I ask the question of Russian's options going forward because that's where I see there is the possibility of movement. Unlike the Russian justification for the "special military operation" (hereafter called a "war" as a "rose by any other name would smell as sweet"), this really is an existential war.
I would suggest that as long as Ukraine is supplied with weapons and ammunition (and training) by NATO the existential threat to Ukraine has significantly receded. However, that does not mean it will be easy for Ukraine to regain its pre-24 February territory never mind Crimea and the entire Donbas. That alone should expose the justification for the invasion of an existential to Russia. Members of the UN must agree to not engage in aggressive war, which is probably the reason Putin raised the justification of "existential threat" so that the operation would be "defensive"; although that's a very thin argument to the point of invisibility. There was no imminent, existential threat to Russia. It was a hypothetical, potential future threat. Neither do I think the Ukraine was able to launch any kind of major attack into Russian territory that Russia could not have defeated – and such an attack by Ukraine would have entirely flipped the situation in terms of popular support. So, in my view a legalistic rationalization for what is an aggressive war. Note that the UN Charter does not say nations should avoid aggressive war unless they don't like the regime of another country. Regime change is seen as a possibility with the UN but only with approval of the Security Council. Yeah, yeah, I know – we seem to have forgotten this. It's time to remember it.
Since the situation with respect to the existential nature of this war is symmetric, it means that the greater freedom of political manoeuvre rests with Russia. For that one needs to look a Russian (or more specifically Putin's priorities. Here's a link to analysis on Putin's priorities and options by a Danish analyst, Anders Puck Nielsen:
YouTube link
In short, accepting "defeat" (i.e., a failure to achieve the major strategic aim for the war – not a "defeat" just as the Axis powers in WWII but more akin the US withdrawal from Vietnam) is a viable option for Russia. I believe at this point it's an imperative for Russia to get out of the war – and sooner than later. Why? Here's an Al Jazeera article on the defeats Russia has suffered militarily, economically and diplomatically:
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In this the diplomatic defeat of Sweden and Finland joining NATO is really significant. Here's the Caspian Report on Finland joining NATO (note this video was done prior the submission of applications by these two countries).
YouTube link
If the hypothetical possibility of Ukraine joining NATO was "existential" for Russa then what can one say of the not hypothetical possibility of Finland joining NATO. The Caspian Report is clear on the risk to Russian strategic capabilities in the Kola Peninsula as well as the implications of the Baltic becoming a NATO lake. Prior to the invasion I thought that NATO would find it difficult to defend the Baltic countries from a Russian invasion as they lacked operational and strategic depth. Sure the current Russian military has shown that they might not have succeeded but I'm sure NATO planners will find it far easier to come up with defensive plans for the region.
So, what does that mean? In this post I'm throwing mud on the wall to see what sticks, with a some support from some other analysts who I think have some interesting insights – note that while Nielsen is Western, Al Jazeera and the Caspian Report are not, so I think I'm not looking for echo chambers.
Okay…
There's a saying, "better the devil you know than the one you don't". I just might be that we can negotiate with a Putin that's pragmatic and, importantly, has done some serious, strategic re-thinking. The alternative might me an extreme nationalist. The strategic re-thinking is what I think is the critical part. Peter Zeihan has done a number of videos that I think are probably a good summary of Putin's long term strategy with respect to Putin's perceptions of Russian vulnerabilities:
YouTube link
Zeihan's analysis makes sense in terms of the history of invasions of Russia, Putin's remarks on a new, new world order, existential threats, etc.
With Finland soon to be part of NATO, despite the potential objections of some NATO countries, Putin will need a completely new strategy. I won't speculate on what that might be, but it will have to be one where there's a far lower degree of tension between Russia and NATO. Defending Russian northern flank in the context of a high degree of tension means bankruptcy even with the wealth of Russian natural resources. Note too that Finland and NATO will need to manage this carefully as well because the threat in the north comes far closer to the triggers for the use of nuclear weapons according to Russian doctrine than anything happening in Ukraine. Here's Perun's video on the potential Russian use of nuclear weapons.
YouTube link
Those are my thoughts – and those of a few others. There's some hope in there, so here's to some hope of a better world to come.
ETA: Here's John Mearsheimer at the Monk debates. I thought I'd add this in fairness, but I think there's several holes in his thinking. I'll let you decide for yourself.
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And the full Monk debate show you can hear both sides of the argument.
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Note that Mearsheimer's side started with an edge of 53%-47% but ended with a 37%-63% loss in the debate.
makes flight stands for 1/300 scale aircraft.
