"Napoleon's Great Scapegoat: Grouchy's Waterloo" Topic

This is a very worthwile podcast to listen to :

link

Here my opinion about the podcast and storyline.

While I have not that real interest about the campaign itself I was always fascinated what was made out of it and all those propaganda stories so well entreched as to be taken as face value, there are endless amounts. I had always my doubts that Grouchy was the culprit of Boney's well deserved defeat – but recent years made it at least for me pretty evident that he was victim of another vicious character assasination by Boney and worse, by his fawners. Already Bernard Coppens – Waterloo – Les Mesonges, pointed that and many other slanders well out. Andrew Field is discussing this topic very well, and no Grouchy didn't do a stellar performance other than saving his miliary command fully intact and conducting a skillfull retreat after Wavre, as well as trying to lie to cover his back, he was no saint.

I am always surprised about Boney's decissions to create wings, or armies – operating more or less under his directive, it failed in 1812, it failed in 1813 and in 1815 as well. How could those guys, even such experienced military men like Ney, run all of a sudden a multiple corps army, whithout having an experienced staff doing this job all before?

About the "gagner" story, I have my own views – the battle at Belle Alliance won already at 13:00 – in my view, even a bit like armchair general like, is that plausible – and wouldn't engaged sound more plausible by such experienced generals like Grouchy? But then again, the stress of the moment, to make decissions on the spot – must have been incredible diffult – reflecting at my own decission making, I could have done always better some hours, days, months later.

One of the best Waterloo games we played involved dicing for the Prussian and Grouchy arrival times and location, Prussians a straight D10 for time and Grouchy a D 10 +5.

Twas a good game,

Tally Ho!

A very interesting podcast. Many thanks for the post. I wasn't aware of the website before.

I am not convinced by the 'rehabilitation' of Grouchy, however, despite all his many commendable traits. He had a knack during the Hundred Days for misinterpreting the Emperor's verbal orders, and particularly concerning the Prussian line of march after Ligny. Is it not reasonable to expect that the commander of the corps of cavalry ought to have ascertained where Blucher had vanished to? I think Pajol did establish this line after some hours were lost, but that he did so largely on his own intiative. Surely it was sound cavalry doctrine that if 35,000 enemy soldiers withdrew out of sight after a defeat, the corps commander ought to have maintained contact that was at least visual?

My opinion may be clouded by admiration for the other scapegoat, Ney. I certainly don't buy in to later Bonapartist conspiracy theories that Grouchy wilfully frustrated Napoleon's chance of victory at Waterloo. I think rather that he and Ney, by 1815, were not quite what Murat and Davout had been ten years earlier.

The "Grouchy didn't pursue hard enough" narrative overlooks the fact that he was left with the most exhausted units from Ligny. He did a pretty commendable job to mount as much of a pursuit as he did.

Never accepted claims that Napoleon's subordinates lost the Waterloo campaign, whether Ney, Soult, or Grouchy. They all had one thing in common, Napoleon picked them.

I worked in corporate America long enough to know epic fails ultimately come from failures at the top, in either talent management or culture setting. In the Waterloo campaign, the fail was in talent management. Napoleon miscalculated the political and military risks he faced and put the wrong people in the wrong places.

Grouchy was an ass, he disobeyed the basic tenants of command, he screwed up the scouting,he didn't have respect of the commanders under his command. His career deserved trashing he wasn't suited to independent command he had never shone outside the command of another. Read Grouch's Waterloo, by Andrew Field – The whole debacle can de summed up by a passage in the book, it roughly states n aide from Napoleon arrived with orders, in a cabin Marshal Grouchy and General Gerard and the bit that sticks in my mind is the aide reports hearing a loud agitated argument with Gerard shouting at Grouchy shouting" WE ARE fU--ED AND ITS ALL YOUR FAULT", upon which the general stormed out mounted his horse and rode to his troops and led an attack on the Prussian held bridges getting seriously wounded, some people think and I agree this was a suicide attempt. Just to trow a choice into the debate, grouchy should have been at Waterloo wioth the cavalry his talent, Napoleon should have made Gerard a Marshal on the field of Ligny and sent him, his corps and Pajol in pursuit keeping Exlmands cav and VANDAMMES CORPS FOR WATERLOO

A case of a blameless Emperor and lots of scapegoats. Bonaparte made them Marshals, appointed them to their roles in the campaign and gave the orders.

