"Americans worst defeat of revolution" Topic

"After a siege that began on April 2, 1780, Americans suffer their worst defeat of the revolution on May 12, 1780, with the unconditional surrender of Major General Benjamin Lincoln to British Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton and his army of 10,000 at Charleston, South Carolina.

With the victory, the British captured more than 3,000 Patriots and a great quantity of munitions and equipment, losing only 250 killed and wounded in the process. Confident of British control in the South, Lieutenant General Clinton sailed north to New York after the victory, having learned of an impending French expedition to the British-occupied northern state. He left General Charles Cornwallis in command of 8,300 British forces in the South…"

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If the armies had been all that mattered, Charleston would have been decisive. But SC immediately organized its militia for guerilla warfare and population control. The British tried to match that with Loyalists, and could have won if they had succeeded.

However, without the presence of a regular army in the South, the partisans could not have defeated the British and Loyalists on their own. Gates defeat at Camden emphasized that fact again.

Greene's appointment as the new commander in the South and his realization to work with the partisans and keeping the southern army intact was a winning combination.

In many respects, Greene campaigned on the model of the French Marshal Turenne and his strategy defeated the British, wearing down the British regulars by fighting them and inflicting heavy casualties on them, which they could not replace, as well as supporting the partisan operations, at times reinforcing them with Continental regulars both infantry and cavalry.

Charleston was the worst defeat the Americans suffered during the war, and Greene's campaigns in the south were decisive and drove Cornwallis to leave the Carolinas and go to Virginia where he became besieged and surrendered.

The number of captured is way low. It likely only counts Continentals captured at Charleston who numbered slightly more than 3,000 men. In addition to the Continentals there were South and North Carolina militia were present in substantial numbers, and there were a number of sailors who joined in the defense and were captured. Clinton put the total captured at around 6,000. Andre puts it slightly above 5,600. Moultrie claims those numbers are inflated, and include men in Charleston capable of bearing arms but who did not participate.

A main force -- eventually Greene's -- was needed, but Marion and Sumter and Pickens pretty much prevented the harnessing of Loyalists by themselves. This was crucial. An effective Loyalist militia would have clenched British control.

And yet Marion was reinforced/supported by Lee's Legion in at least some of his partisan operations which greatly added to his successes.

An effective Loyalist militia would have clenched British control.

Do you have any evidence to support this contention?

The goal is control of the population, from which is derived manpower, economic strength, and political legitimacy. That is what a militia system does. The regulars lacked the numbers to control the countryside and the population. The British army controlled only the few locations it was located. The militia dominated everywhere else. An effective Loyalist militia system would have at least challenged the Patriot militias, and might well have prevailed.

Marion and Sumter and Pickens fought dozens of battles to break up Loyalists from organizing. They had read their Machiavelli.

from THE PRINCE:

The other and better remedy is to plant colonies in one or two of those places which form as it were the keys of the land, for it is necessary either to do this or to maintain a large force of armed men. The colonies will cost the prince little; with little or no expense on his part, he can send and maintain them; he only injures those whose lands and houses are taken to give to the new inhabitants, and these form but a small proportion of the state, and those who are injured, remaining poor and scattered, can never do any harm to him, and all the others are, on the one hand, not injured and therefore easily pacified; and, on the other, are fearful of offending lest they should be treated like those who have been dispossessed of their property. To conclude, these colonies cost nothing, are more faithful, and give less offence; and the injured parties being poor and scattered are unable to do mischief, as I have shown. For it must be noted, that men must either be caressed or else annihilated; they will revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for great ones; the injury therefore that we do to a man must be such that we need not fear his vengeance. But by maintaining a garrison instead of colonists, one will spend much more, and consume in guarding it all the revenues of that state, so that the acquisition will result in a loss, besides giving much greater offence, since it injures every one in that state with the quartering of the army on it; which being an inconvenience felt** by all, every one becomes an enemy, and these are enemies which can do mischief, as, though beaten, they remain in their own homes. In every way, therefore, a garrison is as useless as colonies are useful.

