Here is a partial reproduction of the text of the Grand Fleet Gunnery and Torpedo memorandum covering the Battle of Dogger Bank:
DOGGER BANK (24th January, 1915)
(G. F. G. and T.O. No. 12)
The following remarks on the action fought on 24th January between the British and German battle cruisers are promulgated for information.
2. Relative Positions of Squadrons – The action opened with the German battle cruisers on a S.E. course, bearing on the port bow of our ships, which were formed on a line of bearing to close the range and enable their guns to bear, the rear ship (Blucher) bearing about 15deg from right ahead at a distance of about 21,000 yards from Lion; speed of Lion about 28.5 knots, and of the German battle cruisers apparently full speed as a squadron. Thee was a light breeze from the N.E.; the sea was smooth.
The British ships were on a line of bearing to port, the German apparently in single line ahead, ships being in the following sequence -
Lion – – – – – – – – – – – Seydlitz (not certain; first two ships may have been reversed)
Tiger – – – – – – – – – – Derfflinger
Princess Royal – – – – Moltke
New Zealand – – – – – Blucher
Indomitable
Our ships gradually closed the Germans, and all guns were bearing in Lion about half an hour after opening fire; the German ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leading ship as the action developed, in order to increase the range.
Lion opened fire on Blucher and continued on her for 32 minutes, shifting to Moltke (18,000 yards) when Tiger opened on left-hand ship; Princess Royal opened fire on Blucher about 12 minutes after Lion had commenced. Lion shifter target to the leading ship after firing at Moltke for about 11 minutes, all turrets bearing; Princess Royal then engaging Moltke, and New Zealand, Blucher, which had dropped somewhat astern. At this time the range from Lion was 17,500 yards, which was gradually reduced to about 15,500 yards about half an hour later; the range from our other ships was greater.
The Germans opened fire about 20 minutes after Lion.
3. Fire Control – Both Lion and Princess Royal opened fire with single guns to test range; Lion commenced firing salvos from "A" and "B" turrets shortly after crossing the target and Princess Royal opened with salvos after about 10 minutes of single shot firing.
Tiger used director firing for the first 1.5 hours of the action, when she changed to "gunlayers" owing to the director firing circuit failing.; the circuit itself was uninjured, but a shell striking the armour threw out the particular branch breaker then in use for the firing circuits.
The branch breaker ws made again at once from the switchboard , and the motor generator restarted, but its fuze blew; the generator was then changed over to the other branch breaker and gave no more trouble, though the delay had been sufficient to cause three director misfires, which led to the order "Individual laying" being given.
It is considered that the contacters which feed the low power generators should be wedged up so that they cannot be thrown off by shock; where branch beakers are fitted they should be treated similarly, provided that their fuze junction boxes are close to them. The low power generators should be fed from either side of the ring main through change-over switches.
Auxiliary director firing circuits have since been approved and are now being fitted in all ships.
4. Gunlaying – The gunlaying conditions were difficult; in the forward turrets this was due largely to the spray thrown over the bows at the high speed at which ships were steaming, which inconvenience "A" turrets severely and "B" turrets slightly. The great volumes of black funnel smoke from the German ships increased the difficulty of the gunlayers in adhering to their point of aim; the tops of the funnels the masthead, and the flashes of his guns were occasionally order to be used.
The German gun smoke also appears to be denser than our cordite smoke, and this added to the invisibility of their ships, the wind tending to blow all smoke to their engaged quarter, in the direction of our ships.
On the other hand, the director layer aloft in Tiger found little difficult in laying, as he experienced no inconvenience from spray, was clear above the funnel smoke of our ships, and was much less incommoded by enemy shorts than men in the gun positions; he found no difficult in getting opportunities for firing and fired usually on the upward roll so as to cause the ship to increase her motion.
Taking everything into consideration, the director was probably at a considerable advantage, although the conditions were not sufficiently bad to prevent the gunlayers shooting well.
Evershed's bearing indicator gear was found to be invaluable
All ships experienced difficulty in keeping their periscopes and telescopes clear.
5. – Spray – Every precaution must be taken to keep gun-sights clear of spray. No hoses should be running where the water from them could possibly be blown over the sights by wind or gun blast.
The above applies also to the windows of rangefinders.
