"Russian Tactical Doctrine (2022)" Topic
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Achtung Minen | 20 May 2022 8:23 a.m. PST |
I wanted to open a conversation about Russia's current tactical doctrine, particularly as it would be useful for wargamers. Surprisingly, I wasn't able to find many resources on this… there is a lot of high-level discussion about strategic doctrines and overall military design, but not many clear, comprehensive treatments of how Russian doctrine handles tactical matters. My personal interest is in the brigade down to battalion level. The best work I've found so far is the Opfor Smartbook from Lightning Press (which seems to be based largely in Soviet-era documents with some more modern commentary added). I'm working through that book now, but thought it would be useful to try and work through some things here. So far, I am gathering the following things: Origins Modern Russian tactical doctrine is an evolution of Soviet doctrine, filtered through the experiences in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia and now Ukraine. (The relevance of Soviet doctrine to contemporary Russian doctrine is partly why I am crossposting this thread in the Modern Discussion forum.) A smaller role is played by the incorporation of new technology, which surprisingly doesn't seem to have made an enormous impact on the doctrine (despite new technology being often described in public discourse as changing the nature of warfare). The Russian tactical doctrine is also a product of the waves of military reforms initiated by Putin in the 2000's. These reforms, among other things, were driven both by actual military experiences but also by demographic changes, financial considerations and other practical constraints facing a shrinking Russian army. Defining Characteristics In many ways, the Russian tactical doctrine seems to be a mirror of the US doctrine. Its defining characteristic seems to be the centralized command structure, which has ramifications across the entire tactical doctrine. This centralization is often criticized as the "weakness" of the Russian army, but it is helpful to think about the advantages of centralized command and why it is promoted by the architects of the Russian army. In short, centralized command allows the Russian army to (in theory) embark on grand operational maneuvers and maintain momentum. Speed and surprise are key features of Russian doctrine, and these are theoretically facilitated by a top-down command structure that can coordinate the various elements of a combined arms army and pour firepower onto concentration points, creating operational breakthroughs. Operational Style Operational aims in the Russian doctrine focus on major pieces of terrain, facilities, infrastructure, bridges and other important capture points in a relatively large theater of operation. In contrast to American theories on the fluid battlefield, which develops DURING an operation, the Russian approach develops the understanding of the changing battlefield (battlefield intelligence) BETWEEN operations (including between an attempt that failed due to poor intelligence and a new operation based on the revised battlefield intelligence of the former failed mission). Thus, operations focus on large-scale maneuvers and strategic targets and intelligence gathering is done prior to any operation. This larger operational and strategic-operational focus seems to be a distant descendent of the lessons of Operation Bagration and other large-scale grand battle experiences. An operation is under the command of a single commander, who controls both first echelon forces (the assault wave, often deployed on a relatively broad front and tasked with penetrating the enemy's tactical defenses) and the second echelon (exploitation forces deployed on an axis to break through any openings created by the initial assault). Failure with the first echelon means the second will not be committed (the army is not designed to build upon failure). Forces will be reconfigured and the overall commander will consider different missions. Flexibility Amidst Rigidity: Battle Drill and Mission/Task Organization As we see in the Battalion Tactical Groups, the Russian army is designed to facilitate ad hoc task organization: battle groups that are quickly assembled with a specific mission in mind. This is supported by the Russian emphasis on battle drill, which theoretically allows for a consistent set of tactical structures and assumptions and diminishes the need for large, standing formations that have long experience training together. The first advantage of an emphasis on battle drill is the Russian army's ability to quickly reform tactical units from damaged active units without needing pools of reserves. The second advantage is this allows for quick, mission-based reorganization and theoretically high levels of interoperability between disparate small unit formations without prior team training. The disadvantage of this approach is that battle drill can only really accommodate a fixed set of tactical assumptions that are based in generalizations, not in on-the-ground realities. It also discourages flexible decision making for subordinate commanders, as constituent units are really only trained to follow predictable patterns of engagement and orders. Again however, that is not a flaw, but rather the intended way the Russian army is designed to function (top-down, centralized command structure). The larger advantage of this setup (centralization, battle drill-based task organization) is that a single commander can quickly gather overwhelming firepower specific to the mission at hand. As we see in Ukraine, the BTG is frequently top-heavy with support troops. A typical BTG has as many artillery companies as it does fighting troops, and even then only two companies of mechanized infantry may be actually involved in the actual point-of-contact fighting. Lots of kit, few soldiers is the result of this doctrine and melds well with the demographic crisis facing the Russian army. Initial Conclusions The system I am using for modeling contemporary Russian doctrine is Panzer Korps and these reflections are mainly aimed at that ruleset. I think the best way to model these various doctrinal elements (against the more familiar, increasingly American-style command structure of the Ukrainian army) is to keep the decorated leaders of the Russian force group in the HQ formation, representing the still rather bloated command staff of the Russian army. This will allow the Russians to have a very high initial momentum and initiative, moving many different subordinate formations in concert. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, should distribute their decorated leaders more evenly among the actual fighting formations. This will penalize the Ukrainians with coordinating many formations and acting quickly, but it will give them a far higher resilience to combat losses and degradation. In comparison, the Russian frontline units will quickly deteriorate, as they will be largely unable to shed disorder markers. The Russian army will thus rely upon numbers (filling in fresh units when frontline battalions begin to stumble) and speed (hoping to overwhelm the Ukrainians before attrition sets in and the Russian formation lurches to a halt). The Ukrainians in contrast will rely upon flexible defenses, able to cede ground and weather the blows much better than their Russian counterparts. Counterattacks will be limited, however, as there will be fewer decorated leaders in the command staff. Organizationally, the Russian forces will generally be top-heavy in terms of support. They will have access to artillery out of proportion with the frontline fighting formations that will actually make contact with the enemy. The first wave (echelon) will need to gently feel out the Ukrainian defenders and the second wave will need to exploit parts of the line that have been softened by artillery and first echelon probing attacks. Towards this end, battalion tactical groups will need to be carefully customized for the different kinds of missions they play. Forward Russian forces will have recon, BMP-mounted infantry and potentially engineering assets. Second-wave units will have heavier compliments of tank companies, anti-tank vehicles (like the Shturm) and possibly BTR companies for holding ground. Supply continues to be a bugbear for the Russian forces. The army was already dependent on the domestic rail network and hasn't been doing well with wheeled supply columns in Ukraine (to the extent that there are serious doubts as to how far the Russians can actually penetrate into the interior of Ukraine, as they cannot function far from supply dumps at rail stations across the border). I would recommend limiting Russian supply companies, giving fewer such units and perhaps penalizing their movement speeds, particularly in the season of Rasputitsa/Bezdorizhzhya. These supply problems will further create entropy for Russian offensive operations. The prototypical attack should begin dramatically, with high levels of coordination and maneuver on the Russian side, with gradual but inevitable breakdown from the friction of contact with Ukrainian forces and inability to quickly resupply. Ukrainian forces should be coordinated and mobile on a much smaller scale (with counter attacks being pinpoint affairs rather than sweeping, highly orchestrated acts of grand battle), but the Ukrainians should be much better at quickly bouncing back and taking advantage of the loss of Russian momentum. In terms of rules adjustments, there should be a method for the Russian side to (during the course of the day segments) redeploy decorated leaders from the command staff to frontline formations (only a single leader at a time and only with a successful resupply to that formation). This represents the Russian need to occasionally send high level commanders to the frontlines to kick butts and get things moving again. It will also represent the propensity for high level Russian commanders to be eliminated during these dangerous frontline visits. Moreover, the Kontraktniki have demonstrated a habit of abandoning their tanks and heavy equipment when they run out of fuel and are forced to retreat. Thus, an out-of-supply Russian formation that is forced to withdraw should automatically lose support companies of appropriate types (tank companies and other heavy vehicles being the most likely candidates). |
