"Russian Tactical Doctrine (2022)" Topic

Yeah … but they look nice marching in a parade.

"Yeah … but they look nice marching in a parade."

Yes, indeed. Very smart looking marching on Red Square.

Ukrainian TVD, Day 80-88 by Jomini of the West:

6/ The Russian MoD allocated a small operational maneuver group (OMG) of its most capable forces to punch through the secondary Popasna defensive line and exploit this breach toward Soladar in the west and Lysychansik to the north, likely with the intent of forming a cauldron.
7/ Russian forces appear to be leveraging the advantage of Luhansk's dense rail network to keep forward forces adequately supplied. The OMG in Popasna has made better use of combined arms, a doctrinal approach to breaching prepared defenses, and integrating new combat assets.

Druzhina
Illustrations of Costume & Soldiers

Very interesting … someone in the Russian military that can fight modern maneuver warfare. Seems all those ATGMs the Ukrainians got may come in handy. Not to mention all that artillery, too.

Going further about the evolution of modern Russian tactical and operational doctrine…

It seems from what I've read (and what we're seeing right now in Ukraine) that the Russians do not have the Soviet appetite for mass maneuver. A good example of this is the pincer-strategy being used in the Donbas right now. Back in March, there was media speculation that the Russians may go for an extremely deep envelopment: from the North they could take Kharkiv and then go all the way to the Dnipro (a 140 mile march), while forces from Mariupol and Melitopol would march up to Zaporizhzhia, effectively splitting the country in half.

This kind of mass maneuver represents the deep battle strategy in Soviet thinking. It would be supplemented with deep materiel and personnel reserves and likely the use of nuclear arms to put the defenders off their footing, facilitating a massive encirclement. It goes without saying that the modern Russian army is NOT the Soviet army of old… it is much smaller and much more constrained by political contexts (domestic and international). Soviet "deep battle" military planners worked with a notion of all-out war, with no bars on nuclear arms and an all-or-nothing, zero-sum conflict.

The Russian army is not capable of anything even remotely like this, but they have evolved in interesting ways to find new methods (and a more modest scope of success). They went for a much more narrow encirclement… initially from Mariupol in the south and Izium to the north (with the goal of cutting off Sloviansk-Kramatorsk).

That stalled, and they have since been trying to create an even smaller encirclement of just Severodonetsk-Lysychansk (coming from Popasna in the south and first Bilohorivka and now Lyman from the north).

Summary? The Russian army simply does not have the manpower to commit to a deep battle strategy.

But how have they been adjusting their strategy? Many of these changes can be attributed to the controversial Russian commander Dvornikov, who seems to be applying strategy he used in Syria.

Firstly, they seem to recently be pouring very elite units to spearhead the pincer movements. In the north, against Lyman (captured by Russians yesterday) is the 90th Guards Tank Division with its T-90 tanks and BMPT urban combat support vehicles. From the south in Popasna, we see several Naval Infantry Brigades, an Air Assault (VDV) Division and Wagner Group PMC mercenaries from Syria (you can see their own UAV footage over Popasna on Youtube).

Secondly, the Russian maneuver is much tighter, allowing for close distances between BTGs (which can then support each other). The Soviet deep battle doctrine relied on a millions-strong Soviet army… without those numbers, units are spread too thinly and cannot support each other (which we saw in Phase 1, mainly because the Russians were under the false impression that they wouldn't need to do much actual fighting in Ukraine and would be welcomed with open arms).

Thirdly, the main goal of maneuver seems to be to separate and hedge-in Ukrainian units. Once Ukrainian forces are displaced and compartmentalized, the Russians are using less-elite units to block the Ukrainians from escaping from these fixed positions. You can see this for example in Lyman and the operations going on around Zolote right now.

Fourthly, like in older Soviet doctrine, hard points are simply bypassed. The Russians test a broad frontage simultaneously with probing first echelon forces. Any failed probes are abandoned and any successes are exploited by punchier, heavier and more mobile second echelon forces waiting in the rear area. Bypassed units are fixed in place by lesser troops (as described in point three, above).

