"Elite troops definition" Topic

I still think If Surprised Or Spanish would make a great title for a set of Napoleonic rules.

haha! Maybe so, 4TH!

Elite (dictionary definition): "a select group that is superior in terms of ability or qualities"

Elite (general's battlefield definition): "my best unit/subunit/formation, by my own best assessment of all relevant factors on this given day, and therefore the ones I save for the most critical or demanding mission"

Maybe the Spanish or Neapolitan grenadiers weren't up to Old Guard standard, but they might rate a "Trained" rating against the rest of the Spanish or Neapolitan's "Raw" rating (or whatever equivalents apply in your ruleset of choice).

And I second @Erzherzog Johann's comments.

Hi, Chris. Some people are tired of the same old mechanics. They often produce really wonky, hard to believe results in the games they play. Often, after years with the same rules sets. This sees them seek out new ones to try. Problem is that the glitzy new rules are still just rehashes of 60 year old mechanics with minor differences in unit ratings. Tell me Chris, (As a rules designer yourself) how many treat Command and Control as a radius instead as a process as in real life? How about accounting for the results of unit's leadership's ability to keep the unit as a cohesive fighting force? How many have strayed from using number ratios for units and casualties as the mainframe structure for their designs? After all, pick ANY period in history and you will find units running away with little or no casualties while others fight almost to the last man? Such are major fallacies in historical wargame rules designs. More emphasis on weapons capabilities than on the men pulling the triggers? Yet such designed are tauted as being historical! Simulations get a bad rap because most that have attempted such quickly become paperwork nightmares and go deep into the weeds to find results. I am of the ilk that a game can also simulate more important things than bean counting yet the effects of logistics can be modeled in the game. Not trying to pick on you but you have with BBB had to deal with such things in your designs. So I ask you to consider what I asked above. I am not singling out any system, but most design/steal from existing mechanics based upon poor value sets to design games from. Oh, but we gamers are a bloody bunch of dead lead on the table! (Sometimes, myself included!)

v/r
Tom

Chris used this example: "Elite (general's battlefield definition): "my best unit/subunit/formation, by my own best assessment of all relevant factors on this given day, and therefore the ones I save for the most critical or demanding mission"

I'm fully behind this definition as there can be a myriad of reasons why their best may NOT be able to perform right now when he needs them- so he goes with which unit(s) he feels are the best arrows in his quiver at the time.

Thanks, Tom, glad you like my "General's battlefield definition". Since BBB is geared to fighting historical battles, it is that "who's elite on the day?" question that dictates how troops are rated for a given game.

You asked me "how many treat Command and Control as a radius instead as a process as in real life? How about accounting for the results of unit's leadership's ability to keep the unit as a cohesive fighting force?"

In previous rulesets I've tried written orders, "inertia", orders modes … for BBB we settled on command radius as a simple clean mechanism. It's obviously not a direct representation of how a real-life orders process works. In BBB its subtlety comes from the fact that not all generals are represented, so the better-led armies get plenty of generals while dismal ones get few or none. Units may also be rated "Passive" (a penalty that may represent ponderous doctrine or weak staff work, or may be a temporary factor such as fatigue or limited information etc) or "Fragile" (a penalty against units with "poor motivation or discipline", i.e., including weak junior leadership, hence lack of cohesion). The effect on tabletop is that the well-led armies remain cohesive and operate in a coordinated manner while the bad ones act disjointedly and fall apart. Last night we were using "Extra-Fragile" troops that really ran out of steam fast.

Casualties are obviously a factor in damaging unit cohesion. BBB rates units Raw, Trained or Veteran. Raw units become spent after the first casualty and find it nearly impossible to recover. Veteran units can absorb a lot more hurt and have a good chance of recovering from losses. This is especially important in two- or three-day battles where armies have a chance to reorganise overnight.

"I am of the ilk that […] the effects of logistics can be modeled in the game." Yes, they can and are. In most BBB scenarios logistics doesn't feature beyond a simple mechanism for going low on ammo and then replenishing. But depending on the scenario, logistics factors may be reflected in unit ratings (Passive or Fragile or Spent because of some shortages?), scenario objectives (capture/defend the supply dump, wagon train, line of communications?), greater chances of running low on ammo, etc.

Some people are tired of the same old mechanics. They often produce really wonky, hard to believe results in the games they play. Often, after years with the same rules sets. This sees them seek out new ones to try. Problem is that the glitzy new rules are still just rehashes of 60 year old mechanics with minor differences in unit ratings.

