"The 27th Grievance of the Declaration of Independence" Topic

""He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions."

As with the 25th grievance in the Declaration of Independence, in the 27th grievance Thomas Jefferson carefully constructed a foundation of fear, based on no true account of events regarding enslaved people, and more folklore and myth concerning the native inhabitants of the land they coveted. He appealed to the base fear that lingered and would have been present even if American colonists were satisfied with the government under which they lived. Considering the inequities and injustice under which they suffered, it was a reasonable fear that enslaved people would at some time shake off their shackles and rise against their oppressors. It was further understood that "Indian Savages" had grievances for which they would seek satisfaction separate from any conflict that the colonists had with their government. Any anger and dissatisfaction on the part of enslaved people and Indians were localized and personal, not a conflict with a far-off government they knew little to nothing of…."

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Armand

I think the premise, that Jefferson "constructed a foundation of fear, based on no true account of events regarding enslaved people, and more folklore and myth concerning the native inhabitants", is false.

Anyone who fought the Indians, and there were many, many fights against them since the initial founding of Jamestown in 1607, knew how merciless they were, (and it went both ways). By the time the Declaration was written the king's representatives in the colonies had already started enlisting Indians to fight the colonists.

And Lord Dunmore had already started forming his Ethiopian Regiment and enticed slaves to leave their masters in Virginia, thus inciting servile rebellion.

You can argue that the king's representatives did these things and not the king. You can argue that the colonists deserved these things. But to claim he created false fear is laughable.

Thanks.

Armand

What Dn said.

I think the premise, that Jefferson "constructed a foundation of fear, based on no true account of events regarding enslaved people, and more folklore and myth concerning the native inhabitants", is false. Anyone who fought the Indians, and there were many, many fights against them since the initial founding of Jamestown in 1607, knew how merciless they were, (and it went both ways). By the time the Declaration was written the king's representatives in the colonies had already started enlisting Indians to fight the colonists.

I would say that there are enough contradictory statements in the text of the article. It is important to understand that they wanted to achieve their goal at any cost. My son wrote a few short stories about his life at sunnypapers.com/paper-samples/thomas-jefferson during his founding fathers research. When we discussed this with him, he claimed that the only thing that bothered them was the fear of rebellion and filling their own pockets. As a result, Jefferson became one of the richest presidents in history, so we can say that he succeeded.

TJ is very complicated and that account leaves out a great deal.

One aspect of the American Indians that is usually overlooked is that their usual method of warfare was annihilation. This occurred among the tribal traditional enemies and it was carried over when fighting the European settlers.

And they fought and killed civilians as well as militia and regular troops. They did take captives, killing some of them on the way back to their tribal homeland.

Regarding Jefferson, his signature achievement was the writing of the Declaration.

He was a terrible wartime governor of Virginia, generally opposed the US Constitution being approved by the states (he was then ambassador to France), and disgraced himself by his less-than-heroic conduct when the British invaded Virginia.

He hurt the United States as president by hobbling the armed forces, especially the excellent US Navy, and was a supporter of the war against Great Britain in 1812, encouraging his protege Madison to declare war-a war for which the United States was woefully unprepared thanks to Jefferson's actions as president.

On the plus side, the original draft of the Declaration abolished slavery, something the three southern states (Georgia and the Carolinas) refused to accept and refused to agree to. As the issue at hand was independence, the Declaration was amended to remove the 'offending paragraph.' The issue would be addressed in the 1850s and 1860s resulting in over 600,000 US dead.

Hello Brechtel, I feel you've missed out on a lot.

I take it you are no fan of TJ. It would be interesting to hear your take on the re-imagined tours at Monticello and his paternity with Ms. Hemmings.

TMP link

DnJackson +1

Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans get blamed for the reduction of the size of the U.S. Navy, but the responsibility falls on Adams and the Federalists. Before Adams left office the Federalist controlled Congress passed and Adams signed the Naval Peace Establishment Act of 1801. This Act directed that except for six named frigates all ships were to be sold off. The remaining ships were to be kept in service with reduced compliments. The Act also reduced the size of the Navy officer corps that could be retained.