Fifthly, and this seems to be Dvornikov's specialty, the main units committed to attacks are not infantry, tanks or airpower… it's all artillery. The Russian army is dumping artillery on weak points and then ground forces follow afterwards (ideally not encountering any combat at all, otherwise pushing out weakened and disorganized defenders). Artillery does not serve Russian ground forces, but rather it is Russian ground forces that serve the artillery arm. Ground forces exist to secure favorable ground for positioning artillery units and to exploit gaps in the defender's line created by Russian artillery.

The weakness of the Russian strategy really is urban combat. Russians do not have the numbers to prosecute traditional city fights and the effects of artillery are mitigated. This is significant, since Russian strategy pivots around the use of artillery… they've placed all their eggs in that basket. The approach Russians have taken to cities so far is to level them and encircle them, eventually forcing the defenders to surrender. Unfortunately for the Ukrainians, the vast majority of Eastern Ukraine is open ground and small towns, so the Russian strategy is actually fairly apt, given the predominant terrain of the battlefield in question.

How to represent this all in a wargame? For a brigade-level game like Panzer Korps, battalion tactical groups should be organized to task (mission organization) and divided into first and second echelon forces. First echelon advances on a broad front, close enough that they can support each other (move and shoot on the same target within a turn or two). Any successful fronts should be exploited by mobile, second-echelon forces waiting in reserve.

Both echelons should be proceeded by heavy artillery use. Each BTG can have two to three batteries of artillery (usually a mix of MLRS and SPH) attached organically. In Panzer Korps, that means a BTG can fire three times every turn… once for the attached artillery battalion, again for the combat formation and a third time for the infantry fighting vehicles. The infantry formation attacks will benefit from a mortar company, the IFV attacks will benefit from a tank company and the artillery battalion will fire based on the predominant artillery type. This means, in theory, a single BTG can effect a 3:1 fire advantage against a Ukrainian light infantry battalion in defense or a 3:2 fire advantage against a mechanized unit. The downside to the BTG structure (leaving aside for a moment the poor morale and C3), is that it doesn't represent an actual 3:1 troop advantage… we're still talking about a single formation of combat troops (since IFV are attached and artillery are in the rear area). Thus it is not that difficult to send the BTG packing (6 disorder markers will do the trick) and the BTG lacks the numbers for engaging in close assault (which is needed in urban combat situations). The BTG is thus very poor in urban combat… small urban areas can and should be bypassed. Large urban areas? The Russian forces are simply not likely to perform well.

The fact that the Russians do not appear to be massing their artillery presents and odd problem for wargamers… typically, if you have six battalions of maneuver forces on the table and six battalions of artillery, the impulse is to mass what is effectively an artillery division and pour it all onto one target. This may happen with the second echelon forces, but generally does not appear to be how Russia is actually using its artillery… rather it is parcelling it out amongst the BTGs to support them directly (to increase the ability of each BTG to "test" enemy defenses in this area). It would be interesting to evaluate the new and old models of Russian (Soviet) artillery deployment to see if the new method is effective.

I want to open another discussion about Ukrainian tactics and how they seek to counter the Russian operational doctrine, but I am having difficulty finding deep discussions about how they have evolved to handle the Russians. I am getting snippets here and there (the brilliant and near-futuristic artillery doctrine, for example), but there seems to be more hesitation in the English-language material to openly discuss Ukraine's strategies.

I agree with that assessment. Based on everything we have seen or read.

The Russians generally just don't do modern maneuver warfare very well. If at all. For a number of reasons.

As always FA use is a Russian predilection. We even see this in the TO&E of BTGs. They have as much FA as they do Infantry.

The use of their "better"/elite units now more effectively may give the Ukrainians some trouble. But again the Russians don't have the numbers overall in elite units, AFAIK. They will be attrited as the other less capable units are as their attacks continue. However the Ukrainians still will suffer losses as well. Only it appears in smaller numbers and less often/at a lesser rate.

Something to note FWIW: the US, UK, etc., have been training the Ukrainians since 2015. Only leaving a couple of weeks before the invasion[AFAIK]. If the US, UK, trained them to the level of many traditional NATO units, along with the weapons deliveries. The Ukrainians will be able to and have "bested" the Russians in many engagements.

