"Could Napoleon have won the Peninsular War?" Topic

"Even in 1815 the allies refused to move against Napoleon until Britain paid their wages. If Britain did not have the money to pay the other nations to continue war against Napoleon, it would have been all over. It's a fact. Just accept it."

I would not agree. Russia did not need (or even use) English money in 1815. They did pay quite a bit to the Prussians – partly repaid by the British after the peace. Their "refusal" was not to move against Napoleon, but rather to include the British if they did not either send a large army or money.

From "Rites of Peace" by Adam Zamoyski, pages 462-463:
"[After reviewing the major powers joint pledge to provide 150,000 men each] …. While he bragged to Talleyrand that he would himself face Napoleon in battle, Alexander also flatly announced to Wellington that he could not make a move until British cash began to flow, and the plenipotentiaries of all the other powers which had volunteered troops took the same line. Wellington assured them that money would be found, and set about haggling with his government in London, which finally agreed to pay …. in lieu of its share of 150,000 extra men."
TMP link

British subsidies are better understood as indoor relief to manufacturers, who thereby got to supply weapons, uniforms and equipment to mainland countries with the bill paid by Britain. What better way to flout the Continental System than to sub your allies money to buy uniforms from you in which to fight the French? The sums weren't particularly material, although they were of course in a relatively hard currency that would have been useful.

The other advantage was that if you sided with France you got pillaged, whereas if you sided with Britain, you got helped. Predictably, this meant that eventually, everybody sided with Britain.

Don't forget that those opposing Boney did not fight with A teams either, a not so good British Army (compared to the Peninsular Armies of 1813/14) , at least that is what Clinton says, the Prussians equally poor in the midst of a reformation, mixed regiments, it was the leadership which decided the campaign, both in the operational art of war as well as on the battle field.

At the time, Napoleon didn't see Waterloo as a big deal and he was looking to regroup and keep fighting. It was some of his ministers who lost heart to save themselves who made him abdicate just like they made him abdicate in 1814. We've turned Waterloo into a decisive win with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight but if the Marshals had stayed with him, he could've rallied and kept fighting.

And the military view of Waterloo is mostly that Napoleon's 1815 campaign was brilliant with what he had at his disposal and but for a few miscalculations came close to being pulled off. Additionally, Waterloo itself is considered a fluke and that on any given Sunday, Napoleon rolls over the allies.

Anyone who thinks there exist hundreds of books on the Waterloo campaign because it was a bad campaign by a bad general with no chance of success is bereft of military analytical skills.

British subsidies are better understood as what they were, Britain paying other countries to do their fighting because they felt Napoleon was going to win

And it's a good thing they did because it ushered in the British Empire which was basically the most selfish drain on on other nations' resources ever and has left ongoing global problems of all sorts to this day.

Funny how Napoleon's influence ended after 1815. Funny thing for someone styled an antichrist by a certain segment of nutters.

Aus pas, my point was that 4th was saying that it was the Penisula that destroyed Napoleons A team, so I asked who was left if that was the case.

I didn't say it was a badly run campaign, I asked about the logic of 4ths characterization of the impact of the Peninsula. If the A team and the B team were already gone, which I infer from previous posts, then who was left for the French at Waterloo?

As for the hundreds of books on Waterloo, I think that's just a UK thing they have always done. I am still waiting for someone to write a decent, modern, readable narrative on Leipzig. It's a little like Waterloo for non British with way more soldiers.

Aus pas, my point was that 4th was saying that it was the Penisula that destroyed Napoleons A team, so I asked who was left if that was the case.

Yeah, he creates a lot of statistics to prove it all comes down to prove Napoleon was mediocre. Problem is there are 300,000 books on Napoleon and most armies studied Napoleon's campaigns and army for emulation for another century after Waterloo. Obviously, 4th Cuirassiers has stumbled onto the real facts that the experts couldn't figure out.

I didn't say it was a badly run campaign, I asked about the logic of 4ths characterization of the impact of the Peninsula. If the A team and the B team were already gone, which I infer from previous posts, then who was left for the French at Waterloo?

I was addressing Von Winterfelts comment. He seemed to suggest that Napoleon's plan was flawed. It wasn't but he had a few mishaps. The allies weren't under as much pressure to achieve a quick result like Napoleon was.