From The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918 by Harold and Margaret Sprout, 72-77:
‘The program which President Adams and his Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, were pushing forward during their final months in office envisaged a comprehensive naval development along three lines-ships, personnel, and a supporting organization of yards and docks.'
The land for the shore establishment was purchased at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, and Norfolk. Further, ‘The Adams administration had construed [Congressional] legislation as permitting not merely the specified acts, but also the purchase and development of sites for shipyards in which to build the authorized vessels and docks, and in which to store timber and other materials…These works, hastily undertaken without proper statutory authority in the last weeks of a defeated administration, represented an attempt to lay the foundation for a permanent shore organization before the Navy should fall into the hands of the hostile Jeffersonians.'-72.
Congress had opposed much of what Stoddert recommended and Adams had supported at the end of the Adams administration. The leader of the opposition was Albert Gallatin who would become Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury. He and Jefferson were opposed to a strong US Navy and that was the policy that was implemented, not what was recommended by Stoddert. Jefferson's Secretary of the Navy was a nonentity, Robert Smith, and although he was a supporter of a strong navy, he had ‘little capacity or apparent desire for leadership' and ‘exercised slight influence on policy.'-74.
Gallatin had opposed the naval expansion in the war against France and Jefferson who was an agrarian would not support an institution, the US Navy, which was Federalist in origin as well as tendencies.
‘While there was perhaps some room for doubt as to the President's inner convictions, there was none whatever regarding the attitude of his Secretary of the Treasury. As congressional leader of the Jeffersonian opposition, Gallatin had repeatedly set forth the political economics of the agrarian movement, and it will be recalled that in the notable debate on the capital-ship bill of 1799, he had mercilessly attacked, on political as well as fiscal grounds, the Federalist policy of building up a strong seagoing navy.'-75.
The US Navy was regarding by the Jefferson administration, and especially by Gallatin, ‘as an expensive and possibly disposable luxury.'-76.
Under the Jefferson administration soon after taking office and using the discretion in the Act of March 1801 ‘Liquidation of the Navy was begun at once and vigorously prosecuted.'-76.
‘…the administration sold a large number of vessels and laid up seven of those retained. Word was discontinued on the seventy-fours under construction. And the President projected a ship-building policy limited to collecting materials in case of an emergency. A simultaneous assault on personnel resulted in the wholesale discharge of purchasing agents and navy-yard employees, and a drastic reduction of commissioned officers and enlisted men. Work on dry-docks and other navy-yard improvements, begun under the previous regime, was suspended. Gallatin and Jefferson toyed with the idea of closing some of these establishments altogether, and the latter also worked on a plan for concentrating the Navy's shore organization at the capital, where he proposed to build a great covered dock, in which to lay up the Navy, high and dry, to save the ships from decay, and the country from expense and corruption.'

And then came the Tripolitan War and the need of an active US Navy along with Jefferson's plan to rely on the dubious security of gunboats, over 200 of them, to defend the US coast and harbors…

What the Democratic Republicans thought about the Adams administration's naval program would have been irrelevant if the Federalists had been united. The Federalists controlled the House and Senate throughout Adams' years as president. The problem was the Federalists were not united in their support for the Adams' administration's naval program. Funding the new navy required imposition of new taxes, direct taxes, which were unpopular. It also required government borrowing which drove up interest rates, also unpopular. When Stoddert asked for 12 ships of the line, Congress only authorized six. They limited funding to $1 USD million, and required that part of those funds be used to purchase smaller ships as well. Stoddert chose to disregard the will of the Federalist controlled Congress to use part of those funds to buy dockyards and also to purchase timber for constructing more than the six ships of the line authorized.

The Adams administration had started reducing military expenditures even before the outcome of the 1800 election was known. Within days of South Carolina breaking for Jefferson and Burr Stoddert presented his proposals for the peacetime navy to (the still Federalist controlled) Congress. Stoddert argued for the reduction in part because of what he said was improvident expansion during the Undeclared War and also in part based on the belief that smaller ships, if needed, could be quickly built or purchased. While it was not passed until several months later the Naval Peace Act of 1801 largely reflected Stoddert's November proposals.

So what happened when Jefferson took office? Jefferson sold off most of the ships authorized to be sold under the Naval Peace Act of 1801. He did retain at least one schooner. Jefferson rejected Gallatin's proposal to reduce the navy to just two frigates on active service. Jefferson appointed Robert Smith, the brother of a Democratic Republican Congressman who supported Adams' naval program, to be Secretary of the Navy. Jefferson retained slightly more officers than the Act stated. Jefferson also sent a squadron to the Mediterranean Soon enough Jefferson's navy was being expanded by the addition of smaller ships such as those Stoddert's proposal got rid of.