E.g. the AT ambush and in the defense with these new high-tech weapons that the US/UK, etc. trained the Ukrainians with will continue to attrite Russian AFVs, etc.

Plus the high tech US, etc. FA given to the Ukrainians will also cause Russia losses in both Infantry, etc., and Counter-Battery fires.

Seems the Ukrainians use the newest member of the combined arms team, the drone to much better effect than the Russians.

This all is demonstrated by seeing that the Russians have been pushed back mostly to where they started, in the Donbas and Crimea, etc. With suffering massive losses in men and equipment. E.g. pulling T-62s out of "mothball" to increase their MBT numbers. To continue their attacks.

*** I have never played Panzer Korps, but probably something similar in the past. So I will take your experienced word for how to wargame this current conflict. Using that system.

Oh absolutely. I was just describing the Russian doctrine "in theory." It is as helpful to understand how it is supposed to work as to understand why it sometimes fails to work… in fact, you cannot really understand one without the other. For example, it has become trite to observe that the lack of a trained, effective NCO core in the Russian ground forces causes them to be tactically inflexible when encountering obstacles. Simply put, when the BTG runs into a problem, they just stop advancing and the operational plans of the brigade commander go out the window (leading the brigade commander to risk his own life to visit the frontlines and figure out the hold up).

Of course, the lack of effective NCOs is a general problem, but it becomes a SPECIFIC problem when you realize that the BTG is designed entirely around flexibility (at least on the tactical level)… they are completely kitted out with their own organic assets (armor, artillery, AA and more) so that they can resolve changing ground conditions all on their own… they don't need to make a call in to some centralized artillery fire control, for example, or rely on neighboring armoured formations to provide heavy support. They have everything they need, theoretically, to tackle a large range of tactical problems. But the relative lack of infantry and trained NCOs makes it extremely difficult for the BTG to function in practice as it was intended to operate in theory.

On a larger, operational scale, the Russians are handling this glaring problem with their unique approach to operational art… basically, if a BTG becomes stalled, a BTG in a neighboring sector may have more luck. Operationally, the Russian army is designed to neglect failures and only build upon successes. This leads in some cases to entire BTGs being sacrificed (see for example the river crossing at Bilohorivka) because the Russians didn't want to bail them out. Overall, however, BTGs still continue to "function" in an operational sense because occasionally one of them will encounter a soft point in the defenses that can be exploited by second echelon forces. So relative tactical failure on the one hand is balanced out by an acceptable level of operational function on the other.

That's a MUCH more nuanced conversation than, for example, merely stating "Russians lack NCOs so they cannot adapt to tactical changes" (which is about as deep as the discussion gets in the media).

And there is an even bigger conversation to be had about how the Ukrainian's counter these strategies. Often, discussion of tactical doctrine matters are limited to very one-sided reports… they stress the advantages of one side or another by simply describing the relevant doctrine by rote, how the forces are meant to operate in theory. But in reality, as we see things developing on the ground, both sides have complementary, evolving doctrines that are meant to mitigate the advantages of the other side. A doctrine, particularly one currently evolving in the field, cannot really be understood without understanding how it is adapting to meet the doctrine of the opponent. That is a much more involved but necessary level of discussion. For all the approaches described above for the Russians, we need to understand how they are shaped by Ukrainian strategies and how Ukrainian strategies are evolving to counteract them (and vice versa, of course).

And I agree, the focus on artillery is actually a weakness. It's terrain-dependent, for one, and has been effectively predicted by the Pentagon (which then sent M777 howitzers that both outrange Russian artillery and are much more accurate than Russian artillery). This, combined with the Ukrainian tactic of dispersed dispositions for artillery (and Musk's sat-uplink system and the user-friendly Ukrainian-designed firecon), means that counter-battery fire is the obvious method to effectively disrupt the Russian strategy. We've already seen this put to good use in the Kherson area… the more M777 continue to arrive, the more this simple response will provide a real challenge for Russian tactics.