4th cuirassier isnt making any point besides the one I usually see that the French were lousy, Napoleon was lousy, the Prussians were lousy, the Austrians were lousy, the Dutch were lousy, the Spanish were lousy and hey, looks like the British are the only undefeated ubermensches! What a coincidence.

As for the hundreds of books on Waterloo, I think that's just a UK thing they have always done. I am still waiting for someone to write a decent, modern, readable narrative on Leipzig. It's a little like Waterloo for non British with way more soldiers.

I dont mind the many books on Waterloo; I like the campaign. It is a bit a UK thing but it was still a great campaign and one that Napoleon really should've pulled off.

I suppose some people think the books are all about the "British" victory repeating gumby like over and over that the allies won. But the real reason military enthusiasts like the campaign is the fact that all three players stuck to their strengths. Aside from the accounts of the events, and the masterful campaign strategy by Napoleon, there are the "what ifs" which are stimulating.

The issue here is the concept that Waterloo was definitely the end for Napoleon.If anyone couldve rallied from that, he could. Problem was his advisers wouldnt have it.

Have you looked at 1813 Leipzig: Napoleon and the Battle of the Nations by Digby Smith?

"someone styled an antichrist by a certain segment of nutters"
Nutters like the devout Christians in Iberia and Russia who saw their countries invaded and their lands and churches ravaged by "foraging" ? Those "nutters" ?

Ethnically and culturally, I am at least 1/2 French – and not too religious. And a modern. I "know" Napoléon was not the anti-christ. I admire his generalship and much of his domestic statecraft. But from the right lips, in the right era, the epithet "anti-christ" is completely understandable.

==================

"Napoleon's [1815] plan was flawed"
It was : insufficient number of troops, insufficient industrial capacity, insufficient national consensus, insufficient logistics, not enough cavalry, little cash money, no allies (forced or otherwise), blockaded coasts, etc., etc.

The best Napoléon could hope for : big win win against Wellington and the Prussians, leading to Austria attempting to be neutral and not have their state partitioned by Russia and Prussia. That would leave 1 Prussian and 2 Russian "armies" in the field, vs. the surviving French on the strategic defensive, likely meeting somewhere east of the Rhine in the winter of 1815/1816. For "the best possible" result, that is pretty meagre – because Russia and Prussia could easily send another 3 "armies" for summer 1816. The Russians alone had in 1815 over 600,000 standing, regular, trained, mostly veteran infantry – without any war surge. And they were at peace with all their other potential adversaries (Turkey, Persia, Caucasians, Finns, Swedes).

The nature of warfare had changed : Napoléon's operational art could no longer overcome mass, increasingly industrialized armies embued with "national" aspirations, acting over thousands of kilometers.
Napoléon's era was over.

@ Tortorella

The French army that went into Spain in 1808 and stayed there was the bulk of the A team from Austerlitz, Jena etc. As it stayed there, the army assembled for 1809 was a new, comparatively inexperienced B team, which remained in existence until largely destroyed in 1812. The replacements of 1813 were then in effect the C team. In each case, there were armies in two theatres simultaneously. In 1815 there weren't, and hence the troops under Napoleon's hand was whatever he could assemble from what was left of the A, B and C teams of 1808 to 1814.

The average quality of 1815 was certainly inferior to what went into Spain, but that army was repeatedly beaten there by Wellington. Thus the attempts one occasionally sees to argue that Wellington would not have fared as well in 1815 against Napoleon's best troops overlooks the fact that we don't have to speculate how he'd have done. He met and defeated them in Spain then drove them back into France.

Wellington's own 1815 army was itself of indifferent quality, however, containing a majority of allied troops and of second or otherwise weak battalions among the British and KGL. Not only did this army present him with the usual problems of managing a coalition, not to mention serious supply headaches with incompatible ammunition, etc, but worse, the majority of these allies had themselves until quite recently been French allies. This made them politically as opposed to militarily doubtful, a concern shared by their own rulers / leaders.

The Prussian army of 1815 was likewise their own B or C team and likewise contained units recruited from pro-French regions. After mutiny in the Saxon V Corps the whole lot were sent home, and of the four Corps left, Prussia still had a large number of Landwehr, some from places like Westphalia and subject to the same sort of concern as Saxons and Dutch Belgians. The Prussians also brought no heavy cavalry in 1815 (Prussian dragoons were light cavalry). Why they thought it was a good idea to pit three quarters of this army against Napoleon at Ligny we can only imagine, but possibly it was because they expected the hard cover and the water obstacles to negate some of the French quality advantages.