6. Point of Aim – The gunlayers and trainers must be prepared to aim at various alternative points, such as the top of a funnel, a control top, the flash of the enemy's guns. and even into the "brown" if ordered. There may be no alternatives to these, and the men must be prepared.
7. Rapidity of Fire – It is strongly emphasized that rapidity of fire is essential both to disable the enemy quickly and to reduce the accuracy of his fire.
At extreme ranges, ships may have to open deliberate fire to test the range, but as soon as a straddle or a hit is obtained the rate of fire must be quickened.
The slower we fire, the easier it is for the enemy to develop a rapid fire, and, if he hits, the more difficult it will be for us to quicken again.
Fire can always be checked when need be, and burst of rapid fire, with checks to correct errors, are far preferable to adhering to a slow rate of fire.
8. Spotting was extremely difficult, chiefly owing to the great range and the amount of smoke made by the German ships; columns of water and spray from shorts were additional causes. In a number of cases large quantities of water from shorts came inboard.
Lion and Princess Royal spotted from the revolving Argo rangefinder hood; in other ships the primary control was worked from aloft. A bow observation position appears to be no use in a battle cruiser at high speeds as, even in fine weather, the view is too much interrupted by spray thrown over the forecastle. In fine weather, battleships should not suffer so much from this interference.
"Overs" were usually impossible to distinguish, while hits were very difficult, particularly when the German were firing quickly and the flash and smoke from their guns coincided with the time of arrival of our projectiles; our hell hits seldom make a distinctive flash.
Southampton, which was on the disengaged quarter of the enemy and approximately at right angles to the line of fire, was able to observe the fall of shot from our ships and report the result.
It was often difficult to judge whether shots were falling short of the further enemy ships or over the nearer, or from which ship they were fired, but occasionally there was no doubt on these points and valuable information could be gained.
In order that advantage may be taken of an observation ship on other occasions when a ship is available for such duty, the following signal has been inserted in the Signal Book :- "Take station as requisite to report fall of shot from our ships."
The exact station of the observing ship is purposely not definitely laid down; her object should be to take up quickly a good position for observing our fire.
Great care must be taken not to give inaccurate reports as these would be most misleading. A rake is not essential provided that a good report on the general result of a ship's fire can be made, but it should be used, if possible, when accurate results can be obtained.
Little use could be made of the rangefinders as few cuts could be obtained, whilst the range was too great for accurate readings to be take; time and range plotting was impracticable.
A guessed rate was used as far as practicable, but it was almost impossible to verify by observation of fire owing to the difficulty of spotting, and several ships used "no rate" and worked entirely by spotting corrections. The gun was, in fact, mainly used as its own rangefinder and rate-keeper.
The conditions for spotting were extremely trying, and it appears to be essential that no ship should be dependent upon one spotter for too long a time. The majority of the ships were in action for over two hours, and during the whole of this period the spotters were required to keep their attention concentrated on fire control; this is almost bound to lead to waste of fire when the spotter becomes fatigued, and ship's organization should provide for a spotter in an alternative position taking over from time to time if necessary. This is more likely to be required at extreme ranges owing to long time of flight and the very close attention which must be given to recognize the fall of shot. Emphasis is laid on the great importance of this point, since it is n the efficiency of the spotters that that the result of action will mainly depend; there should be no chance of a ship's fire being wasted owing to undue strain being put upon personnel whose duty requires them to devote the whole of their energies, physical and mental, constantly to their work. A suitable organization should not be difficult to arrange for in the majority of ships, which have a spotter aloft, in the gun control tower and in "A" or "B" turrets.
Large spotting corrections must be used at long ranges when observation of fire is difficult; small corrections have little effect and may be quite insufficient to counteract an error in rate. "Overs" are wasted shots, since they can be seldom even spotted; "shorts", on the other hand, are not wasted.
Spotters should provide themselves with a pair of service six-power binoculars as well as the Zeiss glasses; the latter are apt to become tiring to use after a time.
It is recommended that some practice runs on the spotting table should be made very difficult, to simulate, as far as possible, the conditions described.
Emphasis is laid on the fact that a spotter must give the whole of his attention to observation of shot, and that if this is not done false impressions are obtained; this is a common fault with inexperienced spotters.
The need for having spotters in alternative positions to refer to or take over as required has already been pointed out.
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This Dogger Bank memorandum goes on for a further 40 sections, but the above 8 sections represent the important tactical and gunnery aspects of the action.
Enjoy.
B
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