Again, do you have any evidence to support your contention? You haven't supplied any and where is it stated that Marion, Pickens, and Sumter had 'read their Machiavelli'?

I would suggest that before referring to and quoting from Machiavelli it would be a good idea to understand the period and circumstances in which he wrote. It was nothing like the War of the American Revolution. It was first published in Italian in 1532. The first English translation was in 1640. Was it available in the colonies and is there evidence that the three American partisan commanders read it?

Kevin, I've been studying the Rev war in the south for 60 years and have read most of the primary and dozens of the secondary works on it. I do not need another historian to tell me what to think about it. The Patriots' reliance on the militia is manifold and manifest, both on and primarily OFF the battlefield.

But if you wish you can read my dissertation: "The Virginia War Effort, 1775-1783: Manpower Policies and Practices." University of Virginia, 1977.

And the reliance on the militia was, at best, misguided which has been clearly demonstrated, ad nauseum, on this forum.

The militia was a broken reed as exemplified by Washington. Postwar myth and legend was instigated after the war to give the militia credit that it did not deserve.

Again, solid research is the gathering of facts and with those facts a conclusion can be drawn.

And isn't your research primarily about Virginia, and not the other southern states? The revolutionary south was not a monolith and as the greater majority of the southern Continental Line was lost at Charleston, Virginia had a lot of catching up to do. Further, Jefferson was a terrible wartime governor and he had not ensured that Virginia was prepared to meet the British invasion in the early 1780s.

You are wrong in so many ways, not least about TJ as governor. But we've been through all of that.

You are wrong in so many ways, not least about TJ as governor…

Because you say it, does not make it either fact or accurate. And you repeatedly err in your 'historical comments' which is unfortunate.

I can support my ideas and contentions with credible source material. By your own statement, you don't appear to do that and only put forward an opinion.

Not sure how good or poor a governor Jefferson was has any relevance to the fall of Charleston. In the year leading up to the fall of Charleston Jefferson's Virginia put 3 new Continental infantry regiments, 1 rebuilt cavalry regiment and 1 State regiment sized combat force into the field in the south. Virginia also assisted in the transportation of two brigades of Continentals through the state on their way south.

Jefferson had nothing to do with the decision to pull Parker's regiment from Augusta into Charleston right before the start of the siege. Jefferson had nothing to do with the decision to have Woodford's brigade come into the city in April of 1780 rather than join Huger. Lincoln's decisions lead to the capture of four regiments of Virginia Continentals and the devastation of a fifth. But for Lincoln's decisions the Americans would have had with the arrival of deKalb and the Maryland line a force of Continentals and Virginia State troops over 2,000 strong.

Bill, yes. TJ was no military man, but give a read to his instructions to George Rogers Clark: masterful in scope, and yet detailed in arranging logistics etc. And as you say, TJ sent Virginia's state line into the south where Continental commanders wasted them.

Contrast the Va militia's performance at Camden versus at Guilford. TJ and the state authority came down VERY HARD on the Camden deserters, and it paid off.

TJ also dealt effectively with conflicts between the militia system and Continental logistics. The workers at the various Cont'l factories (leather, gunpowder, repairing muskets, teamsters) fell under their county militia's authority, but if they were called into the field (as was regularly necessary in 1780-81) it disrupted essential war work. Jefferson was instrumental in resolving the competing requirements. By 1781 Continental QM workers were often "paid" by getting credit for a militia tour.

It was General Stevens who got the Virginia militia to perform at Guilford Courthouse. He was ashamed about their performance at Camden and one of the ways he ensured they maintained their position at Guilford for as long as they did was to post picked men behind the Virginia line to shoot anyone who ran.

This is an interesting volume that sheds light on Jefferson's incompetence as a chief executive:

Flight from Monticello: Thomas Jefferson at War by Michael Kranish.