SBminisguy | 20 May 2022 8:49 a.m. PST |
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Legion 4 | 20 May 2022 9:09 a.m. PST |
Good post Achtung. My 2 Cents – FWIW : Basically the Russian conscripts, leaders at all levels don't fight combined arms, are poorly trained, motivated, lead, very poorly supported logistically plus weak intel. I.e. Their C3 capabilities are at the level of fighting the last war(s). Their BTG has as much FA as it does Infantry and limited amount of actual MBTs. In most cases. The Ukrainians see the Russian weakness and use it to their advantage. In many ways, the Russian tactical doctrine seems to be a mirror of the US doctrine The US tactical doctrine is much more flexible and knows how to fight combined arms/the Air-Land Battle Doctrine. Assets are generally cross attached, with supporting fires from FA & CAS[this includes strike aircraft, drones and even gunships]. These assets work in concert to be very mobile and concentrating firepower efficiently and effectively. This seems to be way beyond the Russians' abilities at all levels. |
shadoe01 | 20 May 2022 9:18 a.m. PST |
Have you seen "The Russian Way of War" by Grau and Bartles, 2016? Here's a link: PDF link |
Achtung Minen | 20 May 2022 9:29 a.m. PST |
Just an initial reaction to a few of the above comments… I generally shy away from the narrative that the Russian army is incompetent and is generally "losing" the war in Ukraine. My sympathies are entirely with Ukraine, but it troubles me how strongly the latter narrative is pushed in the media (often by ex-Pentagon/US Army types) and how instrumental that narrative is to ensuring continued popular support in the US domestic sphere (and the larger allied sphere). I think Ukraine could win this war, but it would require a lot more foreign support than the billions already sent (mostly by the US). The Russian army, from my point of view, is functioning largely as designed. No army is as good as it is on paper, and no army has seamless integration of its component parts. The relative "weakness" of the Russian army seems to focus on losses that the Russian army is designed to absorb (and historically has done so with little problem). The US army is casualty-adverse. But note, the US army did recently lose a major, 20 year war in Afghanistan (against a rather primitive enemy that wasn't even superpower-backed) and nobody would say that is an indictment of how effective the US army is. What I think we should resist (as historical wargamers) is the crude idea that the Russian army lacks nuance or purposeful design or that it has no tactical doctrine whatsoever beyond WW1-style mass human waves. I don't think it honours the sacrifice of Ukrainians to downplay the tactical chops of the Russians and it certainly does not serve the kind of sober analysis of military history with which we should be involved. My goal in making this post is to start a different kind of conversation than the one you hear in the echo chamber of the media (which rarely goes beyond the superficial commentary that the Russian armed forces are incompetent, corrupt, mismanaged and risibly helpless). |
Achtung Minen | 20 May 2022 9:47 a.m. PST |
@shadoe01, no I hand't seen that, very useful! Thanks. |
UshCha | 20 May 2022 10:36 a.m. PST |
My concern is what Russian battle drills are in actuality. Like you we have been playing around to see what is going on. Now if you look at battle drills the dismounted infantry is in a relatively fixed formation. Now such as the NLAW allow the defenders to sperad out and still have the same density of fire close range antitank fire, to finish the last few hundred meters of the attack. How flexible is the battle drill. The Russians need to spread out close to twice the frontage to cover the same attacking force as they did before NLAW. That is near double the frontage of a company to attack a dug in platoon. That needs more flexibility at the bottom level, are tactical drills sufficiently flexible to allow this. Where would that order come from, there is as you say little if any flexibility at platoon or company level. Our own evaluations of Battle management systems, not yet available to the Ukraine's is that to exp[loit it requires even more flexibility, you know where they are no, but they won't be long there so the enemy can get well inside the enemy decision loop and often run rings round them. BTG's with vast artillery are great against stationary well understood targets. However BTG organizations seem very light on sophisticated surveillance systems. A flexible defender may be able to change position faster than surveillance can find and then respond,as its a very centralized command system. Even in Normandy the US were handicapped as any request for air support had to be cleared with London. The Brits allowed Junior officers to call in Taxi rank aircraft far quicker. Far more responsibility delegated down the command structure. |
ROUWetPatchBehindTheSofa | 20 May 2022 12:49 p.m. PST |
My concern is what Russian battle drills are in actuality. Which is $64 USDK question. Obviously the current publicly video evidence suffers from fairly horrible biases. But I don't think I've seen a video of the Russian army maneuvering or deployed in way that might be recognisable from the weighty technical tomb that shadoe linked to. Though equally on video evidence you might think the Ukrainian army is largely composed of pickets equipped with drones and AT weapons and a smart phone logged into a Twitter account. I'd also note that when considering Russian performance its not in a vacuum. Its clear at least anecdotally that the Ukrainian military has its own problems. Logistics, haphazard organisation particularly early on among the territorial and militia unit, less heavy equipment, strikes on their rear areas, and some evidence from the stories of foreign volunteers that at least at a local level there are tactical screw-ups going on. |
Legion 4 | 20 May 2022 1:36 p.m. PST |
I generally shy away from the narrative that the Russian army is incompetent and is generally "losing" the war in Ukraine. My sympathies are entirely with Ukraine, but it troubles me how strongly the latter narrative is pushed in the media (often by ex-Pentagon/US Army types) and how instrumental that narrative is to ensuring continued popular support in the US domestic sphere (and the larger allied sphere). I think Ukraine could win this war, but it would require a lot more foreign support than the billions already sent (mostly by the US). Well after over decade in the US Army Infantry if the Russians are not incompetent … well … I don't know what they are ? They certainly are not effective & efficient … As far as foreign support, this is a good opportunity to weaken the Russian forces to the point that they can't do this sort of thing again. Possibly get rid of Putin and some of his ilk. In the end make Russia less a threat. The Russian army, from my point of view, is functioning largely as designed. No army is as good as it is on paper, and no army has seamless integration of its component parts. The relative "weakness" of the Russian army seems to focus on losses that the Russian army is designed to absorb (and historically has done so with little problem). The US army is casualty-adverse. But note, the US army did recently lose a major, 20 year war in Afghanistan (against a rather primitive enemy that wasn't even superpower-backed) and nobody would say that is an indictment of how effective the US army is. If that is the way they are supposed to operate then they need to be retrained, etc. AFA seamless integration that is all part of the Combined Arms/Air-land Battle Doctrine. And yes the Army has to train to make it as close to "seamless" as possible. The US Army believes in initiative at the lowest tactical level. Seems the Russian doctrine is nothing like that. That is part of the reasons they are taking such high loses. Yes the Russian Army has a long history of take high losses. That is not how the casualty-adverse US Army operates. We use doctrine, tactics, combat multipliers, etc. to limit our losses and increase the enemies'. That is the way I was thought. And I'm pretty sure the Army still goes along with that technique.
