's light infantry, adopted combined arms divisions as well as a new General Staff system, and endeavored to create a national army similar to the French model. While not all of their measures were successful, they produced a powerful modern army that played a leading role in driving Napoleon from Germany in 1813.

This story of Prussia's defeat and subsequent reform has dominated the historiography of Napoleonic Prussia. While Napoleon has received the vast majority of historical attention, those who have written on Prussia have focused on the Prussian reform movement or the Prussian army's campaigns against Napoleon. Historians such as Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and T. C. W. Blanning all argue for the ineffectiveness of the Prussian army before the reform movement.[1] These historians present the Prussian army before 1807 as an ossified relic, a hopelessly backward and rigid army commanded by a series of septuagenarians.[2] The complete collapse of the Prussian army in 1806 has colored historians' understanding of it from the end of the Seven Years War to the Jena campaign. However, this interpretation is based mainly on the Prussian army's performance in the battles of Jena and Auerstedt…."

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Armand

An excellent article that provides a realistic assessment of the Prussian Army's effectiveness against the French in 1793.

I was wondering if anyone was familiar with this reference work citedin the article:
T. C. W. Blanning, The French Revolutionary Wars 1787-1802 (London: Arnold, 1996)

Lengthy review by Ronald Schechter Published on H-France (April, 1998) at link

Glad you enjoyed it…

Armand

Nice read

Happy for that…

Armand

The main problem with the Prussian army post-1763 is that it no longer had Frederick to command it after 1786.

The policies of the army, with no established general staff, ossified artillery and engineer arms, and a failure to study their opponents invariably led to the catastrophe of 1806, even though some reforms were accomplished prior to 1806.

Until just before war broke out in 1806, the Prussians had no permanent units above the regimental level. There were progressive officers, such as Scharnhorst, who advocated reform and tried it, but they were too juniot to have an army-wide impact.

I think a telling statement is "the Prussian king seemed more interested in the dismemberment of Poland". I'd suggest that he was, France was and would remain France whether royal or republican. Poland was a place to make further territorial advances at the expense of Austria AKA the Holy Roman Empire, a far more important long term strategy on the road to Kaiserdom.

The French Army metamorphised between 1799 and 1804. It was re-organised, re-configured, and re-trained to beat both Hozenzollen, and Habsburg, armies.

Both dynasties – and that of the Romanovs – only succeeded against the new French military hegemony once they'd emulated it's organisation and methods.

The only house not to emulate the Bonapartes – was the Hanoverians – they succeeded by operational sleight-of-hand in managing to impose their choice of ground (in mainly secondary theatres).

LOL at the good ol' "secondary theatres" myth again.

What was the primary theatre in 1807 to 4/1809, or 8/1809 to 6/1812, again?

It isn't a 'myth.' And it doesn't matter as to the amount of time the campaigns in the Peninsula took.

The bottom line is that the war(s) were not decided there. They were decided in the main theaters of war in central Europe.

Read Christopher Duffy's last version of "The Army of Frederick the Great". Very interesting. He made the argument the Prussian Army began to decline after the SYW and was a shadow of what it once was by the time Frederick died.

It just never was tested except for the Bavarian War at the end of Frederick's reign. Even then it did not do so well.

What is really interesting is the damage that Frederick did to the Prussian artillery arm. It didn't really recover until after 1815.

There are several good chapters available

Hubertsberg to Auerstaedt : The Prussian Army in Decline, by Dennis Showalker pp.389 in Warfare in Europe 1792 – 1815

and also

The Jena Campaign, : Apogee and Perihelion, Dennis Showalker, pp 249 in Napoleon and the Operational Art of War – second revised and extended Edition, edited by Michael V. Leggiere

Thanks.

Armand

All this discussion about what was happening to the Prussian army. Has anyone done a study of the state of the Prussian economy and government during the century leading up to 1806?

Seems not… (smile)

Armand

@Bill N
Data from "Coping with Poverty in Rural Brandenburg
The Role of Lords and State in the Late Eighteenth Century"
Author: Takashi Iida
Table 5. Development of Public Finances of Prussia, 1713–1806
Income from domain estates (Million rt)/Tax (Million rt) Total pure state revenue (Million rt)/Military Expenditure (Million rt)/Number of military personnel/ Population
1713 1.6 2.4 3.4 2.5 38,000 1,600,000
1740 3.3 3.6 7 5–6 72,000 2,200,000
1786 6–7 10–11 23 12–13 195,000 5,400,000
1806 7–8 16 27 16–17 250,000 10,700,000
Source: Schmoller 1898, 180.
Note: rt = Reichstaler.

There are two books by Brendan Simms that might help with understanding Prussia during the period:

-The Struggle for Mastery in Germany, 1779-1850.

-The Impact of Napoleon: Prussian High Politics, Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Executive, 1797–1806.

Thank you PoE. I was able to find the article on the internet. Kevin I was not able to find yours. Not sure how relevant they would be.

The knock on 18th century Prussia was that it was an army with a kingdom attached. That might be a workable arrangement for a state the size of Prussia in 1740. It wouldn't work for the Prussia of 1806. It seems Prussia in 1805 and 1806 had trouble getting up to speed. Not sure whether it was the insufficient economic base, the insufficient bureaucracy, the wrong people trying to run the show or a combination.