The gunboat issue is also a little more complicated than generally portrayed. The colonies used gunboats in the AWI. The same Congress that authorized in 1794 the construction of the six frigates also authorized construction of gunboats. That 1794 measure was backed mostly by Federalists. One problem the American navy ran into during the Barbary Wars was the lack of small ships. This lead in part to the initial authorization for construction of gunboats under Jefferson in 1803. IIRC 8 of the gunboats constructed pursuant to the 1803 authorization ended up serving in the war against Tripoli.

It is the tsunami of gunboats that came afterwards that is harder to justify without some context. Jefferson and Smith attempted at the end of the war against Tripoli to revive the construction of Stoddert's ships of the line. That effort went nowhere in Congress. Jefferson and Smith got funds to refurbish frigates laid up in ordinary under Stoddert, but much of those funds ended up being used to restore ships returning from the Mediterranean. During the war with Tripoli Jefferson was able to get several smaller ships including the U.S.S. Hornet, Wasp, Syren, Vixen and Intrepid for the navy. Afterward gunboats were what Jefferson could get.

Gunboats and the complete absence or eradication of a seagoing US Navy was what Jefferson, along with Gallatin, his Secretary of the Treasury, wanted.

There are two excellent references for the situation of the US Navy under the Adams' and Jefferson administrations.

-The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918 by Harold and Margaret Sprout.

-Stoddert's War by Michael Palmer.

Both point out that Jefferson and Gallatin were anti-navalists and that they deinitely were ignorant of what a navy was supposed to do and why the US needed one.

Adams and Stoddert envisioned ‘a comprehensive naval development' which included the ships necessary to enable the US Navy to adequately defend US interests at sea, a forward-looking view of naval personnel, and an organization ashore which could adequately support the fleet, which included shipyards and docks.

Congress had enacted legislation which authorized the building six ships-of-line, purchasing timber lands and timber to maintain the fleet, and dry-dock construction of which there were to be two.

Stoddert selected the following sites for purchase and construction of the proposed shipyards which were to be located in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, Portsmouth New Hampshire, and Norfolk.

These actions and proposals ‘represented an attempt to lay the foundation for a permanent shore organization before the Navy should fall into the hands of a hostile' Jefferson administration.

Stoddert did recommend the selling-off of the ‘jerry-built and improvised' warships which had been ‘acquired' during the Quasi-War with France and they were to be replaced with new naval construction. Stoddert envisioned a US Navy of 12 ships-of-the-line and 24 heavy frigates with provisions for more expansion in case of war.

Jefferson had opposed any naval expansion in the war against France. He was assisted by his Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, another anti-navalist. The US Navy itself was regarded by Jefferson and his administration ‘as an expensive and possibly dispensable luxury.'

Upon assuming the presidency Jefferson and Gallatin began ‘the liquidation of the Navy'…and that process was ‘vigorously prosecuted.'

The administration then sold off all but 13 frigates and the sloop, the USS Enterprise which was retained by popular demand. All work on the partially constructed ships-of-the-line was stopped and none was begun and the proposed new frigates. Administration naval policy was restricted to laying up seven of the thirteen frigates, keeping reduced crews on the other six and assembling material which could be used in an emergency.

Purchasing agents and dockyard employees were discharged and the number of naval officers and enlisted sailors were reduced. All work on dockyards was ‘suspended.' This left the future of the US Navy in limbo.

Going to war against the North African pirate states clearly demonstrated ‘an unsound line of naval development.' Small naval vessels were needed to operate inshore in cooperation with the available frigates. Congress authorized the building of six brigs and schooners-the Wasp and Hornet (18 guns); the Argus and Syren (16 guns); the Nautilus and Vixen (12 guns). Eight gunboats, fifty feet in length, armed with only one or two light guns, were sent to the Mediterranean ‘with their guns stowed below' to serve with the Mediterranean squadron against the pirates.

These were the inspiration for Jefferson's ideas for a cheap alternative to a deep-water navy. Twety-five were authorized for 1805, 50 in 1806, and 188 in 1807. Most were laid up during peace time with no time to train crews or develop tactics. These vessels were useless for extended operations on the high seas and they offered no defense at all against an enemy blockade. This new policy ignored completely the experience from the War of the Revolution and the war in the Mediterranean.

Considering the successes of the US Navy in the War of 1812, it is worth considering what could have been achieved with Stoddert's ideas of naval expansion and the 12 ships-of-the-line and 24 heavy frigates that he wanted to build and man.