The US Military's "loss" in A'stan was nothing like the ongoing Russian losses etc. that we see them suffering in the Ukraine. US losses in both A'stan or Vietnam was not because of lack of combat effectiveness overall. As again we see with the Russians in the Ukraine. The US fighting COIN in both of those nations is nothing like the modern Tank, Infantry, FA, etc., doctrine the Russians should be fighting now. What they are doing in not it … the kind of sober analysis of military history with which we should be involved. AFAIK my analysis of the Russian combat effectiveness, etc. is based on my study of history, training, experience, etc. We trained to fight the USSR/WP. Nothing that the Russian military is doing in the Ukraine is sound military doctrine, etc. We evaluate a unit/army how well they fight & win. I can imagine saying the Russians are fighting effectively ? Again A'stan & Vietnam were COIN, not modern mobile combined arms warfare. That most modern Armies try to fight. The Russian performance are no were close to that. But this debacle that Russia is suffering, can be said that is the way they fight? |
nsolomon99 | 20 May 2022 5:33 p.m. PST |
The Russians have a tactical doctrine … ?! Are you sure?! |
Legion 4 | 20 May 2022 5:53 p.m. PST |
👍👍 Yeah based on their performance … I'm not sure what or if their doctrine is. Does not seem to be a war winner … Now if you look at battle drills the dismounted infantry is in a relatively fixed formation. Now such as the NLAW allow the defenders to sperad out and still have the same density of fire close range antitank fire, to finish the last few hundred meters of the attack. How flexible is the battle drill. The Russians need to spread out close to twice the frontage to cover the same attacking force as they did before NLAW. Not just the NLAW but the Javelin which has a much longer range. So yes, the defender can spread out more. But they still have to stay in contact at least on the radio generally. You need to know generally where your other troops are. Again, it seems the Russian battle drill is poor to non-existent ? That is near double the frontage of a company to attack a dug in platoon. That needs more flexibility at the bottom level, are tactical drills sufficiently flexible to allow this. Where would that order come from, there is as you say little if any flexibility at platoon or company level. Seems the Russians regardless of the frontage they lack flexibility. And have to wait orders from at least a Bn Cdr (?). Or higher ? BTG's with vast artillery are great against stationary well understood targets. However BTG organizations seem very light on sophisticated surveillance systems. A flexible defender may be able to change position faster than surveillance can find and then respond,as its a very centralized command system. They have as much FA as they do Infantry in the BTGs, generally. Regardless, their C3 is lacking. The Russians don't get drones are part of the combined arms tm now. Their weakness in intel is another reason why the Ukraine is inflicting such heavy losses on them. |
ROUWetPatchBehindTheSofa | 21 May 2022 3:15 a.m. PST |
Incompetent is a rather subjective and perhaps emotive term for some. But is probably a handy shorthand for journalists who don't have the 'column inches' or knowledge to deconstruct whats really going on. Qualitatively we can say with some confidence that Russian logistics are struggling. Quantitatively we can say they are suffering disproportionate losses to supply vehicles. I think we can say with confidence that the Russian army's attempt to take Kyiv failed. Several elements of this coup de main seem to have gone very wrong indeed. Indeed ended in what can only be described as 'defeat'. Seems a similar pattern may have occurred around Kherson. Heavy Russian equipment losses. Plenty of crunchy open source evidence for those. Disproportionate, probably given the level of success exhibited by Russian attempts to advance. Some evidence they are appropriating civilian vehicles to try and stay mobile. BTG's – designed for a specific type and form of conflict. By and large a conventional invasion isn't it. I've also seen it said they don't cooperate well. Also potentially too few infantry to protect their armoured assets. Failure of the Russians to get air superiority or at least freedom of operation. At a more 'tactical level' there is plenty of video of the Russians engaging in company-scale road-bound vehicle advances with some supporting infantry. At least anecdotally, and the wreckage photos tend to bear it out, that the Russians did this early on as well to equal in-affect. I know mud is blamed for this 'behaviour'. But I've seen the same tactic in an urban setting using civilian vehicles (see equipment losses) to completely tragic effect. While much of it is anecdotal there is a clear thread running through this conflict that at least the aggregate ability of the typically Russian unit is poor. Morale is also reported to be low. There also seems to be discipline issues (putting it mildly). High losses among senior field officers is probably pretty good evidence that they are moving forward to get things moving as per the OP. Though we can't totally discount that the Russian's communications aren't heavily compromised and they may be being subjected to targeted attack. |
Tortorella | 21 May 2022 6:01 a.m. PST |
And this gets to a major point. No matter what doctrine is adopted, poorly trained and disciplined conscripts are not able to execute doctrine effectively, they cut and run, commit war crimes, fail to follow orders, go rogue, etc. We expected to see a professional Russian army getting results to match their reputation. At best they are a very mixed bag, it appears. We have seen significant evidence of lack of leadership and poor tactical performance as you say, ROU. It looks to me like you would need a lot of negative modifiers to field a Russian tabletop army, including low command ratings, low performance ratings for many units. Doctrine is not much on the minds of a lot of these guys, it seems. They take loses, then wait for artillery to flatten the objectives. My simplistic overview. |
shadoe01 | 21 May 2022 6:38 a.m. PST |
Doctrine is only one component to capability. We used to use the acronym, PRICIE, for these components. PRICIE stands for: P = Personnel, individual training and leadership R = R&D, operational research I = Infrastructure and organization C = Concepts, doctrine and collective training I = Information technology infrastructure E = Equipment, supplies and services Other countries have similar concepts. The US DoD has (or had – I don't know if this is still current): DOTMLPF = Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities. I like PRICIE because essentially it's the "cost" of a capability. However, if I recall correctly the DoD acronym is the order by which one could improve more easily capabilities (i.e., changing doctrine is easier than building new infrastructure or recruiting personnel). The point is that doctrine is just one component of capability. The US DOTMLPF does give a useful framework for evaluating Russian capabilities and how they might improve or not. Having read the references I don't think the problem is in their doctrine – although there is room for improvement there. The BTG organization could be improved but any reorganization would be constrained by other limitations. Specifically: 1) Material: They have lots of firepower assets but are short in some of the basics – as pointed out by the Perun video, "All Bling and no Basics". 2) Leadership: There's a long standing problem with military leaders being able to succeed in peacetime activities such as defending defence budgets, etc. but being totally inadequate for fighting wars (e.g., look at what Marshall did when he became chief of staff). In the case of the Russian army one would also have to include issues of corruption and the primacy of loyalty to Putin. 3) Personnel: Everyone, including Putin, knows this is an issue – enough said about that. 4) Facilities – I don't see Russia has a problem with enough facilities. In conclusion, for Russia to improve its military capabilities it has to tackle some of the more difficult components of capability – an imbalance in material, poor leadership and lack of personnel. These are problems that could take months to years to resolve. |
Legion 4 | 21 May 2022 7:31 a.m. PST |