Well, some are re-hashes, some aren't. But whilst there are some old mechanics which have been decisively dropped (e.g. the old 50% rule) it is hard to say which command mechanics have been dropped, or which should be.

how many treat Command and Control as a radius instead as a process as in real life?

Well, many do. But OTOH it isn't necessarily clear that games which model process are significantly more accurate.

How about accounting for the results of unit's leadership's ability to keep the unit as a cohesive fighting force?

All of them do this. What you have done is rated the leadership ability according to specific and transparent criteria; what you haven't done is shown that this produces more realistic outcomes or that those criteria are accurately calibrated.

How many have strayed from using number ratios for units and casualties as the mainframe structure for their designs? After all, pick ANY period in history and you will find units running away with little or no casualties while others fight almost to the last man? Such are major fallacies in historical wargame rules designs.

Lots of them. In entirely different ways, I have Phil Barker, Sam Mustafa, Neil Thomas, Howard Whitehouse and Richard Clarke sets on my shelf which don't use strict number ratios/and or casualties as the mainframe structure. And in fairness, rules which don't use number ratios often have some issues with the basics of space and time. But even more traditional rules tend to allow units to be defeated with few or no casualties. You can do it in WRG 1685-1845, you can do it in Quarrie rules Napoleonics.

More emphasis on weapons capabilities than on the men pulling the triggers? Yet such designed are tauted as being historical!

Well that might be true, might not be, depends on what you mean. Your Sherman is not going to knock out my Tiger in the frontal arc at 1500m no matter how high your morale is, my 88 is going to go thorough your frontal armour regardless of how low mine is. Sydney Jary didn't for one moment think that German soldiers were better than Allied soldiers but he did think that their plentiful MG42s and MG42 ammunition made them more effective. And so on. Ignoring equipment in favour of officer leadership and soldier skill and morale can be just as misleading as concentrating on the former and ignoring the latter.

@Dye4

I've written command and control rules and my experience is they aren't popular because players want to fire their muskets and do all the things real commanders don't do and if you try and have both mechanisms in one rule set you slow down too much and to speed it up the players just ignore the C3I sections.

@ Whirlwind

I knew a man called John Semken who knocked out a Tiger [well his gunner and loader did] with a Sherman in the frontal arc. When they examined the captured tank there were no penetrating hits, but one HE round had set the kit on the tank on fire and a sliver of glass from the driver's episcope had 'scabbed' quite possibly wounding the driver. Whichever was the cause the crew bailed out and legged it. The tank was from 12th SS Panzers so elite in some people's books. Picture link is link The bloke sitting in the centre is Stanley Christopherson who was the really lucky one. He was sat in the road in his unarmed command tank when John Semken drove past him and the Tiger turned the corner to face them.

@Mark J Wilson,

For sure, but as far as I remember the incident the Tiger was very close, not at 1500m.

@ Chris BBB: "The effect on tabletop is that the well-led armies remain cohesive and operate in a coordinated manner while the bad ones act disjointedly and fall apart."

But not always. So why? Perhaps that units that were given orders continue with those orders the best they can and in game terms, do not need to receive orders every turn. only when their higher commander deems necessary to achieve his battle plan or reacts to the enemy's? Badly led armies can also act with positive cohesion- especially if used to working in conjunction with each other. Your suggestion indicates that good leaders lead good armies but nothing in the mechanics seem to allow for the friction that usually works against that.

"Casualties are obviously a factor in damaging unit cohesion." So is being attacked in the flank, rear, not supported other units, having to take an objective, weather, fatigue just to name a few. So why "casualties" are the only factor you speak of as well as almost every other rules set?

Logistics: "I am of the ilk that […] the effects of logistics can be modeled in the game." Yes, they can and are. In most BBB scenarios logistics doesn't feature beyond a simple mechanism for going low on ammo and then replenishing. But depending on the scenario, logistics factors may be reflected in unit ratings (Passive or Fragile or Spent because of some shortages?), scenario objectives (capture/defend the supply dump, wagon train, line of communications?), greater chances of running low on ammo, etc."