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No. TJ was un-military, but he was an excellent administrator. Virginia was unprepared for the British invasion because TJ had sent all her state troops into the Carolinas. Virginia had to wage war on two frontiers -- western and the coastal tidewater against British privateers -- as well as conduct highly unpopular drafts for the Continentals (through the militia) and also support the Continental armies in the Carolinas. Sorry, this is my dissertation topic and I have read everything remotely relevant in primary sources. Jefferson did a good-to-excellent job at an impossible task. The Va governorship was a weak office, but not because TJ wished it so; indeed, he tried to strengthen its powers while he was in the office.

You are simply wrong.

Kevin, this your idea of a historian?

Michael Kranish is an investigative political reporter for The Washington Post. He is the author of The World's Fastest Man: The Extraordinary Life of Cyclist Major Taylor, America's First Sports Hero. He is the co-author of Trump Revealed for the Washington Post, and co-author of biographies of John Kerry and Mitt Romney for The Boston Globe. He received the Society of Professional Journalists award for Washington Correspondence in 2016. He is the author of of Flight from Monticello: Thomas Jefferson at War, a narrative of the invasion of Virginia by the traitor Benedict Arnold, and other British forces, during Jefferson's governorship.

He's a journalist and part of the WASHINGTON POST. Sorry, not impressed.

"And the reliance on the militia was, at best, misguided which has been clearly demonstrated, ad nauseum, on this forum."

Huh? The facts clearly do not support this conclusion, especially when considering the Southern Campaign. The militia kept the regulars confined to their outposts and didn't allow them to gain control of anything they couldn't reach with a bayonet. The same thing the New Jersey militia did after the fall of New York.

In the context of control of the inland areas, the militia was highly effective. They were an almost total failure in stand up fights, (with notable exceptions – Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse, etc.)

Doc +1, Djackson +1

Kings Mountain, Cowpens, and Guilford are pretty big exceptions. But yes, it was population control.

Stevens was not present at Charleston, so again what is the relevance?

If we are going down that rabbit hole though, Camden was an early effort by Virginia to mobilizing a large force of militia for service outside the state. Charleston had stripped the state of a number of experienced officers. Prior to Camden the highest field command Stevens had exercised was a Continental regiment. He held that command for about a year. It was a green force lead by a mostly green commander. At Cowpens Virginia militia (not under Stevens) were good enough that Morgan was willing to incorporate some into his third line. At Guilford Courthouse it wasn't just Steven's militia that performed better. It was also Lawsons and Campbell's.

Without going into details, yes, Virginia changed the way militia were organized for field duty. At Camden the "companies" were recently formed of isolated individuals from many counties, under officers who were strangers. After Camden this was reformed so that more militiamen served together with neighbors under their own officers. This matters a lot.

And MM, I think the Loyalist force at KM was a bit better than that. They were fighting riflemen in ideal terrain for that weapon.

By mid-1781, the Virginia militia formed three battalions of "militia grenadiers" who were mostly former Continentals (who fell back under militia authority upon returning home). Their officers were supernumerary Continentals, backed up by militia officers who shadowed them to learn how to do it. New drafts of militia were encouraged to buy their way out of it by hiring a substitute from among the "grenadiers." So those battalions were semi-permanent organizations with a fair bit of training and a lot of experience, and professional leadership.

This was the right answer, after two years of trial and error.

Kevin, this your idea of a historian?

He's a journalist and part of the WASHINGTON POST. Sorry, not impressed.

You referred to the New York Times as a reference, did you not?

Have you read the subject book?

Doc, Jackson. Were not the troops between Lexington and Concord militia as well? Bunker Hill? When used correctly they could inflict disproportionate casualties on the British. They were not made for a stand up fight against trained troops. But they did handle the Loyalists militias and British Indian Allies.

When used correctly as they were at Cowpens and some other battles, they did their part.

I don't understand why this is even being debated.

It is being discussed (again) because of the stated/implied idea that the war would not have been won without the militia. That is an inaccurate assessment and ignores the constant liabilities of the militia that failed throughout the war.

They performed well at Cowpens because they had no place to run which is why Morgan chose to fight there as there was a river at their backs.

The Virginia militia did well at Guilford Courthouse as has already been posted. The North Carolina ran from the battlefield.