Agreed … I and my comrade during the Cold War studied how the USSR/WP would attack and cross the IGB, etc. They certainly didn't operate like that when they crossed into Ukraine. Their "new" approach to modern warfare was not executed as in theory and in practice.

They seemed to use the " If you throw enough 💩 at a wall, some of it may stick. Not the way to fight a modern conventional war.

Plus as we see new high tech systems, e.g. Javelins, M777s, etc., with proper training and employment will give the Ukrainians some very important advantages. Even cancelling out Russian numbers in some cases. Again it seems the Russians are fighting a war of attrition of sorts.

While the Ukrainians, having been trained and armed by NATO[in many cases]. Seem to reflect that as they operate to defeat the invaders. I don't think the Russians can react quick enough to in some case to change up how they do business in combat. However, their few "elite" forces being used seems to help. But those are not large in numbers.

Plus their weak NCO Corps seems to be a big problem. Officers can't be everywhere. However, from what be see their Officer Corps may not be much. better. These among others weakness we have discussed, may cause them to "lose" Putin's war. As I said, they have lost what little ground they have taken and almost back to where they started. Add the very high losses. Putin will be hard pressed to have a victory parade in Red Square. But may do a small one anyway and claim a great victory for Mother Russia. Very Orwellian …

@AM,

It is a bit of challenge to sort out. As stated in "The Russian Way of War" linked above, "The BTG has no relationship to operational art in the Russian context" (pg. 39) as "operational art" for the Russian army goes back to the great Soviet military thinkers and focuses on the manoeuvre of large military formations to maximum effect.

The BTG is really a force generation concept as a means of a brigade to project power quickly using its active personnel while the rest of the brigade remains in garrison to do things like train conscripts, allow for rotation of deployed BTG, etc. (Note for brevity I'll use the term "brigade" as a substitute for regiments/divisions since the Russian army is halfway between an all brigade structure and the former mostly division structure, but it's the same idea, the BTG are the deployed, power projection forces from regiments, brigades and divisions that remain in garrison.)

What that means is that the components of a BTG can be selected according to the overall mission and the readiness level of the "brigade in garrison". However, once deployed its no longer that flexible. It is as they say in the above report, "an integral tactical unit". This why the Russians needed to withdraw depleted BTG from the line to combine with other depleted BTG (i.e., higher level HQ can't simply take companies/platoons from one BTG and cross attach to another BTG the way a commander of an integral brigade could do for the elements within the brigade.

The BTG is rather like a vexillatio of a Roman legion with the legion being the parent, garrison organization.

Okay, fair enough…each BTG is an integral unit that can be assigned a task by a higher HQ.

The questions I have are:

1) Have the Russians mobilized any integral brigades or divisions (most regiments being subordinated to divisions)? The talk is all BTG and "elements from" a specific brigade or division – but that's consistent with a BTG being an element from a parent organization.

2) How are the BTG commanded? What is the higher level command structure? Are BTG commanded by brigades/divisions which are commanded by armies? Maybe, but maybe some BTG are directly commanded by army HQ.

3) What assets belong to these higher level HQ? Where do these assets come from – i.e., what percent of supporting units in the Russian order of battle have been mobilized?

4) Are there any normal infantry or tank battalions mobilized? And, if so, shouldn't the parent brigade also need to be mobilized – otherwise how are these battalions supported as they are not integral, self-sustaining BTG.

As for 2nd echelon I wouldn't use that term for the employment of BTG as that term is more appropriate for classic Soviet/Russian doctrine related to the "operational art". I'd use the term "reserve" implying that they can be used to reinforce success. The key difference is that 2nd echelon formations classic doctrine will hit the frontline far faster than the reserve BTG – i.e., more time delay in getting a reserve BTG to the right spot compared to classic 2nd echelon formations rolling forward.

So, lots of questions.

there is a disconnect between the BTG designed for small scale operations and the current fighting for which fully mobilized brigades and divisions would seem more appropriate. Some thoughts:

1) mobilizing brigades and divisions would have taken longer giving more time for Ukraine and NATO to respond, so they went with BTG to achieve surprise or at least to minimize response; or

2) they think the BTG is better suited for the operation – if so where's the supporting doctrine for employing large numbers of BTG?