So more elite troops never get thirsty, hungry, need assurance that if they get hit there would be medical support to take care of them?, always have full fuel tanks? etc. While I am not a fan of bean counting all of this yet it does not mean we can't (during a game) allow the EFFECTS of certain deprivations in having some effect on the units. Ever consider how much water weighs? How much gets consumed by the men, equipment, and the transportation needed to get it to the men from the "rear area"? A real problem even to this day. In the ACW (and other periods) more casualties were caused by sickness due to diseases from impure drinking water. That is an example of how logistics are needed to sustain the fight and if the Generals/leaders at all levels ignore it, fighting capability takes a hit. Like you, I encourage beginning values be adjusted based upon whatever factors the scenario designer wishes. A long time ago, I read many articles illustrating the need for more scenario designers rather than to place blame on faulty rules. I dare say that condition remains to this day, regardless of which rules are being used.

Whirlwind: "Well, some are re-hashes, some aren't. But whilst there are some old mechanics which have been decisively dropped (e.g. the old 50% rule) it is hard to say which command mechanics have been dropped, or which should be."

Well for one, most do not reflect that Officers are appointed by their Government- that they are tasked always to safeguard the assets of their country. (The unit's they command represent great investments from the country). They always have the responsibility to defend if attacked (US in Nam seemed to have forgotten that bit), but may not engage in offensive combat unless ordered to by competent higher leaders. Command and control is a process NOT a radius! (Sorry I feel like I repeat myself here). How does a radius represent the process and the friction encountered at any/all levels? (Funny thought=Sgt to Captain. "Sir, we MUST stop here otherwise we go outside of Command Control")

Me: "How about accounting for the results of unit's leadership's ability to keep the unit as a cohesive fighting force?"

Whirlwind: "All of them do this."

Me: How?

WW: "And in fairness, rules which don't use number ratios often have some issues with the basics of space and time."

Yet combat is conducted by unit upon unit. A game turn should represent a certain amount of time. Ground scale should also be a game regulator- good example of Linear mechanics. Why? Because Time and Distance will always remain 60 seconds to a minute and a mile will always be 5,280 feet. Rules need to reflect what is possible (and what is not) within those parameters based upon what he desired a turn to represent. Of course, firing range is based upon the technology of the period being played.

Me:"More emphasis on weapons capabilities than on the men pulling the triggers? Yet such designed are touted as being historical!"

WW:" Well that might be true, might not be, depends on what you mean. Your Sherman is not going to knock out my Tiger in the frontal arc at 1500m no matter how high your morale is, my 88 is going to go thorough your frontal armour regardless of how low mine is. Sydney Jary didn't for one moment think that German soldiers were better than Allied soldiers but he did think that their plentiful MG42s and MG42 ammunition made them more effective. And so on. Ignoring equipment in favour of officer leadership and soldier skill and morale can be just as misleading as concentrating on the former and ignoring the latter."

Me: Your examples make my case: Sure, your 88 can penetrate the frontal armor of my Sherman But only if the gunner hits me and the round does what it was designed to do. Trouble is that a study of ammunition expenditure vs. tank loss mimics the same kind of terrible shooting as small arms does! Again, the human factor can play a bigger part and does not seem to be reflected, than technology.

WW: "Sydney Jary didn't for one moment think that German soldiers were better than Allied soldiers but he did think that their plentiful MG42s and MG42 ammunition made them more effective."

Me: Sounds like a perfect example of good logistics and leader foresight (training and experience) to me!

Trying to answer/comment in order.

Mark J. Wilson commented: "I've written command and control rules and my experience is they aren't popular because players want to fire their muskets and do all the things real commanders don't do and if you try and have both mechanisms in one rule set you slow down too much and to speed it up the players just ignore the C3I sections."

Me: So the game mechanics don't reflect history. C and C down to a level lower than Squad? At some point, unit leadership must be allowed to "call the shots". At what level are the gamers playing at? If very tactical, they should be platoon leaders? Unless ordered otherwise, why can't the squad leaders direct and call when to fire?

Some games have a real identity crisis. At what level does the designer aim for? A certain old Napoleonic set suffered from this- A player was Corps, Division, Brigade, Regiment/battalion leader at the same time! What business does a Corps commander have telling a battalion when to fire of formation they must be in? (…all the way down the battle line…) Once the level of player participation is decided, rules should present challenges his real life counterpart might have had to deal with and some issues they could not have any immediate influence over.

Whirlwind noted" For sure, but as far as I remember the incident the Tiger was very close, not at 1500m."

Me: Tactical surprise? Again, human factors come into play. Who shot who first? Surprise. Admittedly, hard to achieve on the game table!

