"Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler in 1941? The ..." Topic

…Historiographical Controversy Surrounding the Origins of the Nazi-Soviet War

"The controversy surrounding the origins of the Nazi-Soviet War in 1941, namely over the issue of whether or not Stalin intended to launch an offensive against Nazi Germany that year, has produced a contentious debate between revisionist (i.e. those who believe that Stalin was preparing for an offensive) and orthodox historians (i.e. those who reject the notion of a soviet offensive in 1941). First popularized by Victor Suvorov, the ensuing debate between orthodox and revisionist historians over Stalin's intentions in 1941 has produced an abundance of scholarly literature, and it is the purpose of this paper to survey the historiography of this controversy…"

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Armand

Later by all of my reading,

Obviously! When in 1941 Hitler, who wanted peace, realized, after the failure of R. Hess mission, that Great Britain would have continued to fight with no chance of winning the war by herself, it was clear she waited the help of some friends. US needed too much time so the fastest could be the Russians who, in turn, hesitated because they feared having to bear a burden too burdensome waiting for US intervention.

I attended a lecture by 'Suvorov' at King's College, London in 2000 or 2001. He explained his book 'Icebreaker' in which he detailed the dispositions of Soviet forces in an aggressive stance, ready to attack Nazi Germany.

He claimed to have first noticed the deviation from the accepted history while at military academy. Stalin was castigated for arranging packed airfields too far forward, for having ammunition trains too close to the front line, for reserves deployed immediately to the rear of the forward troops. These were lessons being taught as part of defensive warfare for Cold War students. The following week the curriculum covered offensive operations, including forward airfields, ammunition immediately to hand, reserves poised to exploit the situation quickly…

From this he extrapolated his suspicions into an entire book (he'd already been published with a number of works on the Soviet Army and Warsaw Pact) and was quite proud of several doctoral theses attempting to disprove his research.

I haven't studied the situation in detail but found his arguments compelling. Definitely plausible even if the actual truth may never be known.

As I understand it Stalin's armies were forward deployed while reinforcing the new borders seized in 1939. I remember reading one account specifically stating the new fortifications were incomplete.
I also remember reading that Stalin had plans for an eventual attack on Germany but dates had not been set and planning was in years, not months.

When talking about where and how Soviet troops were stationed on the eve of the German attack, it must be remembered that Soviet troops appeared in these territories a year before these events – in 1939. Therefore, they occupied those airfields, barracks, warehouses and other structures that were available at the time of their appearance – the former Polish, Lithuanian, Romanian. Even if they were in an extremely unfortunate position in terms of the new situation. A good example is the Brest Fortress, where a large number of Soviet troops (from 7 to 9 thousand people) were stationed in barracks actually on the very border with Germany (part of this fortress, separated by the Bug River, generally belonged to Germany at that moment) and, naturally, they immediately came under attack right in their own barracks.

The construction of new facilities was in full swing, but it took time. For example, the construction of new airfields was in full swing (310 pieces were planned for construction), but by the beginning of the war they were in readiness from 30 to 70%. Hence the crowding of Soviet aviation at existing airfields and their proximity to the border, which led to gigantic losses from the very first strikes (even from enemy artillery fire).

Interesting thought – one wonders what might have happened if, anticipating an attack, the German deferred Barbarossa to build up defenses and forces for a counter-attack; given the Red Army's performance in the Winter War and the early stages of Barbarossa one could see a Soviet offensive derailing pretty quickly, giving the Germans a number of opportunities – plus would make for some good gaming

In addition, the Soviet army was in the process of increasing its size (tripled! from 1938 to 1940 from 1.5 million to 4.2 million), which caused a glaring shortage of trained officers and non-commissioned officers.
The creation of 29 new mechanized corps also began in the army – for which there was no equipment (a huge part of the Soviet tanks of the previous years of production were worn out and subject to decommissioning or overhaul, but it was considered that it was suitable for training recruits until the resource was completely exhausted), no trained personnel (previously trained Soviet tank commanders simply disappeared among the former cavalrymen who joined the tank troops).
This army at this stage was simply not capable of effective action, especially offensive. The country's leadership planned to bring its level of training and weapons to an acceptable level only by 1942.

Such an attack would surely have made it easier for the Germans to destroy the Red Army on the frontier instead of chasing it back to Moscow.

Of the graduates of military schools and accelerated courses of the Red Army (in the period 1938-41), only 40-45% met the existing requirements for trained officers, and of these, almost none, or none at all, had the slightest combat experience at those levels of command on which they ended up.

