"How to model the loss of combat effectiveness" Topic

It's an issues I struggle with as I don't believe that there is a one size fits all solution. Different scales of games and different historical periods need different game mechanics or at least some flavour of difference from one to another.

I have put some general ideas on the subject on my blog. Feel free to drop in and leave comments on your thoughts.

link

A degradation in firepower and increased difficulty in standing your ground seem to be the traditional way. In an old set that used percentage dice, a 01 always hit, and a 100 always passed a morale check. Likewise, casualties also represented soldiers helping their comrades to the rear or deciding that they were done fighting for the day. In Volley and Bayonet, which uses a strength point roster system, the designer notes state that a unit is removed after it loses its last strength point, which represents 50% losses and renders the formation combat ineffective.

When playing a game where the unit represents a battalion or regiment, don't think of "casualties" as numbers of killed and wounded. Rather, treat it a measure of loss of combat effectiveness – casualties, cohesion, supply, fatigue, combat stress, belief in cause, support for commander, support for the rest of the combat team etc.

A "hit" is a combined measure of all the above and more. If you feel that morale is the most important consideration, then think of a "hit" as a lowering of morale. If you feel that cohesion is the most important consideration, then think of a "hit" is a lowering of cohesion. Our little guys can't tell the difference.

When playing a game where each individual is represented would be a different can of worms.

As Sun Tzu was oft to say, "Too many modifiers destroy the mind and the game".

I'll give you another aspect--lost coordination.

A multi-lingual unit takes casualties, and the bilinguals tend to go first. Apart from Murphy's Law, they're usually the ones relaying orders and messages.

In a WWII context, only a limited number of tanks have the radios necessary to talk to the infantry they support, or the fighter-bombers overhead. If the wargame unit is large enough, you can call this "loss of cohesion" but if your tanks and infantry are separate stands, what they've really lost is the ability to play nicely with one another. Please let me know when you find a way to represent this.

Incidentally, when I tried to say this on your comments section, the remark disappeared and you still showed "no comments."

Elenderil,

Your best bet in approaching the 'modeling' of loss of Combat Effectiveness is to aggregate and assess the status of a particular Combat Unit, by determining the collective impact of its current internal Human Factors.

Presently, the criteria used in the US Military to judge the combat effectiveness of units have traditionally been performance on formal training exercises, availability of personnel, and operational maintenance. What is lacking was the assessment of combat effectiveness based on the human factors that were relevant on the battlefield.

Sarkesian (1980) described the drawbacks of current assessment techniques. Measuring subjectivity using quantitative data in a manner similar to objective measures were at best inconclusive and not reflective of the units ability to perform in combat, nor indicative of the soldiers will to fight, his commitment to the mission of the unit, and his acceptance and commitment to the ideology that has placed him on the battlefield in the first place. Indeed, measures have been developed to try to assess these human factors, but these remain peripheral and lack serious analytical depth. It is difficult to say with certainty that a unit would become effective on the battlefield because it performed veil on its Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) or passed the annual general readiness inspection.

Many articles and books have been written that focus on the subjective factors of combat. Most have been written by historians or social scientists who have based their writings on historical research. These accounts of battle tended to not capture all of the reality of war due to the authors' superficial understanding of combat and lack of background in military theory.

Perhaps the best method to establish the C.E. criteria itself, that would help You to better understand and to predict combat effectiveness is to leverage the work S.L.A. Marshall (1947) used to make his assessment utilizing men who actually led soldiers into combat. S.L.A. Marshall felt that nobody knew more about combat than the small unit leader. He wrote:

"One of the deterrents to the adoption of new concepts is that Company Officers and NCOs rarely write of their combat experiences. Even when they do so they are unlikely to search into the reason or nature of them, usually because their experiences are narrow and personal. Also, they have no way of gauging what things are typical or characteristic.

In consequence, most of our textbooks and commentaries on leadership and the mastery of the moral
problem of battle are written by (author.) who are either wholly lacking in combat experience or have
been for long periods so far removed from the reality of small arms action that they have come to
forget what were once their most vital convictions and impressions."

However, as additional operational research was conducted since WWII, one area did stand out above all the others, that are was 'Human Factors'. Human factors are defined as those factors that could psychologically affect a Soldier's will to fight and significantly influence whether a unit is combat effective or not. Combat effectiveness of a unit was based on the sum effect of these human factors on each of the Soldiers within a particular unit.