At Camden the militia ran and abandoned the Maryland and Delaware Continentals. One militia regiment did stay and fight.

The militia could not be relied upon and it is a myth from the Revolution that they won it.

So rereading the thread again, it seems like this started out as the British could not gain full control of SC, NC and Georgia due to the excellent work of the militias of those states outside of the costal areas. From every book on the Southern campaign I have read (and since sold), this is true and that is what the British wanted to do. The militias did an excellent job of defeating the loyalists militias, harassing British communications and supplies. Force Cornwallis to use much needed regulars to escort, hold key locations and pursue these militias. All defeating British aims to control those colonies and to hold more than just the costal areas.

Could the militia have defeated the main British army without a regular colonial trained force? No. But that was not their purpose or aim. They accomplished their purpose. Greene and Morgan, then both used the militia regiments as they should be used and left those like Marion to do what they did best.

The thread then seems to devolve into the uselessness of the militias. That is untrue and I don't understand the point of that conversation at all.

The war could not have been won without the militia. In fact, at least as far as Virginia is concerned, the Continental Army could not have been raised (through drafts on the militia) without the militia. Conscription was very unpopular and local militia commanders had to use force to break up anti0draft riots on several occasions. Militia posses caught Continental deserters and returned them to the army. The militia SYSTEM was essential, and their field units the least important contribution. (Though hte milita COULD be formidable in the field, as many examples attest.)

Kevin, you are simply repeating the old regular-army prejudice that many of the older histories are tainted with.

So the base point is: the war could not have been won without the militia, but the militia could not have won the war on its own. I can agree with that.

I too was going to also point out, that the militia was the source of much recruitment for the Continental Army. The fact they knew in many cases how to use a musket, and some cases the rifle, made training easier. Also the rudiments of some drill.

Lastly the fact that the commanders kept calling them up to supplement their main army, shows that they saw them as necessary and useful.

No they did not perform like the trained continental line. Does anyone expect they could or would? Do we expect Landwher to perform like regulars? Conscripts like Line?

So again: the war could not have been won without the militia, but the militia could not have won the war on its own.

They had their place and they were important.

35th, yes. And I don't know of anyone who argues that the militia could have won by themselves. But it is certain the Continentals could not have won by themselves, either.

The British faced the same twin problems we faced in VietNam; a regular army (NVA) but also effective guerillas (VC). The first required concentration, the second dispersal.

You want to see how to defeat the VC? Read Bing West's THE VILLAGE. A squad of Marines buddied up with the rural force militia (RuffPuffs) in a village, were able to prevent the VC nearby from dominating the village. So someone asked Westmoreland why the program was not more widely used? because the NVA battalions would have rolled up and over such isolated detachments.

"Doc, Jackson. Were not the troops between Lexington and Concord militia as well? Bunker Hill? "

Indeed they were and gave a good accounting of themselves.

"And I don't know of anyone who argues that the militia could have won by themselves."

It was argued by post war politicians. The idea that the militia was able to stand up to the regulars was promulgated after the war by those who didn't want to pay for a standing army. In 1812 and 1861 they re-learned the lessons of Camden and other battles where the militia tried to stand in the line without adequate preparation.

Similar to Jefferson's attempt to defend American ports not with a blue water navy, but small gunboats with a single big gun. Sounds good and saves money, but a total failure when actual battle is joined.

Yeah, Jefferson's gunboats were not a great idea.

The rationale for the Jeffersonians was twofold:

First, they hated Hamilton's financial plan but could not get out of it, so were determined to accelerate it and pay off the debt. So they slashed spending.

Second, republicanism had a long-standing animus to standing armies.

In other words, the Jeffersonian minimalization of defense spending was based primarily on fiscal and ideological grounds. and not on military. Political reasons prevailed, as they often (mostly!) do. And we DID have a moat called the Atlantic between us and most enemies. Lack of a good regular army hampered us along the frontiers but the US was in no danger of being conquered even without it.

Imagine, if you can, the following scenario, which for America is a staple in post-apocalyptic fiction, but which could also be reversed and apply to China, or Russia.