So you had a French B-ish team opposing two allied armies that were the B/C teams. Hence any argument about troop quality disadvantage as the explanation for French defeat doesn't really work, because the other two armies had it worse.

The British A Team was sent to New Orleans where it got its butt handed to it by Andy Jackson.

Well, I guess this sounds right 4th, and in any case I defer to your obvious expertise on troop quality.

I read Digby Smith and Nafzigger (spelling?) on Leipzig. I could not get through the later, full of detail but not exactly lively. Digby has personal accounts, but still not quite zippy.
I am thinking along the lines of Barbero's The Battle. My most recent Waterloo read, where the story just comes alive.
Has anyone read Micheal Leggiere? This seems to be the most recent account of 1813. Two volumes, not cheap.

Murvihill
Rather small 'A Team'?

Murvihill

The British A Team was sent to New Orleans where it got its butt handed to it by Andy Jackson.

Care to relate the huge context in that defeat? Be honest! it was an assault on a reinforced position and not a battle in its 'formal' context. The British leadership was not very stellar. The British troops though(what there was of them), performed as well as they had always done.

Care to relate the huge context in that defeat? Be honest! it was an assault on a reinforced position and not a battle in its 'formal' context. The British leadership was not very stellar. The British troops though(what there was of them), performed as well as they had always done.

It wasn't a battle? I hope you know that sieges and assaults on works are battles. I mean, not in the "wargamey" sense of the word as coined by one of the local celebrities but in the sense of military history.

I do love how the same set who think it's their duty to foul up every thread about Napoleon with inexplicably sophomoric and rabid sentiments suddenly become concerned when an American points out that Wellington's army got battered at New Orleans.

The term, "hoisted by his own petard" comes to mind.

'Wellington's army' did not get battered at New Orleans, but some of the troops (not all, since there were no Portuguese or Spanish present) whom he had commanded in the Peninsula were defeated there when led by Edward Pakenham.

Wellington's leadership was a crucial element of the successes of the Anglo-Portuguese army in the Peninsula and of the Allied army in the Waterloo campaign. Without his presence, Britain was not really fielding its A Team.

To get back to the question in the OP, the simple answer is no, Napoleon could not have won the Peninsular War, because if he could have, obviously he would have returned to Spain and done so.

That he did not indicates that he expected to be defeated there, whether or not he was present himself.

To get back to the question in the OP, the simple answer is no, Napoleon could not have won the Peninsular War, because if he could have, obviously he would have returned to Spain and done so.

The fact that he lost is proof that he never could have won?
This point is very reminiscent of the tea party in "Through the Looking Glass".

That he did not indicates that he expected to be defeated there, whether or not he was present himself.

This is brilliant! Oh, except one problem. There is nothing to indicate that Napoleon was afraid of a gamble. Quite the opposite, he seems to have had a taste for extreme risk.

Not obvious to me. A little confusing, if he returned to Spain, he would have lost whether he was present or not?

But if Napoleon had returned with his best troops and made it a primary theater of war, Would this not spell big trouble for Wellington? . I think that is a reasonable argument to make, per the original post. Imagine the Russian invasion postponed as Napoleon decides to deal with the attrition and end the debilitating "ulcer" once and for all. He heads to Spain instead of Russia with a massive force, Wellington vastly outnumbered against a still masterful opponent.

This seems more like what the OP was speculating about. Again,I do not know much about the British army in Spain, except that Wellington and Sharpe are heroes who spend years there. So please forgive my ignorance.

A Question that still hasn't been answered or speculated upon much is why Napoleon didn't go to the Peninsula and sort out the 'Sepoy General' As he so famously dubbed the Duke.

Just to gloat. The last thing that Nappy saw in the Peninsula before he ******ed off back to France, was the Smashing of his Bodyguard. He got a taste of what he was up against, and ****ed off. Similar to the habit he had when things he observed went ***s-up.