Thanks guys, again, for some really great comments. YOU guys are the "Elites"!

How does a radius represent the process and the friction encountered at any/all levels?

It uses the same insight that SLA Marshall had: that those troops under the immediate eye of the commander performed better and were more responsive. Is it a perfect mechanic? No, probably not. But serviceable – yes, why not?

How? (do rules account for the results of unit's leadership's ability to keep the unit as a cohesive fighting force)

Pretty much every set of rules has something in for morale. Most have some sub-system for leaders to get their troops to do something and/or rally or whatever. I don't really have any idea what you are trying to get at here.

Your examples make my case: Sure, your 88 can penetrate the frontal armor of my Sherman But only if the gunner hits me and the round does what it was designed to do. Trouble is that a study of ammunition expenditure vs. tank loss mimics the same kind of terrible shooting as small arms does! Again, the human factor can play a bigger part and does not seem to be reflected, than technology.

I know of no rules which don't incorporate human factors into shooting mechanics! Not a single one uses technical specifications only to determine outcomes.

Tactical surprise? Again, human factors come into play. Who shot who first? Surprise. Admittedly, hard to achieve on the game table!

And again, lots of rules have mechanisms for surprise, firing first and so on.

Sounds like a perfect example of good logistics and leader foresight (training and experience) to me!

And the weapon itself.

Looking back at what you have raised, I think that 1st edition WRG WW2 rules and WRG 1685-1845 (both from the 1970s, the former from the early 70s) have every single thing you have mentioned so far.

@Dye4

The games were at divisional level so a) command is an issue; b) the commander is not involved in battalion tactics.

I've also tried battalion level games, but the players want to be able to maneuver their subunits, not just form a firing line.

In another era I've tried to integrate radio procedure into games, no interest.

@ Whirlwind

Yes the Tiger was close, but you can set it on fire at 1500m and probably scab optic glass as well. There may have been times when Tigers got to fire on Shermans from 1500m but it was unlikely due to the terrain.

@Dye4

Semken shot first and second and several more times, his big fear when the Germans had bailed was that there was a round in the Tiger's gun that would cook off. He was in a bocage lane and had nowhere to go. The Tiger had just come round a corner.

Who shoots first is mostly who wasn't moving, rules that run – You move and if stationary I fire at any time in your move cover this.

Tom, you seem to be putting words into my mouth that I never said and making some rather sweeping assumptions about other people's thoughts or lack of them.

"Your suggestion indicates that good leaders lead good armies but nothing in the mechanics seem to allow for the friction that usually works against that."
Actually the BBB mechanics do allow for friction. I was generalising. In BBB, better armies don't always work perfectly and bad ones don't always malfunction so badly. BBB uses an activation mechanism which is all about friction and how players' plans cope with that.

"why "casualties" are the only factor you speak of as well as almost every other rules set?"
Erm – because you had specifically dismissed them and said other people's rules pay too much attention to them? I was just maintaining that they do matter. I didn't think I had to list every other possible factor as well. You'll find weather, fatigue and many other factors in BBB scenarios (and many other rulesets and scenarios too – these are commonplace notions).

"So more elite troops never get thirsty, hungry, need assurance that if they get hit there would be medical support to take care of them?, always have full fuel tanks? etc. "
Who said any of that? Not me. In the BBB India book you will find scenarios where water is super-important. In the BBB Hungary '48 book there are scenarios where the imperial forces are severely under-strength because so many of them are down with cholera. Etc etc etc.

I agree that scenario design is where these factors need to be taken account of. Rulesets just need to provide the tools for scenario designers to use.

I think introducing stuff like ammunition supply and fatigue into tactical rules is overdoing it, personally. You can have these as factors ahead of the game with standard modifiers, eg if a unit has force-marched to reach the battlefield, apply all 'Tired' modifiers to it.

I too was surprised at the apparent suggestion that "being attacked in the flank, rear, not supported other units, having to take an objective, weather, fatigue" are commonly-omitted considerations. I don't recall any set that does not consider these.