ROU +1 Incompetent is a rather subjective and perhaps emotive term for some. Well again based on all my training & experience – incompetent is as good a term as any. We were always getting evaluated and evaluating. IMO … labelling the Russian military ops in the Ukraine, I can come up with no other word. One of the 4 Star GEN Ret. used the term "marginal" … OK that may be being generous. Qualitatively we can say with some confidence that Russian logistics are struggling. Quantitatively we can say they are suffering disproportionate losses to supply vehicles. Yes agree … but if I or any of my other officers were evaluating Russian Log functions would be hard pressed to call their performance incompetent or "marginal". I think we can say with confidence that the Russian army's attempt to take Kyiv failed. Several elements of this coup de main seem to have gone very wrong indeed. Indeed ended in what can only be described as 'defeat'. Seems a similar pattern may have occurred around Kherson. Yes, for whatever reasons, mostly Russian inability to fight modern warfare, they failed. Their 4 axes advances from DAY 1 gained little ground, at a high lose rate. What term works ? Incompetent or marginal … take your pick. Heavy Russian equipment losses. Plenty of crunchy open source evidence for those. Disproportionate, probably given the level of success exhibited by Russian attempts to advance. Exactly … again heavy losses for little gains. BTG's – designed for a specific type and form of conflict. By and large a conventional invasion isn't it. I've also seen it said they don't cooperate well. Also potentially too few infantry to protect their armoured assets. Agreed … they failed to understand the force they were about to attack. That is basically an intel failure across the board. Let there be no doubt the BTG could be effective with well trained, motivated, lead troops supported logistically. But yes, the US had intel failures before the Ardennes, in '44 and later in Korea in '50. But the US recovered and along with the allies eventually regained the initiative, counterattacked, inflicted high loses on the enemy, etc. The Russians barely had the initiative besides DAY 1. And their offensives gained little ground, took heavy losses, lose territory and never regained the initiative. They are trying to react to the Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians have the initiative and counterattack at every opportunity it appears. Failure of the Russians to get air superiority or at least freedom of operation. Agreed … they should have tried to gain air superiority DAY 1. That is normally how it is done. Their air force's performance is "marginal" at best. At a more 'tactical level' there is plenty of video of the Russians engaging in company-scale road-bound vehicle advances with some supporting infantry. And we see the results with burned out AFVs, dead Infantry, etc. And they never tried to change or modify their tactics, etc.. AFAIK. The Russian army, from my point of view, is functioning largely as designed. If so … calling them incompetent is generous, IMO. As I said I've been evaluated and evaluated other units often while on active duty. At least in this case the Russian failed in designing their military with the BTG. They lacked flexibility, and were literally "fighting the last war(s)" … IMO. is a clear thread running through this conflict that at least the aggregate ability of the typically Russian unit is poor. Morale is also reported to be low. There also seems to be discipline issues (putting it mildly). High losses among senior field officers is probably pretty good evidence that they are moving forward to get things moving as per the OP. Yes … that points to incompetence IMO and others. Though we can't totally discount that the Russian's communications aren't heavily compromised and they may be being subjected to targeted attack. Again their C3 is not very good it appears. And this gets to a major point. No matter what doctrine is adopted, poorly trained and disciplined conscripts are not able to execute doctrine effectively, they cut and run, commit war crimes, fail to follow orders, go rogue, etc. We expected to see a professional Russian army getting results to match their reputation. At best they are a very mixed bag, it appears. Tort +1 All good points … and seems very true to me and others. Again IMO points to incompetence … Shadoe 1 +1 Good post Doctrine means = 0 if it can't be effectively executed on the battlefield. For whatever reasons. The relative "weakness" of the Russian army seems to focus on losses that the Russian army is designed to absorb (and historically has done so with little problem). This is not WWII … Weapons today are much more deadly/effective, etc. From all my study/training on the Russian Army during the Cold War. As that is when I served/I was there. They were not planning on taking losses anywhere near what we see today. They were an Army of maneuver in concert with large amounts of firepower … We don't see anything like that now. |
shadoe01 | 21 May 2022 7:44 a.m. PST |
Now, it's interesting to look at the other side's capability and where it can be improved using the DOTMLPF framework. If one assume NATO's support then the Ukrainian military's main needs are: 1) Doctrinal improvements to make the best use of the non-Soviet type equipment they'll be receiving from NATO, but there's also a question mark if they have an adequate doctrine for large scale offensive operations. 2) Organization: Territorial units are good for defending their own terrain but not so for offensive operations. 3) Training – they will need training for new equipment and to make use of the large numbers of recruits / volunteers. Easy to train people as territorial defenders on an ATGM but that's not even close to large scale combined operations. 4) Material – a known issue being addressed by NATO, but this will take time., 5) Leadership – hard to evaluate the deficiencies here but no where near the Russian problem. 6) Personnel – lots of people but they need time to be trained. 7) Facilities – NATO can provide training facilities but operational facilities are all vulnerable to Russian attack. So….Ukraine's military capabilities are far easier to improve than Russia's given substantial NATO support. There's a big question mark as to how well they can conduct major offensive operations (i.e., beyond the limited counter attacks we've seen so far). |
soledad | 21 May 2022 8:15 a.m. PST |
The attacking force was mainly made up of contract soldiers. So calling them conscripts is incorrect. The Russians were mainly professional soldiers and they performed very badly. we should separate how a soldier is recrutited (conscript or "hired/professional") and the training he is given. If you have conscripts and give they good relevant training they will be excellent soldiers. If you have hired/professional soldiers and give them lousy training you get lousy soldiers. Russia have the latter, In my view it is the fault of the communist culture which is still in effect. People re not supposed to think or act, they are to follow orders. People who think are dangerous and initiative is frowned upon. This is why they have drills, so that people do not have to think. But drills only get you so far. You NEED initiative and people who think on their feet and take action. Russian discourages this. You can have all the doctrine you want or all the equipment you want or all the training in the world but it won't matter if you do not have personnel who can act in a confusing situation full of fog of war and friction. You will be behind in the OODA loop and lose every time. The old style soviet sledge hammer style worked against a worn out Wehrmacht in WWII but now days it does not. It worked then because Soviet in WWII could absorb incredible losses, losses in the millions. Now you cannot absorb those losses either in men or materiel. Corruption is also a major part that needs to be addressed. Again, if you have excellent doctrine and excellent soldiers but bad equipment due to corruption you are in trouble. Russia has a huge problem with corruption. Russia does not have the skill to plan a operation this big. The planning was abysmal and was planned on faulty intelligence and wishful thinking. Obviously it also did not trust the troops as many were told they were to execute a training mission. If you do not trust your troops you are in trouble. Russia has failed in every aspect possible. In my opinion Russia does not have the capability to wage war against anything other than small bands of irregulars like in Syria. |
Legion 4 | 21 May 2022 8:33 a.m. PST |
Shadoe & Soledad +1 Good posts & statements … So….Ukraine's military capabilities are far easier to improve than Russia's given substantial NATO support. Russia has failed in every aspect possible. In my opinion Russia does not have the capability to wage war against anything other than small bands of irregulars like in Syria. These facts are getting clearer everyday. Errata : Yes agree … but if I or any of my other officers were evaluating Russian Log functions would be hard pressed to call their performance incompetent or "marginal". That should read "hard pressed to NOT call their performance …"