There were a total of nine (9) Human Factors that were identified and used to define and acquire data
for Combat Effectiveness (C.E.) determination:
1. Training & Discipline
2. Fatigue
3. Perception of survival possibility
4. Ability to withstand ponderous enemy fire (stress)
5. Soldier personal status: Hunger, health, weapon, equipment & etc.
6. Combat experience
7. Competent Combat Leadership
8. Acceptance and sense of belonging to unit (cohesion)
9. Soldier's belief that what he is doing is right (moral).

Combat Leadership should be weighted #1 'the highest', followed by Fatigue, Combat Experience and then Training/Discipline. You can make your own assessment of the rest (i.e., your call).

Hope this helps you,..Analsim

Interesting perspectives – we (our local gaming group) have been discussing this mostly in a pre-20th century format. One thing that I have pondered is how you model heavy cavalry; most rules that we have used allow heavy cavalry to charge, counter-charge and break-through charge without much in the way of penalty

In the real world, heavy cavalry were good for maybe two or three charges a day – period. After that the horses were blown and essentially were out of action. One thing we are thinking about (we use Black Powder) is allowing two charges with penalty but applying a -1 modifier (cumulative) to the die rolls for each combat thereafter

Be interested to know if people think think is workable or bat-ear crazy

BIG RED,

Thanks! Yes, I saw that. However, I wanted to be a little more inclusive, in respects to the other TMP members, by providing some context to my comments. Note too, that the 9-Human Factors listed above, are generic in nature and could be applied to any period of Warfare.

Finally, I noted that a couple of TMP members also mentioned "casualties" (in their comments) and wanted to address this factor too, with this DOD combat study's findings.

"Casualties as a Measure of the Loss of Combat Effectiveness
of an Infantry Battalion" by Dr. D. Clark, John Hopkins University 1954.

SUMMARY of Findings: "The very wide individual differences in the ability of an Infantry Battalions to carry out a given Mission cannot be accounted for in terms of casualties alone, no matter how the data is presented. Of the other interacting variables it is believed that failures and breakdowns in leadership, fire support and reinforcements, and communications (C3) are the most frequent and most powerful influences."

Which is consistent and supports the 9-Human Factors.

I might add that, COL Dupuy also sites this very same study in his own book, "Understanding Defeat."

Regards,

Analsim

Analsim, you caught me before I could delete the post. Your more inclusive answer is probably more relevant than mine!

Some really useful insights here thanks everyone. The factors listed pretty much match my views and go along way to show why I dropped the entire casualty count mentality. I must have read the Clark article at some point as I went with the term combat effectiveness in my ECW rules as the overall measure of a units stickatitivness (that really should be a word). The fact that with 2mm figures you can't remove individual figures was the starting point and I seem to have ended up at the right place!

most model casualty removal is farsical, certainly im my period Moderen/WW2 typicaly 10% casualties in the real world would rendet a unit combate ineffective in a battle. So casualty removalis a farce inless its 1 or nothing in most cases.

Our own crude system accrues "leadership" penalties which are analogous to a "Leadersship, fear, ammunition and fatigue" combined parameter. soret of a combiination of your 9 factors which are too many to be usefull in a simulation of our type.

As "leadership" penalties acrue the ability of the elment to carry out its task falls in that it impacts its abaility to communicate and a degradation of its ability maintain itself in combat.

UshCha, Elenderil & Co.,

Several of you are touching upon or alluding to a very pertinent issue in respect to overall wargame design, which has a significant effect on this C.E. discussion.

The issue is, 'Aggregation' – "The ability to group entities while preserving the effects of entity behavior and interaction while grouped together."

Simply put, I am saying, "There is only so much detail you can cram into a 5lbs wargame bag, before you split the bag wide open." In wargame design terms, this design issue is recognized as the balancing act between, "High-resolution (i.e., discrete/detailed) VS Aggregation (i.e., grouping the effects of several factors)" in overall wargame design approaches.

Here's the gist of this design issue from my reference book on, "Aggregated Combat Models."

"Simulation/Models of large-scale combat contribute useful insights for many military decision problems. The designers of such models attempt to achieve a representation of warfare that is as accurate and believable as possible. For moderate sized forces, providing believable results is aided by modeling in 'High-Resolution (detail)', but larger forces require 'Aggregation (combined)' to keep the models within manageable size and execution time parameters.