I have Quarrie rules in front of me, a 50-year-old set now originally, and their morale considerations apply penalties for:

unformed
disordered
neither supported nor unsupported
unsupported
out of sight of friends
conscript
under fire for first time
under artillery fire
under fire from flank or rear
under fire from skirmishers
tired
exhausted
threatened flanks
every defeat scored within past four moves
every three ranks of attacking unit
Friends within 300 yards pushed back this move
Unit on flank routs within 300 yards or retreats this move
Unit's previous morale was poor (ie, worse than basic)

Melees also apply deductions for general or prior unit state:
Tired
Exhausted
Shaken
Unformed
Disordered
Attacked in rear

Units that win a melee or a firefight do a control test, i.e. they next do what the test says, not what the player says. Penalties apply in the following circumstances:

Enemy standing
Enemy Advancing
Enemy Charging
Enemy advancing/charging to flank/rear
Under fire from flank/rear

The mods apply to every unit within 300m and in sight. More than one enemy unit advancing = more than one penalty.

As Whirlwind says, the same is in evidence in WRG. I've only got a ropey scan of these, so I can't ctrl-v the text in, but the reaction tables penalise units in the following situations:

charged by cavalry and not in square
skirmishers
irregular levy
raw
surprised
shaken
disordered
hit by fire in previous move
per broken / routing friendly unit within 300 yards
if not under a general's control

…and so on.

Rather than over-engineering C&C, what these rules attempted to do was embed the effects of it – or the lack of it – into the various involuntary actions a unit takes. A lot of the penalties are mitigated or ignored for units classed as veteran or elite. This is why these definitions have always been emotional. Under Quarrie or WRG, it was very hard to break a veteran unit by force of circumstance, because veterans were unimpressed by skirmishers, flanking fire or most circumstances. To defeat an attack by regulars you could flank them or push back their supports, but to defeat an attack by veterans that wasn't enough. You had to inflict a lot of casualties on them very rapidly as well. A drip-drip of 5% losses for four moves would not do much but 20% in a single move would.

If you force a unit back by threatening its flanks, it will typically rally once the threat is removed. If it retired involuntarily because it was being fired on by skirmishers from the flank, it will rally as soon as this is no longer happening.

The uncertainty of troop performance was what the dice were for. As WW notes, a number of these vintage sets used average dice to limit the extremity of outcomes – so while British line hussars could rout the Chasseurs a cheval of the Guard, it would not be the usual outcome; just a possible one.

So I'd need to see more to understand what it is we're missing.

Great post 4th Cuirassier: I think Tom could achieve much of what he is after by modifying a ruleset like Quarrie Napoleonics or even Black Powder; anything which has enough dials on the statline to twiddled once for the different lengths of training and leadership he considers important, and then twiddled again for pre-battle circumstance bonus or penalty effects.

The actual military men have never been shy about identifying 'elite' units, whether by titles like Guard or Grenadier, or by reputation, such as the 57Th Ligne or 95th Rifles.

In the end their real-life estimations are the most important and reliable 'definitions' of elite--that and actual unit performances. Any other effort is more of an academic exercise than anything reliably useful, particularly 'typing' units who fought across many different wars and periods.

@ McLaddie

Actual military men are also prone to xenophobic over assessment of their own sides superiority as their defeats in many wars prove. I have had to deal with certain 'elite' army units and some of them were far from impressive, particularly when their title was awarded hundreds of years ago.

I would argue that a sober assessment of actual performance by those without egos or careers to burnish/protect is far more likely to yield accurate results. The problem being that such assessments require more data than is usually available.

McLaddie hit the nail on the head with his posting. Short, concise, and to the point.

Well done.

In addition to what Mark said, there are several other problems with McLaddie's comment:

1 – "Military men" can and do disagree and the formulation gives nothing about what to do in that case.

2 – This is exacerbated by the "military men" in question coming from quite different cultures and experience levels: we don't know whether there is a shared understanding of what 'elite' means.

3 – "Actual unit performances" are a really difficult metric, since we have no solid model of what an average unit would have done, there are invariably problems with very small sample sizes or no specific data at all.

4 – As McLaddie himself often points out (in other contexts) it was a long war: we have no idea how far any "actual unit performance" on one day should carry over to the next.

So a genuine academic assessment would be incomparably more valuable and reliably useful than some random comments by military men.

Yes, that claim reminds me a bit of the assertion in Allen's book "Who Won The Battle Of Britain?" that you can't hold an opinion on this question unless you were under orders in Fighter Command in south-east England in 1940.

This is, of course, pure baloney, a transparent attempt to invoke argument from authority and a rather obvious ruse to try to rule dissenting views out of contention before being considered.