Napoleon hated this…'Sepoy General' Accused him of exiling him, and he also had it in his noggin that the 'Sepoy General' wanted him executed (something The Duke did not want, which saved the ogres neck). In contrast, the Duke did not hate Napoleon, and his wartime/post-war attitude towards the ex-Emperor, was exemplary in both praise and criticism.

So If Napoleon hated and dismissed (post-war ravings aside) the Duke so much, why didn't he just go and 'swat' the "Sepoy General" away? Methinks he saw something in the Duke and his army that disturbed him

The French army in the Peninsula fought pretty well. But the same old trait that the British soldier had was, as usual, superior on the battlefield. Which it seems, the fawners of Nappy's hoards find hard to come to terms with. Thus we see 'almost' all the rhetoric, sour-grapes (disguised jealousy) and dismissal emanating from that side of the discussion.

Au pas de Charge

"not a battle in its 'formal' context" Is not stating that it wasn't a battle. Read and stop spinning.

Wellington's army got battered at New Orleans.

That's more rubbish.

The term, "hoisted by his own petard" comes to mind.

Yup! How high did you get?

I do love how the same set who think it's their duty to foul up every thread about Napoleon with inexplicably sophomoric and rabid sentiments

Kettle and black comes to mind.

But if Napoleon had returned with his best troops and made it a primary theater of war…

His best troops were already in this theatre of war. The Grande Armee of 1805-7, minus Davout's Corps and some of the Guard, was largely the force that fought the Peninsular War. He probably couldn't send any more, since that would have left Central Europe and France open to any of Austria, Prussia and/or Russia switching sides and overrunning the Empire before he could do anything about it.

Imagine the Russian invasion postponed as Napoleon decides to deal with the attrition and end the debilitating "ulcer" once and for all. He heads to Spain instead of Russia with a massive force, Wellington vastly outnumbered against a still masterful opponent.

We already know what would have happened. Wellington would have retreated behind the Lines of Torres Vedras. Assuming Napoleon decided to incur the losses in marching the entirety of the Imperial forces to the Tagus and then accept the losses in forcing the lines, Wellington would have re-embarked and then re-based out of Cadiz, Gibraltar, Corunna or Valencia. Meanwhile Russia and Prussia and probably Austria would have flipped and been in Paris whilst Napoleon's huge army was starving itself in Western Portugal.

Unless Napoleon took contingents of Austrian and Prussian soldiers (or hostages?) as part of his Army, as he did in 1812. Maybe.

To add to Whirlwind's comments, yes, Napoleon would have been playing whack-a-mole. From the French border to Torres Vedras is 1,250km or 775 miles, which is the same as the distance between Warsaw and Moscow. In the best case Napoleon drives Wellington back to TV, at which point Wellington embarks his army and re-invades, via Murcia. Or Barcelona. Or Bilbao. Anywhere, really; with strategic surprise each time.

If it was as easy to win in Spain as returning there in person, why didn't he?

Napoleon's strategy to achieve victory in Spain was to invade Russia.

So, Wellington simply retires more or less unscathed with his army to TV? Nothing goes wrong for him at any point and he suddenly reappears at will to defeat Napoleon? . It's not that you don't make good points, but you are absolute in your convictions

Have you guys read Lieven or Rothenburg on the Austrian and Russian impact on these wars?

I did not say nor even imply it would be easy to subdue Spain. Unlikely perhaps that Napoleon would focus on it.

I will say that "we already know what would have happened" pretty much ends this discussion.

@ Tortorella

It's a matter of looking at what actually did happen and, based on that, projecting what would have happened.

We can say with confidence that a full-blown French invasion or reinvasion of Spain would have failed, because we can read across from what happened when Napoleon attempted something similar in Russia, and indeed from when Massena attempted to take Lisbon in 1810. The distances and size of theatre were if anything greater in Spain than Russia – Lisbon's as far from France as Moscow is from Warsaw. And the initial weather conditions were similar. 3 or 400,000 French invading Spain would have meant maybe 80,000 arriving at Torres Vedras, where they'd starve, as they did in 1810.

Meanwhile, we can infer that the British would have played whack-a-mole because that's what they did. They landed in Portugal in 1807, defeated the French, captured their army and forced the liberation and evacuation of Portugal. Napoleon then reinvades, so the British re-embark from Portugal and invade Spain, via Corunna, instead. Napoleon goes haring off after them, but realises he'll never catch up, so he heads off to France so somebody else can own the failure. Meanwhile Moore hands the French a pasting as he re-embarks in January 1809. A few months later in 1809, the British land in Portugal again. And so it goes on.