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Achtung Minen | 21 May 2022 10:12 a.m. PST |
Again, my aim here is less to evaluate the Russian army's performance (there are copious other threads for that) but really rather to understand how it is designed to operate, particularly in terms that a wargamer can then apply. I.e., understanding their tactical doctrine and how battle drill drives their maneuvers and methods. For example, how does the Russian doctrine of echelonment of ground forces shape tactical maneuver and how do operational maneuver groups operate?. I am gathering that these do not seem to be well understood by us wargamers yet. |
soledad | 21 May 2022 12:27 p.m. PST |
From what I understand the BTG first of all need protection from local para military troops/militias. Units from the BTG will scout around and identify a target area. It will then be plastered with artillery from the BTG. Then the mech inf and tanks will roll in and take control of the physical ground after the artillery has worked it over quite good. Exactly how the mech inf and tanks operate I don't know. Most likely old standard Soviet mech inf bat attack with tank support. Nothing fancy I guess. Nothing advanced or subtle. Just roll forward until the target area is under the tracks of the tanks and IFVs. Several BTG can operate together but as far as I know they re not really designed for it, each BTG is pretty much self contained. |
UshCha | 21 May 2022 12:30 p.m. PST |
From my reading of cold war documentation of Russia from our side a Motor rifle group infantry attack is the infantry dismounted and attacking right next to the BMP's to allow the use of the BMP firepower. Further back BMP's hinders arc of fire. At least in that time the PC remains in the BMP and controls the infantry via an Infantry leader but he is not given much flexibility its all controlled from the BMP, the PC does not leave it, so he needs to be up front and vulnerable. Now cold war and the artillery ensures relative safety to a few hundred yards. More flexible defenders can now spread out, making much higher demands on supporting artillery and needs start to be further out. That makes it much harder for the Russians who think little of an NCO class and so do not train them. It must be born in mind the Russian defense budget is the same to twice that of the UK, and lets face it we are a small country. The UK would recognize we have no chance of taking over half of Ukraine. With that sort of funding something has to go with a massive army, training or equipment, especially if its mostly "professional" soldiers who are not cheap. The thing perhaps is look at is how Russia realistically thought within its budget constraints how it might perform if that ever came into their thinking. |
Joe Legan | 21 May 2022 12:47 p.m. PST |
Am, Nice thread. Not familiar with panzer corps just battlefront:). Your suggestions seem to make sense. They are centralized with poor logistics. It does appear there soldiers are poorly motivated. I suspect they are poorly trained as well or their losses wouldn't be as high. While they accept casualties they do so to achieve objectives. I don't see many objectives being achieved right now. Cheers Joe |
ROUWetPatchBehindTheSofa | 21 May 2022 1:53 p.m. PST |
It must be born in mind the Russian defense budget is the same to twice that of the UK, and lets face it we are a small country. The UK would recognize we have no chance of taking over half of Ukraine. Its worth remembering that out of that budget Russia supports a very large nuclear deterrent, air force, navy, and sundry technology programmes – many of which are status programmes with high costs. And may be up to 40% of that budget is subject to corruption! |
Legion 4 | 21 May 2022 5:49 p.m. PST |
rather to understand how it is designed to operate, particularly in terms that a wargamer can then apply. Well my thought is what rule system and unit sizes is the wargamer trying to simulate ? I'd take if it is BTG, we are talking about Bn sized forces. From a tactical game level that generally would be - 1 MBT Co., 3 Motor/Mech Cos 3 FA Btys Plus a Bn level HQ. How would they operate ? I'd think Motor/Mech Infantry would support the MBTs. There is 3 x as many Inf Cos. as Tank Co. The FA Btys would act in the classic form of prep fires, plus and/or supporting the maneuvering Inf & Tanks. The large amount of FA, which is a Russian predilection. With prep & supporting fires to suppress & destroy enemy units. Allowing the tanks & mounted Inf to rapidly overrun those units that the FA just fired on. Soledad & Ushcha +1 I think both your posts are generally accurate. The Russians are well known for working side by side with their BMP, etc. They are wedded to it, it seems. However, the BMP can't go everywhere. Like the US Mech the APCs/IFVs would be in support by fire positions to cover the dismounts. Then move to link up and support those dismounts. The thing about Mech/Motor Inf. You have to know when to dismount or not. If you dismount too soon, based on terrain & situation, you will lose your mobility. Plus a modicum of protection from shrapnel, some small arms, etc. If too late, your APC/IFV could become an easy target. Terrain masking, cover & concealment, etc. is critical. Otherwise, the enemy will get a two for one shot. KO'ing the AFV and killing the Infantry inside. E.g. we see many photos, etc. of BMPs with the turret blown off, extremely fire damaged = catastrophic destruction. If those troops were in those BMPs, BTRs, etc. most if not all were lost. As would be the crews. I know US Mech Infantry can operate in thick forests or jungles. Without being wedded to their track. And of course light units like the 101, 82d, etc., operate in that type of closed terrain as SOP. As I was with the 101 then 3 Mech Bns. So how well can the Russian Infantry operate without the fire support of their BMP/BTR, etc. in closed terrain ? Being wedded to their BMPs/BTRs/MTLBs, etc. May explain why we see so may AFVs destroyed a long a road. But again terrain & situation dictate everything. E.g. a road with muddy farmers' fields on both sides of that road. They may have modify how they operate in this situation ? Or should … But can they operate with their level of training/battle drill ? Can they use their FA properly to support both mounted & dismounted ops. They basically could have an FA bty in direct support of each Mech/Motor units ? With those mounted/dismounted Infantry in direct support of the 1 Tank Co. Or vis versa … |
Achtung Minen | 21 May 2022 8:01 p.m. PST |
Personally speaking, I am particularly interested in up to a brigade or even division in command (I am using Panzer Korps). So battalions are the individual maneuver elements on that scale. If you are interested in a set of rules that has you commanding several companies (basically, your command is a battalion, like in Battlefront WW2 for example), I would recommend this video to describe how the BTG operates (it is in German, but should be clear enough visually for anyone to understand): YouTube link I find his videos (Maj. Markus Reisner) are excellent, as his channel is being put out by an actual military academy (of the Austrian Army). A lot of Youtube analysis videos are quite suspect, but I trust that channel. Anyway, while his analysis is quite good, the focus down on the actual maneuver of individual companies is a bit too granular for me… I'm more interested how multiple BTGs are coordinated with combined arms assets in order to achieve operational missions. So I am looking for the operational art of the Russian army, you could say. For discussion on that, see for example: link |
Martin Rapier | 21 May 2022 11:24 p.m. PST |
"It must be born in mind the Russian defense budget is the same to twice that of the UK," No it isn't. In 2022 UK defence spending was 55Bn USD, whet eas Russia only spent 48Bn USD (World Population Review). Russia actually has very good doctrine for deep operations, breakthrough, fibua etc, but for some reason they have decided to completely ignore it in on the ground. |
soledad | 22 May 2022 12:03 a.m. PST |
Have they ignored doctrine or are they incapable of executing it ? The Thunder run against Kiev could have succeeded if everything in the Russian army had been better. So IMO they followed doctrine but were not good enough in any aspect to succeed. They used the same method in Afghanistan in 79 and in -68. It worked then (although just barely) |
Andy ONeill | 22 May 2022 4:19 a.m. PST |