This leads in some cases to entire BTGs being sacrificed (see for example the river crossing at Bilohorivka)

I have been wondering why there were no specific Russian AD vehicles reported as destroyed. Were the Russians trying to do AD from the other side of the river? The lead BTG was some distance from the crossing point.

Druzhina
Illustrations of Costume & Soldiers

@AM
Thanks for this discussion. In wargaming, we are always playing with the "on paper" capabilities of different armies. It is interesting to see what happens with modern Russian doctrine "done right". The BTG system seems to be designed for small scale, short duration conflicts where the Russians can locally overwhelm a weaker opponent. It's far from the grand maneuvers of Soviet operational art, but at least in theory, it has its uses serving specific political goals, e.g. reconquering small breakaway states.

@shadoe01, I suggest you may be misreading Grau & Bartles. I'm no expert so I may be incorrect, but my understanding of what they are saying there is that the BTG is not itself a product or particular element of operational art… it is, as you say, a task-force organizing/generating tool, an efficient way to quickly throw together the forces needed for a mission (both in terms of organic support assets and capable, seasoned infantrymen). As an aside, supposedly conscripts (who are not supposed to even be in Ukraine, legally speaking) are not used in the combat elements of the BTG, as they lack the experience to be effective (they are in support and auxiliary units only, at least in theory… we know from captured Russian soldiers that they do occasionally find themselves in frontline fighting).

That said, that neither means that the Russians lack an operational art, nor does it mean that BTGs are not the tactical element in the operational art. Brigades are the tactical element in operational thinking and brigades are made up of battalions, thus BTGs are at the end of the day the material with which operations are prosecuted. Grau & Bartles are merely saying there that the concept of the BTG force generation tool is not itself a feature of operational art, but rather is simply another tool of military planning. I will agree though that recent developments in the Russian army (past ten years or so) have put stress on the concept of operational art and have demanded that it become a more porous and flexible idea than in the past. The experiences in Ukraine will only accelerate the matter. That quote from Gerasimov on the bottom of page 39 is a brilliant example of the pressures that are reshaping Russian thinking.

I'll hazard a guess at some of your questions…

#1: The Russians have seemingly deployed both Brigades and Divisions as the main battle forces. The divisions tend to be older, well-established formations that didn't succumb to the abortive brigade reorganization from a few years ago. Strategic maps show, for example, two regiments of the 90th Guards Tank Division in play in the Yampil-Lyman area. The 150th Motor Rifle Division also has at least two regiments in action (their HQ is north of Alchevsk). That said, the by far most common tactical formation is the brigade. Some parts of the front seem to just have clusters of BTGs, seemingly with fixed orders to hold certain positions (which gets a bit to your second point about the relation between different levels of command).

#2: Grau & Bartles actually do discuss this. My memory of reading that section is that something like a Major is in charge of the BTG (he and his staff are usually trucking around in a pair of R-149MA1, with a R-149MA3 and a MP-1IME in the communication platoon. The brigade commander hands down the general objectives and directions for the day and the battalion commander is the one who has to implement these orders, which may involve more refined and detailed choices. Fortunately, the Russian lower field officers are seemingly paralyzed to make hard decisions as they do not want to be blamed for failure (something of a sport in the Russian army hierarchy, it seems). As a result, the battalion commanders tend to call up the line to problem-solve, which creates delays due to typical communication problems.

#3: I was under the impression that BTG assets were assigned from the Brigade or Regiment/Divisional assets. BTGs are derived from higher fixed orders like brigades and regiments. For example, a captured soldier in a Youtube video (Radio Free Europe from Feb 27th) identifies his unit as "Military unit 75242, 25th Brigade." I am assuming the unit number may be his BTG designation, but it could also simply be the number of his mustering unit or something else.