In fact, not only are they back in Portugal in 1809, they're back in north-west Europe as well, invading Walcheren. Some of the troops who fought in Spain in 1807 had been at Maida in 1806, when British troops invaded southern Italy and trashed all the French preparations for invading Sicily. Walcheren was a fiasco, and Calabria was a raid, but both along with Spain should have been an object lesson to Napoleon that if you control the sea, your army – however small – can turn up in unexpected places where it's the only army. Had Britain evacuated Portugal again in 1809, they needn't even have limited themselves to invading Spain. Knowing the whole French army was there, they could have invaded, oh, southern Italy.

Nothing above is conjecture – it's extrapolation from what actually happened.

So why didn't Napoleon intervene and change the game? The only sensible answer is that he knew he couldn't win. He had three full years in which to do so. I'm sure someone has scoffed above that he'd have smashed Wellington and his pathetic little army in weeks. So it's not like he didn't have time. If he could have won, he would have gone back and done so – unless we perversely assume that he didn't return because victory was somehow worse than defeat. The only rational conclusion is that he didn't return because defeat was a certainty in any event.

Going back to first principles, he invaded to put puppets on the Iberian thrones and to close its coasts to British trade. This was the only way he could think of post-Trafalgar to defeat Britain. Unfortunately the Continental System leaked like a sieve from the east as well, so he invaded Russia to plug that leak. Had that succeeded, he would have had armies in both areas where it was leaking.

So yes, incredible as it seems, Napoleon's strategy to rescue the invasion of Spain was in fact to invade Russia.

@4th Cuirassier,

And to be fair to Napoleon, he seems to have grasped some of this quite quickly, as soon as Moore escaped his clutches in 1808. We can then see the 1809 period as Napoleon hoping that his Peninsular armies being able to deal with the Spanish and the British within his existing commitment; we can see 1810-11 as Napoleon's all-out effort to achieve the same. After the failure of Massena, Soult and Victor's various efforts, he then not unreasonably cast around for an alternative strategy for 1812.

As long as we are speculating, I think Napoleon simply underestimated Spain. In 1809, he faced a large, well led Austrian army that beat him at Aspern Essling and gave him a very hard time at Wagram. Yet there is no English biography of Archduke Charles. Rothenberg will give you some idea of how hard the Austrians fought.

Napoleon always had bigger fish to fry, I believe, and I think that is how he saw things. You simply cannot compare the stakes, scope and impact of Wagram, Borodino, Leipzig to Spain. Any attempt to tackle Spain would have left him open to attack from far larger armies in Europe during much of the period. And he was not a field general, he governed his entire country. A busy man with priorities, he hoped Spain would go away. But it appears that you are suggesting that it drove his decisions in some cases. And I disagree.

I meant that Napoleon was not just a field commander, dealing with a single campaign, he was also a head of state. Nor am I trying to minimize the importance of the Peninsula in wearing wearing down his resources. Britain's role was vital.

And he was not a field general, he governed his entire country. A busy man with priorities, he hoped Spain would go away. But it appears that you are suggesting that it drove his decisions in some cases. And I disagree.

This argument can never, ever be made to work. To make it work, one would have to show why it was okay for Napoleon to go to Spain in late 1808, why he left at the beginning of 1809, and why he didn't return after Wagram.

The argument that he didn't think it important enough to go cannot be sustained – because he actually went.
The argument that he he didn't think it important in general cannot be sustained – he sent vast resources to Spain over several years and kept them there.
The argument that he had no opportunity to go cannot be sustained – because he had nearly 3 years in which to go (and longer really, because he opened up hostilities again in Eastern Europe in 1812, not the other way around).
And the argument that Britain was not driving his strategic decisions cannot be sustained: he explicitly made war on to enforce the Continental System against Britain (he had done the same against Portugal). The failure of his 1807-11 'Iberian' policy persuaded him to go to war in the East to enforce the Continental blockade. Incidentally, this also explains why withdrawal from Spain and Portugal was never an option either: it would have meant abandoning the Continental System.