An enemy nukes the capital, and the main military bases, and the nation is left with no effective central government and only remnants of its military. And is then invaded by foreign armies.

Does either the US or China, fall in such a circumstance? Not bloody likely. Certainly America doesn't, because there is a whole layer of authority still intact (the states) and a buttload of dispersed riflemen, and beneath that an advanced economy full of people who know how to build weapons.

Russian resilience may be of a different order or degree, but history demonstrates that it exists.

The early US certainly benefitted from an effective regular army when it had one (e.g. Wayne's legion) but with its militia the regulars were scarcely an existential requirement.

" It was argued by post war politicians. The idea that the militia was able to stand up to the regulars was promulgated after the war by those who didn't want to pay for a standing army. In 1812 and 1861 they re-learned the lessons of Camden and other battles where the militia tried to stand in the line without adequate preparation."

Oh, ok. I thought the initial reference was to modern historians trying to say the militia won the Revolution. Your comments I am very familiar with. So yes in the past that was espoused by some, but I have heard no revolutionary historian recently saying that.

"The early US certainly benefitted from an effective regular army when it had one (e.g. Wayne's legion) but with its militia the regulars were scarcely an existential requirement."

True, but a regular army, and navy, was needed when we did go to war. Just look at 1812. An effective regular army could have, (maybe), conquered Canada or at least kept Washington from being burned.

Dn J, yes, though of course the navy did well on the lakes. I think perhaps a republican might have asserted that we had no business trying to conquer a neighbor, which of course requires regulars as you say -- a moral superiority of the militia, a defensive only system. But plenty of Republicans *the War Hawks) pushed for that (conquest of Canada).

A good book to review for the War of 1812 is Donald Hickey's Don't Give Up the Ship: Myths of the War of 1812.

For example, the reason the US declared war on Great Britain in 1812 was because of the maritime issues, such as impressment, of which about 10,000 American seaman were impressed by the Royal Navy between 1793 and 1812.

Ancillary to that was the nefarious Chesapeake Affair, where a US warship was fired on and boarded by the British. Four sailors were taken off by the British, three of whom were Americans who had previously been impressed by the Royal Navy and deserted.

When the HMS Leopard fired on the Chesapeake, three US sailors were killed and 16 wounded, one of whom later died of his wounds.

Another reason for the declaration of war was the British relationship with the Indians in the Old Northwest on both sides of the border with Canada. The British supplied the Indians with trade goods and weapons in order to keep them as allies if war erupted between the US and Great Britain.

Despite the insistence of the so-called War Hawks in Congress, the myth of the US goal to conquer Canada still resonates in some publications. Taking Canada was not one of the reasons for the declaration of war and it was not a war aim. What did happen was that the only way to get at the British on land was to fight them in Canada.

At sea, the overwhelming majority of ship-to-ship actions were won by the US Navy, and the two fleet actions fought on the lakes were won by the US Navy. The two British fleets were destroyed.

The American militia had the same problems they had in the War of the Revolution. In short, they didn't do too well and too many times refused to cross state lines as well as the Canadian border. The militia system such as it was, was still a 'broken reed.

This is a short synopsis of the militia problems encountered by American commanders in the War of the Revolution. It covers both the pros and cons of the militia system, and the cons considerably outweigh the pros:

Washington's opinion of the militia was that the militia ‘come in you cannot tell how; go out you cannot see when; act you cannot tell where; consume your provisions; exhaust your stores; and leave you at last in a critical moment. Washington believed them to be a ‘broken staff.' Further, he was convinced that the militia would never acquire the steadiness under fire that the Continentals acquired through long service, experience, and finally thorough and efficient training. While many Americans were of the opinion, as had been their British ancestors that ‘the standing army was a monster' the more practical among Congress and the American wartime leadership understood the necessity of the monster. Moreover, Washington believed that a standing regular army could coexist ‘with a free society.'