In a High-Resolution combat model a detailed view of warfare is achieved by representing individual combatants as separate entities. Each such entity has numerous attributes that define its unique position in the force, its unique perception of the battlefield and the enemy force, its capabilities, and its activity at each moment of simulated battle time. Combat processes are decomposed into high-resolution sequences of events and activities. Complex timing mechanisms coordinate the event sequences for the numerous combatants so that subtle interaction patterns can be modeled.

The goal throughout a high-resolution simulation is to model each combat phenomenon so that results are traceable (via formulas and logic that we understand and accept as representing combat actions) to specific physical performance data or to specific behavioral assumptions. The existence of such an audit trail is the single most significant advantage of a well constructed High-Resolution model. It enables us to evaluate subtle differences in
weapons, sensors, or tactics, and to understand why the different inputs yield improved (or degraded) combat performance.

But there are some problems with the High-Resolution modeling approach. High-Resolution models involve large, detailed processes, procedures and sequencing. They are also require many stochastic (i.e., use probability) inputs, in order to replicate and produce the needed answers about each factor simulated, within each engagement/battle.

As we try to model larger forces at division level or higher, the sheer number of combatants and weapon systems makes it impossible to maintain individual item resolution. Models at these levels have to sacrifice detail for scope.

By Aggregating individual combatants into larger units, the large-scale combat modeler can decrease the number of simulation entities & steps back to a manageable number.

Aggregating individual factors and combatants into larger groups totally changes the description of many of the internal factors, there effects and impacts combat processes. At the simplest level, an Aggregated combat model is one in which the basic model entities are groups rather than individual combatants. However,this simple concept has implications that propagate throughout the entire combat model's structure."

Bottomline: Just like everything else in life, wargame design involves making design decisions about, scope, approaches, trade-offs, and compromises. Big surprise there,..Right?

Again, I hope this information provides you with some helpful insight.

Regards,…Analsim

Analsim this is no different to Computational Fluid dynamics. To get the best results you have to have a very detailed model which takes vast amounts of computational time or you use a much coarser grid and some assumptions about the low level behavior, a generalization if you will. This is fine and we used it a lot at work. However as always there can be issues if the low level approximations are not correct.

"For want of a shoe, the horse was lost. For want of a horse, the rider was lost. For want of a rider, the battle was lost. For want of a battle, the kingdom was lost, And all for the want of a horseshoe nail."

In CFD there are areas where this "impact" is more likely so you need to treat the results in some areas as less reliable but still useful.

The trick is to try and get a good aggregation parameter/system. I say system as if you take DBM's very crude system the ability to control effectively reduces dramatically when contact is made. Very crude but a good very simple model of increasing disorder as contact is made. Effectively modelling loss of co-ordination. By no means perfect but an excellent "quick and dirty" solution.

The question as always is not what you would like. In CFD what I want is a huge model with all the detail and to solve it in minimal time. That I can't have so the real trick is not in the 9 Human factors but in setting just one or two parameters that can give a reasonable approximation of the aggregate of the 9 which gives reasonable results for various combinations of the 9 factors.

1. Training & Discipline
2. Fatigue
3. Perception of survival possibility
4. Ability to withstand ponderous enemy fire (stress)
5. Soldier personal status: Hunger, health, weapon, equipment & etc.
6. Combat experience
7. Competent Combat Leadership
8. Acceptance and sense of belonging to unit (cohesion)
9. Soldier's belief that what he is doing is right (moral).

you might say that 1,5, 7, 8 and 9 could be aggregated. Training and discipline requires good leadership in that it takes time and effort to motivate troops to learn, also they need to be well fed. You might also say that would lead them to think they are doing the right thing and hence 9 applies.

7 could be suspect it may be that you could have bad leadership in combat despite being well trained, If leadership in combat was by political rather then military leaders.

Now you then need to have "weightings" for the various parameters so that the aggregate parameter is valid for all variations. it does imply that dissimilar mixes of parameters would give a similar overall result.

Others may disagree with this grouping or the weighting but that is fundamentally what the discussion is about, what is the minimum number of parameters and what do they reflect for a particular level of simulation.

I like the way Battlegroup handles it, simple and effective. The allies & Axis Battlegroups are given a BR (Battle Rating) total based on the units and their experience level. You pull chits for unit losses and to unpin a unit. When you exceed your battle rating your troops leave the field.
You can exceed your BR by have your units pinned constantly, as you would pull a chit and roll the dice to see how many units you unpinned. Even though you didn't sustain a lot of casualties.