@rmaker

You are entirely correct, of course. My opinion of Grouchy does not rest on his failure to pursue with his entire wing but in not thowing forward his light cavalry (who were fresh) while his battered corps rested. I may be mistaken, but I don't think that an experienced cavalry general ought to have required specific orders to carry out a basic principle of his military education.

Speaking as a (far lower level) former flunkey, I'm always suspicious of accusations that the minion disobeyed a verbal order. Too often, they're what the Boss meant rather than what the Boss actually said. And sometimes they're not even that: they're what the Boss wishes he'd said.

Beyond that, as several others have pointed out, His Imperial Majesty had personally approved every promotion for 15 years and was a notorious micromanager, demanding tons of information from distant subordinates who had campaigns to run. Did he not know the capabilities of his marshals and generals?

And he had absolute military authority. No one in the French war machine could deny him any subordinate he wanted in any position he felt appropriate. (See Wellington's correspondence for contrast.)

If he wanted to complain later about staffing in the Armee du Nord, I know exactly who he should address the complaint to.

I find comparisons with corporations very interesting. I hadn't considered that angle, so thank you for that, gentlemen. I wonder if we shouldn't distinguish between 'technical' and 'operational', however (if I have used the correct terms). All operational responsibility lies with the Emperor, of course, the c-in-c or CEO. Corporate strategy is concieved and resources earmarked; executive officers are appointed to specific tasks, which are explained in a series of written directives to be modified by verbal interviews with the c-in-c, or updated by on-the-hoof instructions from the chief-of-staff, who has the c-in-c's full authority. Failure remains the entire responsibility of Napoleon, therefore, as the strategy miscarried in driving the Prussians apart from the Anglo-Beligian allies.

Grouch's failure after Ligny is technical, I think. The CEO is not exonnerated from culpability, but Grouchy is also culpable in failing to maintain contact with the retreating Prussians. The Boss has recruited a department-head on the basis of his experience; and that officer has failed in a core function of his role (reconnaisance), which in this instance, renders corporate strategy obsolete.

If I was the CEO, I would rue the appointment of that subordinate till my dying day; if I was that subordinate, I would drink a good bottle of red wine and go out into the orchard a blow my brains out. Certainly, I would not spend the next 40 years trying to disguise my own shortcomings.

Great discussion. Thanks to all.

It is seemingly easy still to blame Grouchy, who wasn't even prepared to take on an army, what staff did he had, what experience in the past did he have to command multiple corps armies of different arms branches. This system did fail very badly in the past – and it wasn't only a personal but a structural problem as well.

Andrew Field points out well in the podcast, as well as in his books the reasons of the late start of the 17th and why some reports were misleading.

And Boney wasn't up to co ordinate two wings and his reserves at all.

I'd be prepared to argue that Bonaparte remains the greatest Western military leader since classical times. But when I look at the Hundred Days, I remember Bujold's observation that even the greatest geniuses are only geniuses some of the time. And owning up to his own mistakes was never Bonaparte's strong suit.

On the morning of 17 June, he was late off the mark and optimistic. Grouchy might not have been the best pick, and the orders we have in writing pushed Grouchy in the wrong direction. So did the road network, and if Bonaparte didn't know that, he should have.

Grouchy was ordered to pursue the Prussians, determine the direction of their retreat, and inform Napoleon. He did all those things. On the 18th, all his forces were engaged, which is better than Bonaparte could say of his own forces on the 16th. Maybe a perfect subordinate would have shown up exactly where he was most needed on the morning of the 18th, but that subordinate would have gotten there by disobeying or anticipating orders.

I had always my doubts that Grouchy was the culprit of Boney's well deserved defeat

Just so you know how you might look to some readers. I've got no interest in your link. I find it bottomlessly disturbing that you cant discuss Napoleon on a forum that is supposed to admire generalship without always sneering at the man 200 years later. Very off-putting for debate.