Washington, among his myriad problems in New York in September 1776 was plagued by militia that ‘ran like a torrent.' He stated that ‘the militia instead of calling forth their utmost efforts…great numbers of them have gone off; in some instances, almost by whole regiments.' Washington later continued ‘Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life-unaccustomed to the din of arms…' and facing regular troops, especially experienced regular troops, ‘makes them timid and ready to fly from their own shadows.' Interestingly, Washington praised the efforts of the militia in the northern department during the Saratoga campaign, stating that the militia had ‘shut the only door by which Burgoyne could retreat…' Still, in the battles of the Saratoga campaign it was the Continental Regular who, as always, bore the brunt of the fighting and the casualties finally defeating the British offensive at both Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights and forced a British army to surrender.

Unfortunately, some in Congress still believed in the efficiency and reliability of the militia, and disagreed with Washington's judgment that a large regular army was what was needed for the war. Further and disastrously for the southern army in 1780, Congress also erroneously thought that General Horatio Gates, who commanded the northern army during the Saratoga campaign would be the perfect American commander for the southern army. That mistake in judgment had Congress overrule Washington as to who would best command the southern army and led to disaster at the Battle of Camden in August 1780.

Gates' replacement, Nathaniel Greene, thought the militia equivalent to the ‘locusts of Egypt.' When mustered, the militia came in without the required weapons or equipment, took what they needed from Continental stores, and then left and went home when the mood struck them. This belief was not only shared by most of the Continental senior officers, but was reinforced for Greene by the behavior of the North Carolina militia at Guilford Courthouse in March 1781. Not only did the North Carolinians run from the advancing British infantry, whether or not they had fired upon them as ordered, but they ran completely from the battlefield.

British opinion of the militia was twofold: first, they held them in general contempt as soldiers because they did not stand up to British regulars in the field. However, they did consider them to be an ‘armed constabulary' who could and did police areas where no other authority existed. In that role, and in the role of partisans, especially in the southern theater, they could be effective against the British lines of communication. Effective American commanders, such as Greene understood the value of partisans and their operations and carefully coordinated them with the main southern army, reinforcing them with regular troops when necessary. However, without the existence of the Continental Army, the militia lacked the ability to confront British units on their own. Piers Mackesy, writing about the American Revolution from the British perspective claimed that it was the Continental Army that defeated the British, not the militia.

The militia, depending on the location and the British presence, might be inclined to momentarily side with the British if it was to their immediate advantage. Otho Holland Williams, an outstanding officer of the Maryland Line who was one of Nathaniel Greene's key subordinates in the south and a Continental infantry brigade commander at Guilford Courthouse, testified to this in the southern theater.

Skillful American commanders, such as General Daniel Morgan and General John Stark, knew how to use militia to their advantage and win either with them alone or with their assistance. Stark was a hard man and a driving commander and had been an officer of Rogers' Rangers in the French and Indian War. Morgan was of the same mold and his decision to fight at Cowpens in January 1781 was deliberate as their was a river at his back and he knew his militia could not run. He later admitted that if he had crossed the river the militia would have melted away. Stark's fight at Bennington during the Saratoga campaign clearly demonstrated that he could mold the troops he led into a force capable of fighting European regulars and defeating them, as he had at Bunker Hill in 1775. However, commanders of this caliber and talent were rare in any army.

The greatest problem with both the state militias and the state troops was that they took recruits away from the Continental Army because of shorter terms of service and higher bounties for enlisting. This resulted in severe problems that were never alleviated during the war and was a major reason that the Continental Army was never recruited up to full authorized strength. The Continental Army, well-trained and at full strength, could have won the war much sooner.

The Continentals' term for the militia was 'long faces' which is quite apt and indicative of what they actually thought of service in the field.

The source material for the above is:

-American Army Life by John Elting.

-This Glorious Struggle: George Washington's Revolutionary War Letters, edited by Edward G. Lengel.

-Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 by Lawrence Cress.

-The Continental Army by Robert Wright.

-The Battles of Saratoga by John Elting.

-Rebels and Redcoats: The American Revolution Through the Eyes of Those Who Fought and Lived It by George Scheer and Hugh Rankin.