A unit that has extensive battle experience, especially on the winning side, will be more resilient than units that have not. Circumstances can conspire to undermine their confidence nonetheless. We represent this via deductions for flank attack etc, deductions for prior unit supply / fatigue state, and by a bit of randomness via the dice that can either enhance or detract from performance.

We were doing and aware of all this 50 years ago, so I'm not sure we're actually any further forward, and I'm still puzzled as to what it is we've all totally failed to consider.

I do agree that it is probably preferable to try to represent actual processes, rather than gamey stuff like command radius and one side being "out scouted" (what that?) or whatever. But the thing about gamey stuff is…it does tend to make the game run better.

Actual military men are also prone to xenophobic over assessment of their own sides superiority as their defeats in many wars prove. I have had to deal with certain 'elite' army units and some of them were far from impressive, particularly when their title was awarded hundreds of years ago.

Mark: What you say is true in many cases. Wargamers and historians with their "sober assessments" can prove just as xenophobic. I may be wrong, but a good deal of those 'elite' units were categorized as such during peacetime, only to prove less so in actual combat. I was referring to leaders dealing with actual combat and unit performance in actual combat.

I would argue that a sober assessment of actual performance by those without egos or careers to burnish/protect is far more likely to yield accurate results. The problem being that such assessments require more data than is usually available.

Based on what? Where do you get information on 'actual performances' for Napoleonic troops but from those very military men. I would suggest that the most 'sober' assessment of a unit's combat capabilities comes from men whose reputations and very lives depend on those assessments. Obviously, we have the benefit of being able to find several accounts of a unit's performance in which to compare 'soberly', but we are still reliant on information from those "military men who are also prone to xenophobic over assessment of their own sides superiority."

Parsing conditions, circumstances and abilities up into smaller and smaller aspects which *might* have some kind of influence on performance such as 'exhaustion' or 'disordered' is still dependent on the historical descriptions and 'assessments' of contemporary military men.

That is not to say such parsing can't help with understanding, but I think it is wrong to suggest that military men didn't think in those terms too in concluding what a combat unit could do in any particular circumstance.

Yes, that claim reminds me a bit of the assertion in Allen's book "Who Won The Battle Of Britain?" that you can't hold an opinion on this question unless you were under orders in Fighter Command in south-east England in 1940.

4th C: I can see where you would get that impression, but that isn't what I was saying. I was commenting on what basic information those opinions are depending on in listing all those possible conditions in coming to some kind of sober conclusion.

In addition to what Mark said, there are several other problems with McLaddie's comment:

1 – "Military men" can and do disagree and the formulation gives nothing about what to do in that case.

Whirlwind:
All that you say is true, but… Military men do disagree, and historiography does provide approaches to mitigate such cases. However, wargamers can and do disagree too and to have a sober approach does require some methodology.

2 – This is exacerbated by the "military men" in question coming from quite different cultures and experience levels: we don't know whether there is a shared understanding of what 'elite' means.

True, so we either find what that 'elite' means to them or-- Do we impose our culture and military experiences on those Napoleonic military events two hundred years ago? I would suggest that if we are to do the latter soberly, we should have some idea of the former.

3 – "Actual unit performances" are a really difficult metric, since we have no solid model of what an average unit would have done, there are invariably problems with very small sample sizes or no specific data at all.

It is, but as you are trying to simulate past behaviors, there is a 'solid model' for that. We do have a large data base if we choose to use it. How many descriptions of Napoleonic combat do we have access to? Quite a few. It is simply a matter of developing a base, facing the exact same issues any simulation designer faces with the same proven methodology.

4 – As McLaddie himself often points out (in other contexts) it was a long war: we have no idea how far any "actual unit performance" on one day should carry over to the next.

Yep. Again, to get 'some idea' is simply requires research. Yes, possibly a lot of research.

So a genuine academic assessment would be incomparably more valuable and reliably useful than some random comments by military men.

Based on those random comments, observations and assessments. So tell me, what are the performance differences between:
Tired
Exhausted: Couldn't shaken troops be exhausted, or vice versa?
Shaken: What is the difference between shaken and disordered?
Unformed
Disordered

Tough, isn't it? I would suggest any such 'academic assessment' is going to be very random, based on 'impressions' unless you go back to the historical sources and base your conclusions/interpretations on them.

I mean, really, why those descriptors? I would suggest that most if not all the origins for them are found in those 'random' descriptors given by contemporary military men hundreds of years ago.

If we are going to be sober and academic about this, we have to have our interpretations based on the analysis of something historical.