#4: Yes, normal tank and infantry formations are operating. They also tend to be organized as BTGs, however… so a battalion from a tank regiment will feature three tank companies and a mechanized infantry company, and a battalion from a motor rifle regiment will have three mechanized infantry companies and a tank company. The fourth company in each case is simply taken from the fourth battalion of the regiment. I don't think there are any BTGs in the field that are not derived from regimental (divisional) or brigade formations and thus all BTGs could theoretically be supplied from the armory of the parent formation. Note, the entire brigade doesn't necessarily need to be called up. You could theoretically form just a battalion or two of reservists (Kontraktniki) and pull the hardway out of the brigade's depot without deploying a complete brigade structure in the field. Reserves would then be called up from the pool of reservists back in Russia on a steady basis.

Note, Grau & Bartles do indicate that the Russians are using the concept of operational art and two echelons of tactical formations. This quote from the bottom of page 46 gives a clearer picture of what this looks like in practice:

On the offense, the first echelon conducts the main attack. It is charged with achieving the higher headquarters immediate objective and is usually responsible for attaining the subsequent objective. The second echelon is intended to exploit the success of the first echelon, continue the attack, and achieve the subsequent objective of the parent organization. If one sector of the first echelon's attack fails and another succeeds, the second echelon will be committed into only the successful sector. Therefore, the second echelon's attack may be in a different direction than originally planned. The second echelon is committed to combat through gaps between enemy strong points and breaches formed in the enemy's lines as a result of nuclear and conventional fire strikes. Other specific second-echelon missions may be to conduct pursuit, destroy bypassed enemy elements, defeat a counterattack, or replace first-echelon units that are combat ineffective before or during commitment.

I think we see, Russia's doctrine, execution, performance. etc. of their BTGs has not been successful in almost all engagements.

By the way, a good example of fluid operational art was the Mariupol siege. Capturing Mariupol was a strategic objective, there was a tactical decision on April 21st to encircle the defenders but to not storm the steel plant (which would have been incredibly costly), and within a few weeks (May 17th) the defenders surrendered (evacuated?) themselves to the Russians and thus became a political trophy for Putin to parade around back in Russia and put on highly-televised trials (the Russians have already announced the guilty condition that they will seek to prove in these trials… guess what it is? Guilt is determined if a soldier is proved to have fought with the Azov battalion.) So there is still the concept of a fluid relationship between strategic objectives, tactical means and political ends. Mariupol and Azovstal are a particularly ugly example of it, but I think the Kremlin has long ago proven that they really don't care what the rest of the world thinks of it.

@AM,

It's a bit late here to respond but I think we're talking at cross-purposes. Ignoring the term "operational art", I believe the BTG we intended as ways to make better use of active personnel for small contingencies – i.e., Russia isn't "at war" and hasn't mobilized. One would suppose that if Russia was mobilizing for a war with NATO we wouldn't be seeing BTG at all but brigades and divisions as per Russian doctrine.

Keeping in mind that it can one to two years to fully mobilize and very, very brigades/divisions are fully manned in peacetime. I'm not sure of the exact date Russia started to assemble the invasion force but 2-3 months is probably the maximum and that includes transportation. If Russia was mobilizing for a war they'd only have a maximum of 25% of their order of battle ready for combat.

Early in the Chechen wars Russia needed to grab pieces from every division in their order of battle to assemble one division which was hardly satisfactory. The BTG was the solution for these small contingencies but nothing I've read indicates they were intended for large forces. So why are we seeing lots of BTG in Ukraine?

My thinking is the BTG concept was put on steriods to assemble a large force. Obviously they did not expect a lot of resistance so the BTG were seen as adequate but as we've seen in the north it wasn't working. However, more recent fighting shows that the Russians are working some of the problems out.

Essentially the use of BTG was a way to achieve a strategic advantage through the BTG as a rapid force generation concept.

I've put the Russian order of battle (ISW pub plus other sources) into a spreadsheet so I could work with that but fully mobilized it require over a half million troops not counting all the troops in the fixed infrastructure. So I expect that there must be just a single BTG from many brigades. Of course, some of the higher readiness brigades might have generated 2 or 3 BTG.

I also expect most brigade and probably all division HQ from the Western and Southern districts are operational and would command most or all of the BTG generated from those formations but they'd also be taking under command BTG generated from the other districts.