And I know some on here think they have a right to wind up so called Boney-Fawners but I cant respect a bizarre concept that you reserve the right to bait people who are in the proper place to discuss Napoleon openly and maturely. It's like attending a house of worship and constantly interrupting the sermon to criticize the faith and name call the parishioners. It's just odd.

Just so you know, your supercilious tone towards Napoleon has actually made me more interested in him, not less. Consider your tactics and what you hope to accomplish.

We can discuss Hitler's generalship without added attacks, we dont discuss Lee's strategies by calling him a traitor in every sentence and we dont call George III an insane tyrant every time he is brought up. Nothing could possibly make Napoleon different except that there is an unwitting hate club doubtless caused by all that pro-British propaganda that doesn't exist. But no one on here continually degrades Wellington or the British war effort against Napoleon. However, the slightest criticism sends the Anti-Boney-fawner crowd into fits of Anti-British accusations. That disconnect is one of the ways you prove the existence of a cult.

Von winterfeldt is taking one guys opinion and of course the ever historical film, the truth is very different,the light cavalry, the regiments of general Pajol pursuied the prussian rear gaurd until midnight, in the morning of the 17th at 3am General vandammes corps set off in pursuit and at 5am a fight by the Prussians to recover captured artillery took place against portions of the 6th corps. General Pajols with the light cavalry he had available were up early, had began scouting and set off in pursuit, at 5 am the encountered the desrters approx 8,000 heading toward namur capturing guns and equipment abandoned and informing Groughy of such.This information and speedy pursuit led to errors as Ney didnt report his actions in the morning,this lack of info on the british led to conclusions and the active pursuit of the prussians in disarray led to another one. So sadly Andrew Fields is wrong, this
info is taken from the memoires of Pajol, Vandamme Teste and varios other officers, why didnt the Cavalry scout towards Gembloux the actual route, because Exelmens wasnt as active,in that direction or reporting their information, even a significant part ot dragoons at least one brigade support pajol and the conregation of cut of troops and desertsers now early mornig estimated at 20,000 drew attenion and in the namur direction, even though information as early as 5/6am was passed to Grouchy of the retreating forces toward wavre

@marmont1814. It's very difficult to declare someone is 'wrong' when they have based their own comments on primary sources. You may not agree with their interpretation, but that does not make them wrong, any more than your own interpretation is right or wrong. I wonder if you have read Field's book on Grouchy but he has used the sources you list and more.

I think we all know the difficulties of using primary accounts and the fact that they often contradict each other. That is certainly the case here. Grouchy states that he sent out orders for the pursuit, but Pajol states that he sent a number of officers to Grouchy asking for orders and received none. He then says that it was him that ordered the reconnaissance towards Namur.

Grouchy states that he ordered Excelman's dragoons towards Gembloux; Bertin, who commanded the dragoon brigade that you mention as supporting Pajol, claims it was him that learnt the Prussians had gone to Gembloux (from local people) and sent the information to Excelmans who then set off in that direction.

We are all entitled to our own interpretation of the available sources, and our belief in their dependability/accuracy, but that does not make the interpretations of others wrong.

Just so you know how you might look to some readers. I've got no interest in your link. I find it bottomlessly disturbing that you cant discuss Napoleon on a forum that is supposed to admire generalship without always sneering at the man 200 years later. Very off-putting for debate.

And I know some on here think they have a right to wind up so called Boney-Fawners but I cant respect a bizarre concept that you reserve the right to bait people who are in the proper place to discuss Napoleon openly and maturely. It's like attending a house of worship and constantly interrupting the sermon to criticize the faith and name call the parishioners. It's just odd.

Just so you know, your supercilious tone towards Napoleon has actually made me more interested in him, not less. Consider your tactics and what you hope to accomplish.