That does seem a bit all or nothing by your description. OK till not OK and leave the field. Personaly I would want some degradation before having to leaving the field, but again its about what the designer and his or her followers want. It is however far better taking taking figures off.

I like the concept of "shock" as used in various TooFatLardies rulesets (from Dark ages to WW2), which represents a degredation of unit effectiveness (morale and cohesion). In game terms, certain circumstances during a game cause a reduction of a unit's ability to move and fight (up to and including leaving the table if things get particularly traumatic).

Having said that, the effects aren't necessarily permanent and can be reduced (or, in some cases, removed) by leaders expending "command points" to keep troops functioning as best they can.

"The relationship of Battle Damage to Unit Combat Performance" PDF link

It's a very complicated issue and much depends on the time frame of combat and the losses, are you winning or losing, supplies or cut off, leadership, making progress or bogged down, supply and replacements, etc.

Wolfhag

Wolfhag I think the problem is not what ypou need to consider, there are lots but how to define a parameter(s)or VERY small number of paramters that effecy a typical short period (1hr to say a week).

UshCha,
Wolfhag I think the problem is not what ypou need to consider, there are lots but how to define a parameter(s)or VERY small number of paramters that effecy a typical short period (1hr to say a week).

My reference is WWII battles. Some units took over 100% causalities but over a 3-6 month period. A Russian unit "reinforced" by the NKVD could attack to the last man as could Penal Battalions and Banzai attacks. Some units were repulsed, regrouped and then attacked again.

Combat Effectiveness: It's really about a unit's ability to attack or defend. You need a high level of effectiveness, supply and support to conduct an effective planned assault and reinforcements to sustain it.

A low level of effectiveness could still do hit and run/ambush attacks and conduct a fighting withdraw. German and Russian units could continue to conduct a fighting withdraw with over 70% causalities. Japanese units could defend in a prepared positions to the last man. Marines in WWII continued fighting at 30% strength. There are many situations and variables.

Another intangible regarding effectiveness is intel and communication (fear of the unknown). If you are under attack and lose communication with the units on your flank you may decide to pull back even if not taking causalities because you are afraid of being out flanked or surrounded.

Marine units could still attack even at 30% strength. Why? Good supply, low threat of being counter-attacked or overrun, stable flanks, and they were making progress. Also, it was common for Marine units to be withdrawn from the front for 2-3 days refitting, relaxing and getting reinforcements and then go back to the line. This helped sustain them even at 50% strength.

Another extreme example would be a platoon in a close range ambush in VN. They may take only 20% causalities in only minutes and be forced on the defensive until causalities are extracted and they reorganize. They may or may not continue their mission.

Battle for Hill 488:
link

Attacked by 200-250 NVA their 18 man platoon had 6 of the 18 Marines killed and the rest wounded. The battle went on all night but with close artillery support (the commander requested a barrage on his own position) and air support. Helicopters tried to extract them but were driven off. They were surrounded and could not withdraw, they had to fight.

They had good leadership, high morale and intimidated the enemy but were low on ammo and at one point out of grenades. There was much HTH fighting too. When morning came the NVA withdrew. I think the main factor was good leadership, confidence, desperation and the hope that help would come. Also maybe the thought being a POW motivated them to fight.

Another factor is defining what is a causality. In 1:1 infantry games I define them as KIA, WIA and WW (light wound, Walking Wounded). WW can defend but not attack. The result of a hit is generally 25% KIA, 25% WIA and 50% WW. WIA must be evacuated or may die. That means some figures that are OK may have to help evacuate them further temporarily decreasing the unit's effectiveness. WW units can spend the night at an aid station and return the next day completely effective. A player can slow his advance to keep their effectiveness higher.

Units are rated for their "Aggressiveness". To advance under fire they need to pass an Aggressiveness Check first. Certain factors increase or decrease their Aggressiveness. A unit's Aggressiveness can be decreased to the point all it can do is defend or fall back. To regroup they must fall back and be out of the enemy LOS and not being fired at.

Typically, a squad or platoon will sustain some causalities
and may have to assume a defensive posture temporarily before attacking again or they may continue the attack. I think this better portrays friction at the lower level of units.

From my experience playing games and reading different rule sets players don't generally experience an attack being repulsed, the attacker regrouping and assaulting again. I played an ACW game at a convention where a Union Regiment took some causalities (10%?) on the first turn of the game and had a bad morale result and the entire Regiment routed off the table. Not much fun for the player who paid his money to play the game expecting to be engaged for 3 hours. For that reason I don't like the "Rout off the table" result in a game.

