"Rules ideas - ammunition depletion and resupply" Topic

Just posted some ideas for handling the risk of a unit depleting their ammo. Nothing wildly original and the principles might have been used in other rules over the years. You can find the blog post at

link

Nice idea, simple and easy to implement.

Its not clear on what historic basis you based this proability of running out of ammunition. If you were in a well orgaised army shurely ammunition expendidture would be monitored and remedial action taken before they ran out. Furthermore in a well orgaised army surely they would have stocked the troops in line with expected use to start with so running out would be less likely. If ammunition was running out would the troops attempt to conserve ammunition to maintain some fire reate even if reduced rather than run out completely/

Sounds good to keep a little hesitation or possibly bad supplies. I tried a fixed number of rounds a battery could fire but they knew how much they had left and could choose to fire or wait for better odds.

14that sounds like good tactical thinking on the battery commanders part not a problem with the rules.

What prompted me was a 7YW battle recreation and read the Prussians had low ammunition amounts. No one started in dire straight but blazing away wasn't a good idea.

Nice idea. I find that for eg Zulu War & Sudan giving the regulars a chance to run out and then having to resupply from a nearby waggon or baggage camel helps with play balance.

It's a nice system because it works well into the other player's self interest to implement.

"Hey, you rolled two sixes, isn't that unit low on ammo now?"

Or for resupply, the rolling player is the "other" player, that is the one with the parochial interest.

I understand the reason for rules like this. However, personally, I don't view it as a "chance" of all of a sudden running out of ammo coming as a big unexpected surprise to the unit but I'm sure there can be exceptions.

I've read many accounts of small unit sending guys on ammo runs. Squad Leaders should be keeping track of their ammo and dispersing it to make sure everyone has some. We even drilled this when tactical and firing blanks.

Running low on ammo would normally entail slowing the rate of fire or even pulling back. You would not wait until you are completely out. If you are in a static defensive position you have an ammo dump nearby which could get destroyed.

A platoon on a patrol by itself would have a limited amount of ammo and the chances of a resupply or ammo run could be slim. During VN there are quite a few accounts of small units being surrounded and all are KIA. I would imagine at a certain point they did run out of ammo but I doubt it came as a surprise.

Here is an example of a unit running low on ammo and their solution: link

Wolfhag

Wolfhag much better explanation.

I do recall I think in the Zulu wars brits got wiped out as the Admin side of the coloum woould not release ammo. Hoever this is an an exception to be played with very specific rules, a genral rule to coiver such eventsdoes not cteare a credible solutuion.

Thanks.

In small unit actions the platoon would send someone to the rear for an ammo run. There is always the chance he gets lost, killed or "drafted" into another unit.

At Guadalcanal John Basilone made several successful ammo runs to keeps his water cooled Browning's firing killing Japs along the way that had broken through. What if he got killed on his first run? How long would the guns have held out? Could it have changed the entire outcome of the battle?

This could be pretty simple to implement in a game with your opponent not knowing the outcome.

Wolfhag

Lots of documentaries from afghanistan back when it was about shooting show patrolling units running low on ammo. They withdrew.

The zulu war bullets thing.
One assumption was that the boxes were difficult to open which slowed ammo distribution.
That's mistaken.
The wooden ammo box had a lid which was held on by a screw.
In the field, you didn't unscrew that screw, you laid the box on it's side and whacked the edge with a rifle butt. Bam. Open. No hold up.
The problem at isandlwans was in going forward. They should have stayed put in close order.
And built defences as was standard procedure.
Even then it was the flank with the mainlh musket armed natives that folded.

Fun fact about isandlwana.
They would have had re inforcements but for chelmsford. What a berk.

"
The most egregious failure to respond occurred at around 1:30 pm when a message from Hamilton-Browne stating, "For God's sake come back, the camp is surrounded, and things I fear are going badly", was received by Lieutenant-Colonel Harness of the Royal Artillery and Major Black of the 2/24. They were leading the other four RA guns as well as two companies of the 2/24 and on their own initiative immediately marched back towards Isandlwana and had gone some two miles when they were ordered to return to Mangeni Falls by an aide sent by Chelmsford.[99]"
(Wiki)

Random is not an absolute condition, it is relative to the observer. It's also not a binary – things can be random without being sudden, abrupt, and large changes.