If you wanted to game the invasion of ukraine I wouod think you model what the russians are doing. At a low level you have training, unit quality, unit morale and leadership quality. My guess. Maybe there are some russian units occasionally follow doctrine successfully. This doesn't seem common though. Maybe you Roll on all of those stats successfully and you get doctrinal tactics. Fail and you get what we see in videos. The army is corrupt and promotions aren't based on military ability. As a result you get low stats on most leaders. They spent the training budget on their house or car, so the units are low quality. The men know their leaders aren't so good, know they lack principles so they don't trust em. And the track record is poor. The morale is low. Lots of fails on those rolls. I can't see players queueing up to play russians. Their strengths are artillery/ missiles and air. Previous successes rely on blasting bua to rubble before walking in to the moonscape. |
soledad | 22 May 2022 5:51 a.m. PST |
Russia has always had great military thinkers and been good att developing doctrines often quite revolutionary ones. But they are abysmal att actually implementing them. Now they seem to have forgotten everything and gone back till how the red army acted in 1944, but not even close to that skill. So the 2022 red army is a pale lousy copy of the red army 1944… |
Achtung Minen | 22 May 2022 6:19 a.m. PST |
If you wanted to game the invasion of ukraine I wouod think you model what the russians are doing. At a low level you have training, unit quality, unit morale and leadership quality. That is exactly what I want to do. Moreover, I want to learn something about what is actually going on, something that media reporting can never represent but in entirely superficial ways. We'll have to wait a decade or more until we get the careful historical analysis, but I want to get a better understanding (to the extent one is able) right now. Modeling low quality troops, low morale and leadership etc. is already done. Check my other thread. Using Panzer Korps, I am rating Russians as a blue decision die and their troops as mainly conscripts and recruits (aka Kontraktniki). I am devaluing their logistics, limiting their deployment of military police outside of the Donbas (as evidence in Russian ground forces getting mobbed by civilians in the first few weeks… though in the Donbas, the paramilitaries have been playing this role) and restricting their decorated leadership to the HQ formation. What I want to know is: how do I design Russian operations? How do they understand grand battle strategy and operational art? It is doubtful, with all the limitations I am putting on them as described in the previous paragraph, that they will actually be able to pull off their theories of maneuver warfare. Nevertheless, I still want to be inside that decision circle and understand how to play the Russians (without the time and effort of learning Russian and sneaking into a Russian officer's academy and studying there undercover for years). Because it is a very good primer on the subject, and because some may have missed it initially, I'll again post this article to suggest the scope of tactical application and doctrine I have in mind: link |
ROUWetPatchBehindTheSofa | 22 May 2022 7:14 a.m. PST |
How do they understand grand battle strategy and operational art? Well that is the question but I'm not sure its answerable (at least at the moment). I think we lack a lot of evidence at the right scale. Its reasonably clear that the Russian army hasn't always done stuff by its own book over the last couple of decades, though I at least have of only heard of the examples where its gone wrong for them rather than right. Anecdotally the fact that on the small-scale (<company) we don't see the Russian army appearing to follow its own doctrines suggests that at higher levels they may not do either. At least one person on this forum has previously suggested that that Russian military exercises are, to paraphrase, more about 'style over substance' and I'd suggest if they aren't doing drills to learn then they aren't going to able to do it for real. At least for the Ukraine situation I'd bear in mind that their strategy may have been partly dictated by objectives that are not strictly military in nature. At least anecdotally we can be reasonably certain the following factors may have negatively impacted planning and initial operations at least for the opening phase of the invasion: time-scales, biased intelligence assessments (or just wrong), withholding of information due to perceived security risks, uncertainty around allied troop contribution (its not inconceivable that Belarus may have been supposed to play a more active role and there may have been some friction between Russian regular military and separatists etc), and unwillingness to use a lot of heavy preparatory firepower (or not have the inventory). I think I'd probably throw away the books and look at what they did in actuality. The opening phase of the invasion is now (recent) history and reasonably well documented in the media. Another difficult question is do the Russian military high command understand their army's shortcomings? Do their plans attempt to mitigate some of their issues or do they not acknowledge the at all? |
Legion 4 | 22 May 2022 8:35 a.m. PST |
Personally speaking, I am particularly interested in up to a brigade or even division in command (I am using Panzer Korps). So battalions are the individual maneuver elements on that scale. I see … I wish I had my old USSR US ARMY FMs. But even then they don't seem to follow much of those tactics and operations today. Again we saw that from DAY 1. I'm more interested how multiple BTGs are coordinated with combined arms assets in order to achieve operational missions. So I am looking for the operational art of the Russian army, you could say. It seems they are wedded to using BTG almost independently in many cases. Without supporting assets from higher levels of assets ? Have we seen multiple BTGs in coordinated attack operating and supporting each other ? Along with support from actual "Bde" or even "Div" assets ? As many of the modern[NATO] armies operate. I would think the Russians know how to and actually operate like a modern mobile Combined Arms army ? They must in some cases. But even if they e.g. understand combined arms can they execute them on the ground in actual battles ? Russia actually has very good doctrine for deep operations, breakthrough, fibua etc, but for some reason they have decided to completely ignore it in on the ground. Again they know how to do it on paper(?) but don't execute it in battle ? The war has shown that almost since DAY 1, it appears. So IMO they followed doctrine but were not good enough in any aspect to succeed. Agreed … Again that in evident. Their strengths are artillery/ missiles and air. Previous successes rely on blasting bua to rubble before walking in to the moonscape. That seems to be their de fact doctrine. And as we see, even when they failed in most cases in Ukraine. As we know Ukraine is not A'stan in both terrain & situation. The Muj are guerilla fighters. The Ukrainians fight modern tactics with AFVs, etc. What I want to know is: how do I design Russian operations? How do they understand grand battle strategy and operational art? It is doubtful, with all the limitations I am putting on them as described in the previous paragraph, that they will actually be able to pull off their theories of maneuver warfare. Nevertheless, I still want to be inside that decision circle and understand how to play the Russians (without the time and effort of learning Russian and sneaking into a Russian officer's academy and studying there undercover for years). That info in the level of detail must be out there to your satisfaction. I'd think ? I played a lot wargames starting in the '60s. From all eras and levels. Mostly WWII, all fronts & theaters. So I know what you are looking for … But don't know where you can find all that save for e.g. Ft. Benning Infantry School, etc.? |
shadoe01 | 22 May 2022 10:01 a.m. PST |