That might be a bit rambling but what I might do in the coming days is pick my way through the Jomini maps which have a fair bit of detail and see if I can make sense of the structure above BTG.

@shadoe1 Ah I get your meaning and yes, that all sounds quite plausible and raises its own interesting questions. It suggests that the "much kit, few men" structure of the BTG is really quite accidental (a result of the fact that it takes longer to call up combat-ready men than it does to take mothballed weapon systems out of storage) and the Russian army is explicitly not operating in Ukraine as they were designed to operate. That is good news for the Ukrainians as the Russians are in the undesirable position of attacking from a bad footing.

By the way, a good example of fluid operational art was the Mariupol siege. Capturing Mariupol was a strategic objective,

That may have been one of their most "successful" operation. They won't be giving it up anytime soon, if ever.

not storm the steel plant (which would have been incredibly costly),

At least they remembered the lessons on Stalingrad … or got lucky ?

became a political trophy for Putin to parade around back in Russia

Again that may be one of the few "trophies". But he does have show any "victories", real or perceived for the price to Russia.

(the Russians have already announced the guilty condition that they will seek to prove in these trials… guess what it is? Guilt is determined if a soldier is proved to have fought with the Azov battalion.)

Well that was his reason/excuse for the invasion … to go Nazi hunting. And many seemed to fall for that piece of propaganda.

Mariupol and Azovstal are a particularly ugly example of it, but I think the Kremlin has long ago proven that they really don't care what the rest of the world thinks of it.

That has become more & more clear as this war goes on …

Linked not for headline of the story, but rather the anecdotal evidence (usual caveats apply) contained within about the initial phase of the invasion going south from 0-hour. Seems to me for all the granular technical chat here the only thing Russia's ground commanders were actually using published doctrines for was propping up wobbly tables….
link

"Sergey joined the army as a conscript – most Russian men between the ages of 18-27 must complete one year of compulsory military service. But, after a few months, he made the decision to sign a two-year professional contract which would also give him a salary."

Conscripts seem to be paid only an allowance so there is a big incentive to get paid as a contractor instead. He is really only an unwilling 'conscript'.

Druzhina
Illustrations of Costume & Soldiers

only thing Russia's ground commanders were actually using published doctrines for was propping up wobbly tables

That certainly appears to be true … They are the gang that couldn't shoot straight.

According to Russian law, a person cannot sign a contract to serve in the army if he has not previously served as a conscript.
The term of conscription service in the Russian army is 1 year.

Are conscripts supposed to complete a full year of service before signing a contract? If so, the rule seems to have been bent in the case of Sergey.

Druzhina
Illustrations of Costume & Soldiers

Not necessary. Those who are already serving by conscription can conclude a contract after six months of service.
This rule has been preserved since Soviet times. Only then it was not called "contract service", it was called "service overtime", and was not widespread, since there was an alternative in the form of obtaining the military rank of "praporshchik" (ensign) after graduating from a special military school.

Many of those who have no prospects in civilian life or who want to make a military career, but do not hope to pass the exams in a military university, go to the army immediately with the intention of concluding a contract. After the end of the contract, they will have significant benefits for admission to study at a military university.

A Russian soldier's account of his Battles for Rubizhne. How it was.

The original Бои за Рубежное. Как это было in Russian, April 26 2022.

leon_spb67 also replies to some of the comments with more info, until he can't anymore.

Druzhina
Illustrations of Costume & Soldiers

the term of conscription service in the Russian army is 1 year.

Do many live that long ?

I wonder if the last few months have put many potential volunteers off.
Those "no prospects" in civilian life would be looking a lot more attractive than the ostfront if I were Russian.

I think we all agree that the Russian tactics are very poor and a lack of low level tactical ability. There appears to be a totally ineffective NCO cadre.

To me the high level of Officer casualties seems to indicate that the officers are getting involved at levels below their rank responsibility. So company commanders are leading platoon attacks and battalion commanders are in the frontline with the companies.