But in the end it depends on what the game designer wants to model and how realistic it will be and the unrealistic aspect of a "Balanced Scenario".

Wolfhag

wolfhag, what is not being progressed much is how we model the situation, comming up with examples in the real world is nat hard, lots of examples in WW2.
We do have somthing analogios to yor arression check. If an element is suppressed it must remove that before it can fight again. Removing it depend on the quality of the troops. A commander on about his troops in the Falklands praised there ability to get up and get moving again despite the incomming; so that we have a basic common parameter.

Fanatics they are a specific definition within the and have the ability to ignore suppression effects depending on their leadership. This allows them to advance wuickly but at a cost they wear down and there ability lo last long falls rapidly as they are more vulnerable as they are not trying to minimise caualties.

What is missing from this discussion is the issue in my 4th June post how to do it?

So far we have done very little to outline a solution. It may be only one solution is actually required if the "marking" scheme is comprehensive so in even in an isolated game the scenario can account for the relevant back story leading upto the scanario being played.

What is missing from this discussion is the issue in my 4th June post how to do it?

Personally, I think there are so many variables to consider it's going to be hard to implement all of them.

I think two main factors are leadership and desperation. Good leadership can overcome hesitation or reluctance. Desperation is what kept the Marines fighting through the night on Hill 488.

When the Ranger unit was pinned down on the Grenada air field a single low ranking Ranger stood up and said, "I've had enough of this s---" and ran towards the enemy and the rest of the unit followed. Would that be like the ASL Berserk rule?

I think there are enough historical examples of leadership overcoming a unit that is tired, hungry, cold, etc that it should be the main determining factor. Desperate circumstances call for desperate measures.

At the start of a scenario you could assign a unit an Aggressiveness or Morale Rating of 1-10 with 10 being the best for a unit with the 1-9 factors mentioned "maxed out." This could take into account the 1-9 factors mentioned above. If the unit is poorly trained, low morale, etc it could be lower. During the battle the level of suppression and causalities would lower the rating when you want them to advance under fire. Forcing an enemy to fall back (winning) could increase it.

Lets say a unit has a rating of 6 and wants to Fire & Maneuver under enemy fire and needs to roll a 1-6 on a D10 to be successful. The Suppression level is a +2 modifier. However, he has a -3 leadership rating that can influence the result. The D10 roll is a 7 the suppression modifier makes it a 9 so the unit hesitates under fire. Now the player has the option to use his leader to "rise to the occasion" displaying his leadership qualities and motivate his unit with his -3 modifier for a final result of a 6 and the unit moves out.

This way good leadership can overcome poor training and morale.

Each time a player uses his leaders modifier AFTER seeing the initial result he has exposed him to enemy fire and he takes a causality check. You don't get to freely use his leadership modifier every time unless you want to. Use them wisely or lose them.

You could also have a "Desperation" or "Berserk" rule that if the initial D10 roll was a 1 it automatically passes its Aggressiveness Check. You could say a result of a 10 means the unit automatically falls back until they are out of the enemy LOS and safe to regroup.

That's my best suggestion and what I've been working with.

Wolfhag

Imo

Rate of losses is more significant than percentage losses.
Attackers are likely to stop going forward at morale levels where defenders continue.
Defenders who have no alternative will sometimes carry on.

That lone ranger.
Maybe he inspired the others in his unit.
Maybe his comrades felt one goes forward then all go forward.
Reduced perceived threat?
He's still alive…. Must be ok to go.

That nebulous thing, leadership?
Being a leader doesn't mean a badge. A leader is someone the rest will follow.

That's why the job title is:
Platoon Leader, Squad Leader, and Fire Team Leader. Positions above the Platoon are normally called "Commanders".

The exception may be in the Russian Army where a Division Commander is now a Division Leader leading Platoons.

Natural Leaders will rise to the occasion no matter what their rank. It's almost impossible to define Leadership which gives game designers a lot of latitude to portray it and debate.

Wolfhag

wolfhag, clearly Leadershuip cannot dominate overly or else the other 8 woiuld be pointless. With a few leaders it may have a very high effect but like most management ability varies greatly and the average is not good. Soldiers lead only be Holiwoeed style leaders is just plain fantasy so not up for considerarion in a simulation discussion. Hence it is neccessary to have a marking scheme to cope for the "average".