AM, Your question is one I have been wondering from the start. All of the tactical doctrine seems to be based on fully mobilized regiments, brigades and divisions. However, the Russians don't have that in Ukraine. They have the BTG. As I understand it the BTG is a force generation concept – i.e., how to make the greatest operational use of its active forces. I haven't really seen much that describes the operational use of a BTG other than its utility as a standalone force for a small contingency mission. We shouldn't confuse the BTG with the typical task group based on a battalion with cross-attachments of infantry / armour and regimental, brigade or even division supporting assets put under temporary command of a battalion HQ. The BTG are created from the active elements of regiments, brigades and divisions and arrive as integral units (i.e., the supporting assets in the BTG belong to the BTG and not to a higher level HQ. Looking at a typical Russian TO&E for regiments, brigades and divisions its clear that the BTG generated by these formations could only have much of its artillery, air defence, etc. by including most or all of those types of assets from these higher level formations. Without knowing the detailed readiness levels (i.e., active duty components) of these formations its hard to say precisely how much of these supporting assets are left over. So what happens when a lot of BTG are employed in an operation? They will need higher level HQ – brigade, division and CAA, but those higher level HQ will not have the same amount of supporting assets one would expect from the Russian doctrine. Therefore, each HQ is directing the BTG as an integral operational unit (i.e., these HQ may have limited abilities to re-assign supporting assets from one BTG to another – and that appears to be the case from reports of the amalgamation of depleted BTG that are resting/re-fitting). As noted there can't be as much support assets, such as artillery, at regimental, brigade and divisional levels – there can't be as these assets have been consumed to make up the BTG. That makes it very difficult for higher level HQ to switch firepower support from one area to another. Until there's some histories after the war this is guess work, but this is how I would game it. The BTG will have a lot of indirect firepower but about these same direct firepower as a infantry battalion with an attached tank company. Survivability is a bit trickier – at least that of an infantry battalion with a tank company but not a lot more since the supporting assets are very vulnerable without the infantry. At the higher level I would have far fewer supporting assets than one would expect from the doctrine. There'd be one HQ (whether formed from a brigade or division) to control 3-9 BTG. The next level would be army with assets like aviation, etc. The fighting in Donbas is probably more indicative of how the Russians are fighting with BTG. The advance on Kyiv almost seems like it was an administrative move that got ambushed; so it's probably not that interesting to game. At least that what seems to be happening from the information I've seen. |
Legion 4 | 22 May 2022 10:06 a.m. PST |
All good points … seems you can't understand larger ops without understanding what is going on the BTG level. Do the Russians even do Bde or above level ops as doctrine ? Have we seen it ? |
shadoe01 | 22 May 2022 10:54 a.m. PST |
AM, Another idea – from a gaming perspective – treat a BTG as an independent "brigade" composed of one infantry battalion (airborne or mech infantry and including integral tank support) and an indirect fire support battalion. The indirect fire support battalion can only be used to support the infantry battalion when the "brigade" is manoeuvring (i.e., when the BTG is employed to manoeuvre). If the BTG is to be used in a massed indirect firepower mission it should be static with the infantry battalion used for force protection. However, massed firepower missions should, of course, take a lot more time and be directed by the next higher level of command. Treat the next higher level HQ for these mini independent "brigades" as "army" HQ whether these are formed from actual division HQ or proper army HQ. Don't forget to reduce the available army level assets as this is the active component of the land forces and not a fully mobilized land forces. Then I think you might be able to apply the doctrine with the BTG as brigades and the next level as armies. That might give the right level of independence of the BTG and the challenges of coordinating the BTG since this removes regiment, brigade and division HQ between BTG and army HQ. |
Legion 4 | 22 May 2022 10:55 a.m. PST |
Does sound like a workable idea ! |
UshCha | 22 May 2022 2:40 p.m. PST |
One issue I don't understand is availability of reconnaissance assets. The BTG formations I have seen lack any attached recon. If it's all much higher up how is it task oriented to a particular BTG. Given the poor performance in many cases perhaps dissemination of information at BTG level is minimal. The BTG can send out scouts but that takes already low body count down and as recon requires best troops drops the overall performance in combat down. From my limited reading BTG's work well if much of the mundane is done by proxy forces, supply route protection and the basic foot sloggers. The BTG then supplies the pinpoint power in an attack. That does not work in Ukraine where much of the populace is hostile. Anotherissue to me if all the combat power is the BTG that does not seem ideal for supply route protection, proably why ukraine is hitting supply chains so well, too few troops protecting the logistics function. . |
Legion 4 | 22 May 2022 5:07 p.m. PST |
Don't know if the BTGs have any Recon elements ? Maybe some of the Infantry in the 3 Inf Cos. Do recon ? As you mentioned. A US Inf Bns only has one Scout Plt. The Infantry units routinely do their own local patrolling, etc. Supply route protection in the US Army, if any, is usually done by MPs or Infantry… In many situations the supply convoy is responsible for its own security. Don't know if that is how things are done with the BTGs ? |
UshCha | 23 May 2022 1:59 a.m. PST |
Legion, How do supply convoys in the US do convoy protection on long empty strecthes? This at least would give an idea of what resources would be needed in Ukraine |
Tortorella | 23 May 2022 4:50 a.m. PST |
This has been an excellent thread with really informative and insightful posts. Lots of experience here taking a professional approach. Much thanks to all, very helpful. |
StillSenneffe | 23 May 2022 4:53 a.m. PST |
Many of these questions are addressed in a 2017 book 'Russia's new ground forces', by Igor Sutyagin and Justin Bronk. Among many other well-researched points, they contend that Russian units would quickly hollow out in major combat because of shortcomings in the way the mix of contract soldiers and conscripts is arranged. Manageable in small scale expeditionary warfare like Syria- not so good for mounting large-scale aggression like against Ukraine. They also point to significant weaknesses in logistics. Soviets and Russians have always made great play of their expertise in operational level warfare, but there seems to be no evidence of such competence in Ukraine. It's hard to imagine a greater contrast between the sophisticated doctrine created in Russia's general staff academies, and the primitive incompetence their army displays in actual operations. One tiny extra bit of economic hardship that I am sure will hit Russia as a result of its aggression against Ukraine, will be that third world armies won't bother applying for places at Russian academies to study major operations, logistics, C3i or anything else. Whatever places used to cost before the invasion of Ukraine, the Russians won't be able to give them away now…… |
shadoe01 | 23 May 2022 8:55 a.m. PST |
@UshCha, Within the BTG's area of responsibility (BTG AoR), LoC protection would be the BTG's job. Outside the BTG AoR the responsibility would be dealt with by higher echelon command, who if the threat was great enough assign other BTG the task of LoC protection as their primary task. FYI – for a lower threat environment, when I was doing defence planning we used the following for LoC monitoring and LoC security for roads outside the BTG AoR: Monitoring = 1 recce coy / 300 km + 1 recce coy for critical junctions. Security = 1 mech inf coy / 100 km or per truck coy. Greater threats would require dedicated battalions if that greater threat was persistent but if not persistent then a reserve response force might be sufficient. Very much depends on the threat. For a lower threat environment, the troops-to-task @StillSenneffe, very likely a good book but I don't want to spend $50 USD for it when there's free stuff with much the same info online. |
Legion 4 | 23 May 2022 9:04 a.m. PST |