-Washington's General: Nathaniel Greene and the Triumph of the American Revolution by Terry Golway.

-Long, Obstinate, and Bloody, The Battle of Guilford Courthouse by Lawrence Babits and Joshua Howard.

-With Zeal and With Bayonets Only by Matthew Spring.

-The War for America 1775-1783 by Piers Mackesy.

-Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathaniel Greene, Major General of the Army of the United States, in the War of the Revolution, 2 vols. by William Johnson.

-Now We Are Enemies: The Story of Bunker Hill by Thomas Fleming.

-Saratoga: Turning Point of America's Revolutionary War by Richard Ketchum.

Kevin, that utterly misses the point. We KNOW, we've aways known, that militia in the field were unreliable. There was ALSO, what I don't believe you mention, a big political and economic cost to calling them out. (And when a draft for Continentals was ongoing, as in Va in 1780-81, it retarded that, as you could not raise Continental recruits at the same time as field duty). So militia in the field were generally a last resort. one which NOBODY thought was a great idea, but which may nevertheless have been NECESSARY.

The contribution of the militia, I will explain AGAIN to you, was in raising men, in suppressing Loyalist dissent (plus local security from Indians and coastal raiders), in forcing would-be neutrals to commit (when you were called up you either went or refused to go, labelling yourself a Loyalist). In short, in POPULATION CONTROL. The militia could dominate everywhere the British army wasn't. You have yet to dispute that, or attempt to refute it, or even to acknowledge it. Instead you keep telling us things no one disputes.

THIS, however, is problematic. It may be true for state line, but there were no "higher bounties for enlisting" in the MILITIAS because everyone was already IN the militia.

The greatest problem with both the state militias and the state troops was that they took recruits away from the Continental Army because of shorter terms of service and higher bounties for enlisting. This resulted in severe problems that were never alleviated during the war and was a major reason that the Continental Army was never recruited up to full authorized strength. The Continental Army, well-trained and at full strength, could have won the war much sooner.

We can debate the state lines; Virginia's contributed a lot until the Continental commanders squandered them.

PLus, excuse me, but you seem oblivious to the political realities. There was NO WAY the revolutionary generation was going to prioritize creating a strong regular army outside of state control. Not gonna happen. They'd heard too much about Oliver Cromwell.

AFTER the war was over, ex-Continental officers, now Federalists/nationalists (e.g. GW, Knox, Hamilton), and in political warfare against a states-rights party and philosophy, bemoaned, "OH, if we had been running things it would all have been different."

So no, in the context of the time the states were too suspicious ever to have acceded to a Continental-army-only strategy. Which would not have been as effective, probably, as the dispersed/ubiquitous militia.

GW's army shrank from about 20,000 at Long Island to no more than 2000 or 3000 at Trenton. Whose fault was that? The militia? I don't believe so. But the New Jersy militia did give the occupying British a low-key but constant security threat, which was part of the background to Trenton.

Okay, say there's no state line. How many regiments of Continentals will be stationed in Virginia in case of invasion? The British DID invade two or three times, from Dunmore on, and of course MIGHT have invaded any time they chose. Do you leave the largest state undefended? or would, maybe, about a brigade's worth of infantry and an artillery regiment be a minimum? Because that is what the Va State Line provided.

Say there's no militia (impossible, but just assume). How many Continentals will be stationed -- in small units -- in dozens or hundreds of forts along the frontier? How many are assigned to serve as coast watchers, lookouts to give the alarm when a British privateer comes up the river? What sort of alarm force will the Continentals provide, when that happens?

(Historically, the Virginia executive assumed that roughly 20% of its militia were needed along the western, and about the same along the eastern, frontiers.)

But it is certain the Continentals could not have won by themselves, either.

Not even close to being accurate. After the Valley Forge training, the Continental army could meet the British and German regulars on even terms, as they clearly demonstrated at Monmouth in June 1778. And the Continental regiments in the northern army also demonstrated that they could meet and defeat the British and Germans.

I submit that if Washington and the other Continental commanders had the authorized strength of the Continental Amry or even close to it, there would have been no need to be 'supplemented' by militia units and the war could have been shorter and the British defeated earlier.