For example:

Austerlitz and Davout's defense on the French right flank. His troops had just done a night forced march of some 30+ miles and were thrown into the battle straight away. I think it would be safe to say they were tired and maybe exhausted.

So, how did Davout's divisions perform and can we see any evidence of tiredness and exhaustion effecting their performance?--given the random nature of any historical observations. Of course, a number of folks see Davout's corps as somewhat above the average. Elite?

I'll give you an example. I have found 200 descriptions of firefights, some one sentence, some long narratives. All I want is the average behaviors in such a fight. This is what I have found:
1. More that 80% of such fights don't end unless one side is reinforced, charges the other side or is outflanked. Albuera is an extreme example.
2. Rarely do troops withdraw from such a fire fight unless #1 occurs and almost never rout without the troops being poor quality.

How would that change game play in most Napoleonic wargames?

So, looking at all the times 'elite' designated units went into an engagement, how did they perform on average? You'd need at least 40 examples. It could create a percentage expectation of elite performance for a game. I could even pull all the firefight examples that involved 'elite' units and see if their average performance is different from the overall averages.

I don't think I would disagree with any of that, McLaddie. Although I believe that Tom's point is that what could be done for firefights, might also be done for circumstances affecting morale more generally, and he might feel more confident about reading some more results across from other periods, with the reasoning that people haven't changed that much, although weapons and formations have.

It is, but as you are trying to simulate past behaviors, there is a 'solid model' for that. We do have a large data base if we choose to use it. How many descriptions of Napoleonic combat do we have access to? Quite a few. It is simply a matter of developing a base, facing the exact same issues any simulation designer faces with the same proven methodology.

But AFAIK that combat modelling hasn't actually been done yet. And to tie in to and very partially answer 4th Cuirassier's point, I think what has changed in the last 50 years is that the sources relatively easily available in English are wider than they were 50 years ago, so we can be a bit more confident that any conclusions will be valid across a wider range of circumstances and be less worried about pro/anti British/French bias in the sources and results.

…he might feel more confident about reading some more results across from other periods, with the reasoning that people haven't changed that much, although weapons and formations have.

Whirlwind: I have read and spoken to a number of veterans who make the same assertions/assumptions. I haven't seen much evidence provided for the comparative behaviors behind that assumption.

Training, culture, expectations and experience all play into behavior, not just formations and arms. If you have seen any combat footage from the Ukraine, compare that to a line of men standing shoulder-to- shoulder facing a column of hundreds of the enemy advancing on them from less than 100 yards. Everyone, now and then, is going to be scared, but the soldiers' behaviors between the Ukraine infantry today and the French at Talavera are going to be quite different. You don't see French line infantry 'going to ground' in the face of enemy small arms fire… unless maybe they are skirmishing. Going to ground today is a universal response, that and advancing…not standing upright with your comrades. Personally, standing in long lines shoulder to shoulder with others in a field would be a very different emotional experience from advancing in a long skirmish line across a field, maybe even hiding behind an AFV. The 'empty battlefield' of today won't generate the same behaviors from a soldier or a company of soldiers compared to a company of infantry in line in 1805. Today, the Ukrainian officer is going to avoid an open field, in 1805 they were often sought out for battle.

Life was very different then. Our logic doesn't necessarily hold. Why were there church bells rung every half hour in cities across Europe? When did a calendar day start for an Italian? Why did soldiers carry moldy bread collected in bags? Why did French soldiers often wear wooden shoes instead of leather? Not all were from the Netherlands. ;-7

We can't assume their experience and attendant emotions will have Napoleonic soldiers responding the same way, even when the fear itself experienced in combat can be very similar.

And unit behavior, the behavior of groups of men in combat is what is sought with definitions of 'elite.'

It's a thought anyway.

@McLaddie,

It is Tom's argument and not mine to develop further. But for clarity, I don't think he (and certainly not I) would dispute any of that above. What he is getting at (I think) is that the method you used above for firefights he could use for pre-battle (and during battle) circumstances other than firefights – e.g. accounts of being hungry or tired, accounts of close attachments/strong dislike for leaders and so on, and those kind of things are more universal, so he can use other modern research or intuition into these things, in the precise way he can't about tactics in the skirmish line.

Whirlwind:

Oh, if that is the case, I certainly agree. The method is one of several in determining behavioral averages, accounts could be used to establish many of the terms listed in Phil's or Tom's conditions and circumstances.