A single cannon running out of ammo should not be an abrupt surprise to the crew. A team of five cannons hitting a resupply snafu and not firing when expected may be a mild surprise to a commander, who is generally aware of ammo supply but not counting every shot for every gun. The commander should also be aware that snags and problems happen on occasion.

The above system gives a command level awareness of the probability of an interfering event happening, but not detailed knowledge of exactly when and where a failure will happen, if at all. This is very similar to the type of challenge an actual commander faces and was given the name "friction of war" by good ol' Uncle Carl.

I could see a unit that is expecting a resupply in X amount of time and keeping up a ROF so they would start to run low when the resupply arrives. However, the resupply does not show when expected and no communication from them if they ever will show up.

Which "above system" are you referring to?

Wolfhag

I was referring to the one in the OP.

There are all kinds of other things that can go wrong and cause a temporary suspension of fire from an artillery unit or a group of them – ammo load error (many), targeting problem (various), equipment failure (lots of options), key crewmember got food poisoning from the chow and throws up for a minute or two, and so on.

The question is what decisions you are trying to represent in your simulation. If you are trying to simulate an artillery crew dealing with problems, the failure tree you want for the unit should be modeled and tracked. If you are trying to represent the decisions of a commander leading multiple units of different type across a large battlefront, "That unit didn't fire. They seem to be having a problem. They will probably fix it soon (or whenever the design says)." is well represented by a die roll condition to go offline and one to come back online.

Thanks for the comments everyone. I should have made clear this is for my pike and shot rules, and specifically the British Civil Wars. Each turn represents 12 minutes of action. In the BCW musketeers carried around 14 to 16 pre measured shots if they used a bandolier. Plus some spare powder for priming. Musket balls were in a separate bag. Later in the war some troops carried pre-made paper cartridges. Some carried powder in a pouch or even a pocket!

Initial rates of fire would be around two or three shots a minute if battlefield drill was used rather than doing it by the book. By 1645 the NMA was using salvee fire as its primary firing tactic. So it would be entirely possible to use all the available powder in a single game turn. One method of resupply consisted of having additional bandoliers being filled from powder reserves and brought forward to resupply.

Powder was not always available in the amounts required and some fights went to close combat very quickly because of the risk of loosing a musket duel. My suggested rule is a quick and dirty method of introducing those factors in games set at a high command level.

To make it more interesting (or frustrating), throw in some chance rain and the possibility of ruining the powder available… ;-)

… or sawdust in the powder.

Wolfhag

The english Civila war was while my friend was alive a keen ECW player of some inyterest. Powder was often in short supply but that was a known, not a unknown, any sensible general would know this and take it into account. To model it a OK then Not OK seems to be not a quick and dirty option but one lacking any sensible basis and does not influence a generals thinking as he has no control over how or when shortages hit. Sensibly the general could enforece an engagement to terminate early after conserving shot or allow for re supply. Seems to me your system does not in any realistic way model the situation. Your own lasy post highlights the massaive discrepancey between your illogocal system and the real world,.

Ush Cha my original rule was very detailed and placed the players (as army commanders) into the shoes of a musket Sargent counting shots and arranging resupply. Play testers hated it.

I have been playing the role of a musketeer and a musket officer/nco as a re-enactor for over 30 years. Although, this has taught me absolutely nothing about real musket tactics but a huge amount about how quickly a block of Musketeers can burn through their powder supply in a very short time, and how to conserve stocks while keeping up a steady fire.

What I wanted to recreate in the rules was the situation an army commander finds themselves in where the general availability of ammunition is known but the pace of firing by individual units is out of their control. ECW battles don't have scope for detailed command and control even compared to warfare fifty years later. Generals knew the condition of their army at the start of a battle but had very little scope to significantly influence matters beyond committing reserves as they could only tell the big picture situation.

Elenderil, to be fair to you who were the play testers? If they were folk not keenly intereted in the history of the period and the tactics of the war then their appreciation of what was best will vary.

A mix of gamers and ECW re-enactors. The rule is intended to create a low ammo warning before the ammo actually runs out so a resupply run can be carried out. The possibility of rolling two six's on 3D6 is fairly low (5/72 or just under 7%). As there is no firm data on rates of resupply and only anecdotal evidence of powder states at the start of any ECW battles it's almost impossible to create a statistically valid model. If anyone has any better ideas l would be happy to take them on board.