Both the militia and the state lines took needed manpower away from the Continental lines as their enlistments were shorter, their terms of service shorter in the field, and the bounties paid to them for their service higher than those given to Continental recruits. And discipline was easier. Washington's goal for the Continental Army was hamstrung by these state policies and recruiting was below what was actually required to fill the authorized Continental regiments.

The bottom line is that the militia 'system' hurt the overall American war effort and that would continue into the War of 1812. The idea of a 'citizen soldier' in the militia being the American first line of defense is a myth.

Doc, while there were core components of the burgeoning Continental army at Long Island/Brooklyn a year into the war, there were also thousands of untrained and thoroughly undisciplined militia in the overall force.

The "fault" lay in great part with the mistakes Washington made in his disposition of forces, especially regarding Jamaica Plain, and with the skill and execution of the British. It was the core that saved him. The sacrifice of the Marylanders, and the skills of Glovers Marblehead sailors, got what was left of the army away. You could hardly expect the large numbers of militia to stick around after this. Many were farmers and went home.

I am pretty sure Washington blamed the militia for much of what happened. But he was also outnumbered by a professional army. The fact that the core of the army survived was his achievement here.

The British faced the same twin problems we faced in VietNam; a regular army (NVA) but also effective guerillas (VC). The first required concentration, the second dispersal.

The comparison of the war in Vietnam with the War of the Revolution is not a logical comparison. The two wars were completely different.

Unfortunately, some authors have used this comparison for whatever reason and have missed the point and probably have not studied the Vietnam war in any depth. It was in vogue, however, to take that approach in the 1970s-1980s.

One is not a template for the other.

The North Vietnamese invaded South Vietnam and sponsored a 'guerilla' movement in the South. It was a war of aggressions against an independent state. And the insurgency was not a 'home grown' one, but supplemented in the VC units with North Vietnamese, especially after TET 68.

The Viet Cong were destroyed as a fighting organization in TET 68 and the units were then filled with North Vietnamese. The Viet Cong political organization was destroyed in Hue during that battle.

The massacres of unarmed civilians, as well as the rape and torture of Vietnamese women and girls was communist policy during the war. And portions of the American anti-war movement actively aided the North Vietnamese in their conquest of the South.

The Paris Peace Treaty that ended the American involvement in the war in 1972/3 guaranteed the independence of South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese did not honor their treaty obligations.

These are some of the reasons that clearly demonstrate that there is no comparison between the War of the Revolution and the war in Vietnam.

Some sources that might be helpful:

-Summons of the Trumpet by Dave Palmer.

-The Long Grey Line by Rick Atkinson.

-The Two Vietnams by Bernard Fall.

-Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall.

-We Were Soldiers Once…and Young: Ia Drang – The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam by Hal Moore.

-Dak To: America's Sky Soldiers in South Vietnam's Central Highlands by Edward Murphy.

Kevin, I do not mean this as an insult, but you have no historical imagination. No poetry, just prose. The parallels between VNN and the AWI are manifold. When I have time I will list them.

link

GW's army at Long Island was mostly Continentals (green and poorly trained, often). Some militia, often in peripheral roles or positions. Several militia brigades were engaged and took heavy losses.

But the attrition to GW's Continentals between LI and the retreat into Pennsylvania was not militia deserting.

Easy to blame the militia for Continental defeats. Easy, but not often accurate.

So answer the question about defending Virginia in nthe absence of a state line? You seem to be imagining that security and population control is somehow taken care of, without the militia or state lines, and that a larger Continental army somehow eliminates the need for that. No proof of that. SO HOW MANY CONTINENTALS ASSIGNED TO DEFEND EACH STATE if there are no state lines nor active militia?

How does a larger Continental Army drive the British out of NY, or Charleston? Or any port with the Royal Navy supporting them?

And again, THERE IS NO POLITICAL CHANCE of what you are proposing. Politically impossible. Anyone with knowledge of the revolutionary generation and how it thought should realize that.