In 1809, he faced a large, well led Austrian army that beat him at Aspern Essling and gave him a very hard time at Wagram. Yet there is no English biography of Archduke Charles. Rothenberg will give you some idea of how hard the Austrians fought.

There are plenty of Anglophone books which make this point, not just Rothenberg. The courage and toughness of the Austrians isn't really in question. It is a pity there is no biography of Archduke Charles and AFAIK his treatise on war has never been translated. On the other hand, 'Napoleon and the Archduke Charles' has been around for over 100 years.

'Russia Against Napoleon' is a good treatment of the subject and 'Thunder on the Danube' is a pretty impressive treatment of 1809 as well. What leaps out of the latter is the pervasive mediocrity of the Austrian command. Austria stood no chance of winning given the quality and competence of the formation commanders, the commissariat, and the general direction of the war. Instead of focusing on the enemy's main strength and destroying it, they ran a campaign based on dispersal of their forces into Poland, Italy and elsewhere.

The question that hangs over 1809 is whether that campaign would have been attempted had the cream of the Grande Armee not been tied down in Spain. How does it go with another 250,000 French veterans in southern Germany? And with 1812 likewise; how were the Russians going to get Napoleon to march on Moscow so he could be destroyed? What was the strategic imperative that forced him to do that?

I do sense that the problem with Spain is the British, and especially British troops doing that thing they keep doing of being on the winning side. There is a peculiar point of view, frequently aired here, that they contributed nothing of value wherever they deployed. Presumably, in this view of the world, Spain would have liberated itself between 1808 and 1814 by losing even more pitched battles to the French, and Napoleon would have become so exhausted by his endless victories over the Prussians in 1815 that he'd have abdicated even without Waterloo. The problem with this rather eccentric perspective is that if it's accurate, why did Britain or her allies think it worthwhile at the time for her to field armies at all? Why knock yourself out and spend the money, when you can just wait for the Austrians, Russians and Prussians to repeat their epic victories of 1805-7? Who needs Wellington commanding the allied armies in 1815 when you've got figures with the judgment of Ziethen or Gneisenau who could have done a better job?

I do sense that the problem with Spain is the British, and especially British troops doing that thing they keep doing of being on the winning side.

I understand that even when they try to lose, they end up winning; it's uncanny!

There is a peculiar point of view, frequently aired here, that they contributed nothing of value wherever they deployed.

I've never seen this said. I have seen pro British posters work themselves into a lather when anyone suggests that they werent 100% the cause for defeating Napoleon.

Frankly, I see a lot of the continental European posters put up with nasty comments along the lines of the Prussian soldiers were crap, the Spanish were crap, the Austrians were crap. My suggestion is that if people are hypersensitive about nationalistic slurs, they shouldn't engage in them either.

Case in point:

Spain would have liberated itself between 1808 and 1814 by losing even more pitched battles to the French, and Napoleon would have become so exhausted by his endless victories over the Prussians in 1815 that he'd have abdicated even without Waterloo.

This is offensive on its face. No serious military historian would say that the British could've ultimately won in the Peninsula without Spanish involvement. Your own standard of not being "wargamey" (remember that metric you invented?) and judging everything by the results of pitched battles gets violated by you over and over.

The problem with this rather eccentric perspective is that if it's accurate, why did Britain or her allies think it worthwhile at the time for her to field armies at all? Why knock yourself out and spend the money, when you can just wait for the Austrians, Russians and Prussians to repeat their epic victories of 1805-7?

Unbelievable…

I mean, the Allies were facing one of the greatest generals in history. Part of the reason Britain spent time, effort, men and above all money is because, at the time, they were terrified that Napoleon was going to win.

Well I still don't see exactly how some of these points connect with such exact certainty, and I am not entirely convinced, but that's okay.

I would hardly call Charles mediocre, but the Austrian high command was a problem, as were the corps commanders for the most part.

I have repeatedly referred to the importance of Britain on this and the related thread. The RN alone was a major factor and began a historic tradition of world dominance that lasted a century. Spain, financing the wars, all critical. Nothing of value? No way.

@ Tortorella

Agree re Charles. When I speak of mediocrity, it's the formation commanders and the strategic leadership to which I'm referring, not to Charles. Charles was the army commander sandwiched between trying to implement his superiors' feeble strategy, and subordinates who also weren't tactically proficient.