As a result, by May 1940, the army lacked 35% of the required officers, and approximately 70% of its command staff had served in their current positions for six months or less. And what is even worse – 50% of battalion commanders, and up to 68% of company and platoon commanders, underwent only six months of accelerated training in schools, and in courses for various branches of the military. Moreover, only a few of the regimental commanders, and a little more than 26% of the division commanders, had at least some combat experience.

At that moment it was an army of non-professionals and dropouts, alas. Had to study right in the battle, and the Germans became the best teachers.

We all know what Russians (and I do not mean Soviets) are like when their homeland is threatened. OK 1917 was an exception…..for many reasons.

But in an invasion, lacking decent NCOs, with officers that are lazy and corrupt, with poor supply lines and little motivation, armour lacking modern communication kit….that might sound familiar to this day.

It took years (and much Lend/Lease supply) for the Red army to become the victor at Stalingrad, Kursk and Bagration.

AfaIr the Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost saw no danger of an attack from the Sovjets. So Suvorov gives an interpretation, some conclusions. The Bundeswehr planned to cross the border during a hot third world war, does it mean the Nato planned to attack the warsaw pact? No.
Military planning for every possibility, even a surprise attack, and actual execution are totally different things.

Thanks.

Armand

Corruption in the Stalinist USSR? An extremely risky occupation where everyone is passionate about searching for spies and "enemies of the people" (in the KGB archives there were 4 million denunciations from "caring citizens").
Corruption flourishes only where there is impunity. And under Stalin, corruption was equated with anti-Soviet activities (undermining the authority of state power) and was punishable either by very long prison terms (10 years or more) or the death penalty. It certainly existed, but its scale was insignificant.
Corruption in the USSR began to flourish under Khrushchev and reached its apogee under Brezhnev, when the highest Soviet officials were effectively beyond the jurisdiction.

The first significant victory of the USSR was the Battle of Moscow in 1941.

"It takes a brave man to be a coward in the Red Army." -- Joseph Stalin. The same would apply to corruption.

The same would apply to corruption.

Ah, the good old days, when communist discipline and order prevailed, the pure and unadulterated doctrine.
A bit like how the Wahabis imagine true Islam at the time of Mohamed as pure and unadulterated.

Have to take a look at what Western research has to say about it:
The Art of the Bribe: Corruption Under Stalin, 1943–1953 by James Heinzen – On Goodreads

The short review of Professor Alena Ledeneva looks promising, especially because she knows a bit about the topic.
And about Russia and its, at least until now, longer existing predecessor, the Soviet Union.
Review of The Art of the Bribe: Corruption Under Stalin, 1943–1953 by James Heinzen, by Alena Ledeneva

Glup!…

Armand

And I did not say that there was no corruption at all. Corruption is and will be everywhere and always. The question is the level of corruption in society. And the authors you named somehow diligently avoid comparisons with the situation in other periods or in other countries.
On this I think the issue of corruption in the Stalinist USSR can be stopped, as not related to the topic under discussion.

And I did not say that there was no corruption at all.

That may or may not the reason, I didn't adress your comment but that of downlowry.
Nevertheless, it obviously looks like it was a concern for you.

On this I think the issue of corruption in the Stalinist USSR can be stopped, as not related to the topic under discussion.

Which was brought up by whom?
Was elaborated on by whom beside downlowry and me?
Is suddenly no longer a desired topic for whom?

I just followed the scent

So, who decides what is on topic and what is off topic?

Bill, the moderators and the users as a whole, not just one.
And for sure not by sovereignly declaring it as if the thread belonged to him.

Am I right?

After the complete dog's breakfast that was the Russian invasion of Finland, it beggars belief that Stalin would ever have seriously considered an attack on the far-better-organised Germans.

Finland had an 800-mile long border with Russia, which obviously could not be defended. To attack Germany by the shortest route, the Red Army would have had to get through Poland first, which is a much shorter front that absolutely could and would have been defended. Had Russia tried to come via the Balkans, this would simply have gifted the Germans internal lines.

Conceivably Stalin could have been fooled by his army's performance against Japan in 1939 into thinking that it could fight Germany competently too, but the Winter War would have corrected that and anyway the IJA was in no way comparable to the Wehrmacht, having notably poor AT and close air support.

Cuprum's suggestion that units were in forward positions because that's where the barracks and airfields were feels like a superior explanation.

Starting in May 1940 the Russians could have been thinking they could hit Germany while it was distracted elsewhere. Of course, a month later they might have second thoughts but that wouldn't have stopped the planning staff.
Also, the Russians knew the military was unprepared for war after the purges but were taking measures to rebuild their officer corps and expand it to fit the new, larger army.

Well said….

Armand

If this subject interests you, you need to read the book Stalin's War. A lot to think about in that book.