How do supply convoys in the US do convoy protection on long empty strecthes? This at least would give an idea of what resources would be needed in Ukraine The US Log system is based on the Field Trains, Combat Trains and "Push Package". Field Trains are about 20kms behind the front line forces. Is a large operation with all the Classes of Supply in the area. Local Security is pulled by some of the Support troops. But if the threat is large enough. Infantry and/or MPs could also add to the Security. The Trucks from the Field trains will run convoys back to the much large supply functions/dumps much further back from the front. The Combat Trains is 3-5 Kms behind the frontline units. This is a smaller unit consisting of high need classes of supply for almost instant resupply of forward units' Supply Sections. E.g. Ammo, fuel, water, food, some repair parts, medical supplies, etc. With even an Evac Ambulance to take some WIAs to a MASH type unit much further behind the lines. Helicopter medevac is on call. Cos. have a dedicated Medic Track[M113]also. The Push Package would come from the Combat Trains which is a Quick Resupply convoy with Ammo, Fuel, food/water, etc. to go directly to the forward units which have rapidly advanced. Pushing the front forward at least in sector. Log Resupply Points would be set up near the front line units. And the Co Supply Section would link up there and get the supplies to give to the units in the Co. Helicopter resupply is also an option based on terrain and situation. E.g. in the 101 in the jungle we were resupplied by UH-1s helicopters. If they couldn't land they'd push the resupply out of the bird hovering as close to the ground as possible. The USAF can drop resupply also. All Log units are expected to pull their own security. The US field Log system is an echeloned. Which advances as the frontline units do. Routes can be secured by MPs. In some case Infantry and even AFVs could be added to resupply convoys in some cases. Log units could turn some of the Cargo Trucks into Gun Trucks, sand bagging them & loading them up with the units' MG, M203s, etc. Note: each Bn has a Support Plt of Cargo and fuel Trucks. These are the "mules" of the resupply system. Running resupply or going back to pick up supplies. My Bn Support Plt was about 12-14 or so 2&1/2 and 5 Ton Cargo Trucks and 6-8 1200 gal fuel Trucks. Today they also have the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT). Which can carry 10 Short Tons. They were being issued in the last few months I was on Active Duty. You rarely would see a Push Package or convoy having to go very far based on the distance of the combat units penetration. Our resupply/Log units move as the front moves. I know how this Log system works as I ran it for my Mech Bn in the ROK and again later stateside with a Mech Bde. That was my duty assignment. This may be too difficult for the Russians to master. As it appears they have a very poor tactical performance. Their Log Support is not that much better. As I was told many times – Amateurs study Tactics … Professionals study logistics. Like many combat arms officers you would be both through out your career. |
StillSenneffe | 23 May 2022 11:27 a.m. PST |
Shadoe- please yourself re the book. My copy was free as a RUSI member- as have been quite a few other useful publications- the membership more or less pays for itself. Whether or not most of the content is on the internet- maybe some is. But these guys have done a lot of research in contemporary Russian language military publications, sifted and put into context. I can see though why people might be wary of spending money on Russian doctrinal material at the moment, because the reality is so far removed from all the hype of the last few years. If a Russian general can assemble a company and get it to the start line on approximately the right day, things are going well. If he manages (probably personally, carbine in hand) to actually get the company over the start line and heading vaguely towards the enemy- it's tea and medals all round. |
shadoe01 | 23 May 2022 11:43 a.m. PST |
@StillSenneffe, no doubt RUSI membership is worthwhile; and, yes, those guys do a ton of research. However, as I'm now retired with zero intentions of doing any contract work, professional memberships are a thing of the past. In that context, it would be a membership at 100 GBP (for online only) just to get the book. As for free stuff – the Institute for the Study of War has a number of publications on the Russian forces and it's free. Also, the "Russian Way of War" book (US Army and Doctrine Training Command) has parts on defensive and offensive operations from squad to brigade, which is what the OP had asked about, and it too is free. So, it depends on what the OP wants to do as to whether or not that information is sufficient. As for me, I won't be wargaming this conflict which is why I won't buy the RUSI book or pay for a membership. Still I find that a price for a kindle version about the same (5% reduction in price) as a paperback copy a little miserly. Yes, I know there's all the research, but still… |
UshCha | 24 May 2022 3:11 a.m. PST |
Shade 01, Legion, that's very informative, recon troops are very expensive and require lots of training. With LOT'S in 100k streches that's a lot of expensive troops. We have heard very little about russian recon assets which are crucial here. |
Legion 4 | 24 May 2022 6:32 a.m. PST |
Yes, as I said, only one Scout Plt/Bn. With the Infantry Cos. doing their own patrolling including recon, ambush and raid. On the DMZ in the ROK all Infantry Cos would do Squad sized patrolling. Plus our one Scout Plt. At times other Inf Bns would attach their Scouts to our Bn. To assist and get the experience. Again training & experience + good leadership is critical. Now at high levels there is aerial and even orbital assets. And now Recon Drones which should be a plus. SR-71s would fly along the ROK/North Korean border. To take recon photos etc. at times. Sometimes they'd even do a sonic boom to mess with the Norks. We would cheer when we heard that boom ! However, if your Scouts & Infantry are not well trained and/or experienced. You done have air/orbital assets doing recon. Well I think it seems the Russian military is a good example of how not to do things. From Recon to Log Support, etc. The Russian losses have far exceeded US/NATO losses with 20 years in A'stan. And even losses in Iraq. With the Russian's losses being incurred in 3 months or so. |
UshCha | 25 May 2022 1:41 a.m. PST |
So it looks like Russia really don't have much capability tp protect there GLOC in hostile territory. The Ukrainiens are good at ambush tactics helped now by longer range stuff soon like Switchblade and the Russians proably don't have good protection hence the huge logistical losses. Its not obvious how the Russians will deal with this other than contarct. Read recently DNR is cronscripting men with no training and putting them in the front line. This will not stabilied the front. They will be unwilling or rapidly die for no gain. Those sorts of losses may not be tolerable for long. They may have limited use in defence but in attack they would be hopeless. Our system would cope with this. Class tehem as poorly lead (perhaps even LD 8 the worst 9) , minimal radios and having bolt action rifles, they may have Automatics but an untrained guy will be no more effective as he will run out of ammo very quickly so rate of fire will fall very quickly. Once there heads are down they will not be poping up any time soon. |
Legion 4 | 25 May 2022 6:46 a.m. PST |
Yes, like everything else with their tactics/techniques the Russians can't protect their lines of supply & commo, effectively. The Ukrainians were trained by US, UK, etc. NATO forces since 2015. So, they know how to ambush & raid. Plus with drones this gives them a real powerful capability. As I and others have said before. The Russians are fighting a war of attrition. They are more than willing to take large losses in troops, equipment, etc. The will try to use the their firepower to inflict heavy losses on the Ukrainian forces. E.g. Russian missiles and or FA killed 87 Ukrainian troops yesterday, IIRC. The Ukraine Force with their superior tactical capabilities supported by NATO weapons. Will continue to attrite the Russians as well. Note: the Ukrainians don't have to go anywhere. They are home. The Russian are the invaders. E.g. Vietnam & A'stan … The Russians are bogged down with no other choice than to fight a war of attrition. They don't know how to do anything other option. Mobile maneuver warfare is not something they can do effectively or otherwise … From Military.com : link |
shadoe01 | 25 May 2022 7:29 a.m. PST |
I notice that what we're not seen is the standard echeloned attack by the Russians. In Soviet times the lead division of the first army would make contact. Once they came to a halt the 2nd echelon divisions would pile in. Once these were halted the 2nd echelon armies would move through. What we're seeing is 1st echelon BTG pushing on after achieving an objective or coming to a halt. There seem to be few occasions where there's a 2nd echelon BTG. Seems more like WWWI Western Front trench warfare than combined arms maneuver. Take Popasna as an example, they took the high ground and have slowly pushed forward on an expanding front. There does not appear to be an echeloned concept at play. However, I could be wrong as I'm not in the "need to know" loop for either Ukrainian or Russian military sitreps. LoL |
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