Wagram is an interesting example of how at certain points in history, forces can grow to a size where they become unmanageable given the CCC technology of the day. One thinks of WW1 admirals trying to control dreadnought fleets with signal flags read through telescopes, but the scale of Wagram is another example. With 140,000 men on a 12-mile front, the battle was simply impossible for Charles to control with the sort of timing necessary. Napoleon had it slightly better, with 180,000 men on a ten-mile front and internal lines, but these battles feel like a line had been crossed and that they were already too big.

Michman

Alexander stating he 'could not make a move until British cash began to flow' and the other states taking the same line, does not suggest they would go against Napoleon without the British. It suggests the exact opposite. If they did not need the money from Britain, Alexander and the other states, who also refused to move without payment, could have said okay, we will march against him without Britain or British aid. But they didn't, did they?

There are other fears that probably caused Britain to be so keen and quick to pay up. 'Alexander and Francis conferred about the letters they had received from Napoleon and agreed not to reply to them. This was reassuring, as Britain and Austria were the two powers that might conceivably come to terms with a Napoleonic France. (Rites of Peace by Adam Zamoyski, page 464)

Other states, such as Bavaria were also still haggling over what compensation they should be rewarded with and who knows what may have resulted had Britain not paid up and the allies not moved against Napoleon. War is an expensive business so if someone will pay your expenses, then it makes it that much easier to agree to go to war.

There were other problems for Wellington, even when their allies eventually marched against Napoleon:

'And he was not greatly assured by his allies. The Dutch troops under his command showed little appetite for war, while the Prussians under Blucher, who was supposed to act in close support, were a problem in themselves. As they marched through the Netherlands they took everything they required in victuals, horses and equipment, saying the British would settle the bill. Their behaviour and treatment of the local population also left much to be desired.
'Their conduct towards the Saxon contingent assigned to Blucher's command was so insulting that the Saxon mutinied and attacked the Prussian headquarters. Blucher, who had been forced to flee by the back door with Gneisenau, took harsh reprisals, and Saxoin soldiers were executed by Prussian firing squads. It was hardly a promising start to a combined campaign against the greatest general in Europe.' (Rites of Peace, pages 470-471)

'Schwarzenberg, who was supposed to cross the Rhine between Strasbourg and Bale, and make for Langres at the head of 150,000 Austrians, Bavarians, Wurttembergers and other Germans, did not appear to be in any hurry to move' (Rites of Peace, page 471)

Perhaps they were too busy spending their British wages? LOL

As I have stated before, I firmly believe that had Britain not agreed to pay the wages and expenses of the various allies, there may well have been no war in 1815. Well, not in June anyway.

It is an interesting whatif. The same could be considered had Napoleon not escaped until later in the year, considered the delicate situation between the various allies. Who knows what might have happened?

Perhaps they were too busy spending their British wages? LOL

It does make one wonder if without Britain acting as the money bags whether Napoleon would've been seriously opposed in 1815. Further, it takes away from any concept that the Napoleonic wars were a righteous, concerted crusade to oust Napoleon which Britain spearheaded as sort of prime, human rights evangelist. It doesn't look good to have to admit that you had to bribe the other kids to go along with you and that your right-makes-might legend was pay to play.

Wouldn't the rulers of Austria, Prussia and Russia look rather ridiculous if, after expending so much blood and effort to oust Napoleon in 1813-1814, they just stood back and accepted his return as ruler of France the following year?

And would they have been certain that he would not march against them some time in the future?

@ arthur1815

They weren't worried about looking ridiculous changing sides all the time between 1803 and 1814, and indeed actually in the middle of battles, as at Leipzig. So I think they could have found a way to live with it. They might also have considered it equally ridiculous to spend blood and effort ousting Napoleon from his domination of western Europe, only for his place to be taken without a fight by Prussia (if you're Austria), or vice versa.

In the circumstance where Napoleon defeats Wellington and Blucher, and you maybe have Austria, Bavaria, Poland and Saxony rallying to him, he could make a seductive offer: peace on the 1814 borders, but with him rather than a Bourbon on the French throne. Britain wouldn't take it, but others might.

indeed arthur1815, Boney as well as his fawners could maybe daydream about this – but most people had enough about his war mongering.