UshCha,
I think good leadership in the middle of battle is what overcomes factors 2-5 by leading from the front to motivate and rally the troops. There are many historical examples, Dan Daley, Chesty Puller, Herman Balk, Audie Murphy, Alexander the Great, Napoleon. However, even the highest level of leadership was not going to rally the Germans in Stalingrad towards the end, the Americans at Bataan, pockets of Russian divisions in 1941, etc.

Read the accounts of soldiers awarded the VC and MOH and you'll see many examples of "Hollywood" style leadership. It appears that static defensive positions the final assault was often by 1-2 men because it was easier to get close than having the entire squad charge it so it happened fairly often of often with the leader becoming a causality.

How or if you want to portray it in a game depends. I don't think there is any historical data you could use to determine the frequency it happened. It appears it is normally done out of desperation or sacrifice. Like any other rule, it can be overcome.

Wolfhag

wolfhag I checked 182 VC's for the entire Brits including many now independent countries. That does not seem like a typical sample and of little use. The Ukraine war would not seem to have too many equivalents so a model based on that does not seem very crediatable. While vey, occationally there are carismatic leaders or exceptional men, they are not typical. Perhaps a weighting of two to leadership and 1 for everything else may be a start.

While vey, occationally there are carismatic leaders or exceptional men, they are not typical.

Of course not, that's why leaders have a different leadership ratings that can be based on a historical scenario.

That does not seem like a typical sample and of little use.

Awards like the Bronze Star (V), Silver Star, and MOH are given to individuals for bravery and leadership for individual actions above and beyond the call of duty or for their sacrifice. The rules I'm writing allow the player to use an individual leader to "rise to the occasion" to lead and successfully motivate his unit while in combat and under fire (Aggressiveness Check and Leadership modifier).

Poor units will need more displays of leadership, better units not as much. A player uses his Leadership Modifier to motivate the troops when they fail their Aggressiveness Check and there is a chance for him to be KIA making the ultimate sacrifice. I think that's pretty close but no I don't have rules for awards. It may be of little use in your game rules but at the low level 1:1 rules I'm using it can make a huge difference as I think good leadership under fire does make a difference. It also allows the player to make a decision rather than be completely limited by the die roll.

When performing an Aggressiveness Check while under fire there is a chance for one individual to perform a "heroic feat" as described in the award citations. These would most likely be limited to during a close assault or close combat. When performing an Aggressiveness Check to move under fire a unit has a better chance of advancing if only one man attempts to advance and the others provide cover fire so the chance for individual feats of bravery is built in and he can still become a KIA.

So in a game a player can have a single figure assault a bunker or machine gun pit and then attempt to do it to another one close by with a chance of taking out multiple enemy positions as described in many award citations or getting killed in the process which is also described in the citations. Multiple enemy personnel may surrender to him. I like it, players like it, and so far it works. My rules do not have to work in your game to be valid. Our games take a completely different approach to the mechanics and overall game play so what works in one may not work in the other.

The Ukraine war would not seem to have too many equivalents so a model based on that does not seem very crediatable.

I'm not basing it on any specific battle or period. Is this an opinion or some examples to back it up? How can you be so sure? Naval Special Warfare Operator Ukrainian Lt. Col. Nick Nikonov, 37, died on March 12 while fighting Russian forces in Mariupol. During a Russian advance his small unit was encircled. The latest account is that he led the unit as they fought to the last man rather than surrender making the ultimate sacrifice. Russian Generals are being forced to lead from the front and becoming a causality. My rules cover that.

For every documented account where an award for valor is documented and issued there are many more that do not go acknowledged so it is more common than the number of awards would show. Just how common? There is no way to quantify it. That means it's up to the game designer to implement it and like any rule can be overdone. As always, very few people will agree, most will disagree and a small minority will make stupid negative and nonconstructive remarks. That appears to be Human Nature.

Perhaps a weighting of two to leadership and 1 for everything else may be a start.

Here is my suggestion as I agree with Analsim: In the scenario a unit's base/ideal Aggressiveness would be based on number 1, 4, 6, 8 and 9 and modified by numbers 2 and 3 for the Aggressiveness Factor used in the scenario.

The leadership roll would be for number 7.

The "Perception of survival possibility" could be a desperation situation and rate it higher in Aggressiveness/Leadership or a situation like Stalingrad where it would be lower or a Banzai Charge or German desperation breakout like at the Korsun pocket where it would be higher. "Competent Combat Leadership" could also be having an NKVD unit urging you on from behind as that can be a real motivating factor.

Wolfhag