We can discuss Hitler's generalship without added attacks, we dont discuss Lee's strategies by calling him a traitor in every sentence and we dont call George III an insane tyrant every time he is brought up. Nothing could possibly make Napoleon different except that there is an unwitting hate club doubtless caused by all that pro-British propaganda that doesn't exist. But no one on here continually degrades Wellington or the British war effort against Napoleon. However, the slightest criticism sends the Anti-Boney-fawner crowd into fits of Anti-British accusations. That disconnect is one of the ways you prove the existence of a cult.

Who let the dogs out?
Who, who, who, who, who?
Who let the dogs out?
Who, who, who, who, who?

one sees on what fertile ground Boney's propaganda and lies did fall and still linger on despite overwhelming evidence of well balanced research as the book of Andrew Field and the podcast.

one sees on what fertile ground Boney's propaganda and lies did fall and still linger on despite overwhelming evidence of well balanced research as the book of Andrew Field and the podcast.

It is neither the author's book nor the podcast that is at issue, it's the extreme and frequent abandonment of objectivity that makes it a turn off. You don't have to care, but since you're trying to change people's minds, I thought you might like to know.

it is revealing that in case one even puts forward the mildest critic of the great master of propaganda and lies, that his fawners just cannot handle it and seem to regard it as personal offence, I agree a cult indeed.

So comical that sad people, such as VW, to save questioning their own viewpoints, want to believe that those who dare to disagree with their totally biased viewpoints, belong to a cult? LOL

It seems the truth is that some people are so afraid to accept that Grouchy, d'Erlon and others, failed in their objectives and let Napoleon down, that they have to throw out the silly accusation that people are using them as scapegoats! LOL

Why can't these sad people just accept that these officers failed. It is like blaming a football manager when the players he puts on don't score and they lose the game. Obviously, all managers and Emperors have to be psychic to win! LOL

It is not looking for scapegoats. It is basic facts. But some people can't accept such facts unless they throw a negative against Napoleon.

It is interesting how some people appear to like Andrew Field's book Grouchy's Waterloo. Perhaps it is has something to do with something negative being said about Napoleon. LOL

Napoleon was not sure that Wellington would stand or where, which is why, after the Prussian defeat at Ligny, he needed to know what the Prussian intentions were and that is the task he gave to Grouchy. He had to know what they were going to do and if they would become a threat to his right flank, should he begin a battle with Wellington. It should have been obvious to anyone of the importance of knowing what the Prussians were going to. And a capable commander should not have needed an order to tell him to prevent the Prussians from doing so or at least informing the Emperor what was happening. Instead, Grouchy gave the impression that he had found them but gave no indication that any had bypassed him and marched off towards the Waterloo battlefield. Field mentions of Grouchy 'He had failed to contemplate a Prussian move from Wavre to Waterloo…' (page 206 Grouchy's Waterloo)

Why did Grouchy not contemplate this? Especially after he did mention it might happen in one of his messages, 17th June, 10pm, he sent to Napoleon in which he states. 'It may perhaps be inferred from this that one portion is going to join Wellington…'(The Battle of Wavre and Grouchy's Retreat by W.Hyde Kelly, page 60)

In hindsight, as usual, people claim that Napoleon should have ordered Grouchy to try to prevent any Prussians marching to join up with Wellington or at least delay them. But Grouchy himself should have been well aware that he should try to prevent them or at least warn Napoleon of their intended line of march. He did not need an order to tell him to do so. I am sure even Grouchy was aware of why Napoleon had given him such a task. he did not want Grouchy to trace and follow the Prussians for fun!

Napoleon needed to know the intentions of the Prussians. That was the task given to Grouchy and Grouchy failed to do so but gave the impression that he was achieving his task and that no Prussians had bypassed him.

'…we could tell by the direction of the fires that we were further to the north than the Prussian left wing and that it could make off without us knowing about it. But the marshal hesitated, refused, giving reason after reason…' (Rumigny from Grouchy's Waterloo by Andrew Field, page 207)

It seems that Grouchy just did not want to accept that he had not found the retreating Prussian army, had not discovered which direction they were going in or what their intentions were. He also appears to not wanting to accept that any Prussians had actually slipped by him. Above all, I suspect they just did not want to admit he failed in the task given to him. And the rest, of course, is history.