@arthur1815

Wouldn't the rulers of Austria, Prussia and Russia look rather ridiculous if, after expending so much blood and effort to oust Napoleon in 1813-1814, they just stood back and accepted his return as ruler of France the following year?

I think by his point they were accustomed to being outfought by Napoleon. Isn't that why they developed a policy of avoiding him in theater/battle?

It might be closer to the case that with the possible exception of the Czar, the other Nations were beginning to accept the possibility of a France headed by Napoleon as part of the landscape.

Thus it isnt a question of looking ridiculous so much as not possessing the single minded obsession demonstrated by Britain to rid the world of Napoleon. It could be said that aside from finding Napoleon threatening to their social and political structures, the British understood that this was part of a 150 year old struggle concerning which nation would emerge as a colonial super power.

And would they have been certain that he would not march against them some time in the future?

No, they wouldn't have. However, I think Napoleon was actually hopeful of being left in peace. Bear in mind that most of the fights he was involved with against the allies were coalitions declared against him.

indeed arthur1815, Boney as well as his fawners could maybe daydream about this – but most people had enough about his war mongering.

Is that what Britain was all about during this period, ending war and preserving humanity?

What exactly makes one a "Boney fawner"? Someone who doesnt adopt your opinion of right and wrong? Someone who analyzes the events and doesnt give it the political spin you approve of?

Why do you think you have the right to criticize people from being interested in Napoleon on a Napoleonic Wars forum?

Is this a two way street, do you find people suspect who are partly or completely pro British and Wellington?

About dreams. The living brain dreams. Only dead brains do not. Thus it would seem curious for someone so admirably worried about the preservation of life to sneer at the living.

For a military enthusiast and wargamer, naturally part of the thrill is speculating over what might have been. Frankly, it's odd that someone with your approach would be on a forum like this. It's like a vegan crashing a meat lovers convention.

There we ranted a bit of biased Anglo centric views, or French ones, I like to draw the attention to this podcast with Paul Demet, on of my all time favourite authors who is conducting marvellous research which would suit as prime example how to do it for any other authors.

link

And no he is not playing down the non British nationalities fighting along with them in the campaign, and he wrote a marvelous book about it.

There we ranted a bit of biased Anglo centric views

But is it Anglo-centric? I wonder. The army was very much the possession of the King. It would be like saying that the Austrian army was representative of a popular Hungarian and Czech war against Napoleon. Or that the Czar's army was filled with eager volunteers rather than conscripted serfs. Those armies were basically the property of the crown and I am not even sure the monarchs liked the concept of nationalism.

In his rules, Bruce Quarrie wasn't totally wrong about that concept of British racial superiority. But he is looking at it with 20/20 hindsight. It may have developed into that after the Napoleonic Wars and during the British Empire's later zenith but during the Napoleonic Wars the British army looks more like downtrodden people taking pride in propping up the officers' and aristocracies privileges. Thus, the idea that it was all British people working in selfless harmony to rid the world of a common threat is erroneous. This concept of Britain didn't exist at the time.

Meanwhile, the French army under Napoleon looks a lot more like a popular, National effort. It wasn't perfect but it was a lot more broad based than in Britain. I point this out because when some members get bent out of shape that criticizing the British in the Napoleonic wars is somehow an attack on the British people/culture while attacking Napoleon is to concentrate all that hatred against one man and not an attack on the French is exactly wrong and the opposite of reality. In fact, it is closer to the truth to say that attacking Napoleon is to attack the french while attacking Britain means really just George and his peerage.

VW's post is just hilarious and so utter proof of his blinkered bias. In 1815 Napoleon walked back to the throne. No battles to do it. Just a simple walk. Napoleon asks for peace. But the allies declare war and Britain pays them to do it. Yet Napoleon is the one accused of being the one doing the war mongering! LOL

Au Pas de Charge, whilst every time I visit these boards I find that someone has saved me posting, you most recent statement here suggest some reading needs to be done on the British state, its governance and control of its armed forces in this era (and for more than a century prior).

Note that there were few professional armies of any size in this era. I believe it made a difference and was much better suited (along with the Royal Navy) to the British way of war. It's not just simplistic to assume there was little difference between the British army and its allies (or indeed enemies), but downright misleading.

And in answer to the OP, I think Napoleon at least had a better chance of winning Waterloo than the Peninsula War.