@ McLaddie

There's a well-known quote from the era to the effect that while it was possible to be hit by a musket ball from 300 yards away, you'd have to be very unlucky to be hit from that range by one that had been aimed at you. I suspect this observation may explain at least some of the differences in battlefield behaviour then and now that you've correctly pointed out. Someone who had been under fire a few times in 1805 would probably have worked out that there was almost no difference in his survival chances whether he stood up, knelt, ducked or did the Macarena. One line exchanging volleys with another might inflict 30 casualties apiece, but it would be almost completely random which 60 individuals were hit. Throw yourself flat and you could get hit by a round that would otherwise have whistled harmlessly between your knees.

In the modern era, a round aimed from 200 yards away actually stands quite a good chance of hitting you. I mean, even I used to be able to do this with an SMLE when I was 15, so I would think a Russian conscript could, too. So the diving-for-cover reflex is one it's not helpful today to suppress. In 1805, OTOH, if you hit the dirt every time a bullet went by, not only weren't you that much safer, but also, you probably couldn't reload your musket.

The question of whether elites etc are behaving correctly has never really troubled me too much. In the various rule sets I've looked at it's usually all about the circumstances, and the results make reasonable sense. In eg Quarrie, you'd always struggle to rout the Old Guard, but if you open up on them with musketry such that "in less than a minute over 100 were down", that would do it.

The gameplay issue with which I have more issues actually is the Unrealistically Prolonged Firefight. In some rules these can go on pretty much indefinitely until the casualties rout one side or the other. I struggle to identify many antecedents in history for this sort of encounter, and such firefights seem if anything to have a sort of brittle equilibrium that could abruptly become a rout. At Waterloo d'Erlon was advancing and firing until he wasn't; ditto Bernadotte at Wagram and so on.

In the past I hacked both BQ and WRG rules to prevent these. Generally I cumulatively diminish the effects of the fire per move, so that after about three, you're still racking up fatigue and ammo expenditure points, but no longer inflicting any appreciable losses. Someone then realises this is pointless and that's when something happens – you reinforce, there's a flank move – that triggers or or other unit to do something involuntary.

In the various rule sets I've looked at it's usually all about the circumstances, and the results make reasonable sense.

Hi 4th Cuirassier:

The more I study history, the less I am inclined to accept what appear to be historically 'reasonable results.'

The Prolonged Firefight. They could and did go on for 'unreasonably long times' if allowed to. As I said before, I could only find one or two out of 200 firefights that were ended by the firefight itself. Its length was nearly always determined by other circumstances intervening, reinforcements, a charge or flank attack. This is true of d'Erlon or the Guard at Waterloo, Bernadotte at Wagram or the French divisions at Albuera.

You are quite right about the diminish effects as the firefight progresses. The classic is the Iron Brigade vs the Stonewall Brigade the day before 2nd Manassas began. They blazed away at each other for over at least twenty minutes according to reports, not seeing each other for all the smoke, even though they were less than 80 yards apart. Both sides finally stopped firing, almost at the same time. They were left staring at each other when the smoke cleared. They both left by "mutual agreement." Both sides took less than 25% casualties, depending on the source. IIRC, both sides had smoothbores.

That smoke issue was also seen in many battles including Albuera and Bernadotte's fight. As most flintlocks would need attention, either the flint or bore after @12 shots, that too would degrade the effectiveness of the fire. It is no wonder that such firefights were seen as requiring a quick result rather than standing and shooting at each other with less and less effectiveness.

Prolonged firefights alone, as the British officers watching the firefight between Hoghton's Brigade and the French II Corps exclaimed, "It's madness, absolute madness." Flank attacks finally drove the French away.

4th Cuirassier:

I should add that for what I have collected, firefights were ended by outside actions and those firefights continued until then, regardless of how long they lasted.

So, by deciding to enforce limits, from what I have gathered, that isn't based on history, however unreasonable it may seem. That doesn't mean you shouldn't enforce an end, your choice. However, you seem to enforce that limit to firefights because they were 'unrealistically prolonged' when maybe that isn't unrealistic at all and why military men intervened as soon as they could… even the volley and bayonet or go in without firing approaches make that much more sense.

Hi Bill,

a refight of the Battle of Toulouse in 2014 : the pic gives an idea of what it means to be 70-80 yards appart .. pretty scary in fact to be so close from the "enemy line" even a small 4pdr canon makes a tremendous sound when fired

best regards : )