In the Falklands the British army had high casualty rates amongst the junior NCOs (the section commanders) who were ‘cutting about' getting things moving. It seems that missing this element, the officers are taking on this role.

I'd say you are generally correct about the Russian's inability to properly use combined arms modern mobile maneuver warfare. As I have said many times before. We thought during the Cold War they'd be "Hell on Wheels". With heavy FA barrages, airstrikes, waves of USSR/WP armor/mech forces rolling across the IGB, etc.

Their level of training is poor, as are their NCOs', which again speaks of their poor to little training as well. That is why it seems to me Co. Cdrs, Bn Cdrs, etc. are upfront leading attacks of smaller units.

They lack motivation. Which means officers must be upfront as well. For a highly armored/mech/motorized army their logistics also seems to be lacking.

Well, let their be no doubt, from my study, etc. the UK Army at the Falklands clearly outclasses the Russians by any measure.

So nearly a year on from the last post what do we know. Russian losses seem astronomic in the untrained end. Ukraine is launching a counter offensive but that seems more aimed at logistics and Russian artillery than immediate territorial gains and it seems to be working, Artillery parity between Russia and Ukraine is getting closer. This will impact on the front especially in the south where the logistics of the Russians is being hit the hardest.

So nearly a year on from the last post what do we know.

During the last one year, Russian offensive operations have been rather limited. The biggest one seemed to be the capture of Bakhmut, which was a slow grinding process with lots of artillery support (and largely carried out by the Wagner forces and their ex-convict auxiliaries).

That said, they have had a fair bit of time to dig in and prepare for defending the captured ground. Seems that the combination of dense minefields with good artillery cover is quite effective in slowing down Ukrainian advances at the front lines.

The writing is on the wall the Russians are losing the Artillery war

link

and that is their only real advantage. Their men and equipment is no great advantage and some of the Ukrainian armour from the West is more modern and capable.

Mines are one Russian hope to slow the war down, however it only really works when coverd. With weak armour and artuillery that advantage is beginning to reduce.

When it comes to covering the defensive minefields, artillery and good infantry might be more useful than tanks.

Ukrainians seem to have lately made Russian artillery (and ammo depots) a priority target. If they are succesful (and the numbers in that linked Forbes article are a bit small to estimate real trends), then it would truely become harder for the Russian military to hold their mine-covered defensive positions.

Also, since the Russian offensive tactics (after the very first months) have relied heavily on the use of artillery, losses in this area would also affect their ability to go again on a tactical offensive.

Based at least on what I've seen reported by commentators and supported by other sources like ISW. Maneuverer units remain small. Smaller than many CW wargames – at least for the Ukrainian's anecdotally multiple platoon-sized assaults, or up to company-sized for the main effort, along a relatively constrained front with minimal vehicle support – I'm guessing the finer details of assigned artillery support for these operations is something that will not be known until afterwards. The Ukrainian's clearly still have someway to go in terms of their ability to handle bigger combined operations but to be fair are also in a position that Russian artillery dominance and the availability of air support make large concentrations of men and vehicles a dicey prospect. Not sure what the Russian excuse is… but poor troop and officer quality must have something to do with it, as does the slow of erosion of that artillery dominance. In particular Russia also has a shell problem – probably a lot, lot worse than Ukraine's if you consider the quantities of ammunition expended in order to achieve the gains they made in the immediate post-invasion phase.

Based on what the Ukrainians are reporting Russian operations are pretty similar in size to Ukrainian ones but seem more variable in terms of vehicle support. The Russian's seem willing and able to still summon up "relatively large" vehicle concentrations for attacks. The VDV for example seemingly lost a good number of vehicles trying, and failing, to dislodge that small Ukrainian "bridgehead" a couple of weeks ago now.

Perun's update on the artillery war is worth a watch
YouTube link

Seems Russian tactical doctrine has not evolved much. Failing to use combined arms. With the heavy losses they have taken in both men & material over the year. Appears they are fighting more to WWI standards with a war of attrition.

The Ukrainains are doing pretty well all things considered, on the offensive albeit slow and deliberate. They need more of the promised US/NATO assets to really get rolling, IMO.